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JULY, 1916 —————— OCTOBER, 1916

To be continued Quarterly

Edited by HAROLD COX

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The Edinburgh Review

JULY, 1916 No. 457

IMPERIAL RECONSTRUCTION

1. **Imperial Unity and the Dominions.** By ARTHUR BERRIEDALE KEITH, D.C.L., D.Litt. Oxford: Clarendon Press. 1916.
2. **The Empire on the Anvil.** By W. BASIL WORSFOLD. With a Preface by Lord SYDENHAM OF COMBE. Smith, Elder. 1916.
3. **The Problem of the Commonwealth.** By LIONEL CURTIS. Macmillan. 1916.
4. **Imperial Defence and Closer Union.** By HOWARD D'EGVILLE. P. S. King and Son. 1913.
5. **The Problem of Empire Governance.** By C. E. T. STUART-LINTON. Longmans. 1912.
6. **Union and Strength.** By L. S. AMERY, M.P. Edward Arnold. 1912.

'THE Empire seems to us something greater than it was a year ago. When mighty armies from the Dominions and Dependencies arrayed themselves in battle line a new and impressive epoch in its history was marked. These pregnant events have already given birth to a new order. It is realised that great policies and questions which concern and govern the issues of peace and war cannot in future be assumed by the people of the British Islands alone.'

In these impressive words, spoken at New York on the 22nd of December, 1915, Sir Robert Borden, the Canadian Premier, gave expression to thoughts which are brought more clearly before our consciousness as the war goes on. The events of the past two years have been a revelation to many of the

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character and the possibilities of that political association of States and peoples which we call the British Empire. Before the 4th of August, 1914, it was a subject for academic or interested speculation how far the self-governing Dominions would be prepared to take part in a struggle between Great Britain and the military Powers of the European Continent. There were those who thought the Dominions would give no help at all. Even the participation of Australasia and Canada in the South African War had failed, owing to the special circumstances of the case, to bring conviction to the minds of these doubters. Our enemies had no doubts. They launched war upon Great Britain with the confident expectation that our Dependencies would only be a source of embarrassment to us in the conflict, and that the Dominions would give us no effective aid. At the best they would merely defend their own territories against attack, if any were directed against them.

All such predictions have been triumphantly falsified. The Dominions, and the Dependencies as well, have made England's quarrel their own. The world has seen that the British Empire, through all its 11,000,000 square miles of territory and its 430,000,000 of people, is one against the world. Its populations are not all British: most of them are not British at all; some have small knowledge of the faith, the speech, and the institutions of the Mother Country; but they stand together not so much for an empire as for an ideal, the ideal of freedom, justice, and right living. They know that the victory of the Central European Powers would mean the loss of those ideals, and they think it worth while to risk everything in order to avert that disaster.

But the war, as Sir Robert Borden says, will leave the Empire greater than it was and also different. It is impossible to believe that the present Imperial constitution can remain unchanged after the strain to which it has been exposed.

There are, it is true, some who ask why anything need be done. The Empire has responded magnificently to the call of emergency. Of their own volition, without pressure or formal obligation of any kind, the self-governing Colonies have thrown themselves into the war, and have given us their aid to the fullest measure of their resources. Why, then, should we trouble? Why create stricter bonds when so

much can be achieved by voluntary association? Could an organic union of the Empire add anything to the effort and the enthusiasm of the daughter-States? The Imperial relationship has been proved strong enough to endure the most terrible test that could be put upon it. Why, then, not leave the matter as it stands? Why seek to remodel a system which has on the whole answered its purpose with gratifying success?

The question can be easily answered. The system—if anything so accidental and unsystematic can be called by that name—cannot be left as it stands. There is nothing static or permanent about it, and change is inevitable. Even a commentator so conservative as Professor Keith, who is much occupied in pointing out the difficulties which attend any large changes, is convinced that change of some kind must come. The existing arrangement, which is that of a loose confederacy of semi-sovereign white States and immense dependent communities, grouped round a European kingdom, responsible for the defence and the foreign policy of the whole, cannot be indefinitely maintained. The burdens and the privileges of the 'predominant partner' are alike too great; the liabilities and the duties of the oversea States are too indefinite. The freedom to control their own destinies, which is essential to the British idea of citizenship, is not possessed by the peoples of the Dominions, nor in the fullest sense by those of the Mother Country; for such freedom includes the direction of external relations as well as of domestic administration.

The Dominions are autonomous within their own borders, but the moment they look without they find their affairs at the mercy of a governing committee in London, which is not responsible to their legislatures or electorates. It is the 'Imperial' Cabinet, a group of British administrators floated into power on the wave of local party politics, which can commit the Empire to war and peace, which makes treaties, alliances, and plans of strategy. The sovereign people of the United Kingdom may check, or in the last resort punish, this supreme Executive; but the democracies of the Dominions can neither supervise its action nor deprive it of office. On the other hand, the Central Government cannot call upon these democracies to discharge their full share of the common obligation. The Navy, which keeps their coasts inviolate, is main-

tained at the expense of a body of taxpayers who form little more than one-tenth of the entire population of the Empire; the Army, though in this war it has been magnificently reinforced from the Dominions, is primarily the British Army, trained, commanded, equipped, and in peace-time levied and recruited, in these islands; the Dominions need not, unless they please, contribute a man or a gun to the forces by which their safety as well as our own must be vindicated against militant aggression. There is a glaring inequality both of rights and of duties. The Empire is not an organic union; it is not in reality a State; there is technically a sovereign authority, but in effect no genuine sovereign legislature; there is a 'responsible' executive, which is responsible only to three-quarters of the English-speaking inhabitants of the self-governing areas; the remainder do not enjoy the full measure of self-government, and their liberty is to that extent restricted and curtailed. Change is inevitable. The colonists will be content with nothing less than the complete rights of citizenship; the British people cannot continue to discharge an undue share of the burdens of Empire.

The war has given a new aspect to the problem. It has shown that the existing compromise is not only illogical and unjust, but teeming with peril. We might have 'muddled on' with an unorganised Empire for generations but for the startling lesson which Germany has inflicted upon the world. We have had to learn that the very existence of a nation may depend upon its ability to co-ordinate its resources for defence against the tremendous impact of peoples armed and organised for aggression. We know now that if the British Empire is to be secure against similar attack in the future, from the same or other quarters, its vast resources must be developed, and its whole latent strength concentrated for joint action, whether in the military or the economic sphere.

We have indeed brought a most appreciable portion of the strength of the mass into operation, but it has been done slowly, clumsily, with immense difficulty and dangerous delay. With five millions of men under arms, and our industries mobilised for war work, we have at length become a military, as well as a naval, Power of the first magnitude. Yet even now our achievement is incommensurate with our resources. With one quarter of the world's population, and one-fifth of its

land-area, and that the richest and the best, at our disposal, we should be able to develop capacities for war, as well as peace, which should dwarf those of our present adversaries.

The white inhabitants of the Britannic realms number 62,000,000 ; there are nearly 370,000,000 belonging to Asiatic and African races. It would need an effort far less than that made normally in time of peace by Continental Powers to provide us in a few years with an army of 6,000,000 white troops trained and properly equipped ; and it would be no intolerable burden upon our dependent populations to draw from them half as many more. With an army that could be swiftly and smoothly brought up to a war-footing of nine or ten millions, with a navy and an air-fleet that fully responded to the needs of our industrial and geographical position, the British Empire would be secure against attack.

Common defence implies common contributions for naval and military purposes, and common control of the funds so contributed. It was because this principle was imperfectly understood in the eighteenth century that we lost the American Colonies. If it is not grasped—and acted on—in the twentieth century we might run upon a similar disaster in Canada, Australasia, and South Africa. We have outlived the system under which the people of one portion of the Empire alone are responsible for the issues that determine peace and war, and in the last resort for the defence of the whole aggregate. There must be an apportionment of political rights and financial obligations, with due regard to the ability of each unit to exercise the one and to discharge the other. The European islands must be relieved of some part of their excessive load ; the oversea States must bear their fair share of financial liability, and be allowed a voice in the shaping and direction of the policy they are called upon to support.

'If you want our help,' said Sir Wilfrid Laurier in 1902, 'call us to your councils.' In December 1915, in the Canadian House of Commons, Sir Robert Borden said :

'When Great Britain no longer assumes sole responsibility for defence upon the high seas, she can no longer undertake to assume sole responsibility for, and sole control of, foreign policy, which is closely, vitally, and constantly associated with that defence in which the Dominions participate. It has been declared in the past, and even during recent years, that responsibility for foreign

policy would not be shared by Great Britain with the Dominions. In my humble opinion adherence to such a position would have but one and that a most disastrous result.'

This part of the case was put briefly and plainly by Mr. Andrew Fisher, on his arrival in England as High Commissioner for Australia :

If I had stayed in Scotland I should have been able to heckle my member of Parliament on questions of Imperial policy, and to vote for or against him on that ground. I went to Australia. I have been Prime Minister. But all the time I have had no say whatever upon Imperial policy—no say whatever. Now that cannot go on. There must be some change.'

Not many people, either at home or in the Dominions, would now dissent from this opinion. In the *laissez-faire* era the anomaly was endured at home because the dominant school of political thought regarded the entire colonial relation as temporary and transient. The Colonies would not so much ' go on ' as go off, and become independent States, and the Dependencies would follow the same path when we had made them fit for the journey.

The Colonies themselves were languid in the matter. They were loyal to the Mother Country, and cherished a genuine pride in the common tradition and history. But they had never quite got over their suspicion of ' Downing Street,' and were afraid that any tightening of the constitutional bond would infringe upon their autonomy and leave them at the mercy of domineering British officials and meddlesome party politicians. They had a certain pride in the Empire, but no great inclination to share its burdens and responsibilities. Their hands were full enough with the business of settling and rendering habitable their own vast empty spaces of territory ; and Europe, with its armies and navies, and obscure clashing policies, seemed too far away to trouble them.

It was in this unpropitious atmosphere that the movement for Empire Federation began. The Imperial Federation League was founded at a Conference which met in London on the 29th of July 1884, with the avowed object of applying to the British Empire, so far as circumstances would permit, the principle which had been embodied, in one form or another, in the federal constitutions of the United States, the Swiss Republic, the German Empire, and the Dominion of Canada.

In all these cases it had been found possible to combine under one strong central legislature and executive a number of self-governing States or provinces. The founders of the League laid down the axioms (1) that no scheme of federation should interfere with the existing rights of local parliaments as regards local affairs; and (2) that any scheme of Imperial Federation should combine on an equitable basis the resources of the Empire for the maintenance of common interests, and adequately provide for an organised defence of common rights. The soundness of this programme cannot be challenged. It recognises the twin principles of Imperialism and Nationalism, which imply association for common purposes among all the constituent groups without the sacrifice of the autonomy and the self-conscious identity of any. The founders of the League, men like W. E. Forster, Sir John Colomb, Lord Rosebery, Edward Stanhope, Lord Knutsford, knew that the Empire was, and must remain, a collection of nations. They meant it to preserve this character while acquiring the cohesion and effectiveness of a State—'one State,' as Forster said, 'in relation to other States.'

The League did useful work during its too brief career, which ended, prematurely as many thought, by its dissolution in 1893. Its failure, so far as it can be said to have failed, was due to two causes. It was in advance of the sentiment it was itself trying to create. Neither in the Colonies nor the Mother Country was there any vivid desire for political union. Men were still thinking in terms of economics. In the Colonies those who supported federation did so mainly as a means for securing preferential tariffs; at home many regarded its propaganda with suspicion as being likely to imperil the doctrine of free imports. And its leaders were timid. They feared the spectre of party and were anxious to conciliate all opinions. Consequently they shrank from proposals definite enough to rouse opposition, and dealt too largely in generalities. In June 1891 Lord Salisbury told them plainly that this non-committal attitude could lead to no result. 'I think,' he said, 'that we are almost come to the time when 'schemes should be proposed, and that without them we 'shall not get very far.' The League tried to act upon Lord Salisbury's suggestion, and drew up the outline of a project of Empire union, a very good project in its broad lines, and

laid it before Mr. Gladstone, then Prime Minister. But Mr. Gladstone dismissed it on the ground that its financial proposals, though insufficiently definite, seemed to hint at 'reversing the principles of our commercial relations.' The League, composed as it was of 'numerous and diverse elements,' did not care to bring forward more precise and detailed proposals and decided that its central organisation should be dissolved.

Some of those who sanctioned the abandonment of the League's campaign twenty years ago think that the time has arrived for its resumption. Lord Rosebery, the second founder of the League, is of the number. He believes that the stimulus imparted to the sentiment of unity by recent events justifies the return to an ideal that seemed academic and even impracticable in the state of feeling which prevailed in the 'nineties. A number of able writers, dismissing the makeshifts and expedients tentatively suggested in the intervening period, boldly set forth schemes of organic union on a federal basis. A complete federal system is outlined clearly and fairly by Mr. Worsfold and Mr. Stuart-Linton, and defended with enthusiastic eloquence in Mr. Lionel Curtis's 'Problem of the 'Commonwealth.'

The perfected Imperial constitution, according to this conception, would include an Empire Parliament or Congress and an Empire Ministry. The idea, so much in favour with some eighteenth-century reformers, of enlarging the existing British Parliament by the addition of Colonial members, is by these writers definitely dismissed. That plan might have been possible when it was suggested by Otis, and Grenville, and Adam Smith, and perhaps if it had been carried into effect at that time there would have been no American revolution. Burke, in 1775, found it impossible. 'Perhaps I might be 'inclined to entertain some such thought; but a great flood 'stops me in my course. *Opposuit natura*—I cannot remove 'the eternal barriers of the creation.' The eternal barriers have been removed, or at least so reduced that they are no longer formidable; but Colonial delegates would not consent to sit in the legislature chosen by the votes of British constituencies on issues connected with British party politics. Under the proposed scheme the 'Imperial Parliament' would correspond to its designation. It would definitely devote itself to those matters which affect the whole Realm; leaving

the internal affairs of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland to a new State Parliament confined to such functions and clothed only with such powers as were reserved to it by statute. Great Britain and Ireland would become a Dominion,* differing only in wealth and population, but not in constitutional status, from Canada and Australia; its legislature would make laws valid only within limits bounded by the seas that wash the shores of the island group of north-western Europe; it would be subject, as all the other legislatures of the Empire are at present subject (in theory), to the sovereign Parliament elected by the votes of all citizens entrusted with the Empire franchise. To this sovereign Parliament, and so in the last resort to the Empire electorate, the central executive would be responsible.

The organic statute which would be required to create the new Imperial constitution might take one of two forms. It might create a new legislative assembly, transferring to it the powers taken from the Parliament of the United Kingdom; or it might leave that body in being, add oversea representatives to it, and institute one or more new legislatures for the United Kingdom. The former alternative was favoured by the older federationists, and follows the analogy of Canada, Australia, and South Africa; the latter is recommended by the newer school, who think that no council called into existence *ad hoc* can acquire the dignity, the historic importance, or the full legal authority of the ancient Mother of Parliaments. That famous organ of government would not be extinguished; it would be only modified in its composition by the addition of oversea representatives; and it would cut itself loose from the complications of our domestic politics by handing all these over to local parliaments.

The method by which this transfer of sovereignty could be effected is explained by some of our constitution-makers. Mr. Stuart-Linton is even bold enough to draft the Act of Parliament which is to lay down 'The Constitution of the United States of the Britannic Empire.' Section 1 of this hypothetical statute runs as follows:

'That the Imperial Parliament of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland shall hereafter divide its two capacities, Imperial and local, from one another, and with the said two

* Or possibly *two* Dominions.

capacities shall create itself into two distinct Parliaments, which shall be (First) The Parliament of the British Empire, formed from its Imperial status, and having all its rights, powers, and jurisdictions, excepting those hereafter otherwise provided; (Second) The Parliament of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland, formed from its local status, and having all its rights, powers, and jurisdictions, except as hereafter provided.'

The Imperial or Federal Parliament is to consist of a Senate and a House of Commons. The senators are to be appointed by the Crown for life, and their number from each State is to be fixed according to the State's contribution to the Imperial Exchequer. The House of Commons is to be elected by the people of the States, the representation to be determined by population, 'subject to modifications in the communities where 'there is included a coloured population which may not 'be in a state of mental and moral development to have 'the ordinary status of citizens.' Direct taxes are to be apportioned among the States on a similar basis. The reserved powers of the Federal Parliament include matters dealing with the Imperial Army and Navy, treaties and foreign relations, war and peace, foreign commerce and inter-state trade, ocean cables, imperial migration, coinage, copyright and patents, and generally everything touching 'the common 'defence and general welfare of the British Empire.' The Ministry shall be a committee of members of the 'Privy 'Council for the British Empire,' which committee shall be the Imperial Cabinet. Its existence shall 'depend upon a 'majority in the (Imperial) House of Commons.' The supreme executive power of the Empire is to continue as heretofore vested in the Sovereign, who is to have the title of Britannic Emperor in addition to that of King of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland.

Mr. Worsfold and Mr. Curtis do not venture to formulate an organic Act of Parliament, but they go somewhat closely into the crucial question of Imperial Finance. How is the vast revenue required for the Imperial services, including the Navy and the Army, or at least all that part which is not required for purely local defence, to be raised? The authors of 'The Problem of the Commonwealth' and 'The Empire 'on the Anvil' will have nothing to do with an Empire tariff. They refuse to complicate the question of political union by

associating it with fiscal and economic interests; and they insist that the national and social identity, which the colonists cherish, cannot be maintained unless every State has the absolutely unfettered control of its own tariff policy. There should therefore be no Imperial Customs, and no means of raising revenue by indirect taxation. The Imperial Chancellor of the Exchequer would frame his Budget for the year, or better for three years, and get it passed by the Federal Parliament. The quota which each Dominion would be liable to pay would be fixed by a Standing Commission like that on the Financial Relations between Great Britain and Ireland, which would go closely into the relative taxable capacity of the contributories, and determine the specific proportion in which each was liable to the common account. With this table before him the Imperial Treasurer would issue his precept to the various States, including of course the United Kingdom. The State governments would pay the required amounts from their consolidated funds, receiving in return a rebate for the agreed sums allowed them on account of their local expenditure on defence. They could raise their revenue as they pleased; but the Imperial demand would be a first charge upon it.

Supposing, however, they declined to honour the Imperial draft? Such things might happen. There might be a Ministry in power which declined to endorse the Federal Budget; or, if it did, its legislature might refuse to sanction the expenditure. Something resembling this did occur in Canada. In 1912 the Canadian Cabinet agreed with the British Government that it would contribute £7,000,000 towards the cost of new construction for the Imperial Navy. The Bill was, however, vetoed by the Dominion Parliament, and the three battleships on which the Admiralty had reckoned were not provided. It is at least conceivable that, under the proposed constitution, the Federal Government might meet with a similar rebuff. What would be its remedy?

Mr. Curtis does not hesitate to suggest that the Imperial authority should be clothed with powers to enforce its mandate. If any State—be it Great Britain or Newfoundland—refused to pay its contribution, the Federal government should be enabled to collect the money itself from the individual taxpayer. Mr. Curtis argues that this is a logical necessity, but

it is more than doubtful whether colonial sentiment is at present prepared to accept any such proposal.

As above noted, some of the most enthusiastic Imperialists are reluctant to touch the tariff controversy. But is the maintenance of that attitude possible? It is not by armies and fleets alone that the strength which is essential to human freedom is maintained; and it seems difficult to believe that a Federal Parliament and Federal Government could refrain from dealing with reconstruction and co-ordination in other spheres besides those of war and peace. New phases have emerged even while the war is in progress. The replacement of man's work by woman's work, and the return in due course of the 5,000,000 men who have been diverted from industry, will lend fresh urgency to the question of land settlement and inter-imperial migration. The manner in which Germany has employed financial and mercantile exploitation for political purposes reveals a danger which cannot be met without concerted action by the governments of the Empire. And the condition of the British proletariat will become an imperial, as well as a national, interest, if the Labour caucuses beyond the ocean are to nominate delegates who will sit in Parliament beside the representatives of the English constituencies. The war has widened our horizon. It has shown that the defence of nations is intertwined with their life in all its ramifications, and must be dealt with in relation to the whole.

No central organ of government and legislation can come into being unless the wish to create it is definitely manifested by the peoples of the Mother Country and the Dominions. Both must be prepared for some sacrifices. The Dominions will indeed acquire the full status of citizenship; but they will have added to them burdens and liabilities from which they are at present exempt. They will be assessed to the full extent of their proportionate resources in population or wealth, or both, for the support of the Imperial services, instead of escaping, as they do at present, with a voluntary contribution much below that exacted from the tax-payers of the United Kingdom. Nor will it be easy to reconcile the colonial democracies to the raising and the disposal of revenue by an authority which is not under their own undivided control. Australians and Canadians would be taxed under a

Finance Act framed in London and sanctioned by a legislature in which the majority of members would not represent Canada or Australia. Here is a prospect that will fill many colonists with alarm. They will not willingly exchange the compact, self-absorbed isolation, under which they have grown and thriven, for the large anxieties and indefinite responsibilities of genuine Imperial citizenship.

Sacrifice would be demanded also from the electors of Great Britain and Ireland. They would be required to sanction a great renunciation if they agreed to surrender the political supremacy of the United Kingdom in the Commonwealth of nations and to accept for that great kingdom, or for fragments of it, the status of a self-governing Dominion. They would see their ancient Parliament pass from their hands to take new shape as an Empire Congress ; they would retain exclusive rights of self-government only in subordinate local matters. The ' Sovereign People ' of the United Kingdom would be compelled to share their sovereignty with the peoples of the oversea States. Other sacrifices would follow. The British electorate, like that of the Dominions, would have to surrender some portion of its fiscal liberty, to abandon to some degree its system of free imports, and to submit to that increase in the cost of commodities which would be the necessary result of an imperial customs system. In return English, Scotch, Welsh, and Irish electors would be relieved of the sole liability for the cost of armaments, and of that parliamentary congestion and confusion by which their domestic reforms are impeded and delayed. British politics, disentangled from those of the Empire, might gain a new coherency and effectiveness. Yet the sacrifices would be real ; and if they were accepted it would be less from any balancing of material advantages than from a profound belief in the ideal of Empire, and a conviction, burnt deep into the hearts of the citizens of the United Kingdom, that only thus can all that the Empire stands for be maintained in permanence.

The Empire Union can only be the work of the Empire Will ; and in the end that Will—in the opinion of the present writer—is likely to express itself in the form of a complete Federation. How far in its details the scheme will follow the plans of any of the writers whose suggestions have been discussed it is impossible to predict. Constitution-making in the study is

easy enough, but not on that account futile. It is desirable that all possible methods should be worked out in advance, and considered. But the new constitution will not be moulded by historians and philosophical speculators, though these can do their part in clearing the ground and informing opinion. It will be hammered into shape by full and free discussion between the representatives of the peoples who will be parties to the great contract. The Britannic Union, like those of America, Canada, Australia, and South Africa, will emerge from the deliberations of a Convention or Constituent Assembly, chosen by the legislatures or electorates of the United Kingdom, Canada, Australia, New Zealand, South Africa, and Newfoundland, and assisted by delegations, necessarily non-representative, from India and the Crown Colonies. Such a Convention ought to be in a condition. to assemble very soon after the conclusion of the war It could be called together either on the invitation of the British Cabinet or in response to a Resolution of the Imperial Conference. If that Conference meets next year, as it should, even if the war still continues, it could resolve that the Convention should be summoned, and the Prime Ministers and their colleagues could take the necessary steps to give effect to the recommendation.

But one cannot deny that the task of this Constituent Assembly will be protracted, even if in the end it be successful. Federal unions between a number of self-conscious and ambitious communities are not made in a day, as the experience of the United States and the Dominions has shown. And the federation of the British Empire has difficulties never encountered in the past ; for we have here to deal, not with a number of conterminous provinces almost identical in character and composition, but with nations separated from one another by thousands of miles of sea, and by the widest climatic, geographical, and social diversities. The Convention may sit for years, and be dissolved and reassembled more than once, before it finds itself in a position to submit its definite scheme for the approval of the various electorates.

In the meanwhile there is work to be done which cannot wait. Long before the Federal Parliament could be elected there must be some machinery for co-operation and co-ordination more efficient than that which exists. We must be able

to meet the emergencies which will thicken upon us after the war, even if it be necessary to adopt some stop-gap scheme which would not satisfy those, like Mr. Curtis, who are impatient of any derogation from the whole faith of the Federalist. Joint executive action cannot be postponed to a remote and somewhat uncertain future. We shall need an Imperial Ministry before we get an Imperial Parliament, and even if we do not get an Imperial Parliament at all. It seems probable that, while the larger and more systematic plan is being debated, we shall quietly proceed to adapt such instruments as we possess to their new function. We shall follow our customary British methods, and meet the exigencies of the moment by temporary expedients which may, like so many that have preceded them, prove permanent. Long before the Imperial written constitution can be promulgated a working constitution for the Empire may have come into being. It may even have 'come to stay.'

We have to look at facts; and the essential facts are (1) that joint executive action is required for common protection against such dangers as those which have been revealed and such others as are likely to arise; (2) that while there is no effective demand in the Dominions for joint law-making there is a very strong claim to a share in executive control; and (3) that the real organ of government for the kingdom, as well as the Empire at large, is the Imperial Cabinet. Let us add this further fact, unpalatable as it may be to many, that this body is virtually irresponsible in the sense that it has ceased to be subject to the will or the control of Parliament. 'Responsible Government,' according to the English interpretation of the phrase, has been found incompatible with the conditions of a great war; it may also be found incompatible with that kind of weaponed and sentinelled peace that will follow the conflict.

The Cabinet has changed its character. It has ceased, temporarily at least, to be 'a committee selected by one 'member of one party in Parliament from among other 'members of the same party.' It has emancipated itself from the party system; yet it is on the party system that responsible government hinges. The Coalition Ministry, which is no longer under the control of the representative House, has itself become a representative body, embodying what are

supposed to be the opinions of all parties in the constituencies. Too large now for ' closet government,' it is a kind of Council of State, such as the Privy Council was intended to be, and for a short period in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries actually was : a group of influential politicians, supported by the authority of the Crown and the confidence of the country, entrusted with the direction of public policy and the supervision of the group of Chief Ministers, or high officers of State, who carry on the actual administration. The small intimate ' cabal ' of party leaders is now a miscellaneous assembly of twenty-three, which can include at times privy councillors like Sir Robert Borden and Mr. Hughes, who are in no way responsible to the United Kingdom electorate, and did include Lord Kitchener, who was not a party politician.

This large Coalition Cabinet may have been formed with no other object beyond that of bringing ' All the Talents ' into the administrative circle, and exhibiting the unity of the nation. Mr. Asquith, no doubt, was much too busy to consider the remote consequences of his invitation to the Unionist and Labour leaders. But one may conjecture that these were not wholly ignored. It is not the first or the only attempt the Prime Minister has made to release the supreme administration of affairs from the rigid trammels of the party system. One interesting example is connected with Empire governance. In 1913 Mr. Asquith invited Mr. Balfour to take part in the work of the Imperial Defence Committee, and vindicated himself against some partisan criticism which this step evoked in the House of Commons.* In the Parliamentary Conference of 1910 he attempted to settle the difficult constitutional question of that year by agreement between the leaders of parties. The plan was wrecked at the very last moment by an irreconcilable difference on the Irish question. But it came very close to success ; and if ever the Prime Minister were to write his autobiography he might confess that this failure, when a settlement was so nearly reached, was perhaps the greatest disappointment of his political career. Again in the summer of 1914 Mr. Asquith endeavoured to arrange the controversy over Irish government on non-party lines

* See The Times, March 25, 1913.

by the Buckingham Palace Conference. He may yet go down to history as the Premier who substituted government by parties for government by party.

The Coalition was formed last year as a temporary expedient, a war measure. It is possible that, like other war measures, it may be continued in peace. For that peace will be in many respects only a prolongation of war, in an equally acute, though less murderous, form ; and it may be found that a small committee, representing little more than half the nation, is no more fitted to cope with diplomatic and international problems than with those of strategy and transport. The large non-party Council of Ministers, with its inner ring of executive officers, may remain as our normal organ of government.

If that should be the case the way is open to bring about the association of colonial statesmen with the central administration, which for the moment is what the Dominions seek. It would be difficult to place Dominion politicians at the head of British administrative departments ; but in the larger Cabinet there are already Ministers 'without portfolio,' and room could be found for more. Such a Minister from each of the Dominions could become a member of the Cabinet. No constitutional difficulty should arise. It is admitted that as privy councillors they are competent to attend, and all that is necessary is that they should be regularly summoned to the meetings and that they should take part in the deliberations, or at least in such deliberations as are occupied with Imperial affairs. They would not be responsible to the British Parliament, and if they were given seats in one of its chambers they would not sit as the elected representatives of British constituencies. Their responsibility would be to their own legislatures, where they could be called upon to defend the policy of the Administration either personally or by deputy.

It would be left to each Dominion to decide how its representatives in the Imperial Cabinet should be appointed—whether on the nomination of the Colonial government, or by the vote of the two legislative chambers. Each Dominion would also decide whether this office should be combined with that of the High Commissionership in London, or should be held by a member of the local Cabinet selected for the purpose. Whatever the mode of selection might be, the Dominion government would have its own representative in the supreme

Executive, able to confer on equal terms with its directing members, empowered to criticise its proposals, and to bring forward in an authoritative and confidential manner such other proposals as the views of his constituency might dictate. If he failed to convince his colleagues he would resign ; if the policy to which he had given his assent were disapproved by his local government he could be recalled. In practice he would as a rule find it possible to agree, or bring about agreement, with both entities ; and the joint measures required for common defence, and for common protection of international and economic interests, would be determined by negotiation and discussion, and carried into effect by concurrent legislation. The Dominion electorates might not care to place their representatives in a purely British party Cabinet which had obtained power on the issues that divide us in our insular politics. But they would be less reluctant to send representatives to a Council composed of the 'elder statesmen' and leading men of all parties, and forming a truly Imperial Cabinet, unburdened by the preoccupations of British parties or by the details of British departmental business.

This Empire Cabinet or Council of Ministers seems likely to take shape long before any true Federal Constitution can be constructed. For our immediate needs, the needs of the critical post-war periods, are administrative, not legislative : we shall require joint executive action to grapple with the emergencies that will arise, to arrange for common action on such matters as international policy, defence, land settlement and migration, the conservation of economic resources, and protection against the economic attack with which we are threatened by our enemies. These questions cannot be left over till the systematic and symmetrical structure of the Empire Constitution is designed and finished. We shall build what Mr. Worsfold calls a half-way house, put together somewhat roughly out of the materials that lie ready to our hand. Of these the Cabinet is the chief and the most adaptable, since the technical irregularity and informality of its character enable it to be run into new moulds as occasion demands.

In whatever fashion this enlarged and modified organ of government may come into existence, it seems probable that it will be associated with the representative systems of

the Dominions by some further adaptation of existing instruments. The 'half-way house' Cabinet will require some representative body with which it can discuss and settle the contributions of the States to the expenditure on armaments and other common purposes. There must be something in the nature of a Federal Budget even before the creation of a Federal Parliament. For this purpose it may be possible to utilise the Imperial Conference and the machinery of Parliamentary Delegations. Some device of this kind, if only as a stop-gap pending the evolution of the larger constitutional unity, has been suggested by several observers, including Mr. Amery, Mr. Worsfold and Mr. Howard D'Egville, and was urged by the present writer in a paper on 'The Problem of an Imperial Executive.'*

The scheme might take some such form as this:—The Imperial Conference might meet annually or biennially, and become an assembly not merely of representatives of the several governments but of delegates from their parliaments. Each Dominion would send an equal number of members appointed by its legislature, under a system of election which would allow the minority as well as the majority to be represented. The House of Commons would send a similar delegation from the United Kingdom; India and the Crown Colonies would also have delegacies appointed by some method of combined nomination and election.

As this assembly will be a Congress of States and not a deliberative council, relative population could be ignored and each constituent unit would have a numerically equal representation, each delegacy voting as a whole. The Budget for the Imperial services, drawn up by the Imperial Chancellor of the Exchequer, after consultation with his British, Colonial, and Indian colleagues in the Cabinet, would be laid before these delegations, which would thus have the power to grant or withhold supplies. The States of the Confederacy would enter into a contract or treaty, valid over a prescribed term of years, that the financial resolutions of the Conference would be duly enforced, and that the proportionate share of the Imperial Budget, allotted to each on an agreed basis, would be paid out of their revenues into the common fund. The

* King's College Lectures on Colonial Problems (1913).

Budget would not necessarily be voted annually ; there might be some advantage in fixing it for a two years' or a three years' term. The delegations would have no control over the internal taxation or revenue systems of the States ; each parliament, or in the case of Dependencies each government, would levy and collect its own taxes. But each would be liable for its proportionate contribution to the sums which the delegacies, by agreement or a majority vote, had allotted to the Empire Treasury.

Such a scheme would be far indeed from the compact symmetry and logical completeness of the full Federal system, with a ministry responsible to a representative Parliament elected by all the citizens of the Empire under a wide popular franchise. We should be a Confederacy of States, not a 'Commonwealth' of peoples. But we are a confederacy at present, and a confederacy without a central executive or a central board of finance. The enlarged Cabinet, with its colonial representatives and its ministers for the dependent territories, would act in the former capacity ; and the delegations would furnish at least a possible and temporary substitute for the latter. Permanent they would not be if in due course they are to be superseded by a Federal Congress ; but they would prepare the way for this development, and in the meanwhile bring the governments and the legislatures together, and enable them to concert in unison, after consultation on the old constitutional basis of discussion over expenditure and supply, those measures for the common benefit which will be called for in the critical years that lie immediately before us. 'Responsible government,' in the sense in which the term is used in our parliamentary politics, will not be attained ; possibly in this sense it may never be applied to Imperial affairs, for responsible government as we know it is an accident largely due to exceptional conditions that are not reproduced elsewhere. Responsible government in England has meant not only party government, but party government under the direction of a limited number of men connected by the ties of society and friendship, and for the most of their lives in close personal contact with one another. Removed from this exotic atmosphere its growth has seldom been vigorous ; and even among ourselves it is languishing. For any federation of widely scattered and

socially divergent communities it may be found that genuine responsibility is best attained through an executive answerable in the last resort, as it is in the United States, to the ultimate verdict of the people as a whole rather than to that of the people's elected representatives.*

But no British community will be willing to surrender the power of the purse, and the right to discuss the stewardship of its public finance. And a scheme of parliamentary delegations, such as that roughly outlined here or some other, might serve the purpose until a more complete and scientifically adjusted mechanism can be constructed. It will be all the better if it can be made to spring out of the Imperial Conference. For though we may agree with Professor Keith that the Conference has not so far done very much—though it may be true that it has busied itself with secondary matters—and has not ventured to deal with the greater questions of policy, yet it has taken root as an established institution, it has familiarised us with the idea of joint consultation and discussion, it has enabled the governments of the Britannic States to interchange views in a regular and authoritative fashion. Limited as its sphere of operation has hitherto been, it has in it the seeds of development and more pregnant activities.

For such activities there is real and urgent occasion. Empire Union, in some practical if not in a theoretically complete and argumentatively unassailable form, must be obtained without much further delay. Unity of sentiment, splendidly as this has been vindicated in the war, is not enough. We must have unity of effort and consciously directed energy, with some means of concentrating them on the work of naval and military administration, economic development, and social reconstruction. The Mother Country, the Dominions, the Dependencies, while retaining their national characteristics and national identity, must be able to bring their full combined capacity to bear, not only in order to beat back external assault, but also to overcome the insidious maladies, racial,

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* See, on this subject, an article by Mr. Bernhard Wise, Agent-General for New South Wales, in the 'Nineteenth Century' for April 1916; and on the Empire Cabinet generally Mr. Roberts's suggestive pamphlet 'An Imperial Policy.'

political, and industrial, that threaten our modern civilisations. How to turn mechanical science into the kindly servant of man instead of his uncouth and terrifying master; how to employ the unsurpassed natural wealth of the British Empire for the advantage of all, of whatever stock or colour, who dwell within its bounds; how to secure those millions against the external dangers that would imperil their ordered progress; how to deliver the world, if it may be, from the scourge and menace of war—these are among the objects in which the Empire peoples could co-operate if suitable methods of co-operation were provided. They will not come of themselves. Constitutions do not always 'grow'; they sometimes require to be made, as indeed in most cases they have been. A great adventure in political architectonics lies before us, and the time is at hand when the Empire peoples must brace themselves to undertake it.

SIDNEY LOW.

DISRAELI

Life of Disraeli. Vol. I., 1804–1837. 1910. Vol. II., 1837–1846. 1912. By W. F. Monypenny. Vol. III., 1846–1855. 1914. Vol. IV., 1855–1868. 1916. By G. E. Buckle. John Murray.

MR. MONYPENNY and Mr. Buckle have successively written four volumes, covering in all about two thousand pages, on the career of Disraeli down to the year 1868. He died in 1881 at the age of seventy-seven. The story of the last thirteen years of his life has, therefore, yet to be told. It is certainly inconvenient for a reviewer to discuss or for a general reader to study piecemeal the career of any distinguished statesman. Both, almost unconsciously, look to the end and yearn to express or to form an opinion, not on parts, but on the whole of the biographical record. The inconvenience is notably great in the case of Disraeli, for the warning of the Athenian sage that no man should be called happy till he dies applies in a very special degree to the career of this very remarkable man, though in a sense which is the exact opposite of that in which it was, with something of prophetic instinct, addressed to Croesus.

The first sixty-four years of his life may, without exaggeration, be regarded as a laborious preparation and apprenticeship for the prize which he had told Lord Melbourne so far back as 1835 that he intended to grasp, and which, in fact, he did grasp when, in 1868, to use his own phrase, he ' climbed ' to the top of the greasy pole ' and became Prime Minister. If he had died before 1874, he would probably have gone down to posterity as a man who in his early youth attracted some degree of amused attention by marked eccentricities of dress, demeanour, and conduct ; as a clever novelist ; as a politician of alien extraction who never really understood the English character ; as one who, at a moment of acute crisis, turned savagely on the leader from whom he had but a short time previously solicited office in obsequious terms ; and as the principal author of a measure which has been regarded

by many as the greatest act of political apostasy of modern times.

Far different has been his posthumous fate. He has falsified Shakespeare's aphorism that the evil which men do lives after them, whilst the good is often interred with their bones. His faults have been forgotten. His political practices, even when condemned, have been condoned. He has been placed in public estimation on a pedestal as one of the most national of British patriots. No British statesman has of recent years exercised so wide an influence on posterity as Disraeli. Whilst the fame of his greatest rival and opponent sank almost on the morrow of his death to zero, the influence which Disraeli exerted from his primrose-bedecked grave was for many years a living force in politics ; nor, after the lapse of a quarter of a century, can the impulse which he gave to political thought and action be said to have been spent.

What has been the reason of this curious and instructive episode in the psychology of nations ? It cannot be said that Disraeli initiated any policy or manipulated any acute national crisis in such a manner as to leave any very abiding mark on the history of this country. He did not, like Chatham, lay the foundations of an extensive world-dominion. He was not, like the younger Pitt, the pilot who weathered a storm which threatened at one time to engulf Europe and to wreck the domestic institutions of England. The greatest political achievement of his life was that, as a Conservative, he was largely instrumental in passing a measure which, as Lord Goschen said, went far to destroy Conservatism. The original programme, which he conceived as a youth and endeavoured to carry into execution as a sexagenarian, of cementing an unnatural alliance between what he termed the ' patricians ' and the proletariat resulted in complete failure. Yet there must be some reasons, apart from the man's unquestionable intellectual brilliancy and from his power to seize political opportunity by the forelock, to account for this singular phenomenon. What are they ?

In the first place, it may be observed that the waifs and strays which float down the tide of history in the form of *obiter dicta* often do more to secure the survival of political fame than events of real and abiding importance. Posterity has seized on the cynical epigram of Louis XV.—' Après moi

'le déluge'—which had not the merit of being original,* as a description which accurately embodies the principles on which that thoughtless forerunner of monarchical disaster acted. Similarly, the phrase, 'L'État c'est moi,' which Voltaire put into the mouth of Louis XIV., is supposed to embody the political system of Louis XV.'s grandfather. 'L'Empire c'est la paix' is to this day regarded as a very correct summary of everything that the Napoleonic Empire was not. Mr. Gladstone's utterances of this casual description were few and far between. The contrast which he instituted between 'the classes' and 'the masses'; the singularly inopportune warning conveyed in 'Hands off, 'Austria'; and the encomium on the savages of the Soudan, who were described as a people 'rightly struggling to be free'; have either been forgotten, or, when remembered, are mentioned with disapprobation.

Disraeli's *obiter dicta*, on the other hand, have lived in public memory, if for no other reason than for their caustic wit. Such sayings as when, in speaking of Darwinism, he said that 'he 'was on the side of the angels,' or when, on Lord John Russell being unable to form a Free Trade Government, he said that the discomfited statesman 'handed back the poisoned chalice' to Sir Robert Peel, or when, at a later period, he spoke of his political opponents sitting on the bench opposite him as 'exhausted volcanoes,' stick in the public memory and are not easily forgotten. But Disraeli's greatest triumph in this connexion was his famous 'Peace with honour' utterance, pronounced on his return from the Berlin Congress in 1876. Moreover, the mere fact that he was described with jocular acrimony by John Bright as 'the mystery man' of the Conservative Party helped for some long time to keep his memory alive.

But all these trivial incidents and more or less ephemeral gossip do not, of course, in any way suffice to explain the predominant influence which he exerted after his death, and which to some extent he still continues to exert. The reasons

* I gather from what Mr. Bussell says in his 'Roman Empire' (vol. i. p. 33) that the 'apocryphal adage,' 'ἐμοῦ θανόντος γαῖα 'μιχθήτω πυρί,' has been attributed to the Emperor Tiberius. I do not know on what authority this statement rests.

must be sought deeper. Stated in a few words, it may be said that, being himself a man of fervid imagination, he awoke all the sympathies and ideals lying dormant amongst a race which so acute a political observer as M. Hanotaux has called ' la ' plus politique et la plus imaginative du monde.' He was enormously assisted by the circumstances of the time. Gladstonianism was associated in public estimation with a pusillanimous foreign policy, and, at a subsequent period, with the defeat at Majuba and the abandonment of Gordon. All the wounded pride and fighting instincts of a nation, which though not warlike is extremely pugnacious, were stirred to their utmost depths. A strong reaction against Gladstonian policy ensued. Disraeli seized the opportunity, even before the reaction which gained greatly in force after his death had fully developed, and although many of his former utterances were far from being in accordance with the aspirations of that Imperialism which was destined to become a prominent feature of English political life, he was able to identify himself with the movement and to become the posthumous champion of a spirited foreign and Imperial policy.

Besides this, it has to be borne in mind that a very distinct line of cleavage separated the spirit in which Liberal politicians approached the question of domestic reform during the mid-Victorian period and that in which it presented itself to the special class of Conservatism conceived by Disraeli. The aims of the former were, broadly speaking, wholly destructive. The era of constructive Liberal policy could not, it was thought, be inaugurated until the last vestiges of privilege and feudal right had been swept from the political board. Disraeli, on the other hand, endeavoured, but with very questionable success, to initiate a constructive policy on the shifting foundations of institutions which were already menaced, and which were still more endangered by such partial repairs as he erroneously thought would add to their strength. None the less, the mere attempt which he made in the domain of constructive statesmanship has earned for him the sympathy of all those who are inclined, and with much reason, to decry a political programme of mere destruction.

Neither Mr. Monypenny nor Mr. Buckle has spared any pains to present to the public a full and accurate account of all the political transactions in which Disraeli was engaged

throughout his strenuous life. More especially, Mr. Buckle, in his last volume, has described at some length the provisions of the various Reform Bills which, during the mid-Victorian period, wrecked a succession of Governments. He has expounded to us what the politicians of the day thought of the relative merits of a franchise based on rating and on rental values. He has unveiled the mysteries which surrounded the existence of the compound householder and other long-forgotten ghosts of electoral science whose political rights and privileges sorely troubled that small clique of Whig and Tory aristocrats who, mated latterly to a leaven of upper middle-class opinion, were endeavouring, with simulated sympathy and real apprehension, to solve the problem of how it was possible, at one and the same time, to concede much in appearance and as little as possible in reality to the onward march of that strident and dreaded democracy which both alike endeavoured to conciliate and to cajole.

But in spite of these praiseworthy efforts to evoke an interest in extinct controversies, the life-story of the principal actor on the stage is in this case so far more interesting than the drama in which he was engaged that both the political student and the general reader will probably be more attracted by the biographical record than by the history of which it forms an episode. Mr. Buckle, indeed, appears himself to have recognised the force of this consideration, for he has very appropriately placed on the title-page of his last volume a characteristic utterance of Disraeli culled from 'Contarini 'Fleming,' which embodies the essence of Carlylese philosophy: 'Read in history nothing but biography, for that is life 'without theory.' Moreover, paradox is always fascinating. For this, if for no other reason, the biography of a man of genius who habitually made use of paradox as one of the chief weapons in his dialectical armoury is calculated to possess a special degree of attraction. Disraeli was, in fact, a sort of English Alcibiades, whose acts and language, though often dictated by motives which were personal and justified by arguments which were more specious than solid, nevertheless invariably commanded attention by reason of the dash of genius and originality with which they were tinged.

Disraeli began political life weighted by almost every adventitious disadvantage which could accompany an aspirant

to place and power. He belonged to a race against whom a strong, if often a very unreasonable, prejudice exists. At a time when nepotism, although tottering to its fall, still pervaded the whole political and administrative system of the country, he was unable to rely on any social or family influence to advance his interests. His appearance and habits of thought were essentially foreign, and were on that account singularly little suited to attract the sympathies or command the confidence of a nation strongly impregnated with insular prejudices and prone to offer a stubborn resistance to the reception of exotic customs or ideas. Such a remark as that which Disraeli made to Lady Blessington—'Dyspepsia always makes me 'wish for a civil war'—is witty, but is also indicative of the gulf which separated him from the ordinary standard of commonplace English thought and mode of expression.

The same may be said of his dress and appearance. Could anything be more likely to give an electric shock to British conventionalism than the aspect and apparel of a man who was thus described by Lady Dufferin: 'He wore a black velvet 'coat lined with satin, purple trousers with a gold band running 'down the outside seam, a scarlet waistcoat, long lace ruffles 'falling down to the tips of his fingers, white gloves with several 'brilliant rings outside them, and long black ringlets rippling 'down upon his shoulders'?

Until almost the last days of his life, he was unable to shake off the scorn and suspicion with which he was regarded by his political associates. Lord Stanmore, in his life of Sidney Herbert,* speaks of the 'dislike and distrust with which Mr. 'Disraeli was regarded by the *grands seigneurs* of Lord 'Aberdeen's type,' and so late as 1865, when he had become a recognised party leader, a Tory Member of Parliament accurately described the situation in language borrowed from the national sport to which he was addicted when he said 'Our team is the Gentlemen of England, with a Player given.' He was, in fact, regarded rather as a useful helot than as a genuine participator in the fortunes and misfortunes of the Conservative Sparta.

Nor was this feeling of scarcely veiled contempt for a *parvenu* confined to his aristocratic associates. It was to a great

* P. 160.

extent shared by the general public. The cartoons in 'Punch' give a very fair indication of the ephemeral opinion of the day. Anyone who refers to those which were issued in the 'sixties cannot fail to be struck by the marked difference in the spirit shown in the comic representations of the parts played respectively by Gladstone and Disraeli in public life. It is true that the features and appearance of the latter readily lent themselves to caricature, whereas a long time elapsed before the cartoonists, in slang language, 'got home' on the shirt collars of the former. But this does not altogether account for the difference of treatment. Gladstone, though at times caricatured in a hostile spirit, is always allowed to preserve his dignity. Disraeli, on the other hand, is almost invariably made not only eminently ridiculous, but to some extent contemptible. He is represented as a parliamentary trickster rather than as a statesman. In one cartoon, entitled 'Fagin's Political School,' he is depicted as filching a Reform Bill from Lord John Russell's pocket. In another, he appears in the person of Léotard, a celebrated acrobat of the day, one of whose tricks it was to pretend to fall from his trapeze and then to land safely on his feet. In another, entitled 'The 'Great "Trick Act,"' he is shown as a woman circus rider, who has gulled the clown, representing a licensed victualler, into affording her valuable help and then withheld his reward. Again, he is represented as a conjurer who is doing 'The '"Extinguisher" Trick.'

All that Disraeli could bring to bear in order to overcome the formidable array of obstacles which lay in his path was brilliancy of talent, untiring industry, indomitable courage, and a very large measure of that dogged tenacity which was, in his case, a racial inheritance. It was the possession of these qualities which enabled him to pass not, indeed, unscathed, but certainly undaunted through all the vicissitudes of a stormy political career, to lead captive a proud and powerful aristocracy who originally regarded him as an instrument rather than as an associate and whose foibles he eventually satirised in 'Lothair,' to rise again from constant disappointment and defeat in the confident belief that his strong will and subtle intellect would eventually triumph over all difficulties, to lay the foundation of a posthumous fame which surpassed all expectations, and to afford the most remarkable example

of realised ambition which the world of English politics has ever witnessed.

The precocity of his talents was shown when, at the age of twenty-two, he produced what his warm admirer, Mr. Frederick Greenwood, has called 'that insolently clever novel, "Vivian 'Grey,"' in the composition of which it is surmised that he was helped by Mrs. Austen. His courage throughout life was illustrated by many episodes, but in none more strikingly than by the highly creditable persistency with which he championed the cause of his own race. He did not think, like the Franco-German Jew, Heine, that 'Judaism was not 'a religion, but a misfortune.' On the contrary, although he was baptised at an early age, he gloried in the qualities of his ancestors. He boldly asserted their claim to intellectual and even to moral supremacy, and he eventually had the satisfaction of being largely instrumental in removing the civil disabilities to which a prejudiced legislature had previously subjected them.

When Disraeli first decided to adopt a political career, his fertile brain teemed with ideas, but his opinions were in a very fluid state. He had studied history deeply, more especially the history of English politics during the eighteenth century, with the result that he had come to the conclusion that Bolingbroke was 'one of the ablest men who ever lived.' It was Bolingbroke, therefore, whom he took as his exemplar. That talented but not very high-principled statesman's biographer has said that 'he went into Parliament, as so many 'young men even in our days go into Parliament, without 'any acquired political knowledge, and without any decided 'views except to make a speech and to become distinguished.' * The description may, without any loss of accuracy, be applied to the earliest phase of Disraeli's political career.

On one point, however, he never wavered. He was from the first resolutely determined not to join the Whigs. This decision was, without doubt, partly based on personal motives, and partly on conviction. He saw clearly enough that, as Thackeray said somewhat later, anyone, to be a Whig, must 'be born a Whig.' The close corporation of Whig aristocrats afforded but little scope for the ambition of a free-lance such

* MacKnight's 'Life of Bolingbroke,' p. 62.

as Disraeli. Besides this motive, however, there was no natural affinity between the receptive and highly unconventional mind of a man like Disraeli and Whig policy. He was constitutionally daring and prone to run to extremes. The Whigs, on the other hand, were wedded to compromise and to the adoption of a middle course in all political controversies. In 1833 Disraeli said, and it cannot be doubted with perfect truth, 'A Tory and a Radical I understand; a Whig—a 'democratic aristocrat—I cannot comprehend.'

Being, therefore, debarred from entering the Whig camp, he, in the first instance, as Mr. Monypenny puts it, 'straddled 'between the extreme of Toryism on the one side and Radicalism ' on the other.' In his first electoral contest the Radicalism certainly predominated over the Toryism. He stood for Marylebone 'as a militant democrat,' and was defeated. Eventually, the influence of Lord Lyndhurst induced him definitely to join the Tory party, although neither at that time nor at any subsequent period did he ever subscribe to the principle that mere stubborn resistance to change could or should form the essence of a Conservative policy. To the end of his life he remained a Reformer, and even at times a Radical Reformer. In 1837 he was elected to represent Maidstone.

The story of the next nine years has been told by Mr. Monypenny in his second volume. It was during this eventful period that the great and, as it then appeared, final battle in the cause of Free Trade was fought and won. It is unnecessary on the present occasion to repeat the oft-told tale, Every Englishman knows how Sir Robert Peel was cold tale. to the cause of Free Trade, and how, from a warm anverted Disraeli turned to be the most bitter opponent of the man whom he, in common with all the landed interest, regarded as an apostate Minister. It will suffice to say that by the close of the struggle Disraeli had gained notoriety, but had not acquired any predominant influence or secured to any great extent the confidence of the public.

The third volume of Disraeli's life, which is the exclusive work of Mr. Buckle, also covers a period of nine years, from 1846 to 1855. It was an intermediate period. From the point of view of the student, whether of history or of character, it presents fewer incidents calculated to bring into relief Disraeli's aims and methods than occurred during the dawn

and also during the sunset of his career. In 1851 he obtained office, which he enjoyed for but a very short time. In 1855 his influence had increased, but it was as yet slight by comparison with that which he was to enjoy in subsequent years.

A large part of this volume is taken up with an account of the relations between Lord Derby and Disraeli. Both statesmen stood in need of each other. But the necessity of the Lieutenant was far greater than that of the Captain. Reading between the lines, it is abundantly clear that Lord Derby cared little for place or power, and, indeed, that at times politics were highly irksome to him. What he really liked was racing and literature. Lord Malmesbury wrote that the necessity of calling together a small political council at Knowsley ' bored ' Derby, as it obliged him to turn from translating Homer to ' politics.' But he was a staunch Protectionist. The late Lord Northbrook once said to me that ' Free Trade and ' Protection were very proper subjects for gentlemen to differ ' about.' Lord Derby differed from Sir Robert Peel, Lord John Russell, and their associates, not so much because he challenged the validity of their economic theories, for to these theories scarcely an allusion is made in his numerous letters, but because he honestly thought that Protection was necessary in the interests of the landed classes, and because he held that the political predominance of those classes was the corner-stone of the British constitutional edifice.

Far different was the case with Disraeli. He cared little for Protection, save as a stepping-stone to that power which he was resolved to attain. His shrewd intellect clearly indicated to him in 1846 that the victory of Free Trade was final and decisive. Protection, he said, was ' not only dead ' but damned.' Neither did he stand alone in holding this opinion. Lord Derby's son, whose political views differed widely from those of his father, said in 1850 ' It really will ' not do to make another Protectionist demonstration ; the very ' turnips of Norfolk will cry out against us, as the turnip-' headed inhabitants thereof have already begun to do.' Disraeli was, therefore, obliged to look out for some alternative programme to rally the scattered ranks of the Conservative party. The search was arduous, and in the end the result proved disappointing. Disraeli had to overcome the stubborn resistance of genuine Tories, like Lord Derby and Lord John

Manners, who hesitated to follow the erratic lead of their versatile fugleman.

Personally, he would not have been disinclined to throw principle and consistency to the winds, for, as he said of himself in the early part of his career, ' my mind is a revolutionary ' mind.' At one time, indeed, he went so far as to endeavour to establish an unnatural alliance with John Bright, to whom he described Protection as an ' infernal question.' His overtures were coldly received.

His famous Budget of 1852 was an attempt to devise a substitute for Protection, but his proposals failed to satisfy his friends or to conciliate his foes. The Budget was rejected and the Derby Ministry fell. Thus the first tentative step in the direction of founding that Tory Democracy, which was to unite the ' patricians ' and the proletariat to the exclusion of the middle classes, proved a complete failure. At a subsequent period the political conception was re-born, and it then became abundantly clear that, in the execution of the programme, Democracy would of necessity become the predominant and Toryism the sleeping partner in the concern.

Mr. Buckle has exercised a wise discretion in devoting a special chapter to ' Tancred.' Those who have lived for long in the East can perhaps best realise the full import of the language which Disraeli put into the mouth of his fictitious hero. His inherited proclivities and exuberant imagination enabled him to comprehend the true spirit of the East. Indeed, not only in ' Tancred,' but throughout all his writings, ' the tone ' of thought ' is, as Professor Walker has said,* ' Eastern rather ' than English.' ' Send forth,' Tancred says to his Syrian Egeria, ' a great thought, as you have done before from Mount ' Sinai, from the villages of Galilee, from the deserts of Arabia, ' and you may then remodel all your institutions, change their ' principles of action, and breathe a new spirit into the whole ' scope of their existence.' It was perhaps somewhat fantastic to suppose that dreams such as these could be made to influence the prosaic politics of the West, but the diatribes against materialism in which Tancred indulges and his main conception that only ' ideas exist for ever ' fitly represent the yearnings and aspirations of Eastern thought, and might with

* The Literature of the Victorian Era, p. 657.

no great change have been uttered by one of those dreamers whose mysticism has been revealed to British readers by the master-hand of Sir Alfred Lyall.

A consideration of Disraeli's Near Eastern policy must be postponed until the history of the close of his career is written. Here it will be sufficient to say that his treatment of Indian affairs was, on the whole, marked by true statesmanship and by a profound appreciation of Eastern mentality. 'You can 'only,' he said, 'act upon the opinion of Eastern nations 'through their imagination.' He readily grasped a truth which is hidden from minds cast in a purely Western mould. He saw that Oriental loyalty and enthusiasm might possibly rally round a personality, but never round an abstraction such as a Parliament or a Constitution. When, therefore, after the suppression of the Indian Mutiny, the Crown assumed the direct government of India, he strongly urged that 'the 'relation between the people of India and their real ruler 'and sovereign, Queen Victoria, should be drawn nearer.' In June 1858, when the India Bill was under discussion in the House of Commons, he wrote to the Queen, 'This is only the 'antechamber of an imperial palace, and your Majesty would 'do well to deign to consider the steps which are now necessary 'to influence the opinion and affect the imagination of the 'Indian population. The name of your Majesty ought to be 'impressed upon their native life.' He never abandoned this idea, and eventually persuaded Parliament to confer on the Queen the title of Empress of India. The measure, though at the time it met with much undeserved ridicule, was eminently wise and statesmanlike.

The views entertained by Disraeli as regards the wisdom of establishing a closer connexion between the Crown and India constituted one, though probably not the most important, of the reasons for the high esteem in which, during the latter years of his life, he was held by Queen Victoria. One of the most interesting portions of the third and fourth volumes of the biography is, in fact, that which deals with the relations between Disraeli and the Court. The victory which Disraeli gained over original prejudice was, in this case, complete. The skill which he showed in overcoming it was remarkable. The methods which he adopted were highly characteristic. Mr. Buckle's pages abound in proofs that the Queen and Prince

Albert originally entertained the greatest distrust and dislike of Disraeli. In 1847 Her Majesty was 'rather shocked' when Sir Charles Wood (afterwards Lord Halifax) designated Disraeli to her as one of the 'persons destined to hold high 'office in the future.' When the Ministry of 1850 was formed, the Queen told Lord Derby that she would reluctantly accept Disraeli as Chancellor of the Exchequer 'on his guarantee,' 'but,' she added, 'I do not approve of Mr. D. I do not approve 'of his conduct to Sir Robert Peel.' These feelings of repulsion speedily evaporated under the charm of personal contact with a man of high intellectual attainments, who did not hesitate to advance his personal interests by the most fulsome flattery. Mr. Thayer * relates, but without giving his authority, that Disraeli once said 'Other women you flatter with a teaspoon; 'for the Queen you lay it on with a shovel.' Some years ago a story was current in London that he told Her Majesty that her 'Highland Journal' was the most remarkable book published in the English language since Milton wrote 'Paradise 'Lost.' These *Beaconsfieldiana* may be more or less apocryphal, but there can be no doubt that Disraeli belonged to the class stigmatised by Tacitus as 'pessimum inimicorum genus 'laudantes.' With infinite adroitness and supreme tact the flattery was generally bestowed, not on the august personage whose mind it was sought to influence, but on the memory of one whom she had loved as a woman and whom she regarded not merely as a wise but as an infallible preceptor.

Whatever may be thought of the dignity and morality of Disraeli's method, its success was indubitable. On the occasion of Disraeli's death the Queen wrote to Lord Cranbrook that the loss to her was 'dreadful and irreparable,' for, Her Majesty added, 'whether in or out of office she could 'always turn to dear Lord Beaconsfield for advice and help 'in so many things. He was a real friend, and oh! so wise, 'so calm, and so kind.' †

The statesmen who were responsible for the Tory Reform Bill of 1867, which forms the main subject of Mr. Buckle's fourth volume, have been attacked with an acrimony rarely recorded even in the annals of party polemics. The intro-

* Life and Times of Cavour, vol. i. p. 504.
† Life of Lord Cranbrook, vol. ii. p. 160.

duction of household suffrage by Lord Derby's Government unquestionably afforded a legitimate subject for party attack, for it involved a complete abandonment of all the principles which had hitherto been advocated by the Conservative party. Moreover, it was wholly inconsistent with the attitude which, but a short time previously, they had adopted in opposing Liberal Reform Bills on the ground that they were of too revolutionary a character. It has generally been held that Disraeli was mainly, if not entirely, responsible for this hazardous 'leap in the dark,' as Lord Derby called it. The full knowledge which is now available of what actually occurred points to the conclusion that this verdict must be revised. Sir William Fraser relates that Mr. Ralph Earle, who was for long Disraeli's private secretary and most trusted friend, but with whom he eventually quarrelled, said to him: 'I know what your feelings must be about this Reform Bill, and I think it right to tell you that it was not 'Disraeli's Bill, but Lord Derby's. I know everything that 'occurred.' Mr. Frederick Greenwood, in an account of Disraeli's life published in the last edition of the 'Encyclopædia 'Britannica,' says that Mr. Earle 'gave the same assurances' to him. Mr. Buckle also says that, on December 22, 1866, Lord Derby wrote to Disraeli: 'Of all possible hares to start, 'I do not know a better than the extension to household 'suffrage, coupled with plurality of voting,' and it would certainly appear from his very full and painstaking analysis of all the transactions which preceded the introduction of the Reform Bill that Disraeli was no more responsible for that measure, at all events in its initiatory stages, than the majority of the colleagues with whom he was associated. A minority, indeed, consisting of Lord Salisbury (then Lord Robert Cecil), Lord Carnarvon, and General Peel, dissented and left the Ministry. It is clear, however, that, in giving his support to household suffrage, Disraeli cast to the winds all the opinions to which he had previously been pledged. How was this great revulsion of opinion brought about? The inconsistency was, indeed, glaring, but consistency is, as Emerson has said, 'the hobgoblin of little minds.' Disraeli was no more inconsistent than Sir Robert Peel in dealing with Catholic Emancipation and with Protection, Mr. Gladstone in advocating Home Rule for Ireland, or Mr. Joseph

Chamberlain in suddenly transferring his allegiance from Free Trade to Protection. When, however, a great statesman changes his opinion, the world is naturally curious to know the reasons for the change. Has he been convinced that his original views were wrong, or is the change merely due to political necessity and to the exigencies of party? It can scarcely be doubted that in Disraeli's case the explanation is to be sought rather in the latter than in the former of these two alternative motives. With characteristic daring he sacrificed Conservatism to party interests, and eventually, to use his own phrase, 'educated' his followers to the belief that one of the most Radical measures which had ever been placed on the statute book was dictated in the true interests of safe Conservatism. The change which Disraeli was instrumental in making was inevitable, but had it not been for the sudden conversion of the Tory Ministry in 1867 it would probably have been delayed for a quarter of a century or more. As it was, democracy secured a premature triumph, and Conservatism, in the sense in which that word had previously been used, finally disappeared from the English political stage.

Anyone who has been for long behind the scenes of government knows that political history teems with myths and with mythical heroes, the latter of whom are often, in the eyes both of their contemporaries and of posterity, vested with attributes which they never possessed, praised or blamed for opinions which they never expressed or entertained, and even at times credited with having committed acts which they never performed. There was a half-truth in Walpole's statement that, whatever else was true, history was always false. Disraeli's fame now rests to a great extent on the current belief that he supported and initiated a wise and spirited foreign and Imperial policy. How far is this reputation justified by his acts? Mr. Buckle's two volumes enable a partial answer to be given to this question. Its full consideration must be postponed until the publication of the final volume, which will, without doubt, deal with the whole of the famous 'Peace with honour' episode and all the incidents which cluster round it.

As regards foreign policy, Disraeli deserves credit for the foresight which he displayed in advocating, at the cost of some popularity, the conclusion of peace with Russia in 1856, and

in resisting, albeit unsuccessfully, the endeavour of Lord Palmerston and Lord John Russell to limit Russian naval armaments in the Black Sea. 'Restrictions as to the amount 'of naval force to be maintained by a sovereign power,' he said in 1855, 'are at best but illusory guarantees.' Only a few years were to elapse before it was shown how illusory those guarantees were.

For the rest, Disraeli does not appear to have shown a greater insight into the future course of foreign politics than most of his contemporaries. He cannot, indeed, be blamed for having held that the progress of the world was 'towards a more solemn 'recognition and sacred maintenance of treaties.' It would have required the foresight of an inspired prophet to have predicted that an era was approaching when any civilised nation would regard the most solemn treaties as mere 'scraps 'of paper.' It was natural, moreover, that he should regard Austria as 'the centre and nucleus of all Conservative effort 'in the field of European politics.' But it does not speak highly for his patriotism that he should have visited Paris with the express object of endeavouring to undermine the confidence of Napoleon III. in the government of Lord Palmerston. Neither is it altogether excusable that, in his attempt to secure the votes of English Catholics, he should have shown the most marked want of sympathy for the cause of Italian unity, which he regarded as 'a race between the red 'flag of Mazzini wafted on by the passions of centuries and 'the cold diplomatic standard of mere Sardinian ambition.'

That Disraeli should have refused to see Kossuth in London was perhaps a judicious indication of resentment against Lord Palmerston's excessive tendency to meddle in the domestic affairs of foreign countries, but it showed but little sympathy for what was, after all, a righteous cause to say that 'the 'Polish question is a diplomatic Frankenstein, created, out of 'cadaverous remnants, by the mystic blundering of Lord 'Russell.'

He objected to the cession of the Ionian Islands to Greece on the ground that 'a country, and especially a maritime 'country, must get possession of the strong places of the world 'if it wishes to contribute to its power.' In common with Mr. Gladstone and many others, he held, during the Civil War in America, that 'the United States were breaking

'down,' but he had the wisdom to keep his opinion to himself and the statesmanship to plead that the British Government should 'extend to all which the United States say at least a 'generous interpretation, and to their acts a liberal con- 'struction.' He carried his wish to conciliate the United States so far as to object to the despatch of reinforcements to Canada, although it is clear from Lord Lyons' Memoirs that, during the 'Trent' affair, the adoption of this measure materially contributed towards the maintenance of peace.

He was shrewd enough to recognise the true character of Prince Bismarck. 'Take care of that man,' he said to Count Vitzthum, 'he means what he says.' But he was wholly blind to the growing power of Prussia. He failed to foresee the unification of Germany, and he greatly overrated the power of France. In 1863 he thought that 'Prussia, without 'nationality, the principle of the day, is clearly the subject 'for partition.' In 1864 he said to Brunnow, the Russian ambassador, 'Prussia is a country without any bottom, and 'in my opinion could not maintain a real war for six months.' In 1860 he wrote to the King of the Belgians that 'the great 'object of English statesmen should be to terminate or at 'least to counteract the understanding between France and 'Russia.' He objected to any policy which would furnish fresh allies to France. 'Whatever weakens still more the 'power of Germany exposes us also here to new dangers, and 'we can only see this with just apprehension.'

Moreover, in connexion with Disraeli's claim to have been the initiator of a spirited foreign policy, it is worthy of note that the adoption of any such policy must depend largely upon naval and military strength. Now, if there is one thing more than any other which is clearly proved by the researches of Mr. Buckle, it is that Disraeli constantly inveighed against what he termed 'bloated armaments.' When he was Chancellor of the Exchequer he wrote to Lord Derby commending the fatal policy advocated by Mr. Laird, who represented Birkenhead in Parliament, that there should be a large reduction in naval stores. In October 1866 he told Sir John Pakington, who was then First Lord of the Admiralty, that he intended to invite the Cabinet to 'discard every other 'consideration' and to insist on 'inexorable economy.' He held that the best preparation for war was to establish

a thoroughly sound financial position—a statesmanlike view, but one which must be tempered by the recollection that modern war moves fast, and that, as we now well know, the risks of excessive unpreparedness are very serious.

Turning to the question of the Colonial connexion, it is to be observed that the views very generally entertained on this subject during the mid-Victorian period were thus formulated by so high an authority as Sir George Cornewall Lewis :

> 'A nation derives no true glory from any possession which produces no assignable advantage to itself or to other communities. If a country possesses a dependency from which it derives no public revenue, no military or naval strength, and no commercial advantages or facilities for emigration which it would not equally enjoy though the dependency was independent, and if, moreover, the dependency suffers the evils which are the almost inevitable consequences of its political submission, such a possession cannot justly be called glorious.' *

Disraeli's utterances on this subject were so various and so discordant that it would be possible for a lawyer speaking from a brief to show, with an equal amount of reason, that he was a staunch Imperialist and also a stout opponent of Imperialist policy. Writing to Lord Malmesbury in 1852, he spoke of 'those wretched Colonies' as 'a millstone round our necks.' If this view really represented Disraeli's mature opinions it would be fatal to his claim to be reckoned as one of the fathers and forerunners of modern Imperialism. Mr. Buckle, however, holds that it was a mere 'petulant outburst inspired by 'the irritation of the moment.'

Although this plea is far from being absolutely conclusive, it is clear from other passages in Disraeli's correspondence that he attached a higher value to the Colonial connexion than would appear from this hasty and, it must be admitted, very unstatesmanlike utterance. In 1859 he made a fine speech in which he dwelt on the extent to which England was 'bound 'to the communities of the New World,' and in 1865 he expressed himself in the following terms :

> 'If, from considerations of expense, we were to quit the possessions which we now occupy in North America, it would be ultimately, as regards our resources and wealth, as fatal and disastrous a step

* Government of Dependencies, p. 233.

as could possibly be taken. Our prosperity would not long remain a consolation to us, and we might then prepare for the invasion of our country and the subjugation of the people. I infer that honourable gentlemen opposite do not express these views, which have, however, found utterance in other quarters; but they take a truly patriotic and English view of this subject—namely, not to force our connexion on any dependency; but if, at the moment of revolution in North America, we find our Colonies asserting the principle of their nationality, and if, foreseeing a glorious future, we find them still depending on the faithful and affectionate assistance of England, it would be the most shortsighted and suicidal policy to shrink from the duty that Providence has called upon us to fulfil.'

This decisive statement would appear to be conclusive as to the nature of Disraeli's matured opinions, were it not that at a later period, that is to say on September 30, 1866, being then anxious to enforce economy at any cost, he wrote to Lord Derby:

'It can never be our pretence, or our policy, to defend the Canadian frontier against the United States. If the Colonies can't, as a general rule, defend themselves against the Fenians, they can do nothing. They ought to be, and must be, strong enough for that. Power and influence we should exercise in Asia; consequently in Eastern Europe, consequently also in Western Europe; but what is the use of these Colonial dead-weights which *we do not govern*?. . . . Leave the Canadians to defend themselves; recall the African squadron; give up the settlements on the West Coast of Africa, and we shall make a saving which will, at the same time, enable us to build ships and have a good budget.'

It will thus be seen that upon close scrutiny Disraeli's title-deeds to be considered a great Imperialist do not rest on any very solid basis. His views manifestly varied according to the parliamentary and party exigencies of the moment. But it would be not only unjust but also wholly incorrect if, on this account, his claim were totally rejected.

For, in truth, the most singular thing about this very remarkable man is that his fame rests not so much on what he did or even on what he said as on the power which he possessed of turning the thoughts of his countrymen in certain directions in spite of the very contradictory views to which he at times gave expression. He was not a demagogue. On the contrary, although in the case of the Reform Bill he took his opinions from the crowd, and became what Sir Martin

Conway * calls a ' crowd-exponent,' he was far more generally a ' crowd-compeller ' who guided the people and was not led by them, and this, it must be acknowledged, is a quality in a leader which, as democracy advances, is becoming every day of greater value. Similarly, it may be said that in the field of domestic politics, although his project of uniting the landed interest and the proletariat to the exclusion of the middle classes proved a complete failure, he nevertheless achieved one of the main objects of his life. He snatched from the Liberals the monopoly which they previously enjoyed of posing as the champions of progress, and he identified the Conservative party with the cause of reform. This was a very notable achievement.

On the whole, there is nothing in Mr. Buckle's two volumes to justify any serious modification in the verdict already passed by those who are not carried away by partisanship on the character and career of this singular and highly interesting politician. His courage, tenacity, and brilliant intellectual qualities command admiration. It is certain that, as he pursued his onward march to place and power, the early characteristics of the political adventurer tended to disappear, and that the qualities of the statesman asserted themselves with ever-increasing force. At the same time, all his language and his conduct point to the conclusion that, amidst the manifold vicissitudes of political life, he placed advancement to power in the first and attachment to principle very decidedly in the second rank. His apologists defend his methods on the ground which he himself advanced—namely, that the use which he made or intended to make of power when obtained justified the means by which it was acquired. There is a wide field for difference of opinion in deciding how far this justification can be accepted as adequate. Plain-thinking people, however—more especially those of the Anglo-Saxon race—are disposed to resent casuistry, whether in the domain of politics or religion.

CROMER.

* The Crowd in Peace and War.

THE POLITICAL WRITINGS OF ROUSSEAU

The Political Writings of Jean Jacques Rousseau. Edited by C. E. VAUGHAN. 2 vols. Cambridge University Press. 1915.

THE English opinion of Rousseau, whether as man or publicist, has never been very flattering, and a long series of excellent writers, representing the conservative traditions of the country, have denounced him as the source of most of the unsound political sophistries which vex the sages of mankind. Years before the 'Confessions' had shocked the world with their pitiable revelations of baseness, Dr. Johnson expressed his opinion with characteristic vehemence: 'Rousseau, sir, is a very bad man. I would sooner sign a 'sentence for his transportation than that of any felon who 'has gone from the Old Bailey these many years. Yes, I 'should like to have him work in the plantations.' And though we do not say these refreshingly one-sided things now, most normal Englishmen and not a few distinguished Frenchmen do in substance agree with Dr. Johnson and think that Rousseau was a bad man who exercised a bad influence, and that it would have been better for the world if he had never been born. Quite apart from all questions of personal character and temperament, we are apt to think of him as a man of genius who, without any real knowledge of life or history, founded a political philosophy in the clouds. It is not an uncommon view that his teaching was responsible for some of the worst excesses of the French Revolution, that he represents that dangerous compound of romantic sentiment and abstract logic which has been for more than a century the bane of French political life, and that in him are to be found the first lineaments of that disastrous theory of the Absolute State 'beyond good and evil' which governs the German conduct of the present war.

We are an historical people, and we live in an age in which all studies have been brought to the historical test. The revulsion from Rousseau, caused by the fact that he was

regarded as the intellectual parent of the French Revolution; has been intensified by the nature of his procedure. We think of him, principally, as the author of the 'Contrat Social,' a treatise of striking merits and commanding influence, founded, as we know, upon imaginary history and false psychology. And we contrast him unfavourably with the judicious Montesquieu, in whose methods of comparative jurisprudence we discover that blessed principle of relativity in which modern political prudence finds a welcome refuge.

To all this kind of depreciation Dr. Vaughan's elaborate edition of the Political Works of Rousseau does in some measure furnish a very necessary modification. It is well, in the first place, to be reminded that the 'Contrat Social,' itself the fragment of a larger project, is only one of many political treatises composed by Rousseau, and that apart from this famous manifesto there are other tracts, less abstract in form and shaped with more immediate reference to historical circumstance, notably the 'Considérations sur le Gouvernement de Pologne,' which the late Lord Acton picked out from among the writings of Rousseau as the most valuable of all his works. And even from the 'Contrat Social' itself there are, as Dr. Vaughan points out, opposite impressions to be gathered. The earlier chapters which principally arrest the attention of the reader are individualist and abstract. But the later part of the book develops a collectivist theory of the State and is distinguished by some sense of those climatic and historical influences which Rousseau, in this country at least, is commonly reputed to have ignored.

But, quite apart from this call to revise traditional verdicts, Dr. Vaughan's edition is a distinguished contribution to scholarship, providing us, as it does, for the first time with a pure text founded upon a careful examination of the manuscripts, and adding to the existing stock of published material some scattered pieces of reflection which have never previously seen the light. These fragments do not in themselves constitute a substantial addition to the body of Rousseau's philosophy, for they contain no ideas which cannot be found in writings previously published. They do, however, shed light upon Rousseau's laboured method of throwing detached reflections upon paper, to be subsequently woven together into a continuous tissue, and so prepare the mind to expect

that, in a system of thought built up so painfully, there will be some insoluble and contradictory elements.

There are few subjects less worthy of discussion and more often discussed than the inconsistencies of great authors. In proportion as a man feels deeply and is capable of expressing his feeling with point and eloquence, he is likely, if his sympathies be wide and various, to be betrayed into propositions which are not easily combined in the same philosophical system. Not that Rousseau was defective in tenacity of principle, or to be dismissed as a mere rhetorical writer sacrificing everything to effect. There is a very hard kernel of business in Rousseau, despite his vagaries and sentimentalities, and one proof of it is that he has managed to engrave indelibly certain very practical conclusions about law and politics upon so keen-witted a people as the French. But he undoubtedly was a great artist, and we do not expect artists to speak as if they were on oath in a witness-box, least of all when they clearly take delight in affronting the conventional prejudices of mankind. Besides, it was Rousseau's method to make a clear-cut incisive effect with every stroke. He does not blur the salient outline of his phrase with adverb, parenthesis, or participial clause. If qualifications be needed, they will appear later on in the work, shining in their own substantive right, brightly burnished and acute. So in the 'Contrat Social' the Republic is declared to be the only legitimate form of government. Yet all the objections and drawbacks to Democracy are clearly apprehended and etched in high relief.

Political philosophers have generally been persons of the tabulating order of mind, but the distinction of Rousseau is that, like Plato and Coleridge, he was a poet. In a fragment written in old age and printed for the first time by Dr. Vaughan, he says of himself: 'My whole life has been nothing but one 'long reverie, divided into chapters by my daily walks.' A dreamer, but with forked lightnings in the cloud, a confirmed melancholy, yet cherishing sublime illusions of hope, lyrical and romantic, yet with the strange capacity of putting everything which he writes into the most exciting and startling form, he is clearly not one of those logical people who repay a dry mechanical analysis. It is, of course, easy to trace a genealogy for Rousseau's theories. We may say, if we please, that he got his 'Social Contract' from Locke and his 'General

'Will' from Diderot, his division of legislative and executive functions from Montesquieu, and his political economy from the Physiocrats; and, with very little exercise of ingenuity, it would be possible to contend that he had nothing new to announce at all. But all this will tell us nothing as to the sources of his power. The secret of Rousseau was not purely intellectual: it consisted in the fact that, while endowed with fine intellectual penetration, he felt certain simple things about the rights and wrongs of human life very deeply, things of which there was already a confused and general consciousness in the society of his age, and which his language of matchless ardour and perspicuity first rendered articulate to the world.

One of these feelings was a romantic enthusiasm for nature, and, as connected with nature, for simplicity. It was part of that exquisiteness of sense which made him so delicate a judge of the voices of birds, so passionate in the presence of mountain scenes and flaming sunsets, that he should view the life of the city, with its hard pavements and jarring noises and not easily intelligible conventions of society, as an offence against the natural reason of man. But there is more than one way of admiring the simplicities of nature, and Rousseau's way was not altogether simple. Mingled with the genuine passion of the poet was the acid consciousness of the vagabond and the outcast, sensuous, restless, ill at ease, tormented with suspicions and humiliating memories, and, even in the midst of fame and flattery, feeling himself singular and estranged from the human kind. So that it was not altogether out of a youthful love of paradox that, in his first essay, the 'Discours 'sur les Sciences' (omitted, by the way, in Dr. Vaughan's edition), he championed the extravagant thesis that the human soul was corrupted in proportion as Science and Art approached perfection, that astronomy was born of superstition, eloquence of flattery and lies, geometry of avarice, physical science of vain curiosity, even morality itself of human pride, for the apostle of the civic virtues was in some moods himself more than half a misanthrope.

And yet, when we have said this, we are at once arrested by the recollection of his quick and loving sympathy for the poor, and by his faith in the value of ordinary men. 'One of the 'great causes of the sterility of our modern historians,' he would say, 'is their lack of interest: they have nothing for

'the people.' The proposition is true also of the political philosophers : of Hobbes, whose genius he so warmly admired ; of Locke, from whom he drew much of his formulated opinion ; of Montesquieu, whose influence on his speculations is clearly apparent to the unprejudiced reader. They, too, have nothing for the people. And part of the originality of Rousseau consisted in the fact that he drew attention to the claims of undistinguished, uncultivated humanity. 'Je parle des mœurs, 'des coutumes, et surtout de l'opinion, partie inconnue à nos 'politiques, mais de laquelle dépend le succès de toutes les 'autres.' That the guidance of opinion was the true secret of statesmanship was a startling revelation, indicating a displacement of all the established political values. 'There was 'a time,' wrote Kant, 'when I despised the people because 'they did not care for intellectual progress. Rousseau brought 'me to a truer state of mind. My foolish vanity has dis-'appeared. I have learnt to honour men.' It all seems very simple and elementary now ; it is in all our text-books ; but it needs either a great war or a great genius to make us really feel this sentiment of human fraternity which Rousseau's eloquence made popular in Europe.

A third influence, leading to a view of the State sometimes difficult to reconcile with the individualist outcome of these romantic sympathies, was the enthusiasm for civic virtue which he derived in part from the traditions of his native Geneva, but chiefly from a study of classical antiquity. Not that Rousseau can be numbered among the scholars. He had no Greek and very little Latin, and for him the living residue of the ancient world was principally enshrined in the 'Lives' of Plutarch, read in a French translation, and so ravenously devoured that they could be repeated from memory. So it came about that, while he would not willingly allude to contemporary politics, the examples of Hellenic and Roman patriotism were never far from his mind. He would say that he was more familiar with the streets of Athens than with his native Geneva ; and from this pertinacious Classicism, in which he was not indeed peculiar, but only more intense and one-sided than his contemporaries, there arose in him that passionate restoration of the civic ideal which is his ain contribution to the history of European morals.

Indeed, although he wrote on many topics, such as religion,

music, botany, love, war, his principal concern was public virtue. Contemporaries spoke of him as 'the virtuous Jean 'Jacques' because he specialised on virtue and talked about it constantly in a feeling, eloquent, arresting way, so that ladies wept tears of sensibility as they listened to the little man's beautiful voice and watched the play of his black and flashing eyes. It was virtue in the grand old classical style which had taken his heart captive—the virtue of Lycurgus framing laws for Sparta, of Cato dying for the Republic, not the laborious humdrum sacrifice of the modern parliamentary voter who sits upon countless committees and endures a hundred painful speeches to cure the civic drains or to oust the Tory at the next election. And, given the character of French society at that time, the large passionate way in which Rousseau felt about public virtue, about the call of the State and the utter devotion of the true citizen, was the most effective means which could have been devised for diffusing very widely among men and women who had ceased to be interested in public things something of that elevated and heroic conception of political life which is found in the writers of antiquity.

It is this paramount concern for the being and authority of the State which lies behind the theory of the 'Social Contract.' In a passage in the 'Letters from the Mountain' Rousseau allows us to see what meaning the doctrine held for him and why he believed in it. The problem before him was to find some sure, indisputable, rational ground for political obligation, some authority for the State other than brute force, and, for this purpose, what could equal mutual agreement? He did not pledge himself to the historical character of the contract. The important point for him was that the State should be legitimate, and he could see no source of legitimacy other than the rational consent of consciously directed wills. The doctrine of the general will, always omnipotent and always right, followed as a natural sequel, but was vitiated by a fatal confusion between the will of the majority and the will for good. It was a doctrine of extreme collectivism, wholesome as an antidote to the more material and fashionable forms of individualism, but carrying with it as a logical consequence the red spectre of persecution. In a famous chapter of the 'Contrat Social' Rousseau advances with habitual courage to the grim conclusion of his premisses. After contending that

it is important for the State that every citizen should have a religion which makes him love his duty, he continues thus :

' Il y a donc une profession de foi purement civile, dont il appartient au souverain de fixer les articles, non pas précisément comme dogmes de religion, mais comme sentiments de socialité, sans lesquels il est impossible d'être bon citoyen ni sujet fidèle. Sans pouvoir obliger personne à les croire, il peut bannir de l'État quiconque ne les croit pas. Il peut le bannir, non comme impie, mais comme insociable, comme incapable d'aimer sincèrement les lois, la justice, et d'immoler au besoin sa vie à son devoir. Car si quelqu'un, après avoir reconnu publiquement ces mêmes dogmes, se conduit comme ne les croyant pas, qu'il soit puni de mort ; il a commis le plus grand des crimes : il a menti devant les lois.'

It is true, as Dr. Vaughan reminds us, that Rousseau is not always consistent, and that, in a note to ' La Nouvelle Héloïse,' published at the beginning of the year in which this passage was written, a position is taken up entirely at variance with this advocacy of political persecution. Nevertheless it may be noted that Marat publicly commented upon the ' Contrat ' Social ' in the streets of Paris, and that the worst excesses of the Committee of Public Safety may find theoretical justification in its keen and brilliant argument.

The doctrine of the State as an end in itself has received so much attention of late, through the hold which it has obtained over the German mind, that it is worth while to consider how far the Prussian theory is contained in the philosophy of Rousseau. In certain very material points the standpoint of ' the virtuous Jean Jacques ' is very different from the pitiless theory which is the foundation of modern German political thinking. Rousseau hated war. So far from regarding war as the medicine of the State, as a great purifying agency, or as an essential condition of human progress, he declared it to be one of the two worst scourges of mankind, and, ' in spite ' of the horrible theory of Hobbes, ' contrary to nature.

' L'homme est naturellement pacifique et craintif : au moindre ' danger son premier mouvement est de fuir : il ne s'aguerrit qu'à ' force d'habitude et d'expérience.'

So; in the introduction to St. Pierre's ' Projet de Paix ' Perpétuelle,' he states with truth and eloquence the tragic contrast between the professions and the practice of Europe :

' À voir d'un côté les dissensions perpétuelles, les brigandages, les usurpations, les révoltes, les guerres, les meurtres qui désolent

journalement ce respectable séjour des sages, ce brillant asile des sciences et des arts : à considérer nos beaux discours et nos procédés horribles, tant d'humanité dans les maximes et de cruauté dans les actions, une religion si douce et une sanguinaire intolérance, une politique si sage dans les livres et si dure dans la pratique, des chefs si bienfaisants et des peuples si misérables, des gouvernements si modérés et des guerres si cruelles, on sait à peine comment concilier ces étranges contrastes ; et cette fraternité prétendue des peuples de l'Europe ne semble être qu'un nom de dérision pour exprimer avec ironie leur mutuelle animosité.'

And after noting the various seeds of war in the European organism, he points out how impossible it is to derange the equilibrium of Europe ; how neither one Power nor a league of two or three Powers could hope to establish a universal dominion ; and how, whatever suppositions may be made, it is improbable that either a prince or a league could henceforth hope to make any considerable change in distribution of territory and political force. The solution which suggested itself was, accordingly, a federation of Europe, a scheme of which a partial outline already existed in the German Federation—' a body redoubtable to foreigners by the extent and ' by the number and valour of its peoples ; but useful to ' all by reason of its institution, which, by depriving it of the ' means and will to conquer, makes it the stumbling-block ' of conquerors.' It is curious to reflect that, to the thinker of the eighteenth century, the German Federation offered the chief guarantee for the preservation of the balance of power in Europe, and furnished to pacifist thinkers the principal hope for a realisation of their dream. So, too, a wise professor at Göttingen, whose lectures the youthful Bismarck may sometimes have attended, sharing in some measure this older opinion, ventured to predict that, if ever the German peoples were united in a single State, they would constitute a menace to the liberties of Europe.

The speculations of Rousseau about war and peace, his view that no aggressive war can be just, and that wars should only be waged to maintain the equality between peoples,would be dismissed as fantastic by the modern professors of ' Real- ' politik.' He lived before the age of fierce nationalism, and conceived of Europe as ' a real society, with its religion, morals, ' customs, and even laws,' as, indeed, in a sense it truly is, and may again be conceived to be. He anticipates also

some of the modern argument directed against the supposed economic advantages of conquest. He speaks of the destruction of lives in battle as the most apparent and sensible, but at the same time the least grave, of the losses incurred in war. There are other losses, less easy to repair—the children who are not born, the fields which are left untilled, the grinding taxes and the interrupted commerce. The true power of a State consists in its men, and every subject who is born is as good as an enemy slain.

It would be easy also to collect from the body of Rousseau's political writings a series of passages expressly directed against the doctrine of the omnipotence of the State. Indeed, not the least of Rousseau's services to political thinking, and certainly one of the principal sources of his influence, is that he conceives of politics as a department of morality, bringing every institution to the touchstone of right and wrong, and entertaining no exculpatory pleas founded upon ancient use. So that, although the doctrine of the general will might, and indeed did, lead straight to the establishment of political tyranny, it was no part of Rousseau's real outlook upon life that such should be the result. 'That government should 'be permitted to sacrifice an innocent person to the safety of 'the multitude, I hold this maxim to be one of the most 'execrable ever invented by tyranny; none could be more 'false, more dangerous, more directly opposed to the funda-'mental laws of society.' There could be no clearer affirmation of the limits which ethical feeling imposes upon the exercise of material power.

Another feature of Rousseau's political thought, difficult to reconcile with the collectivist theory of the State, is his steady belief in the rights of property. 'It is certain that the 'right of property is the most sacred of all the rights of citizens, 'and, in some respects, more important than liberty itself'; and he goes on to speak of property as 'the true foundation 'of civil society and as the guarantee of the engagements of 'citizens.' In part this deference to the rights of property may have been due to the influence of Locke, who makes the preservation of property the prime end of the establishment of civil government, in part to Rousseau's enthusiasm for agriculture. That it was based on no deep speculative analysis did not prevent its being a very genuine and deep-seated feeling

in Rousseau's mind, nor was its inconsistency with other parts of his political doctrine a bar to its subsequent influence. The French Revolution was not directed against property, but against privilege, and both Danton and Robespierre defended private ownership to an acclaiming audience: indeed, the preservation of property was one of the dearest objects of the newly enfranchised peasantry of France.

Again, it does not seem as if Rousseau ever consciously thought of the State as Power: he thought of it as Will, and this word to him carried with it no relentless associations. He defends his ideal State as a benignant democracy acting through a popular legislature and an executive of experts—for he was no believer in the democratic control of foreign policy—and he preferred that it should be of a modest area, choosing to assume that public spirit must necessarily be more vivid and intense in a small State, and that languor and indifference were congenital to the citizens of great countries. In such a preference he may have been specially influenced by his patriotic regard for the prowess of the small republic of Geneva, to whose achievements in peace and war he has dedicated a noble panegyric; but it is doubtful whether local pride would have been sufficient to determine his views, had not the general political condition of Europe afforded them a plausible measure of support. To the observer of the eighteenth century the case for the small State was by no means desperate: the whole of Central Europe was a mosaic of political fragments, and there seemed no reason then to expect that the little republics and principalities of Germany and Italy would ever be combined into national States. Indeed, the decay of Spain, the debility of France, the anarchy of Poland, the palace revolutions of Russia furnished some ground for thinking that the true solution for all the political troubles of Europe was to be found in some scheme of federation which would combine the advantages of the small with those of the great States. Among these advantages Rousseau was never tempted to reckon mere material wealth. He thought that poor nations had always fought and would always fight better than rich ones, that commercial prosperity was a curse in disguise, that the representative system was an imposture, and that true ideal democracy could only be practised in miniature. The idea of a nation organising itself as a standing army was utterly foreign to him, though he may

truly be described as the spiritual father of all the conscripts. 'For a new people whose public interest is still vigorous, all 'the citizens are soldiers in time of war, and there are no 'soldiers in time of peace.' So little did he anticipate the age of Krupp.

If the worth of a publicist is to be assessed by his power of divination, by his capacity of picking out from the confused mass of contemporary experience the shaping forces of the future and of seeing the world as it will surely become when these forces have acquired a further degree of momentum and influence, then Rousseau will not take a very high rank. It would be impossible to find in his writings any appreciation of the importance either of Colonial development, or of the relations between the New World and the Old, or of the influence likely to be exerted by physical science upon human affairs, or of the national as apart from the civic spirit as a factor in the formation of great nations. He thought that Europe was destined to be conquered by the Tartars; he believed that economic development was injurious to military power; he concluded that England was on the road to ruin for the same absurd reason which led him to argue that the disaster of the Lisbon earthquake was due rather to the sins of the Portuguese than to the cruel caprices of Nature. It was a sufficient indication of decay that London was a big city, that big cities were wrong, that agriculture constituted the strength of a nation, and that the size of London was inconsistent with a flourishing state of the farming industry. Such a verdict indicates a lack of elementary economic knowledge. We need not quarrel with Rousseau for sharing the ordinary physiocratic view as to the importance of agriculture as a source of wealth, but it is a serious disqualification in a publicist —even in one whose concern in public affairs is mainly guided by ethical considerations,—to condemn commerce and industry *ab initio*, to hold that industrial development is unfavourable to the growth of population, and that the agricultural industry itself is not considerably helped by the markets for its produce which the development of great towns inevitably opens out to the farmer.

Nevertheless, as Burke may be regarded as the intellectual parent of the British Empire, so to the genius of this vagabond son of a Genevan watchmaker we may attribute the outlines of that French Republic which, for a second time, has astonished

Europe by the intense and ardent quality of its patriotic devotion. We doubt whether there is another instance in the history of literature of a writer who has combined so many fantastic ideas and unrealised prophecies with a central core of political doctrine which has become so closely intertwined with the intellectual process and habit of a great nation. For this influence it is customary to assign literary reasons, as if any assemblage of literary qualities, however imposing in range and brilliance, would in itself suffice to explain a result so solid and permanent. The truth is that Rousseau's doctrine won upon its merits, the least of which was that, being subversive of an outworn and unpopular system, it chimed in with the rising spirit of revolt. But what gave to it an abiding influence was the fact that it traced with Euclidean precision the outline of a new form of State founded upon the popular will, controlled by the nation in the general interest, and raised clear of those sinister and sectional interests which had so long perplexed the course of public affairs in Europe.

One of the implications of this new polity was a scheme of national education:

'Un enfant, en ouvrant les yeux, doit voir la patrie, et jusqu'à la mort ne doit plus voir qu'elle. Tout vrai républicain suça avec le lait de sa mère l'amour de sa patrie; c'est-à-dire, des lois et de la liberté. Cet amour suit tout son existence: il ne voit que sa patrie, il ne vit que pour elle; sitôt qu'il est seul il est nul; sitôt qu'il n'a plus de patrie, il n'est plus; et s'il n'est pas mort, il est pis.' *

These sentences taken from a treatise written in old age, with a characteristic note of rhetorical exaggeration, represent one important side of Rousseau's teaching on education. It is the duty of the State to form the mind and character of its citizens, and an obligation rests upon parents to see that their children are duly indoctrinated with respect for the laws and institutions of their own country. The practical consequences which, both in Europe and America, have flowed from the application of these principles are too complex to be lightly assessed, and have not been unattended by drawbacks. If the civic festivals of the Revolution were comparatively innocent (though generally tedious and ultimately mechanical), the Napoleonic application of the doctrine was a disaster to intel-

* Considérations sur le Gouvernement de Pologne.

lectual liberty, only less fatal because the system was less efficient and thoroughgoing than that which has been inflicted upon the political mind of Germany by the educational control of a military empire.

There remains the curious paradox that this apostle of civic training composed an elaborate treatise on education from which it would be difficult to gather that the inculcation of civic duty was any part of the business of the instructor of youth. Émile is educated privately, and with no direct reference to any constituted theories of public policy. He learns no republican catechism, he is drawn to no public games or festivals, and he receives an amount of individual attention which is inconsistent with any general scheme of national pedagogy. Dr. Vaughan argues that in all this there is no real incompatibility of doctrine, seeing that, in the opening pages of the treatise, Rousseau avows his conviction that a public education is always to be preferred wherever a true public life exists. If then Émile is to be educated by a private tutor, it is because 'the civic spirit, the very idea of the father-'land and the citizen, has been swept away.' It is, however, worth noting that Émile receives little or no instruction which might not be given in a modern elementary school. His education, in other words, though administered on refined principles of psychology, is popular and general in its extent. He learns reading, writing, and arithmetic, singing and drawing, the principles of undenominational religion, national history taught orally by narrative. He receives physical and technical instruction, is taught by object lessons; is encouraged in the practice of observation, so that, without any direct patriotic training, he may yet become a useful member of society. The Committee of Public Safety thought so well of the programme that they attempted to carry it into practice in the schools of the French Republic.

The day has gone by when a philosopher, eminent for his abstract meditations, receives an invitation to legislate for a community in trouble about its soul. But in the eighteenth century there was a wide and innocent belief in the virtues of philosophy, and the illustrious author of 'Émile' and the 'Contrat Social' received two separate calls to prescribe for the maladies of a State. The first summons came in the summer of 1764 from Buttafuoco, a Corsican soldier of distinction, who appears to have been acting at the instigation, or with the

authority, of Paoli. The letter of invitation could not have been couched in more gratifying terms.

'Our island,' wrote Buttafuoco, 'as you have very well said, sir, is capable of receiving a good system of laws. But it needs a legislator. It needs a man of your principles, a man whose happiness is independent of us; a man who knows human nature from top to bottom; who, husbanding a distant glory, may be willing to work in one age and to enjoy in another. Condescend to trace the plan of a political system and to co-operate in the felicity of a whole nation.'

Rousseau replied with great good sense that he lacked experience of affairs, 'which alone throws more light upon the art 'of government than all the meditations in the world,' and that six months in Corsica, did his health permit, would give him more instruction than a hundred volumes. But, since a voyage was impossible, he asked to be supplied with ample materials for a judgment, adding to a well-conceived list of requirements that it was very much better to have too much than too little, and that no information capable of throwing light upon the national genius of Corsica could be too detailed. This is not the procedure of a visionary, but though the *Projet de Constitution pour la Corse* (written in the autumn of 1765) is clearly based upon the evidence, apparently none too copious, which had been supplied by Buttafuoco, it is, in effect, a charming dream. The Corsicans are advised to abjure currency and commerce, to avoid town life and to spread themselves evenly over the surface of the island, irrespective of inequalities in the fertility of the soil. Forced labour and dues in kind supply the needs of this primitive and stationary community of peasant farmers.

An agrarian law fixes a limit to property, sumptuary laws rigidly curtail expenditure, for the spirit of the polity is not so much freedom as equality. 'Il faut que tout le monde 'vive et que personne ne s'enrichisse, c'est là le principe 'fondamental de la prospérité de la nation.' No Corsican is to enrich himself. Had Rousseau ever, among his protracted meditations, considered the extent and quality of the interference which would be necessary to prevent a Corsican from enriching himself, or from pursuing any other elemental human ambition (conquest, for instance) to which he had a mind? But we may be sure that any objections, founded upon the imperfections of human nature, would have been brushed

aside with serene and implacable logic. He would show the Corsicans what they should do, but whether they were likely to be wise or foolish was none of his affair.

The most careful and detailed of the political writings of Rousseau was an *œuvre de circonstance*, composed in old age and posthumously published. The 'Considérations sur le 'Gouvernement de Pologne' was executed by request during that period of troubled uncertainty in Polish politics which immediately preceded the first partition. To Rousseau no task could have been more congenial than to write prescriptions for a spirited people who had taken arms against the autocratic Empress of Russia and were famed through Europe for their inveterate habit of anarchy. The Poles seemed to have the root of patriotism, the promise of nationhood. He is, accordingly, remarkably tender to the traditions and institutions of a race so singularly distinguished from the general level of European cynicism and selfishness. He will allow the dear people to keep their serfs, their nobles, even their monarchy. He acknowledges that they suffer from anarchy, and that two of the causes of anarchy are the *liberum veto* and the right of confederation. Yet he will not condemn these curious vestiges of barbarous antiquity. The *liberum veto*, 'a brilliant right rendered pernicious by its abuse,' is to continue under limitations and safeguards, one safeguard being that it is to be confined to fundamental laws, another that the single voter who blocks a law must answer by the loss of his head if, six months later, his action is not endorsed by a tribunal.

The right of confederation was legalised civil war. Rousseau applauds it as 'a masterpiece of policy, the buckler, the 'asylum, the sanctuary of the Constitution.' So decisive a means of expressing the general will must not, at any cost, be sacrificed. It was the opinion of the most reasonable party in Poland that the sovereign cure for the ills of the kingdom would be the establishment of a strong hereditary monarchy. 'It is a great evil,' observes Rousseau, 'that the chief of the 'nation should be the born enemy of liberty,' an observation hardly calculated to encourage monarchical sentiment. Nevertheless, a monarch Poland must have. Republics are only suitable to small States and, though it is desirable that Poland should be divided into thirty-three provinces united by a federal tie, the federation will be of the size which demands

the supervision of a monarch. At all costs, however, the monarchy must be elective. 'An elective monarch with the 'most absolute power would be better for Poland than an 'hereditary King who was a cipher.' Rousseau is aware of what, indeed, was notorious throughout Europe, that one of the chronic sources of intrigue and disorder in Poland consisted in the elective character of the monarchy. He proposes as a remedy that the monarch should always be a Pole and that he should be chosen by lot from the Senators. Sensible as some of his suggestions are, it would, on the whole, be difficult to conceive a series of recommendations less calculated to establish the tottering State upon firm and stable foundations.

And yet, in these 'reveries,' as Rousseau himself calls them, there is a ground-note of truth and wisdom, of which his own generation in particular stood in special need. He realised the manifold and unexplored potencies of the national spirit. He tells the Poles in effect that, if they have the heart of a nation, they are unassailable, so that Russia may conquer but never digest them. To enhance the reputation of the military calling, he advocates a citizen army on the Swiss model, and in a remarkable passage praises the martial spirit which pervades the citizen soldiers of his native land. 'I 'remember the time at Geneva,' he says, 'when the burgesses 'manœuvred much better than the regular troops,' adding a regret, strange in a professor of pacifist opinions, that the magistrates had discouraged them.

Indeed it will generally be found that the unsound or questionable provisions in this eloquent and curious treatise spring from just this pervading consciousness that the body politic is a dead thing without national feeling. The weak elective King who is carefully deprived of patronage so that he may not corrupt his subjects, the frequent but short-lived Diets strictly bound by instructions from their electors, what are these but instruments intended to promote the reign of public virtue? Unfortunately, the prescriptions made up to cure the patient can only be safely taken if the patient is already cured. Rousseau assumes that the lazy, turbulent nobles of Poland are already spotless patriots, eager and able to discharge public duties to the advantage of the State. For such a people three brief codes, intelligible to every schoolboy, will be amply sufficient. 'Are not all the 'rules of natural law better graven in the hearts of men than

'all this nonsense of Justinian? Only make them honest 'and virtuous and I answer for you that they will have law 'enough.'

'*Only* make them honest and virtuous.' Is it then so simple to induce honesty and virtue among Poles and the neighbours of Poles? Is it true that a large community of modern men, rendered honest and virtuous by the alchemy of a wise political tractate, will be content to live under a few simple laws such as may not overtax the memory of average schoolboys? Abolish commerce, currency, scientific inventions, destroy the towns and scatter the inhabitants broadcast through the country in self-sufficing agrarian communities, so that there is little intercommunion and clash of interests—then perhaps the ideal might be realised. The *Lex Salica* was brief enough, and there is no need for a complicated criminal jurisprudence when cattle-stealing, murder, and rape are the only crimes. But in Poland, where, in Rousseau's own true and penetrating phrase, 'the nobles are everything, the burgesses nothing, 'and the peasants less than nothing,' where the very alphabet of a State sense had still to be learned, was it reasonable to expect that the casuistry of human needs and misdoings could be so easily exhausted? 'Le bon sens suffit pour gouverner 'un État bien constitué; et le bon sens s'élabore autant dans 'le cœur que dans la tête.' An admirable phrase, provided that it be understood that it is never good sense to give to complicated things a false appearance of simplicity.

Among the many golden sentences strewn about Rousseau's political writings there are none which in his own country exercised a more decisive influence than those in which he declares the true character of law:

'Le premier et le plus grand intérêt public est toujours la justice. Tous veulent que les conditions soient égales pour tous, et la justice n'est que cette égalité. Le citoyen ne veut que les lois et que l'observation des lois. Chaque particulier dans le peuple sait bien que, s'il y a des exceptions, elles ne seront pas en sa faveur. Ainsi tous craignent les exceptions; et qui craint les exceptions aime la loi.'*

In this shining little chain of unbreakable argument lies the gospel of Jean Jacques, and the sufficient explanation of his everlasting power over men.

H. A. L. Fisher.

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* Lettres de la Montagne, IX.

LAND PROBLEMS IN ANCIENT ROME

1. **Studien zur Geschichte des römischen Kolonates.** By M. I. Rostowzew. Leipzig and Berlin. 1910.
2. **Agrargeschichte,** in **Handwörterbuch der Staatswissenschaften,** Ed. 3. By M. Weber. Jena. 1909.
3. **The Imperial Domains and the Colonate,** in **Essays on Roman History.** By H. F. Pelham. Oxford. 1911.
4. **Grandezza e decadenza di Roma.** By G. Ferrero. Milan. 1902-1907.
5. **Les grands Domaines dans l'Empire romain,** in **Nouvelle Revue historique de Droit français et étranger,** vols. xxi, xxii. By E. Beaudouin. Paris. 1897, 1898.
6. **Il Capitalismo nel Mondo antico.** By G. Salvioli. Turin. 1906.

VERUM confitentibus latifundia perdidere Italiam, jam vero et provincias. The epigram of the elder Pliny has become the dogma of modern writers. It is true that they usually quote it with the omission of the last four words ; yet if these are pondered in the light of Mommsen's famous dictum that ' if an Angel of the Lord were to strike the balance, ' whether the domain ruled by Severus Antoninus was governed ' with the greater intelligence and the greater humanity at that ' time or in the present day, whether civilisation and national ' prosperity generally have since that time advanced or retro- ' graded, it is very doubtful whether the decision would prove ' in favour of the present,' we may find reason to doubt whether the ruin described by Pliny was as complete as is too often assumed.

The fact is that the *laudator temporis acti,* whether satirist, moralist, or historian, was a too familiar figure under the Early Empire, and the lights and shadows of his picture are seen, on a closer scrutiny, to be heightened by an artificially contrived illumination of reality. Moreover, in dealing with the literary sources of ancient history we must always bear in mind the strength of convention and the prevalence of plagiarism. To furbish up the commonplace for a new generation of readers

was the recognised aim of much ancient writing; and this is especially true of the lamentations over the corruption of manners which meet us at every turn in Roman literature. It is not only the preacher for whom the manipulation of selected texts is a besetting sin; and in the present case even the *advocatus diaboli* might quote Pliny to his purpose; for, as Fustel de Coulanges long since pointed out, the cry of a ruined Italy suits ill with the glowing periods which the same author devotes to the agricultural wealth of the peninsula. The duty of the scientific historian is to present, not selected facts, but, so far as he is able, the whole case; and though much remains obscure in the economy of Rome and her dominions, we have learnt a great deal in recent years, especially from the often mutilated, but not wholly destructible, monuments of stone brought to light in every province, and the papyri for which the dry sand of the Nile valley has reserved a happier fate than that which awaits the *paperasses* of the modern State. Above all, we are enabled to view the political and economic movements of antiquity in the true perspective which distance of time imparts. It is the object of the following pages to show how the outlines of the picture are already being drawn by the students of the present generation. The list of works which stands at the head of this essay speaks eloquently of the growth of that super-national Republic of Scholars of which, even in the darkest hour of the modern world, it were treason to despair. Italy, it will be noted, 'takes her place in the sun' in this field of study, and a Russian writer is among the foremost of our pioneers.

It is the merit of Ferrero to have arrested the attention of all students of history by his brilliant, if in some respects inaccurate and overdrawn, sketch of the moral and economic crisis of the last century of the Roman Republic, and its analogies with that by which our own society is faced. But the formula in which he sums it up—'the growth of a national-'ist and industrial democracy on the ruins of a federation of 'agricultural aristocracies, having the Roman world-conquest 'as its effect'—will hardly withstand analysis. Ferrero's fellow-countryman, Salvioli, has made it clear that an industrial democracy in the modern sense of that term was impossible in the ancient world, since 'the characteristic trait of ancient 'economy is the absence or the weakness of capital employed

'in industrial production.' The capital concentrated in Roman hands in the second and first centuries B.C. was simply the accumulated wealth of the older societies of the Near East, drained by the insatiable rapacity of the conquering people. It was not employed to any large extent in the manufacture of goods for a world-market such as exists to-day. Most of it was in the hands of strong financial houses, which made advances at exorbitant rates of interest to the over-taxed provincials and insolvent princelings of the East; much was held by the great joint-stock companies which farmed the State contracts and the collection of revenue; the remainder was for the most part invested in the purchase of landed estate, either by the aristocracy to whom this represented the only form of wealth consecrated by tradition, or by the 'new men' who aspired to join their ranks. The economic results of this transference of productive power were such as might have been expected. They were seen partly in the growth of large properties, partly in the development of new branches of husbandry—cattle-ranching on a scale only possible for the capitalist who could command the means of alternating summer pasture on the hills with winter keep in low-lying coastlands, and the intensive cultivation of the vine and olive.

The indictment which has been drawn against the authors of these changes is concerned, in the main, with their social consequences. It is alleged that a large class of yeomen were gradually divorced from the soil, which was almost exclusively tilled by slave-labour, and that the cultivation of cereals, from which they had drawn their livelihood, was rendered unprofitable by the competition of imported corn grown on the plantations of Sicily, Africa, and the East. Now, although it may be doubted whether our knowledge of the ancient world is intimate enough to enable us to strike the delicate balance between social loss and economic gain, it need not be denied that the importation of a vast human capital in the form of slaves introduced an unhealthy element into Italian life, and indirectly led to evils which had a very real existence. But if we fix our attention upon the economic side of the process, we shall not find it difficult to show that the supposed 'ruin' of Italy was very far from being a reality, and that the growth of *latifundia*, though undoubtedly a

marked feature of economic transformation, left many smaller units of cultivation intact.

In studying the closing century of the Roman Republic we naturally turn to the tracts of Cato the Elder and Varro on husbandry; and we note that whilst they write with a single eye to profit for the guidance of the investor in land, the unit of cultivation which they assume—the *fundus*—is, like the *podere* of modern Italy, limited in extent. Cato's calculations are based on the olive-yard of 240 *jugera* (150 acres) and the vineyard of 100 *jugera* (a little more than 60 acres). Varro, although he reproduces Cato's estimates, takes a wider outlook, and his hints to graziers were doubtless intended for those who, like himself, owned ranches in Apulia and Samnium. But it is scarcely true to say, as Mr. Heitland does,* that Varro's model estate, or *villa*, is a *latifundium*; the same author is more correct in describing it as 'a country house 'and farm of the old-fashioned type.' The truth is that, so far as Italy was concerned, tillage in general was based on the *fundus*, regarded as a manageable unit; and the wealthy Romans who invested their gains in landed property seem to have preferred to purchase a number of such *fundi* in various parts of the peninsula rather than to acquire large tracts of territory—partly from a desire to distribute risks, partly because amongst the 'social amenities' attaching to the ownership of land was the convenience (in the absence of tolerable inns) of possessing rest-houses on the main routes of travel. There were also political advantages to be gained from the possession of large estates in days when the prizes of the State were scrambled for by the members of an intensely selfish governing class; for the armies which fought in the Civil Wars were largely recruited from the slaves, freedmen, and other dependants of these magnates, typical of whom was that Domitius—an ancestor of Nero—who, as Caesar tells us, in addressing an army of some thousands, promised to furnish from his own estates allotments of four *jugera* apiece to each private soldier, and larger holdings to the higher ranks.

But we must be on our guard against the supposition that the bulk of Italian land was held by the senatorial aristocracy. Ferrero points out that an all-important change in

* History of the Roman Republic, vol. iii. p. 450.

the structure of society was taking place in Italy during this period.

'This was the emergence, between the great landlords and the few surviving members of the old peasant proprietor population, of a new middle class of landowners who were prepared, with the small capital and few skilled slaves at their command, to attempt the scientific and intensive cultivation of the East. The old peasant proprietors would never have acquired the knowledge to do this for themselves; while the large absentee landlords had not at their disposal, or were not inclined to stake, the vast capital required to stock huge tracts of land with olives, vines, fruit trees, and the necessary buildings. Moreover, they could hardly ever devote to their estates the personal attention so indispensable to agricultural success. Occasionally some unusually well-informed man of business, some wealthy financier on the look-out for new opportunities of investment, some large landowner who lived upon his property, some man of letters or retired politician or general might be tempted . . . to turn his hand to the new-fangled processes of cultivation. But ordinarily, unless their estates happened to be in the immediate neighbourhood of a town or of the capital, they found it more convenient to rely upon pasturage, conducted with greater care and knowledge than in the old primitive days. . . . The steady progress which was being made, more especially in North and Central Italy, by the introduction of intensive cultivation and the growing of vine and olive, was due almost entirely to middle-class proprietors who no longer lived, like the old-fashioned middle class, in the open country and made a precarious living by setting their whole family to work on the soil. The new landed middle class spent a good part of each year in the neighbouring town, leaving the whole of the manual work to their slaves and labourers . . . and devoted a large part of their attention to increasing to a maximum the profit drawn from their estates.' *

It was to this new *bourgeoisie*, largely recruited from freedmen and their sons, or from the time-expired centurions and legionaries who had acquired a share in the spoils of the East, that the transformation of Italian agriculture was due. Ferrero has drawn attention to two incidental remarks of the elder Pliny which throw light on the growing importance of the new cultures. The famous 'Opimian' wine, named from the Consul, was, he tells us, a general term—local names being not yet in use—for the vintages of the year 121 B.C. which was a landmark in economic history as being the first in which

* Eng. tr. vol. i. p. 132.

Italian wine was recognised as a commercial product worthy of systematic distribution. A still more important date was 52 B.C. (the year of Pompey's sole consulship), when, according to the same authority, olive oil was first exported from Italy to the provinces. By such means it came about that 'the 'wasted Italian country-side began to blossom once more 'with its old prosperity.' *

In face of these facts, the complaints made by Roman writers of the decline of Italian husbandry—attributed by modern economists to the 'ruinous competition of slave-grown corn 'from overseas'—are subject to a heavy discount. Ferrero acutely remarks that 'modern Europeans and Americans 'are so accustomed to see cities with populations of many 'millions regularly fed by private enterprise that they regard 'this as the natural and normal state of things.' † It was not so in ancient times. Cereals are bulky and land-transport expensive, and we constantly find the city States of antiquity resorting to legislative and diplomatic expedients in order to secure a regular supply of corn. Rome was the latest in growth of the great capitals, but ultimately became by far the largest, as she outstripped her Hellenistic rivals in the race and took her place as the centre of a world-empire, and the result was that the feeding of her populace became an urgent question. It may be doubted whether Italy, broken up by mountain ranges, devoid of navigable rivers, and dependent for its communications upon the military highways, could in any case have met the new demand: certainly it was more economical to organise sea-transport and thus secure the constant supplies furnished by Sicily, Egypt, and North Africa, which played somewhat the same part in Roman life as that of Canada in the economy of Great Britain.

The government of the Roman Republic is of course open to criticism on the score of its demagogic policy in the provision of corn at less than cost price, or even free of cost, for the urban population. This measure went far beyond the legitimate satisfaction of a crying need, which would have been adequately met by a securely maintained supply of corn and the steadying of prices by means of regular purchases or

* Ferrero, op. cit. vol. i. p. 123.
† Op. cit. vol. ii. p. 324.

requisitions in lieu of tribute. There is no need here to enlarge upon the scandal to which the corn-doles gave rise in the political struggles of the dying Republic; but the question must be asked (an exact answer cannot be given) whether the effect of the system was to withdraw free labour in any large quantities from Italian agriculture and thus to accelerate the process by which the peasant proprietor gave way to the slave-owning capitalist. It would be absurd to deny that the *frumentationes* promoted the rural exodus—in any case an inevitable result of the new conditions; and Suetonius quotes a characteristic saying of Augustus (who reduced the system to order and made it serve the purpose of a Poor Law), to the effect that 'he had been impelled to put an end for all 'time to the public largesses of corn, because reliance upon 'them caused agriculture to be neglected, but did not persevere 'in his intention because he felt sure that the desire for 'popularity would some day lead to their restoration.' But we do not know what proportion the recipients of cheap corn bore to the population of the capital, much less to that of the peninsula. Their numbers, at any rate, were hugely swelled by the manumitted slaves and their descendants, who formed a rapidly growing element in the urban population. Pompey, we are told, instituted a census of his own freedmen 'in order that they might receive their corn allowances in a 'regular and orderly manner,' and it is therefore much to be doubted whether the effect on agriculture was far-reaching or disastrous.

We would gladly know more of the process by which the wounds inflicted on Italy by the Civil Wars were healed under the régime of the *Pax Augusta*. It is true that the historians of the Empire, fascinated by the mirage of the fast-fading glories of the Republic, repeat the old complaints of the plantation system, 'estates as large as kingdoms,' 'districts once 'populous, now only redeemed from solitude by slaves,' and so forth. Columella, the only contemporary writer on husbandry, is often cited as a witness to the evils of the *latifundia*; and it is true that he has his fling at the 'magnates 'who own the territories of whole tribes, the boundaries of 'which they cannot even traverse on horseback, but leave 'them to be trampled under foot by herds or ravaged by wild 'beasts, or garrison them with slave-prisons or citizens held

'in bondage.' But his argument is that this form of agriculture is economically unsound, and should be replaced by the intensive cultivation of more manageable areas; almost in the same breath he quotes Virgil's

'laudato ingentia rura;
exiguum colito.'

His own calculations are based on small units, such as the vineyard of seven *jugera*, which he would entrust to the care of a skilled slave, holding that the higher return justified the initial outlay; and Mommsen was no doubt right in his judgment that the old plantation system with its noisome *ergastula* and fettered slave-gangs became largely extinct under the Empire. In fact, slavery was itself a decaying institution. The causes of its decline are too complex to be discussed here, but the chief of them, viz. the rise in price of human material owing to the *Pax Romana*, which restricted the sources of supply, operated directly on agriculture. Correlated with this change is the growth of the system of free tenancy and the rise of a landowning class resembling that with which we ourselves are familiar. Typical of this class is the younger Pliny, whose grumbles at agricultural depression, the difficulty of finding satisfactory tenants, the necessity of rent-reductions and the accumulation of arrears, might come from an English squire of the nineteenth century. Pliny tells us that almost all his fortune consisted in real estate, and that he had no 'chain-gangs.' His usual practice, it seems, was to grant five-year leases to tenants. In a letter of about 110 A.D. he announces his intention of adopting the *métayer* system in place of money-rents. His properties were certainly considerable. For example, in applying to Trajan for leave of absence from his duties as a Treasury official in order to find new tenants for a group of estates, he estimates the rental at 400,000 sesterces (£4000), which may represent about 5000 acres. In another letter he mentions the purchase of a property adjoining his own for 3,000,000 sesterces (£30,000), telling us that before agricultural depression had reduced rents and prices it would have been worth 5,000,000 (£50,000).

Such properties must certainly be classed as *latifundia*. But the senatorial squirearchy, now as earlier, were far from possessing a monopoly in the soil of Italy. Such evidence as

we possess of the number and distribution of the *fundi*, which were still the recognised units of management, is naturally imperfect. Fortunately, however, the Roman genius for order was nowhere more clearly shown than in the surveying of land and the registration of titles. We possess a series of tracts written by the *Gromatici*, or professional surveyors of land, the earliest of which dates from the end of the first century A.D. The provision of allotments of land for the veterans of Sulla, Pompey, Caesar, the triumvirs, and Augustus led to the establishment of 'colonies' throughout the greater part of Italy and to the distribution of small holdings. In connexion with these operations an official map of the town and territory concerned was drawn and accompanied by a register of properties, copies of both being kept in Rome. In these registers each *fundus* bore the name of its owner, and this name continued to belong to it through successive changes of ownership, and in spite of subdivision into parcels. This fixity of nomenclature supplies us with the means of measuring the changes in the distribution of landed property in Italy.

We are further helped by the records of operations taking place under the system of *alimenta*, a form of State-endowed charity established by Nerva, whose interest in Italian agriculture is shown by the fact that he also secured the passage of an agrarian law under the ancient forms, providing for the purchase by the State of lands for allotment to small holders. Under the *alimenta* system capital was lent to landowners at moderate rates of interest on the security of their estates, and the revenues derived from the mortgages served to maintain the children of poor parents. Two inscriptions have preserved for us lists of such properties, together with their estimated values and the very much smaller sums advanced on this security. From one of them—found near Benevento—it appears that ninety *fundi* were, in the reign of Trajan, in the hands of sixty proprietors, of whom only two can be described as great landowners. The original *fundi*, valued at sums ranging from 30,000 to 100,000 sesterces—£300 to £1000—represent holdings of very moderate extent, and many owners appear to possess only one of these. A similar document from Veleia (near Parma) likewise reveals the existence of numerous holdings of moderate area, although the number of large properties is greater here than in the

South. Doubtless the rich soil of the Po valley had more attractions for the investor than the mountainous regions of Samnium. Further evidence is afforded by an inscription of the early second century which records the building of a private aqueduct near Viterbo, which in its course of a mile and a quarter passed through eleven *fundi* owned by seven proprietors. Our conclusion must be that the distribution of ownership in the Italy of Trajan's time was as uneven as it is amongst ourselves.

Such was the gradual solution of the economic crisis brought about by Rome's conquests, in so far as it affected Italian agriculture; and our verdict on the text of Pliny which we set out to examine may fitly be expressed in the words of Mommsen:

'The worthy man, in writing these words, had not primarily in view the contrast between free and slave labourers, but wholly or at any rate principally that between the peasant-proprietor and the small tenant-farmer without property of his own. How much of this is truth and how much mere words we cannot here inquire: the statement is no gospel truth of national economy, but a manifestation of the idealised conception of the earlier Republic in contrast with the later decadent commonwealth which was a commonplace of Roman thought.'

But Pliny, as we have seen, invites us to extend our view to a wider horizon, and only by so doing can we rightly appraise the significance of what was but an episode in the economic history of the Græco-Roman world.

Rome, we must remember, was the inheritor, not only of the material wealth of the Eastern monarchies, but also of their methods of government, and when we look below the surface of events we see that these were determined by the special forms in which the unending conflict between the State and the individual clothed itself under varying conditions. For the ancient State, wherever the central control was strong, was bureaucratic; and bureaucracy is the sworn foe of individual exploitation, whether of land or capital. The process by which the territories of the Near East, parcelled out amongst the successors of Alexander, were organised by the business capacity of the Greek, hitherto confined within the limits of the City-State, forms a new chapter of history, of which only the outlines are so far written. The methods

pursued by the Seleucids in Hither Asia are dimly discerned by the light of the scanty stone records which have survived. We find a hybrid type of civilisation based partly on the Greek cities, old and new, which enjoyed a measure of autonomy under the protection of the monarch; partly on the vast tracts of territory in which the monarch possessed an eminent domain. Whether he retained these districts in his own hand as 'royal land,' or assigned them by a kind of feudal tenure to his family or followers, or, it might be, to a God—for the great temples of Asia Minor were the centres of ecclesiastical principalities *—or, finally, sold his rights, whether to individuals or cities, the cultivators of the soil were attached to the estate by a species of serfdom, and as such are expressly included in the royal charters.

In Egypt the conditions were very different. Here the Greek urban community reached its brilliant culmination in the capital of the monarchy, Alexandria, but the Ptolemies never sought to graft its institutions upon the native stock in the Nile valley. Here were no tracts of sparsely populated territory, but a strictly limited and accurately surveyed area of cultivation, which could only be increased at the expense of the desert by a considerable outlay of labour and capital. We know little of the system which the Ptolemies found in existence, but it is clear that they assumed a right of eminent domain in the soil of Egypt, and expressed this by the classification of all land as either 'royal' or 'ἐν ἀφέσει,' i.e. 'released' from royal control. Of this latter there were various categories: the 'sacred land' assigned to the numerous temples, the 'lots' held by military tenure, and the private estates, which (so far as we can trace their formation) were acquired either by purchase from the State or by bringing waste or unoccupied land under cultivation, in return for which temporary freedom from taxation was bestowed. But the monarchy never relaxed its grasp of the main object—the exploitation to the uttermost of the natural resources of the country; occupation rather than ownership is the appropriate term to apply to the various tenures. Even the military 'lots' were acquired by a fictitious purchase; they were

* Mommsen's comparison with the prince-bishoprics of the Holy Roman Empire may be remembered.

subject to conditions of cultivation, and the right of alienation was severely limited. The system was in fact designed partly to serve military ends, partly to encourage the immigration of Greeks, Jews, and other natives of the Levant with an economic object.

A further point deserves notice. The net of the tax-gatherer has probably never been spread so widely as it was in Ptolemaic Egypt. Not only was the produce of the soil subject to heavy and ingeniously multiplied contributions, but every trade and handicraft, even the meanest, paid its toll to the government. As the ingathering of revenue was, according to the universal practice of the Greek world, farmed out by contract, and the collector was obliged to furnish the security, not only of his own property, but of that of sureties as well, it was clearly necessary to maintain a class from which both tax-farmers and their sureties could be drawn; and by a process which cannot here be traced in detail, the collection of revenue, from being a lucrative enterprise, was transformed into a burden shared by the whole class of nominal proprietors, upon whom the government laid its heavy hand, enforcing a system of corporate responsibility. Thus was realised the bureaucratic ideal in all its perfection, and it is obvious that such a system effectually bars the overgrowth of private capital.

Slavery played a relatively unimportant part in the economy of Egypt. The 'King's husbandmen' who inhabited the villages and were the ancestors of the modern *fellahîn* were held in perpetual bondage by the government and the tax-gatherer, but they were not bought and sold to form human capital for investment in private enterprises, and crafts of every sort were exercised by free-born Egyptians. The monopolies, such as that of oil-production, which were carried on in connexion with the temples, came nearest to modern industrial concerns, but here, too, the bureaucracy gradually extinguished all prospect of private enrichment and converted the manufacture into a branch of the administration.

It was not, however, directly from Egypt that the Romans drew their first lesson in the art of bureaucratic exploitation. The conquest of Sicily gave them possession of a rich estate whose resources had been as scientifically tapped by its ruler, Hiero II. of Syracuse, as those of the Nile valley by the

Ptolemies, who may indeed have been his masters. Here the collection of a general tithe of agricultural produce by tax-farmers, of which Cicero, in one of his speeches against Verres, gives us a full account, was regulated by an ordinance which bore the name of Hiero and may fitly be compared with the Revenue Law of the Second Ptolemy in part preserved to us in a papyrus. The Romans found nothing to add to its provisions, and the simplicity of its principles made it easy of application elsewhere, as in the kingdom of Pergamon, which fell to Rome by the bequest of Attalus III. in 133 B.C.

Thus the Roman conquest of the Near East gave no direct stimulus to the application of capital to agriculture, but rather led to its employment in the speculations of tax-farming syndicates. We must look elsewhere for the *latifundia* which 'ruined the provinces'—namely to the West, where capital (for the time being) held the advantage of position against bureaucratic government. The province which claims our special attention is that of Africa, where the plantation system, better suited to an oligarchic than to a monarchical form of government, had flourished under Carthaginian rule.

The fall of Carthage in 146 B.C. opened a large field for the investment of Roman capital in North Africa, and full advantage was taken of the opportunity. The Agrarian Law of 111 B.C., in part preserved, contains a number of clauses dealing with the tenure of lands in Africa, some of which had been sold to private persons, subject to a quit-rent, whilst others were held on the same terms as the public lands of Italy with which the legislation of the Gracchi was concerned, i.e. by the precarious tenure of *possessio*, subject to the State's right of re-entry and the payment of dues collected by tax-farmers. Of the system of cultivation in force we learn nothing from this law; but it is easy to see that the conditions were favourable to the growth of large estates, and we are not therefore surprised to find that, when the veil is lifted by the writers of the Flavian age, Africa furnishes the classic example of the *latifundium*. The land-surveyor Frontinus contrasts the conditions in Italy, with its 'crowd of owners,' with those prevailing in Africa, where private persons possessed domains 'far exceeding in extent the territories of commonwealths.' These *saltus* contained a large population grouped in fortified hamlets about the owner's *villa*, and enjoying exemption from

the municipal burdens imposed on urban communities. The elder Pliny tells us that six landlords owned one-half of Africa ; they were executed and their estates confiscated by Nero.

Whether Pliny's statement be literally correct or not, it brings into relief the process by which, during the first century of the Empire, ' Caesar,' i.e. the Imperial government, absorbed by various means—confiscation, inheritance, the acquisition of crown-lands in annexed territories, and so forth—a large proportion of the existing *latifundia*. The next step was for that government to reduce to a uniform system the administration of the vast territories thus brought under centralised control. It is here that the inscriptions discovered of recent years in North Africa have proved of priceless value. It is true that these stone documents are tantalising from their fragmentary condition, and have given rise to controversies which will hardly be settled except by further discoveries. But the main outlines of the picture are clear enough. The domain, or *saltus*, is cultivated by a number of small holders (*coloni*), whose tenures are regulated by Imperial ordinances, which partly consolidate and stereotype the ' custom of the ' estate,' partly introduce new features (probably directly or indirectly suggested by the institutions of the Eastern kingdoms) with a view to encouraging the extension of the cultivated area.

It appears that the Imperial domains were grouped in districts managed by the agents (*procuratores*) of the Emperor, whose offices were to be found in cities such as Carthage. The several estates were let to middlemen (*conductores*) who occupied the demesne or *villa*, and probably kept a bailiff and *familia* of slaves after the fashion of the Italian landlord ; but their chief duty consisted in the collection of the contributions in kind made by the *coloni*, who held their lands as *métayers*, and were obliged to bring their corn to the common threshing-floor and hand over a third part of the grain to the middleman. Moreover the *conductor* was entitled to exact labour from them for the cultivation of the land in his own occupation—a feature which reminds us of the week-works of the villein under our own manorial system, and may indeed be connected therewith by an historical chain whose links remain to be traced.

Of the conditions of life on the Imperial manors the inscrip-

tions give us some illuminating hints. The circumstances under which they were engraved are in themselves significant. In the first to be discovered the tenants of the estate known as the *Saltus Burunitanus* appeal to their Imperial overlord —in this case Commodus—for protection against the illegal exactions of the middleman, a certain Allius Maximus, 'versed 'in the arts which gain favour in high places,' who, like his predecessors in the post of *fermier général*, has, with the connivance of the Emperor's agents at Carthage, sorely oppressed the *coloni*, 'humble country folk who eke out a living by the 'labours of their hands' and are powerless in face of the lavish bribes of the *conductor*. They rest their claim on the law of Hadrian regulating the tenure and cultivation of crown land, which determined for all time by a 'fixed schedule' (*perpetua forma*) both the rents payable in kind and the *corvées* to which the tenant was liable—two days' labour at ploughing time, two at seed time, and two at harvest. In this case redress was promptly granted. The petition was endorsed by the Emperor with an instruction to his agents to see that no more than the six days' labour should be exacted; and the *coloni* instructed their headman to inscribe on stone their own complaint, the Emperor's rescript, and its covering letter from the *procurator* at Carthage.

On another estate we find one of the Imperial agents setting up an 'Altar of the Law of Hadrian'—here described as a 'law concerning waste lands and those which have remained 'out of cultivation for ten years'—which encourages the planting of such lands with olives and other fruit trees by grants of immunity from taxation for periods of ten and seven years.

But Hadrian was not the first to legislate for the benefit of agriculture. In 1896 an inscription was found in the valley of the Medjerdah containing lengthy extracts from a certain *Lex Manciana*, as it applied to the estate of *Villa Magna*. This comprehensive ordinance regulated in detail the conditions of tenure and also dealt with the extension of the cultivated area on the same lines as the Law of Hadrian, which in fact did not wholly supersede it. There has been much controversy with regard to the date and source of this ordinance. The inscription itself was set up in honour of Trajan: but the most reasonable view is that of Rostowzew,

that the law belongs to the first century A.D., most probably to the reign of Vespasian, and takes its title from an Imperial Commissioner named Mancia, empowered by his warrant to legislate for the crown-lands and extra-territorial estates of Africa. If this be so, we learn to appreciate the benefits conferred on the Empire by the Flavian dynasty and their successors—notably Hadrian—in the pursuit of a definite economic policy. With regard to this policy Professor Pelham well says * that it represented

> 'an heroic and partially successful effort to replace the extravagance of the Neronian age by careful economy, and to husband and to develop resources which recent experience had shown to be no longer inexhaustible. . . . The *conductor* brought his capital and skill to the profitable exploitation of the demesne, the *coloni* supplied a resident free population, who not only cultivated their own small holdings, but whose services were available for the demesne itself, and this in an age when capital was scarce, and population already showing signs of decline: when, too, slave-labour was not only becoming difficult to procure, but was beginning to be viewed with disfavour by economists.'

It may be added that, as Rostowzew has shown, political were intertwined with economic motives. Strong as the government was, it could not afford to neglect the danger of disruption which the overgrowth of private estates foreshadowed, and the creation of a body of Imperial tenants promised to increase the stability of the foundations upon which the power of the Emperors rested. This policy may have been suggested by the institutions of the Eastern monarchies, to which allusion has already been made. If space permitted, much might be said of the discoveries of Sir W. Ramsay and others in South-Western Asia Minor, from which we can draw a picture of the 'estates of Caesar' which agrees in the most important particulars with that of the African domains.

The action of the forces which moulded and modified the Imperial land-policy is well illustrated by the history of the administration of Egypt, with which the Emperors, as the successors of the house of Ptolemy, were able to deal freely. Here the government at first encouraged the investment of private capital in land, and up to the reign of Nero a number

* Op. cit., p. 290.

of large estates (*οὐσίαι*) were formed; many of them, as their names show, by members of the Imperial family, such as Germanicus, the two Agrippinas and Messalina; others by ministers and favourites like Mæcenas, Seneca, and the freedmen Pallas and Narcissus. But, like the African *saltus*, these domains were gradually absorbed into the Imperial patrimony,* and their management was entrusted to a special department. The policy of the government in exploiting the resources of the kingdom (upon which Rome was largely dependent for its regular corn supply) was naturally in the main a continuation of that of the Ptolemaic dynasty. At the head of the administration was the *praefectus Aegypti*, whose post ranked with the prefecture of the Praetorian Guard as one of the great prizes of the new Civil Service. An enlightened and liberal holder of this great office—and of such there were not a few—had opportunities comparable with those enjoyed by the great administrators who have moulded the British Empire.

Even under Nero the record is one of which Rome had no cause to be ashamed. Soon after his accession Nero appointed as his viceroy Ti. Claudius Balbillus, a man of some literary distinction, who appears to have boasted descent on the spindle-side from one of the royal houses of the Near East. The inhabitants of Gizeh were probably indulging in something more than empty flattery when they set up an inscription in honour of Nero, 'the Good Genius of the world' (this was during the *quinquennium*), and his prefect, who had 'caused 'the gifts of the Nile to increase' by his measures for the relief of agriculture.† His successor was a representative of the Romanised West, one Julius Vestinus, a native of Vienne in Southern Gaul, described in the famous oration of Claudius as 'one of my closest friends and men of business.' He encouraged the occupation of vacant lands by private cultivators by fixing a nominal purchase price, upon payment of which the holder was only liable for a low 'customary rent.' Vestinus

* For example, we read in a papyrus of an estate in Nero's possession 'formerly the property of Narcissus,' whose enormous wealth was confiscated on his fall.

† Balbillus had also (after visiting the Pyramids) cleared the half-buried Sphinx from a mass of accumulated sand, and earned the gratitude of a community which was beginning to reap a rich harvest from the globe-trotter.

found an unworthy successor in Caecina Tuscus, a foster-brother and favourite of Nero, who after a brief rule was dismissed in A.D. 66, to the great relief of Egypt.

His place was filled by one of the Empire's most capable administrators, the renegade Jew, Tiberius Julius Alexander, a nephew of the philosophic theologian Philo, who had proved himself an ' organiser of victory ' in the Parthian war, and was to play a still greater part on the world's stage by initiating the movement which made Vespasian emperor. In an inscription found at the Great Oasis we possess a copy of an edict issued by Julius Alexander in A.D. 68, in which he deals in a statesmanlike manner with the abuses at which some of his forerunners had connived, such as the refusal of the temporary remissions of taxation accorded to those who brought public land under cultivation, and the use of compulsion to secure tenants for the *οὐσίαι*. More than a century later we find appeals in the papyri to another of his rulings, which exempted women from the obligation of cultivating vacant crown-lands. Here we touch the weak spot in the provincial land-settlements of the Empire. However liberal the principles professed by such administrators as Julius Alexander or by emperors like Hadrian, the progress of bureaucracy down the slippery slope of compulsion could not be permanently arrested. The papyri prove to us that, heavy as was the load of taxation, it provoked less discontent than the compulsory cultivation of crown land, annexed as a charge to the adjoining private properties ; and we can thus trace to an Egyptian origin the practice generalised under the name of *epibole* in the fourth-century enactments of the Codes.

The fruits of bureaucracy were slow to ripen, but they were seen when emperors who exercised an active control over their subordinates and were inspired by an enlightened conception of the duties and opportunities of empire gave place to soldiers of fortune. As economic difficulties increased when the *Pax Romana* was broken by internal strife, and the defence of the frontiers against the increasing pressure of the barbarians imposed a fresh strain on the resources of the Empire ere yet the task of developing and consolidating them was completed, the extraction of revenue from the soil became the chief, indeed the only, end of the official class, to whom the middlemen were gradually assimilated as subordinates in the work of tax-collection. Above all things, it became

necessary to secure the maintenance of the revenue by the attachment of the cultivator to the soil by the bonds of law. It is now recognised that, however complex the causes which transformed the free cultivators of the second and even the third centuries into the semi-servile *coloni* of the fourth, one of the principal factors in this special phase of the general movement from Contract to Status which marked the decline of the Empire was the stereotyping in the bureaucratic interest of the conditions of tenure on the 'estates of Caesar.' Officialdom is all for the Stationary State; and nowhere does its establishment seem easier than in an agricultural community where freedom of movement can be largely restricted by administrative measures. The protection of the *perpetua forma* (even supposing it to be adequate) was dearly bought by the 'adscripts of the glebe.'

But the dialectic of history did not allow the last word to rest with the centralised administration. Precisely in the period when the absolute monarchy of Diocletian and his colleagues threw off the mask of the Constitutional Principate —the period when the enactments embodied in the Theodosian Code gave permanence to the system of hereditary castes— the disintegration of the Imperial domain began, and private *latifundia* were once more formed upon a scale hitherto unknown. As early as the second century appanages had been created for members of the Imperial family. Sir W. Ramsay has shown that a large group of domains in South-West Asia Minor passed into the hands of a niece of M. Aurelius, doubtless by a grant from the Emperor, and from her to her descendants in the female line. But the rapid extension of the process came with the New Empire. The transference of the capital to the Bosphorus was followed by the growth of a new Senatorial order based on the personal service of the Sovereign; and reasons as well economic as political dictated the concentration of landed property in the hands of the *clarissimi*.

The inelastic methods of the bureaucracy had been tried and found wanting, and the decay of agriculture could only be arrested—or so it seemed to the Emperors—by measures designed to induce or, if needs be, compel the holders of capital to apply it to the needs of the land. Fresh tenures, such as those of emphyteusis and the perpetual leasehold, the germs of which, as we have seen, had long been in existence, became widely spread, and the new aristocracy secured for itself the

lion's share of the soil and the serfs who tilled it. Small holdings, of course, never ceased to exist—the letters of Cassiodorus show that they survived the barbaric inroads. At the same time a fresh bureaucracy had been created by the Church for the administration of the vast domains which she obtained by Imperial grants. The *Liber pontificalis* gives us a list of the *massae* (or groups of *fundi*) assigned by Constantine for the maintenance of the See of Rome; and the letters of St. Gregory the Great picture for us a system which in many of its features, such as the *conductores* to whom the estates are farmed and the population of *coloni* (who, as 'Servants of Blessed Peter,' take the place of the *vernulae et alumni* of the *Saltus Burunitanus*) recalls the African domains of the second century.

But in the main the structure of Roman society as the barbarians found it was feudal. The territorial aristocracy had absorbed vast tracts of land in Italy and the provinces; the estates of great families such as the Anicii and the Symmachi were distributed throughout the Empire; the rent-roll surrendered in obedience to the impulse of religion by St. Melania the Younger is said to have amounted to a sum equivalent to £1,000,000. This aggrandisement of the rich carried with it the ruin of the middle class; the story of their unhappy fate may be traced in the enactments of the Theodosian Code, and has been admirably summarised by Sir Samuel Dill. But the government had its difficulties with the landowners to whom it had been forced to concede what was practically an *imperium in imperio*. It required them to collect taxes, furnish contingents for the army, and exercise jurisdiction on their estates; and the local potentates thus created were not slow to increase their influence by the exercise of *patrocinium* or 'maintenance.' In other words, their domains became harbours of refuge for the overburdened taxpayers of town and village. The fulminations of the Codes prove to us that what Mommsen described as 'the 'eternal strife between the great landed interests and the 'Idea of the State' was carried on continuously from the middle of the fourth century to the fall of the Western Empire. So far as the ancient world was concerned, it ended in a drawn battle—to be resumed in the new communities founded upon the ruins of the Roman dominion.

H. Stuart Jones.

THE ANTIQUITY OF MAN AND THE DAWN OF ART IN EUROPE

1. **Men of the Old Stone Age.** By HENRY FAIRFIELD OSBORN, Sc.D. New York: Scribner. 1915.
2. **The Antiquity of Man.** By ARTHUR KEITH, D.Sc., F.R.S. Williams and Norgate. 1915.
3. **A Guide to the Fossil Remains of Man in the British Museum.** By ARTHUR SMITH WOODWARD, D.Sc., F.R.S. British Museum. 1915.
4. **Prehistoric Art.** By E. A. PARKYN, M.A. Longmans, Green. 1915.

THE question of the antiquity of man, so much discussed during the last sixty years, has not yet been settled, although our knowledge has been greatly increased by the numerous discoveries made in almost every part of the world. It is universally agreed that man has been on the earth from a period far beyond history, and that he has made good his place in nature by a series of changes, in an ascending plane, giving ample hope for the future. The date, however, of his incoming is still under dispute, and with the wider knowledge of to-day the area of controversy has been enlarged, and the difficulty of the student in finding his way through the labyrinth of the ever-growing literature proportionately increased. We are, as Disraeli said at Oxford in a debate on Darwinism, 'on the side of the angels,' but how and to what extent are yet open to debate. There are three great discoveries which stand out beyond the rest.

The discovery of Pithecanthropus, in Java in 1891, revealed the presence of a missing link between man and ape in the warmer regions now the home of the higher apes, in which such a being might be expected to occur. Then after a period of years followed the discovery of another link between man and the higher apes (Eoanthropus Dawsoni) in Sussex. But here the surroundings forbid the idea that the evolution took place in the region of the discovery, for they indicate a period

when all the apes had been driven from Europe by the lowering of the temperature at the close of the pliocene age.

The cave explorations begun in France by Lartet and Christy, in the third quarter of the nineteenth century, and carried on since by Breuil, Cartailhac, Obermaier, Capitan, Piette, and others, have been crowned by a most wonderful revelation, of the greatest value to the history of art. It is not too much to say that the frescoed caves in Southern France and Northern Spain throw as much light on the life of those times as the Egyptian tombs on daily life in Egypt, or the walls of the Minoan palace on the luxury of the rulers of Crete before the Achaean conquest.

All these subjects are dealt with in the books under review. The date of the incoming of man, and his place in Europe, are treated by Osborn in ' Men of the Old Stone Age.' Smith Woodward tells the story of the incoming of man into Britain and his relation to fossil human types, in a guide to the Fossil Remains of Man in the British Museum. Keith, in his ' Antiquity of Man,' devotes the greater part of his book to criticism of Smith Woodward's account of the British missing link, and to the proof that modern types of mankind were present in Europe in the pliocene, and in the lower palæolithic stage of the pleistocene period. Parkyn, writing solely from the point of view of art and taking no share in scientific controversy, gives us, in his judicious and well-illustrated book, a clear account of primitive art in which the French and Spanish discoveries are plainly laid before the reader, without being obscured by speculation as to date and race. It contrasts strongly with the larger work of Osborn, which is a laborious collection of materials—mostly good but some very bad—bearing the same relation to the story of man as the stone, bricks, and mortar on a building site bear to the finished work of the architect.

In dealing with the element of time Osborn realises the danger of placing prehistory on an historical basis, and then proceeds to adopt a chronology founded upon the advance and retreat of the Alpine glaciers, which are assumed to be dated with sufficient accuracy to be used as standards for the measurement of time over the whole of Europe, and even as far from glaciers as Java. There have been many estimates of the duration of the glacial period, ranging from the 800,000 of

Lyell to the 100,000 years of Upham. Out of these Osborn chooses that of Penck, taking as his unit of measurement the time supposed to have elapsed since the fourth great Alpine glaciation, which is assumed to have taken place between 20,000 and 34,000 B.C. This unit he averages roughly into a standard of 25,000 years. He then proceeds to elaborate fixed dates for the incoming of men, and for their stages of culture. In all these calculations he is so anxious to be accurate that he tells his readers to add to his figures the lapse of time from the beginning of the Christian era. This surprising scheme must be rejected for many reasons. The unit of measurement is an assumption unwarranted by the facts. The movement of the glaciers at the present day varies in each locality, so as to present no definite rate capable of general application to the Alps or anywhere else. Still less have their movements been brought into sufficient touch with primitive man, in regions away from the Alps, to throw any light on his date, although the geological evidence is clear that he was present in Europe after the great extension of the Alpine and Scandinavian glaciers, and the period of the glacial drift in Britain. But more than this, there are no points on which geologists differ more than in the classification of the glacial period, and the whole matter is now under discussion, both on the Continent and in England. Under these circumstances it is unfortunate that this unscientific chronology should have been used as a guiding principle in the book under review.

Nor are we helped to a date on the principle adopted by Keith, in his ' Antiquity of Man,' that equal thicknesses of sediment are deposited in equal times. He takes Sollas' assumptions that the pleistocene deposits are 4000 feet thick, and were formed at the rate of one foot in a century, and in this manner arrives at the date of 400,000 years for the beginning of the period. Here also the rate of deposit at the present time is so variable that it cannot be used as a standard of time. Nor do we know the thickness of the pleistocene strata. In Britain they are not more than 500 feet thick.

Both these attempts to construct a chronology have failed, as all others have failed, because they are not founded on strict inductive reasoning. There are no chronometers in nature with the exception of radium, and that has as yet only

been used to show the great age of minerals. In history we have a record not only of a sequence of events, but also of the length of the intervals separating one event from another. In the prehistoric and all other geological periods we only have a sequence, without means of measuring either the intervals or the length of time occupied in the events themselves. The sounding-line of history is as useless in fathoming the abysses of the past as it would be if applied to the future. Although the antiquity of man cannot be computed in years, it is proved to be very great by the changes in life and in geography that have taken place since he appeared, changes which imply a vast lapse of time, only to be measured by the series of events in the geological record of the tertiary period. We will therefore see how these events will help our inquiry.

The tertiary or third of the three great life-periods in the ancient history of the earth is divided into a series of stages, based on the specialisation of the higher (Eutherian) mammalia, then, as Gaudry aptly puts it, ' en pleine évolution,' while the rest of the animal kingdom had for the most part reached their present forms at the close of the secondary period and were therefore worthless for purposes of tertiary classification. It was recognised that from the earliest, or eocene, stage down to to-day, there are no breaks in life or in geography of sufficient magnitude to justify a fourth or quaternary period, or to allow us to look upon modern man and his works and the present surface of the world as cut off from the last phase of the tertiary. This is shown in the table on page 84.

In the five lower subdivisions (Nos. I. to V.) it will be observed that the living orders, families, genera, and species follow in due order, in such a manner as to take the shape of a genealogical tree, with its trunk buried in the secondary period, and gradually dividing into branches and twigs, passing upwards through the various stages of specialisation to the present day—a very tree of life, with the living mammalia as its fruit. In the sixth or prehistoric period the specialisation of man and his advance in culture offer the means of classification, and in the last or historic there is the testimony of history. These two latter periods differ from the rest by overlapping each other. In Britain, for example, the historic period cannot be extended further back than the voyage of Pytheas, in 325 B.C.; while in Egypt it ranges as far back

CLASSIFICATION OF THE TERTIARY PERIOD
by means of the Higher (Eutherian) Mammalia.

VII. Historic. Events recorded in history.	Modern races. Modern culture.	Man the master of Nature.
VI. Prehistoric. Wild mammalia of living species, one species extinct (Irish elk). Domestic species.	Modern races. Prehistoric culture.	Cultivated plants. Domestic animals. Prehistoric Iron Age. Bronze Age. Neolithic Age.
V. Pleistocene. Living more abundant than extinct species.	Modern Man=*Homo Sapiens* in upper Palæolithic Culture. Extinct Man=*Homo Neanderthalensis; Eoanthropus Dawsoni; Homo Heidelbergensis* in Lower Palæolithic culture.	Upper Palæolithic Culture. Dawn of Art. Lower Palæolithic Culture.
IV. Pliocene. Living species few. Extinct species many. Living genera abundant.	Anthropoid apes.	Temperate and warm species. Extinct species, mainly of warmer types.
III. Miocene. Alliance between living and extinct Eutheria closer.	Anthropoid apes.	No living species. Living genera. Extinct genera dominant.
II. Oligocene. Alliance between living and extinct genera closer than in Eocene.	Lemuroids.	No living genera. Living orders and families. Extinct orders and families numerous.
I. Eocene. Living and extinct families and orders.	Lemuroids.	No living genera. Living orders and families. Extinct orders and families dominant.

as 3500 B.C. Consequently a portion of the prehistory of Britain overlaps the history of Egypt.

This classification, originally prepared for Europe in 1880, applies equally to the tertiary strata over the whole world, the mammalia of each zoological province being taken as the standards. It even applies to the Australian region, in which the standard is presented by the living marsupials. From this remarkable uniformity in the stages of successive evolution it may be inferred that the causes of change did not act sporadically, or with irregularity, but everywhere in such a way as to give the same general results in the same order; or, in other words, that the earth, as a whole, has passed through biological changes in the tertiary period analogous to those of the individual in the passage from infancy to old age.

If we turn to the tertiary record in the above table, it will be seen that there is no place for man in the eocene, oligocene, and miocene chapters, because the evolution of the higher mammalia on the earth had not yet arrived at the stage marked by the appearance of any living species. Had man then existed, it is impossible to suppose that he would have been free from the law of change, which ruled in the rest of the mammalia. Had he lived, for example, in the miocene period, when there were none of the existing species, he would have stood in the same relation to living man that genus stands to species; and had he lived in the two preceding periods he would have been in stages of evolution still more remote from modern man. It is not until the succeeding pliocene period that men can be looked for. Even here the small proportion of living to extinct species makes it unlikely that he was then on the earth, although he may have been represented by extinct ancestral forms. No human skeletons have as yet been discovered in undisturbed deposits of this age in any part of the world.

Nor is there any light thrown on the question by the supposed discoveries of implements. The roughly chipped flints, the 'rostro-carinates' and other forms of 'eoliths,' taken by Moir, Lankester, Rutot, and Keith to be of human workmanship, have been shown by Sollas and others to be probably the result of natural forces—the dash of the waves on the shore-line, or the crushing movements of the superficial sands and gravels, without the agency of man. The broken flints,

indistinguishable from rude palæolithic forms, discovered by Breuil, close to the pebbles from which they had been crushed, in the undisturbed lower eocene gravels of Belle Assize, Oise, have undoubtedly been formed without the aid of man. There is also ample evidence of the same kind in Britain that places the natural origin of these forms beyond dispute.

The eoliths closely resembling the handiwork of man are, as Boule happily points out, the result of ' hyper-selection ' (*hyper-sélectionnées*). They are the most artificial section of a series that graduates into rude natural forms, and therefore can only lead to error if they are dealt with by themselves apart from their surroundings. For these reasons they have no value in an inquiry into the antiquity of man, although there can be no doubt that the naturally broken edges and points of stones were among the first instruments used by man, or that they were improved by him into implements which were entirely artificial.

We have now arrived in our survey at the fifth or pleistocene division of the tertiary period, in which man appears, not only in Europe but also in Africa and Asia, in association with numerous living, and a smaller number of extinct mammals. He comes into a Europe differing both in geography and climate from that of to-day. Europe then was united to Africa by two land barriers, the one uniting Spain to Morocco at the Straits of Gibraltar, and the other linking Italy with Sicily, Malta, and Tunis. It was also united to Asia Minor by a broad belt of land that included Crete, Cyprus, the islands of the Ægean Sea, and the Bosphorus. Thus the Mediterranean was reduced to two comparatively small basins : the western, in which the Balearic Islands constituted a range extending southwards from Spain, and Sardinia and Corsica were parts of another range extending southwards from the mountains of Tuscany. The eastern basin was probably cut off from the much diminished area of the Black Sea. All this is amply proved by the distribution of the living wild animals in the Mediterranean regions, and more especially in the islands, to which they could not have gained access unless the land had been raised some 600 fathoms above the present sea-level. Further evidence of the elevation of the land is presented by the soundings, which reveal ravines and valleys submerged to that depth and more, off the present coast-lines. It is also proved

to have taken place in the pliocene age by the presence of the African hippopotamus in the pliocene fauna of France and Italy. There was therefore no physical obstacle to the migration into Europe at the beginning of the pleistocene



GEOGRAPHY OF EUROPE IN PLEISTOCENE PERIOD.
Vertical lines = Range of Southern Mammals.
Horizontal lines = Range of Northern Mammals.

age of animals now living in the warm climates of Africa and Asia.

There was a similar enlargement of Europe on the Atlantic side, where the distribution of the pleistocene mammalia over Britain and Ireland can only be explained by an elevation of

at least 600 feet. This would convert the North Sea and the English and Irish Channels into valleys traversed by rivers opening upon a seaboard now marked by the hundred-fathom line ranging northwards from off Brittany far to the west of Ireland towards Scandinavia. On the east also the elevation of the sea-bed from the Caspian to the Gulf of Obi offered a free passage to the immigrants into Europe from the Arctic and from the temperate regions of Asia. The incoming extinct species also fall into the same northern and temperate groups as the living species, and the whole fauna presents an association of animals unknown in existing nature. If reference be made to the map it will be seen that the northern and southern groups are closely intermingled over France and Germany and the British Isles, while to the north is a zone free from southern animals, and to the south a similar zone extending from the Alps and Pyrenees southwards over the Mediterranean area, free from the northern species. The temperate group is common to all three zones.

The singular association of northern and southern species may be explained by their occupation of the same feeding-grounds at various seasons of the year. In the hot continental summer the southern animals would be tempted northwards, and in the severe continental winter the northern beasts would be driven to the south, as in North America and in Asia at the present day. The great range in latitude, however, of the common feeding-grounds cannot be explained only by seasonal migration. It finds its solution in the great secular changes in climate marked by the glaciers and the glacial deposits. With each oscillation of climate the frontier between the northern and southern groups shifted, until it traversed the whole area, not in one season, but in a period of immeasurable length. Osborn's view that the animals did not live in the same place at the same time, but in separate glacial and interglacial periods, is negatived by the examination of their remains. In twenty-two out of thirty-one caves in Britain the teeth-marks on the gnawed bones prove that the reindeer was part of the food of the spotted hyena of Africa. In the hyena-dens of Kirkdale in Yorkshire and Cefn near St. Asaph, the reindeer, the hippopotamus, the lion, the ancient elephant, and Mercks rhinoceros were eaten at approximately the same time, though perhaps at different seasons, by the same pack of hyenas. In all cases

the kill was dragged into the caves and eaten promptly, certainly not after a glacial or interglacial interval of many centuries. The two groups are mingled in the caves and river deposits over the whole of middle Europe. Nor can we agree with Osborn in the view that these animals brought along with them into Europe the climate of their present habitats, whether it be northern, southern or tundra, or steppe, or in dating their migrations by the advance or retreat of the Alpine glaciers.

The incoming of these mammals into Europe gives us the means of classifying the pleistocene river deposits and caves into three subdivisions, shading off into one another without clearly defined boundaries.

III. The late pleistocene, in which the northern and the temperate mammals are the most abundant.

II. The mid-pleistocene, in which the temperate are abundant, the southern groups present, and the northern rare.

I. The early pleistocene, in which the temperate and southern are mingled with survivals from the pliocene age.

Man is represented in all these three divisions by implements that prove him to have been a hunter, or by fragmentary skeletons that tell us his physique. He comes before us in two clearly defined phases of culture, the lower and the upper palæolithic, each subdivided into a series of periods by the French archæologists, that are taken to be of universal application on what appears to us very imperfect evidence. Is it probable that the palæolithic hunters used precisely the same implements at the same time in different regions? We certainly find no similar uniformity in the equipment of modern uncivilised peoples. Were there then no families or tribes too careless or too stupid to get implements up to the general standard—as there are now in every community? Or again, is it likely that the same set of implements would be lost or left behind by the hunter in every cave and river deposit throughout Europe? Until all these questions meet with satisfactory answers it is surely safer to treat all these subdivisions as merely of local application and to refer the question of chronology to a suspense

account. In Britain the lower palæolithic is quite as clearly distinguishable from the upper as in France, but the intimate association of the implements characteristic of the French periods in the same stratum shows that they were in use in Britain at approximately the same time.*

The lower palæolithic races lived in Europe in all these divisions of the pleistocene period, while the upper palæolithics appear only in the late pleistocene as invading tribes with better implements and higher physique, and intelligence immeasurably greater. The lower palæolithic implements are of stone, and very roughly chipped, although some were better made than others. The lower types, however, were not abandoned. They were mainly used in the hand. There were flakes for cutting, scrapers for preparing wood and skins, choppers and axes for various purposes. Some of the smaller pointed flints may have been used for the heads of javelins or spears. Arrows were apparently unknown. There are no implements of bones or antler with the solitary exception of a club made of the thigh-bone of an elephant used by the Piltdown hunters. Wood was probably used for clubs and other purposes, but all traces of these have perished.

With this poor equipment the lower palæolithic hunter or ' river drift man ' held his own in the struggle for life with the wild beasts over a large portion of the old world. He lived on the reindeer and most of the other pleistocene beasts in Britain and in France, and he was a contemporary of the southern elephant in Spain. He followed the migratory animals as they swung to and fro, north and south, on the great pleistocene continent, extending from Africa to the glacier-crowned mountains of northern Britain and Scandinavia. In Egypt his camping-places have been met with on the high plateau overlooking Thebes, and in Palestine in the river gravels between Jerusalem and Bethelem, as well as in those of the Deccan in India. Throughout this wide region he was in the same low stage of culture, using the same implements in hunting in the forests of Europe and in

* If there be any doubt as to this it will be removed by a visit to the Sedgwick Museum in Cambridge, or to the Manchester Museum in Manchester. In both all the associated types in each locality are shown instead of the hyper-selected types generally to be seen elsewhere.

the luxuriant vegetation of the tropics. It may be inferred from this wide distribution over three continents that the lower palæolithic type of human culture lasted for a very long period, for otherwise it would have been impossible for it to have been spread by wandering tribes over such vast distances. It was probably evolved in the warmer regions of Asia or perhaps Africa, and brought into Europe by the hunters who followed the migrating southern mammals.

We must now consider the physique of the lower palæolithic hunters. The discovery, by Dawson in 1912, of a broken human skull and mandible, in the old river gravels of Piltdown, near Lewes, proves that man had found his way to the south of England in the early phase of the pleistocene marked by the presence of the red deer, and in the lower palæolithic stage of culture indicated by the rude flint implements of chellean type.

The skull, as Smith Woodward tells us in his 'Guide,' is 'essentially human,' with large face and snub nose, narrow forehead without strong brow ridges, with crown low and flattened and the back of the head low and broad, indicating a thick neck. The great breadth of the back of the head as compared with the forehead and some other minor characters suggests a connexion with the higher apes. The mandible, on the other hand, presents a remarkable predominance of simian over human attributes, the molars being human, while in the shape of the canines, and their projection above the general level of the teeth, in the absence of a chin, and in other points, it is referable to the chimpanzee. It indicates also that the lower portion of the face was modelled on the coarse outlines of that animal. The cast of the brain cavity taken from the reconstructed skull shows, according to Elliot Smith, the most primitive and most ape-like human brain hitherto discovered, but with a capacity far larger than in any of the apes, and larger than that of the Australian natives. From all this it is clear that this strange being, aptly named Eoanthropus—the man of the dawn—by Smith Woodward, had acquired the human brain before he had lost the large simian face, and that he still retained his canines as weapons, although he was provided by his increased intelligence with implements that enabled him to hold his own in the struggle for life.

The discovery of a mandible, in 1907, at Mauer, near Heidelberg, in a river deposit, along with remains of animals belonging

to the fauna of the Forest bed of Norfolk, established the presence of a second tribe (*Homo Heidelbergensis*) also in the early pleistocene age. It is remarkable for massiveness, for the large size of the teeth, the reduction of the canines to the same level as the rest of the teeth as in modern races, and for the absence of the chin. In this combination of characters it is closely allied to the Neanderthal race, and is taken by Osborn, Keith, and Boule to have been an ancestral form, or primitive variety.

These types of mankind are represented only by one specimen in Britain and Germany. The third, represented by the *Homo Neanderthalensis*—the man of the cave of Neanderthal, near Düsseldorf—spread far and wide over Europe, from the valley of the Danube, through Germany and France and Spain, and as far as Gibraltar. The skull is characterised everywhere by a heavy, projecting mandible, large face with sunken eye-sockets, strong brow ridges, snub nose with wide nostrils, and retreating forehead; the chin is absent, or represented by a mere rudiment. The cranium is long and flattened, and the brain cavity larger than in the average modern European. We would refer to Osborn for further details. In his restoration, the Neanderthal man is represented with an enormous head and short neck, bent forward into the same curvature as the back. He was small in stature, the tallest male being five feet five inches, and the shortest female four feet four inches. In many points the type is nearer to the higher apes than to modern man. It occurs in association with Mousterian implements, in the caves of Spy in Belgium, in La Chapelle-aux-Saints in south-western France, and in Krapina, near Agram in Austria.

These three lower palæolithic tribes, differing from each other in varying degrees, are distinct from modern types of mankind, and bridge over the interval separating them from the higher apes. There is no reason to suppose that they were evolved in Europe. According to Smith Woodward the Eoanthropus represents the true line of the descent of man, from the stem common to him and the existing apes, and he agrees with Osborn in looking at the Neanderthal type as an extinct and degenerate branch from the same stem.

It is further to be noted that in the tropics the *Pithecanthropus erectus* found in 1891 by Dr. Dubois in a river deposit at Trinil in Java is also one of the missing links. This is, how-

ever, essentially an ape with the large brain and erect posture of man rather than a man with affinities with the apes. It belonged to a fauna compounded of living and extinct species, and may be referred to the same geological horizon as the Piltdown or the Heidelberg man.

The present writer is unable to accept the view advanced by Keith that modern man—*Homo sapiens*—was a contemporary of any of these palæolithic races. It is mainly founded on the occurrence of human remains in glacial deposits at Ipswich (Keith, c. xii.) and in the mid-pleistocene brick earth of Galley Hill near Gravesend (c. x.), which are taken to be of the same age as the deposits in which they rest. Both are cases of burial, and both, as pointed out by Duckworth, have the characters of modern skeletons in graveyards, and cannot be dated in the absence of tombstones. The other finds taken to prove the presence of modern man not only in the lower palæolithic stage of the pleistocene period but also in the pliocene are unsatisfactory, and largely consist of burials of uncertain age. Modern man belongs to a later stage of evolution than that of the Neanderthal, the last of the three extinct tribes inhabiting Europe in the lower palæolithic stage of the pleistocene period.

We pass now to the incoming of modern man, *Homo sapiens*. The human skeletons associated with upper palæolithic implements leave no doubt as to the superior physique and brain-power of the invading tribes, as compared with the above extinct races. The tribe of Cro-magnon, so called from the cave of that name in the Dordogne, was physically and mentally the equal of any existing European people, and reached its finest development in the Riviera, where the average stature of six skeletons from the caves was no less than 6 feet 1½ inch. In other places it is less, as in the burials at Ober-Cassel, near Bonn, where the male was 5 feet 3 inches and the female 5 feet 1 inch. The main characters of the skulls are the lofty and well-arched forehead, with moderate brow ridges, narrow prominent nose, high cheek-bones, short face, and well-developed chin. All these are verified by the human statuettes left behind by the late palæolithic dwellers in the caves of the south of France. The skulls are also remarkable for the combination of a long head with face broad and short that characterises the Eskimo. Indeed the identity of form of a skull found in the cave of Chancelade, in

Dordogne, with those of the Eskimos, recognised by Testut in 1888, has been confirmed by Sollas, and is beyond dispute. It is therefore probable that the tall as well as the short tribes in France represented by the Cro-magnon and Chancelade remains are the ancestors of the modern Eskimos, who have been dwarfed by the severe conditions of Arctic life. This view, as will be seen presently, is supported by further evidence.

The place in ethnology of the two skeletons assigned by Verneau to the 'race de Grimaldi' is uncertain, and should be put to a suspense account, while the round skulls found in the cave of Furfooz and in the burial-ground of Offnet are later than the pleistocene deposits in which they have been buried, and belong to the existing Alpine race.

In dealing with the upper palæolithic caves Osborn follows the French classification into distinct periods, the Aurignacian, the Solutrean, the Magdalenian, and the Azilian. The sequence of these is clear in some of the French caves, but it does not follow that they are equally applicable to the whole of Europe. Nor can they be distinguished from one another by the associated mammalia, because the animals found in refuse-heaps must vary according to the varying habitat of the animals that happened to be caught by the hunters. The first three periods are closely linked together, and are phases of one type of culture, while the fourth or Azilian, as pointed out by Parkyn, is neolithic, and is characterised by the domestic animals, cultivated plants, and implements belonging to that well-defined phase of prehistoric life. In the British caves the implements of all three occur together in the same refuse-heap, and obviously were in use in the same camp.

We now turn to the equipment of the upper palæolithic hunters. The stone implements are immeasurably better than before, as might be expected from the higher intelligence of their makers, and were differentiated, according to their increasing needs, into tools of various kinds, for piercing, cutting, sawing, engraving and carving. With these better tools, better implements, ornaments, and weapons were cut not only out of wood, which has perished, but out of bone, antler, and ivory, and frequently adorned with the figures of the wild animals and other designs. In these we find the true dawn of art, that gradually developed in southern France and northern Spain into the wonderful engravings, sculptures,

and paintings that decorate the roofs and walls of the caves, converting them into veritable picture galleries, illustrating the daily life of the hunters. In Parkyn's book the reader will find an excellent account of these things, with accurate references to the works of all the French explorers. He will also find that they are assigned to their true place in the history of art in Europe.

The animals figured by the artists prove the strange mixture of the late pleistocene fauna. When we see, for example, in the Magdalenian cave of the Font de Gaume processions of woolly mammoths (Parkyn, pl. viii.) and sketches of woolly rhinoceros (fig. 109) and reindeer, bison, urus, and others, it is evident that all of these animals were living in the Dordogne in the closing phase of the pleistocene. The frescoes of Combarelles add the cave bear (fig. 100) to the same group. It therefore follows that the classification of the French refuse-heaps by the presence (1) of the cave-bear, (2) of the mammoth, and (3) of the reindeer must be abandoned. The red deer also, supposed to mark a period later than the reindeer, is proved by the pictures in the cave of Altamira to have been hunted in Spain by tribes in exactly the same stage of artistic culture as those that followed the reindeer in the plains of southern France, the Pyrenees being the boundary between the habitats of the two animals. The great majority of figures are those of the temperate and northern groups, while the southern is solely represented by the lion.

The designs vary in artistic merit, some being feeble, while others rise to a very high quality, in which the chief points of the animal are represented with the utmost truth and freedom. The horse, for example, is sculptured in the act of grinning, neighing with open mouth, or alert with pricked-up ears. On one small slab of stone the artist has caught, with his graving tool, the moment when two mobs of startled horses have wheeled round, each with a master stallion in front. There is also a remarkable figure of a horse, painted in a few bold strokes after the manner of Phil May. Among the masterpieces we may note the woolly rhinoceros painted in strong red lines, the herd of mammoths painted and engraved on the walls of the Font de Gaume, the reindeer quietly grazing, found on a fragment of antler in the cave of Kesserloch (Fig. 69), and the wonderful fresco of bisons and other animals

on the roof of the cave of Altamira, occupying a space no less than 46 feet long (Fig. 126).

It is impossible by mere description to do justice to the mural decorations in the caverns, carried out in the dark chambers and passages by the dim light of a stone lamp filled with grease. There are animals on the walls and roof painted in red, yellow, and black. In some the outlines are simply emphasised by colour, in others the whole body is painted and sometimes shaded. The colours employed were probably in the first instance used for personal adornment. Apparently simple lines were first used, then came painting in one tint and the shading of the whole figure, and finally red, yellow, and black were combined together to form the polychromes of the frescoes.

Some caves are adorned with horses and deer, carved out of stalactite. In a cave in the Ariège, two bisons (pl. vii.), modelled out of clay, rested upon a rock in the middle of the chamber; one was finished, and the other was in process of completion, with finger-marked balls of kneaded clay close at hand. The artist had been interrupted, and by little less than a miracle the chamber was left undisturbed and unvisited until 1912, when it was broken into by Count Bégouen. There may have been similar life-like clay models of animals in other caves that have perished.

It is probable that all this decoration in places where it could only be seen by lamp light was due to the caverns having been inhabited by shamans or medicine men. It is not likely that it was prompted by any other than a religious motive. That the belief in the world of spirits was then held is proved by the burial of the dead with their equipment for life in the future world.

Carvings similar to those of the caves are also met with in the open air. In the valley of the Beune (Dordogne) a procession of horses in high relief and nearly life-size forms a frieze, while in a neighbouring rock-shelter are four human bas-reliefs carved on blocks of limestone.

The evidence of the French caves is conclusive that the arts of engraving, painting, and sculpture appear simultaneously in the Aurignacian or beginning of the upper palæolithic culture-period, and arrived at their zenith in the Magdalenian or concluding phase. They probably were introduced from some

other region, and arrived at their greatest development in the south of France and the north of Spain. Modelling in soft material and the representation of form by simple lines were probably invented first, then painting with shaded colours and engraving, and lastly sculpture out of hard materials such as stone, teeth, and ivory.

We have already seen that the Cro-magnon tribes were physically closely related to the Eskimos. This relationship is confirmed by a comparison of the whole suite of their implements, ornaments, and weapons with those now in use by that people. They are practically the same in the south of France and in the Arctic Circle. The modes of hunting are the same. The art differs only in its being more highly developed in the caves of France, Spain, and Switzerland, as might be expected from the easier conditions of life in Europe. A further and more powerful argument is presented by the distribution of upper palæolithic refuse-heaps through Germany and Russia into north-eastern Siberia, where the same animals, both living and extinct, were hunted as in France. Still further to the north-east are similar refuse-heaps as yet unexplored as far as Behring's Straits and the land now inhabited by the Eskimos. For these reasons it is probable that the upper palæolithic hunter retreated from Europe along with the Arctic animals to the Arctic regions, and without leaving behind any traces of his existence in Europe in the succeeding prehistoric period. On this latter point the reader may be referred to the latter half of Parkyn's book.

As noted above, there were at the beginning of the pleistocene period profound geographical changes preceding the migration of new animals from Africa and Asia. At the end of that period there was a similar revolution, that brought about the present relation of land to sea. In the south the Mediterranean became united with the Black Sea and the Atlantic. It flowed over the lower grounds, converting the hills into islands, Sardinia, Corsica, Malta, Sicily, Cyprus, Crete, and the rest. On the side of the Atlantic also there was a depression, similar but not so great, by which Britain was severed from the Continent, and Ireland from Britain. Coincident with this change the characteristic pleistocene mammalia disappeared from Europe, leaving behind only those which could adapt themselves to the changed conditions of life. The magnitude of these changes,

measured by our short human experience, implies that the interval between the pleistocene and the succeeding prehistoric period was of vast duration. It is a definite barrier between the retreating upper palæolithic hunters and the incoming neolithic farmers and herdsmen, who brought into Europe with them the domestic animals and cultivated fruits, and many arts which form the basis of our present civilisation. There is no evidence, as Parkyn points out, of transition from the one form of human culture to the other. The contrast in art could hardly be greater. In the neolithic art we find only simple curves and right lines, without any trace of the artistic study of nature. In that of the bronze age these are repeated and reinforced by various mechanical designs in middle and northern Europe. In the Mediterranean region, however, Minoan art belonging to that age has all the upper palæolithic freedom and movement, although there is no reason to suppose that there was any connexion between them. The art of the prehistoric iron age is also conventional and owes its beauty to the flowing lines, that are only half revealed in nature.

It now remains for us to sum up the results of this inquiry. They are as follows:

1. The antiquity of man is proved to be very great because of the series of geographical and biological changes, immeasurable in terms of years, that have happened since he appeared in Europe.

2. Man's antiquity cannot be brought into relation with the Christian era.

3. Lower palæolithic man is represented in Europe by three extinct forms, all more or less related to the higher apes.

4. The modern man, *Homo sapiens*, does not appear until the upper palæolithic or concluding phase of the pleistocene period.

5. He shows high artistic qualities and great brain capacity.

6. He is probably represented by the Eskimos.

7. There is no trace of any connexion between upper palæolithic and neolithic art.

8. The invasion of Europe by the ancestors of the present inhabitants began in the neolithic phase of the prehistoric period.

W. Boyd Dawkins.

RUSSIAN HOPES AND AIMS

WE find ourselves in an alliance which was only anticipated by very few. It is an alliance with a country which, not many years ago, was generally regarded as our natural enemy. This alliance has, however, in the working proved to be one of the most thorough-going and whole-hearted that history has known. Alliances are temporary unions of variously interested States against the pretensions or the fortune of a third party, and ordinarily the closer one examines the working of them the more one sees of jealousy and the less of co-operation. This alliance on the contrary—as will certainly be seen when its history can be written—becomes the more creditable and convincing the more one knows of its actual working ; the further one goes into detail the better it bears examination. This would be quite impossible unless the time had been ripe for it, and unless it rested on a community of national aspirations and interests that reached beyond the scope of the present war. It could not be what it is if it depended only on the will of the rulers, for the time being, of the two countries It is what it is because in the broadest sense it is an alliance with the whole Russian people.

One of our chief preoccupations must be the safeguarding and strengthening of this alliance, just as the only hope of the enemy is that he may succeed in breaking it up. With regard to the Russian people England is not only very ignorant but also retains a number of the crudest misconceptions. The war is educating us with amazing rapidity ; but we have ever so much lee-way to make up, and there is a certain time-limit. We have got to be on terms with our subject before the time comes for making peace. If we succeed in this, the peace of Europe will be secured by an intelligent understanding in England of the primary interests and aspirations of Russia—for Russia already knows what it is essential that she should know about England. If, on the other hand, we are not in time, it is unlikely that any satisfactory peace

will be made at all, for Germany will have plenty of opportunities of spoiling it at the birth. For this reason I think it is worth trying to say, as plainly and as shortly as I can, how I understand the attitude of the Russian people toward the war, and what in Russia is hoped or expected of it.

To start with—this war is national in Russia because it is a war against the German ; I say, against the German, because the German is all over the interior of Russia, as well as on the western frontier, blocking the contact which Russia seeks with Western Europe. And we must not forget that this is the Prussian side of Germany, and that the actual frontier is the most Prussian part of Prussia ; for East Prussia is the very nest of Junkertum, of militarism, of class aloofness, of racial domination. The only thing that is quite like it is the German domination in the Baltic provinces, which are a part of Russia itself. It is East Prussia that fixes the standard of things German for Russia. It is not the genial farmer or industrious trader of Baden or Westphalia ; it is the very cream of Prussian swagger and brutality that sets the tone for the whole outlook of the Russian people on Germany as a State. Indeed it is the complete triumph of Prussian-ness over Germanity that we have witnessed in the present war.

In England the German feels that he must behave as a guest. In Russia he runs rampant among a people whose large humanity is to him silly and contemptible. The Russian is much too gentle to cope with him, and he knows it. A current sketch shows a worthy old official in a cocked hat trying to pull up by the hair a sort of man-octopus called 'German bullying' that has a hundred tentacles deeply imbedded in Russian soil. It is a task that can only be attempted by the nation as a whole ; it is a task of national emancipation. Why Germany, by provoking war, should have given Russia the present opportunity of emancipation is not easy to understand. The only possible explanation is that she was quite sure that the Russian Government would climb down, and not take up the challenge of her ultimatum. But the opportunity having been given, there is hardly a Russian who does not wish to see it utilised to the full—to the final removal of the 'iron fist at home.' This is why the mob wrecked the palatial German Embassy in Petrograd

and hurled its bronze horses on to the square below, realising that from this building had been started a strike propaganda among the Russian workmen in order to tie Russia's hands at the moment of the German challenge.

The German is well known to the Russian people ; he meets them at every turn, and always as a kind of deputy master. He is the small trader, the petty official in charge, the under-steward of the estate, the foreman or manager, the senior clerk, the head of the chancellery, the chief constable, the big capitalist, the Governor or Deputy-Governor, the Minister, or the powerful courtier. Field-Marshal Yermolov, on being asked by Nicholas I. how his Sovereign could further show his approval of him, replied ' By making me a ' German, Sir.' When the reactionaries were defending Stolypin's field courts-martial as a patriotic institution, the Labour leader Bulat read out the names of the presidents of these courts, who were nearly all German. At the beginning of the war, Purishkevich, a reactionary who is at any rate Russian and sincerely patriotic, telegraphed from Poland, ' Warsaw ' is occupied by the Germans,' and giving a list of the chief Russian officials there, he showed that they were nearly all Germans. It has even happened during the war that the Germans on occupying Polish towns have re-installed as German officials, Germans who had served in the same towns as Russian officials. Incidentally the German administrator in Russia has often taken no pains to conceal his contempt of those whom he rules. Everywhere the German has stood between the State and the people, between Russia and herself.

Nowhere has this been clearer than in what is specially called ' politics.' The aim of the Germans in Russia was that Russia should never be allowed to find a voice of her own. As courtiers and as executors of orders they had a hold on the administration of the Empire which would necessarily be endangered by any national assembly. In Russia the cause of patriotism and the cause of national representation go hand in hand, and almost the only enemy of either is the German interloper. One of the chief protests against the institution of the Duma was written by a Baltic German (Herr Schwanebach) in German, and was sent by him to the German Emperor. According to the reactionaries of Russia, the one prop of autocracy in Europe is the Emperor William,

and he is not likely to underdo the part. The same reason helps to explain why the Duma, though it has nine parties and has varied very much in composition, has nearly always succeeded in maintaining a certain solidarity.

In the long absence of representative institutions in Russia, the history of the country is more pre-eminently concerned with economic problems than elsewhere ; and it was on the economic life of Russia that the Germans had their strongest grip. Latterly they were at all the best points of vantage, and they were regarded even by the peasant as having bled Russia. The tariff treaty which they forced on Russia during the Japanese War was nothing short of economic bondage.

It was the Japanese war that gave the occasion for the creation of the Duma, in answer to a united protest of almost the whole population. In so far as the creation of the Duma indicated a revolution, it failed ; as a step forward towards reform and a national policy it was most important. The creation of the Duma was in line with Russia's past. There had been national assemblies at the beginning of the Romanov period, before Peter the Great had set the example of administration by foreigners ; and since 1865 there had been elective county and town councils, which had served as schools of responsible administration.

After its first failures, the Duma took up the patriotic ground of demanding a liquidation of the causes that had led to disaster in the Japanese War. Whatever its limitations the Duma was a voice, a tribune, and the speeches made in it had free circulation. The power of criticising the Budget, however restricted, was a very real one, and would have been valuable even if the Duma had been exclusively composed of ex-Ministers, ex-officials, and courtiers. With criticism of the Budget the way was inevitably opened to criticism of everything else. The Duma Committees had a right to demand information from the Government and explanations from Ministers or their representatives. That these were given to a body representative of the whole House behind closed doors added to their value, for this created a school both for Duma and for Ministers. Every Minister was interested in getting his credits through the House, and therefore in part dependent on political leaders who commanded votes. Further every Minister, in a Cabinet subject

to internal quarrels, desired personal success in the Duma. As a result there were all sorts of informal conferences between Ministers and leaders of parties, and of necessity much more account was taken of public opinion than before. Above all, the Duma greatly lessened the importance of the rival extremists—the reactionaries and the revolutionaries—who, before its establishment, had, by dint of shouting, held the stage and pretended that there was no one else in Russia. The Duma provided a club where the best men in the country got to know each other, and to learn how little they disagreed as soon as they had some practical question to settle. It gave the lie to the fashionable fiction of office-holders that the alternative to absolutism was a social revolution; it proved that the real Russia was moderate, reasonable, loyal, and capable of self-government. This became all the clearer when the best of the officials began to fuse with the Duma world, and the best of the Ministers set themselves to win its confidence.

But all this was not enough to launch a new period. It was either too little or too much. The question of the nation's participation in law-making was not decided—it was only in course of decision. And while the settlement of this main issue hung fire, the very existence of the Duma made the country more conscious of the great mass of legislative arrears which required to be dealt with. One first-class reform was indeed achieved, though more by the initiative of the Prime Minister, Mr. Stolypin, than by that of the Duma. Peasants were enabled to convert their communal holdings into farms of their own; and it is not too much to say that the creation of a propertied class of farmers was the beginning of a new and altogether more prosperous rural Russia. By the united efforts of the Government and Duma the army was made more efficient; an impulse was also given to the development of facilities for public instruction, which were far behind the demands of the country.

But, with the position of the Duma itself unfixed, all sorts of major questions which ought almost to have settled themselves were treated as controversial and as involving conflicts of principle. As time went on, the opinion of the majority of the Duma on most of these questions became more or less clearly defined, but it could not express itself in legislation;

even a unanimous Duma could not necessarily settle anything. And often the expression of public opinion only led to the opposite of what the public wanted. The anti-Duma section of Ministers fought the Duma on principle ; but there was no ' heroism of reaction,' no hard and fast reactionary policy—it was no more than a flow of cross-currents.

Meanwhile the rudderless country drifted its own way, and its way of drifting was to grow beyond all recognition. In consequence of the rural reform establishing individual in place of communal property in land, both country and towns were enriched. For twenty years previously the development of the enormous resources of Russia had been rapid and wholesale, but the rate of development was now immensely increased. Nothing calls so loudly for efficient administration as the creation of propertied interests. Such interests, big and small, were being created on all sides, and the great influx of foreign capital made it all the more imperative that internal order should be established. In the confusion the country was at the mercy of anyone with enterprise. Strong in their training and equipment and in their ties with the authorities, the Germans made haste to secure all the strategic points of the new Russia. A great country cannot be governed like a farm, through household officials or chance advisers ; and it cannot be left without any direction at all. At the time when the Duma was created the leaders of trade and industry federated themselves into a General Council, and the deliberations of this Council, which were very practical, came to have more and more importance. Moscow, the home of obscurantism in trade policy, became cautiously progressive ; Petrograd, Warsaw, and South Russia needed no conversion. But all this movement only increased the number of questions that clamoured for settlement ; and the first of them all was a national direction of the nation's economic policy.

Another profoundly national instinct demanded a quite new foreign policy. In his well-known book on the Far East, Prince Ukhtomsky practically says to the young Russian, ' Forget about Europe and constitutions : go to Siberia ' and rule Asia.' Mr. Stolypin, in a talk with me, once complained that the young Russian did not wish to go and serve in Siberia. Prince Ukhtomsky said more : ' The ideas for

'which I have stood are dead and buried.' The hopes of the Russian nation took a quite different direction ; it sought contact with Europe, and it interested itself before all things in the fortunes of its kinsmen and co-religionists of the Balkans. It is to Germany that Russians ascribe the impulse that sent Russia wandering afield to Manchuria and Corea, presumably because Germany herself wanted a free hand in the Balkans. It was the growth of the population and the enormous potential economic strength of Russia that frightened Germany, and made her hurry to secure her own anti-national settlement of Balkan conditions.

Meanwhile England was still obsessed with the belief that Russia threatened Constantinople and British communications with India. Yet Baron Marschall von Bieberstein was then doing what Russia had never attempted, and England was being asked to provide money for a Bagdad Railway which was to remain under German control. Russian writers and public men were more clear-headed than ourselves. They saw their ideal in the Balkans, their enemy in Germany, their friend in England. What they wanted to do was not to enslave the Balkans but to strengthen by Russian help and protection the smaller Slavonic nationalities in their struggle against economic, cultural, and political absorption by Germany and by her junior partner Austria. In framing this policy the Russians were following the direction of their national strength, for the population and economic forces of Russia have long been rapidly gravitating southwards. They even dreamed of the liberation of the Slavs of Austria, who amount to three-fifths of the population of that Empire. Finally the Russians hoped to close their long duel with the Turk by driving him from Europe, and to hold in Constantinople the capital of their Church and the natural outlet of their Empire to Western Europe.

All this policy rests on live facts, and is therefore simple and convincing. The policy is admirably expounded in a remarkable essay, 'A Great Russia,' by Professor Peter Struve, a very original thinker on political problems.* Other leading public men of Russia had come to the same conclusion.

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* Printed in 'Russian Thought,' and translated in the 'Russian Review.'

It was one of the ties that united nearly all the Duma men, Conservative or Liberal. It united them against Germany, and it united them in favour of England. This policy also demanded a more liberal settlement of the Polish question ; for how could the other Slavs be convinced of the good intentions of Russia while there was this open sore within the Russian Empire ? Thus the Poles joined with the Russians in the new Slavonic movement of Liberal Imperialism. But this again meant enmity to Germany ; for the natural outcome of the Liberal Imperialist policy would be the reunion of all Poland ; whereas the friendship between reactionary Russia and reactionary Prussia had been grounded on the partition of Poland, and was maintained by the common policy that Poland should rise no more. There were a number of New Slavonic Congresses in Petrograd, in Sofia, in Prague, which Germany and Austria roughly interrupted by the annexation of Slavonic Bosnia and Herzegovina. Russia, then still suffering from the Japanese War, let the mailed fist decide ; but war with Germany became inevitable.

These were the conditions that made natural and necessary in Russia a broad national understanding with England. At every point England came into the programme. England was the model in constitutionalism ; England was the alternative ally in the economic sphere ; England was the friend of small States and the champion of national rights ; England upheld the standard of Liberal Imperialism. All these things, and not least the by no means accidental similarity between the two Churches, had to be borne in mind by any Englishman working for the friendship of Russia. The friendship had to be between the two nations, and not merely between sections of them ; and what two nations had a broader basis for such a friendship ? In 1907 the two Governments signed an agreement as to Persia. In 1908 was founded the semi-official Russo-British Chamber of Commerce. In 1909 Great Britain gave strong support to Russian diplomacy in the Bosnian crisis. In the same year the leaders of six Russian parties were entertained in England ; and in 1912 a number of representative Englishmen were given an historic welcome in Russia. Meanwhile there was a constant and deepening stream of communications of all kinds. English books on Russia began to reach a much higher level.

The wonderful outburst of enthusiasm at the beginning of the war was founded on all that had gone before. It could not have been otherwise. All the things that Russia most wished for were closely linked together, and here was the promise, as it seemed, of the simultaneous satisfaction of all these aspirations. No wonder this was for Russia a religious war; it was a war of thanksgiving, and the Russian people, humble and sincere, were ready for all sacrifices with such ends in sight. This deep satisfaction, this simple harmony of all that was herself, of all her dearest instincts, came like a wonder. It was the greatest thing which the war gave to Russia. It reincarnated, in the person of the reigning Emperor, the sovereign majesty of Russia, the idea of that traditional and intimate unity, seldom realised but always cherished, that bound the whole rich and varied world of Russia to the sovereign leader of the people.

The war of itself, by the simple force of facts, brought within reach of fulfilment all these hopes. The same enemy was the enemy of everything. At the bottom of Germany's attitude toward Russia lies a deep contradiction, the hopelessness of uniting the desire to hurt with the desire to exploit, the hopelessness of complete victory in war, and the equal hopelessness of a complete peaceful domination. These things were reflected by every phase of the war. They explain why crushing blows of artillery were almost immediately followed by suggestions of peace from the apparent victor. The fundamental fact has remained throughout stronger and more fateful than any of the phases of the war; and the fundamental fact is this, that by beginning the war Germany at one blow wrecked all her long work of internal domination in Russia, smashed all her own machinery, and was left only with the hope of being able to pick up after the war the fragments of wreckage and turning them once more into an efficient instrument for the policy which she had so foolishly abandoned. The haste and headiness of the German Emperor had spoilt Russia for Germany. How Professor Schiemann, who is his chief consultant on this subject, could have allowed such a crucial mistake will always remain unintelligible, except that a German from Russia's Baltic provinces is not the best judge of the strength of Russia's spirit and the futility of attempting to bully her. Even throughout the war and in

spite of all the military advantages gained, Germany's one effective instrument has continued to be what remains of her machinery for muddling up the internal affairs of Russia; her Myasoyedov with his spy organisation; her bogus contractors who underbid the genuine offers of others; her delayers of supply and transit; her intimate letters suggesting peace. But nothing, not even the inefficiency of rivals, can make good the *débâcle* of German economic influence in Russia. The war has seen a growing campaign, still violent and excited, but with ever more steady and resolute purpose, against the revival of economic domination under any form or from any quarter. Individual Germans will creep back and make their own affairs. English and other economic enterprises, if not guided by non-English or questionable speculators, will find a great field. But there will remain a permanent warning to all against German conceptions and German methods, and there will rise a new and greater development of Russian industry and commerce, already marked signally enough in conservative Moscow by the collapse of commercial obscurantism and the triumph of an enlightened and progressive trade policy.

The war with Germany and the collapse of German influence in Russia at once showed themselves in a new vigorous initiative on the part of the Russian public and in the increased importance of its voice, the Duma. The first war session of the Duma was unique: loyalty and initiative were now one and the same thing; in fact, there could now be no true loyalty without initiative for the winning of the war. The expression of the Russian public in war-time is the civil Red Cross, and members of the Duma streamed into this organisation, occupying very many of the most responsible places. Without this full co-operation of the public, which the Premier welcomed and invited, it would have been quite impossible to deal with the enormous number of wounded. The Zemstvo Union and the Union of Towns, always regarded as organs for the claim of the public to a further participation in public affairs, were now invited to work side by side with the Government, first in Red Cross work and later in the supply of munitions. At the front, by the force of facts, the line drawn between the military and the civil Red Cross disappeared of itself, and Red Cross and army came everywhere to

be parts of one whole. There is now a vast system of official war committees of all kinds, on which the Duma members and other representatives of the public play a prominent part. It was impossible that all this should be without significance in a country where, before the war, the unanimous cry was for an extension of public initiative.

The crisis in army equipment and the enormous losses of brave men in Galicia and Poland brought a period of grave anxiety for the internal tranquillity of Russia. You cannot send cripples by thousands all over the country, with the inevitable story of unequipment, without deeply stirring the public mind. The existing arrangements were proved to be quite inadequate ; the rear had become as important as the front ; and the full forces of the country were required to turn reverse into victory. The public asked that the Duma should be summoned and that the Ministry should be so reconstituted as to deserve its complete confidence. Then took place a political development which had long been anticipated, even in peaceful times, only on a larger scale than had been expected. The six central groups of the Duma, which would correspond to almost every opinion that counts in English politics, joined together in a new 'Progressive Block.' Outside the Block there remained hardly any considerable sections of opinion. The most striking feature was that, apart from the war needs, the Block was able to put forward a united programme on all political questions of primary importance.

The issuing of this programme proved to be a misfortune. The Duma was summoned, and some unsatisfactory Ministers were replaced. But the Premier, against whom the public movement was principally directed, was able to change the ground of the controversy. Clearly the time of the country could not be taken up with the settlement of so many first-class questions while the war had yet to be won. The Duma did not in fact press its programme, and its protest was in essence an appeal for efficient war work. But the Premier, who was himself on trial for inability to deal with this task, was able to appear as the champion of concentration of all energies on the war. The Duma was prorogued, and the next Ministerial changes took an opposite direction. This crisis was ended, however, by the appointment of a new Premier,

by the re-summoning of the Duma, and by the impressive visit of the Emperor to that body, the first he had ever paid. There will be no more talk of an extra-war programme of legislation in time of war; the nation, through its representatives in the Duma, is at one with the Sovereign. There will be other ups and downs; but the very fact that the Ministers have been changed so frequently as to rob them of personal weight has added much to the importance and stability of the Duma.

The first economic demand of Russia is emancipation from German economic domination. The second is a full and free initiative within Russia for the development of her own economic resources. For this it is essential that official tutelage should in general give place to local effort. The Duma represents this principle, and the broadening and extension of the system of local government is one of the chief articles in the programme of the Block. Already, during the war, the creation of an additional smaller unit of local government, the canton, which had been asked for since 1904, is conceded in principle by the new Premier as a pressing war need—if only to deal with the great mass of local business for refugees, regulation of agriculture, army supply and transport. The big business men who sit on the semi-official but elective Council of all the trades and industries of Russia have for many years been calling for an extension of public initiative in the field of commerce.

Russia has grown bigger and richer. Moscow is full of business and life. As already pointed out, the economic flow of Russian energy and population is southward towards the Balkans. The conquest of Eastern Galicia was the conquest of a long-lost Russian population, and it was the work of their close kinsmen, the Little Russians of the army of Kiev. No wonder the great Russian military success was here; no wonder the conquerors and conquered lived together in fraternity; and no wonder, when heavy artillery upset for a time the course of history, a large number of the inhabitants came away with the retreating Russian army. Again the settlement of the destiny of Constantinople is one of the oldest aspirations of Russian history, but it is also a first need of the new economic Russia. When the Straits are open there will be a free sea road to free and industrial England.

On the other hand, Germany has done everything to organise Austria into a German-controlled economic unit for blocking the economic progress of Russia, and for advancing German domination over the Slavs of the Balkans. The question of the division of spoils of war has raised in Germany the cry for economic union between Germany and Austria. For Russia the legitimate direction of advance, economic and cultural, is the Balkans ; and the maintenance of independent Slav States in the Balkans is the link of common interest and sentiment between Russia and England. Both countries are concerned to prevent after the war the systematic economic penetration of the Turkish Empire by Austria-Germany, and for both the independent Balkan States will be an economic as well as a military rampart.

A further question raised by this war, from its very beginning, is the continued existence of the Austrian State, of whose population three-fifths consist of Slavs crushed under German domination. While Austria was an independent State this question did not arise ; it only arose when Austria became the humble instrument of Prussian ambitions. This question has to be answered before there can be any talk of having fought the war ' to the end.' The liberation of non-German peoples from German control is the only practical solution to the problem of destroying German militarism. The Austrian Slavs anticipated this solution where possible by passing over in large bodies to the side of their liberators—an operation attended with great danger, but the only way open to them of putting on record their national aspirations. The answer of the Germans has been to reduce the Slavonic population of Germany and Austria by every means in their power. The Croats have been left to die of epidemics, untended, in concentration camps. The Poles are fed on half rations. The Serbians have been systematically wiped out. After Austria's invasion of Serbia, there can be no talk of re-establishing the old artificial frontier, which never had any racial significance. There can now be no Serbia but a Greater Serbia, beginning from Croatia, that is from the heart of the artificial empire of Austria. Austrian Germans, when interrogated at the front, freely express their desire to be quit of the Slavs and to join their brethren in Germany, which in the long run no one can

prevent them from doing. What we must prevent is the continued existence of a Germany that controls all the forces and population of a mainly Slavonic Austria. It goes without saying that from Germany itself must be torn the Slavonic provinces of Poland which are necessary to the reconstitution of Polish unity, promised from the Russian throne and only defensible in the future under the aegis of the Russian Empire and army. To take from Prussia that which is not hers, to leave to Germany that which is German, to destroy the fictitious and Germanised unit of Austria—these are the aspirations of the Russian who wishes to see his Slavonic brothers independent from and guaranteed against German domination.

On every issue which I have mentioned it is in the nature of things that the English alliance in war should become an English alliance in peace. To start with, we shall be joint guarantors of the peace which is to be made. But we are much more than that. English influence, which is of a very different kind and very differently exercised, is the wished-for substitute for German influence in Russia. England, without interference in the internal affairs of her ally and friend, will continue to be, as she has been in the past, a model for public effort, initiative, and progress in Russia, where she is as much the kinswoman of the truest conservative instincts as she is the pattern of the best Russian Liberalism. Germany did not understand Russia, and understands less than ever. We did not know Russia, but we are learning and we can understand her.

The gap left in the economic life of Russia by the withdrawal of so many Germans offers a unique opportunity to Englishmen. The pity is that we have made hardly any preparation for filling it, and that we are in danger of seeing an unregulated and confused crush of purely personal interests, directed by dubious middle-men and trampling their narrow path through this fine field of economic and political promise. The common economic interests of the Allies will continue after the war ; and on the Russian side their importance has been so well appreciated that something in the nature of a standing Imperial Commission is being planned to deal with them. It is sincerely to be hoped that we, on our side, shall be no less far-sighted and no less alive to the issues involved. If we take it that the Germans are

to be excluded for our personal profit and that we are free to do as they have done, only with less knowledge and efficiency, we shall make the crudest of mistakes.

The war has had other effects of a more general kind on Anglo-Russian relations. The spirit of England at her best has become a daily study of the keenest interest to our comrades in arms; we have, like our allies, been on trial, through our army, our navy, our war-factories, above all for our character; but though every one of our deficiencies necessarily affected our allies as well as ourselves, we have very greatly gained in the good opinion of Russians by the severe test through which we have passed. It is the whole-heartedness and the sincerity of our co-operation that have stood out above all faults of detail. Besides this, the personal association in war work of so many British officers with the Russian forces, and the presence of the admirably organised Anglo-Russian Hospital in Petrograd, have given Russia a real insight into our English character and methods, such as could hardly have been gained without this war.

BERNARD PARES.

SINN FEIN

1. **The Resurrection of Hungary : a Parallel for Ireland.** Dublin : Duffy, Gill, Sealy Bryers and Walker. 1904.
2. **Labour in Irish History.** By JAMES CONNOLLY. Dublin : Maunsel. 1910.
3. **Literature in Ireland : Studies Irish and Anglo-Irish.** By THOMAS MACDONAGH. Dublin : Talbot Press. 1916.
4. **The Irish at the Front.** By MICHAEL MACDONAGH. With an Introduction by JOHN REDMOND, M.P. Hodder and Stoughton. 1916.
5. **What the Irish Regiments Have Done.** By S. PARNELL KERR. With a Diary of a Visit to the Front by JOHN REDMOND, M.P. Unwin. 1916.
6. **Why is Ireland at War?** By HUGH A. LAW, M.P. Dublin : Maunsel. 1915.

BY way of supplement to the findings of Lord Hardinge's Commission, it is desirable to give some account of the rise of the Sinn Fein movement. By tracing the history of that movement we shall get nearer to an understanding of the sordid tragedy of Easter 1916. The heel of Achilles—we borrow the image from Irish partisans of Germany—was an insignificant part of his frame, but it would have been worth his while to attend to it.

Sinn Fein—*Anglicé* 'Ourselves'—is a movement that in its early stages attracted little attention from any of the recognised political authorities. The Parliamentary Nationalists could hardly be expected to advertise opponents who proclaimed that Parliamentary Nationalism was an elaborate system of conscious and profitable humbug. The animadversions of Irish Unionists were discounted by the fact that to many Irish Unionist politicians one kind of Nationalism is as bad as any other kind. Most Englishmen heard of the thing for the first time in April 1916, and cannot yet pronounce its name aright (Shin Fane). But this strange agitation, which came into being less than eleven years ago, which was never strong enough to maintain a daily paper in Dublin and could not win a seat in any constituency, which was almost unknown

to rural Ireland before 1914, which had not one single leader or adherent of recognised political importance, has been able to inspire an armed Irish rebellion more formidable and more murderous than any since 1798. Commenting upon Sinn Fein when it was not yet two years old, M. Paul Dubois, in his 'L'Irlande Contemporaine,'* described the Separatists as standing for physical force. He puts into their mouths the admission that physical force was at the moment impotent, but adds that in their view

'"Physical force" is not limited to armed resistance or rebellion, but stands for everything outside moral force, from parliamentary obstruction as practised by Parnell, which is precisely the opposite of Parliamentarianism, to the refusal to pay taxes and the "no rent" movement. Besides, though physical force be impossible to-day, will it be so to-morrow? Will not its day come when a great war brings England into conflict with Europe, when Europe will sustain us by force? For this future we must prepare ourselves by propagating in the first place the idea and the necessity of "physical force," and then by strengthening the Irish nation from the moral and the material point of view and practising towards England the policy of exclusion, that is to say, by ignoring her. Sinn Fein! Ourselves Alone!'

This description may be criticised in detail, but the important point is that an acute French critic, who saw point in some of the strictures passed by the Separatists on the Parliamentary Nationalists, regarded the Sinn Fein movement as one that looked to the attainment of fruition by the means of a great European war.

The rivalry between Moderate and Extremist is endemic in any country whose Nationalism takes the form of protest against an existing form of political connexion with another country, and the convenient labels are often misleading.

The modern Irish Extremists are satisfied with no readjustment of mere political machinery, but have in mind the deliberate fostering of what may best be described as a separate national *Kultur*. And in this they stand sharply distinct from the earlier phases of Irish Nationalism. O'Connell was content to take his abstract political ideas from English Whigs. He spoke Irish fluently, but looked on the language as a handicap on the progress of the peasants whom he brought

* Translated by Mr. T. M. Kettle, M.P., Dublin, 1908.

as an active force into the world of British politics. The Fenians of the 'sixties borrowed little but a name from the legendary Fianna, the warriors of prehistoric Ireland. Isaac Butt's Home Rule movement was at its inception very much akin to the movements for responsible government in the Dominions. Parnell knew nothing about Irish history. His agitation became formidable only when Michael Davitt enlisted in its service the agrarian discontent of rural Ireland and established touch with the extreme Irish societies in the United States. The 'eighties in Ireland were a period of *Realpolitik* in its ugliest form, an orgy of boycotting and intimidation, punctuated by murders which the recognised leaders failed to prevent. The ' Bad Times ' have gone, but the demoralisation of rural Ireland due to Land League methods required more than a single generation to become effaced, although the improvement in the material condition of the people has been immense. The sketch of modern Irish history issued by the Nationalist Party in the House of Commons on the 10th of May last is extremely interesting as showing, out of the mouths of Nationalists, how Ireland has prospered in the last thirty years of the Union :

' Two-thirds of the entire land of the country has passed into the hands of the people. . . . Tens of thousands of cottages have been built all over Ireland in which at a moderate rent and with a portion of land the Irish labourers have been transformed from the worst-housed, worst-clothed, and worst-fed class in Europe into the best-housed, the most comfortable, and the most independent body of labourers in the world. . . . There has grown up in some of the most poverty-stricken districts in the North-West, West, and South of Ireland a new Ireland of happy and prosperous homes. . . . In so far as the local government of Ireland is concerned, it has been wrenched from the landlords and is now in entire possession of the people, with chairman and members freely chosen by the people themselves. . . . The tenants in the towns have achieved a charter far in excess of anything ever extended to any city or town of England. . . . Old age pensions have brought comfort and hope to tens of thousands of old men and women.'

But while proclaiming this progress in order to justify its own position the Irish Parliamentary Party has constantly shown a greater anxiety to save the rebels from punishment than to condemn the rebellion. The more closely the record of the Constitutional agitation is studied, the more the student

is reminded of Anatole France's cynical remark : ' Les modérés ' s'opposent toujours modérément à la violence.'

Mr. Redmond's colleagues to-day claim the whole credit for measures of amelioration to which at the time they gave a very lukewarm support. As practical politicians they have been faced by the disagreeable dilemma that unless they procure from Parliament tangible advantages for their constituents their policy of concentrating their activities upon Westminster becomes obviously futile ; while every tangible advantage won tends to make the recipients more contented with the existing political constitution, less inclined for a leap into the dark. The ' happy and prosperous homes ' to which Nationalist politicians now complacently refer are very largely due to the Irish Agricultural Organisation Society, against which they have fought continuously, using every weapon of calumny and misrepresentation, and finding in Mr. Birrell an obedient jackdaw, and in Mr. T. W. Russell a subservient instrument. The realised successes of Parliamentary Nationalism have in fact transformed it from an agitation working against landlordism and Protestant ascendency into an association for the defence of the petty *bourgeoisie* of Ireland. Licensed victuallers, graziers, and village shopkeepers, whose kinsmen are Roman Catholic priests or Nationalist members, now very largely control the local affairs of Ireland. The slum-landlord of Dublin and the gombeen-man of Connaught, by subscribing to Parliamentary funds and professing profound respect for the Roman Catholic Church, make it very difficult for Mr. Redmond's followers to take any step in the direction of social reform. In order to reward the Nationalist shopkeepers Mr. T. W. Russell has been inspired to disparage rural credit societies and to discourage agricultural co-operation. The Department of Agriculture and Technical Instruction, which under Sir Horace Plunkett worked single-mindedly for agricultural Ireland, now takes its orders from urban traders and refuses to prosecute merchants who sell adulterated seed. The Congested Districts Board (transformed by Mr. Birrell's Act of 1909 from the character impressed on it by its founder, Mr. Balfour) is in many respects little better than a sub-committee of the United Irish League.

The plain fact is that the Nationalist Party, which was faced by enormous difficulties and had to contend against

very great odds, could not afford to dispense with the aid of any possible allies. Its first object was to secure Home Rule for Ireland, and its practical policy was to unite up to this point all Irishmen who disliked the Union. What was to follow was, until recently, left vague: the practical minimum on which all could unite was the modification of the present British Constitution. There was room in the party for the Federalist and the Fenian, so long as Home Rule had not been won. There would have been room for all classes but for the agrarian policy which was necessary to enlist the enthusiasm of the farmers. There was and is room for members of all creeds so long as the party is committed to nothing the pursuit of which would alienate the Roman Catholic priesthood. It would be sheer political hypocrisy to blame the Nationalist Party for taking a line which, given the facts of human nature, is in any country practically unavoidable by a political party that aims at the modification of existing institutions. But this extreme comprehensiveness involved the repudiation of any attempt to frame a definite political programme. Since the time of Butt—who was a Federal Imperialist and consequently lost the leadership—the Nationalist Party has never tried to draft a Home Rule Bill.

It was this vagueness as much as the declared Constitutionalism of the party that afforded a target for the shafts of the Extremists. The split over the question of Parnell's leadership led to disillusionment, recrimination, and faction in the ranks which had obeyed his strong hand. The younger Irishmen lost faith in Parliamentarianism: they had to listen to a prolonged outburst of mutual public candour about the personal defects of leading Parliamentarians which made it difficult to retain many illusions as to their representatives at Westminster. But the temporary decay of Parliamentarianism fifteen years ago, unlike the collapse of earlier popular movements, nourished the growth of new plants in the national life of Ireland. The partial eclipse of the Parnellite and Anti-Parnellite stars coincided with the beginning of the literary and dramatic movement inaugurated by Mr. Yeats (the 'Celtic-note drivel,' as uncompromising Gaelic Leaguers amiably term it), the rise of the Co-operative movement under Mr. (now Sir) Horace Plunkett, and the establishment of the Gaelic League. Very few observers

seem to have noticed that actually one-third of Mr. Redmond's followers in the Imperial Parliament to-day are over sixty years of age and just half of them over fifty, while no really influential member of his party except Mr. Joseph Devlin is under the latter age.* Creditable as these facts are to the fidelity of Irish constituents, they show that Parliamentary politics have not attracted the younger men. Mr. Redmond's most able colleagues are men whose political intellects were moulded in the 'eighties and have become stereotyped.

Into this complacent circle the Gaelic League, with its ambitious programme for re-establishing the Irish language,† came in 1893 as a disturbing force. It was uncomfortable for Nationalist members to learn that they themselves had been, although perhaps unintentionally, worshippers at the shrine of 'the demon of Anglicisation.'

The Gaelic League, writes Mr. W. P. Ryan, one of its most able supporters,‡

'began and encouraged a general national examination of conscience. Every institution in the land was shown how it had sinned against itself and the soul and vitality of the nation by its neglect of the national language. Political leaders, on the whole, heard the plainest truths, mainly on the subject of the distinction between politics and nationality, and on the flowery phrase-making they had substituted for serious thinking. The political leaders in the main, with hundreds of their followers, were either indifferent or hostile to the language movement for years. . . . Patriotism with them was not an enthusiasm or a faith, but an inherited tendency or a mood, responsive in the main only to surface politics. There had been little to awaken their national consciousness. Church and school, professions and press, had forgotten the deeper Ireland.'

The Gaelic League was 'strictly non-political and non-sectarian.' Non-sectarian it has honestly desired to be: hence many troubles with individual priests who deprecated close companionship between Protestant and Catholic young people of both sexes, and looked on Gaelic ideals as the natural monopoly of the Church to which, through centuries of persecution, Gaelic Ireland had steadfastly adhered. The leaders

* The average age of the Irish members of other parties is slightly higher.

† Fifty years earlier Thomas Davis had written: 'A people without a language of its own is only half a nation.'

‡ 'The Pope's Green Island,' London, 1912, p. 55.

of the new movement—men like Mr. Eoin MacNeill and Dr. Douglas Hyde—had no sectarian bias. The latter is the son of a Church of Ireland clergyman. The movement began with a postulate that to most minds must seem false—the doctrine that Irish is the natural language of all the present inhabitants of Ireland. Unlike their Anglo-Norman predecessors, the majority of the Protestant Scots of Ulster, and of the Elizabethan, Cromwellian, and Williamite settlers in the Southern provinces, have never spoken Irish.

The language movements on the continent from which the Gaelic League has derived guidance—Magyar, Czech, Finn, Polish, Ukrainian—have the common feature of a strong political tinge, and Ireland could hardly hope to fare differently. 'Anglicisation' to an ardent Gaelic Leaguer means not only de-nationalisation but vulgarity, the debasing of a naturally courteous and pure mentality by the contagion of a civilisation identified with Philistine commercialism. When he speaks of English literature he is thinking rather of 'Ally Sloper,' which used to command a large sale in Ireland, than of Shelley or Keats. And thus the Gaelic League influence has powerfully swayed Sinn Fein in the direction of cultivating an angry and unceasing hatred for all things English. With something of the spiritual fervour of the Hindu Arya Samaj for the glorification of ancient ways of life, the Gaelic League has combined an insular suspicion of all 'foreign' ideas that recalls the extravagance of the earlier Russian Slavophils.

A few convinced Unionists have been members of the Gaelic League from genuine interest in the language, in the old country dances and other customs, in the rich folk-lore of Ireland. But their position has not been altogether easy. As a protest against the uncritical acceptance of English fashions and ways, the young lions of the Gaelic League have adopted a very marked attitude of aggressiveness. 'The Gaelic revival,' writes Mr. Thomas MacDonagh in his posthumous volume, 'has given to some of us a new arrogance.'

At the same time there was so much in the programme of the Gaelic League that promised to stimulate a new interest in Ireland that many persons of moderate views hoped that the violent politicians would not succeed in dominating the League. Unhappily the outbreak of war turned the heads of most 'Irish-Irelanders,' as they loved to call themselves. Dr. Hyde,

after miracles of vain tactfulness, found the Presidential chair no longer tenable, and Lord Ashbourne lost by his appeals on behalf of France and her allies the influence that his criticisms of England had won for him.

Without the preliminary work of the Gaelic League, the Sinn Fein movement must have taken a different shape if it had arisen at all.

In November 1915 an extremist Dublin journal wrote:

'The poison of Constitutionalism and compromise had eaten far into the hearts and minds of the people till the "non-political" Gaelic League came to arrest the decay. It is to a great extent the harvest of the seed scattered by the Language Movement and kindred organisations that Ireland is reaping in her "felons" to-day.'

The League was founded in 1904 by Mr. Arthur Griffith, who had for some time edited a weekly paper, 'The United 'Irishman,' in which an advanced Nationalist programme was advocated, while an amount of space unusual in Irish journals was devoted to poems and essays. In 1904 he produced a remarkable anonymous pamphlet: 'The Resurrection of 'Hungary: a Parallel for Ireland.' Disregarding almost entirely the inevitable result of the Prussian war of 1866 in weakening Austria, he argued that Hungary had attained autonomy in 1867 by the simple policy of refusing to have anything to do with Austria. Ireland was to follow the Hungarian example by keeping her Members of Parliament in Dublin, by utilising the framework of local government established by the Conservative Act of 1898 to form a national civil service of County Council and Municipal clerks, recruited on a definite system. The National Council, though without legal powers, could pass resolutions as to internal affairs which at least three-fourths of the Irish County Councils would be able to carry into effect. Meanwhile Irishmen were to abstain from the consumption of articles which brought revenue into the Imperial Exchequer, and Irish manufactures were to be encouraged in every possible way. There are certainly great possibilities of such encouragement when the number of contracts controlled by popularly elected local bodies is considered. Unofficial Irish consuls were to be appointed in foreign countries to do for Irish manufactures the work which the Imperial Consular Service has failed to perform. (Here,

no doubt, the inspiration was borrowed from Norway.) All recruitment of Irishmen for the British Army and Navy was to stop. In due time England must realise that the government of Ireland was a financial burden ; that the refusal of Irish representatives to go to Westminster made the Union a farce which the whole world must deride ; that the passive resistance of Irish local bodies frustrated all legislation at Westminster, and that the stoppage of recruiting was an Imperial inconvenience. The effect that the spectacle must produce in the United States—a power that England courts in vain so long as the Irish race is unreconciled—would react upon London. England would find that it paid her to restore Irish autonomy.

The Parliamentary Party pronounced the whole scheme lunacy. But here is what Mr. Griffith had already written of the Parliamentary Party :

'In one sentence the impotence of the Irish Parliamentary Party in Westminster can be exhibited. It has been there for thirty-three years—a generation ; to keep it there Ireland has expended over £600,000—and during the period of its existence the population of Ireland has decreased by 20 per cent., and the taxation of Ireland for *British* purposes has increased by 70 per cent. No condemnation is further needed than these figures. A man who runs his business on such lines ends in the Bankruptcy Court. A nation which persists in running its business on such lines must inevitably go smash.'

The constitutional position taken by Sinn Fein was that by the Renunciation Act of 1783 (which ratified the establishment of ' Grattan's Parliament ') England had solemnly bound herself to leave Irish affairs to Ireland, that the Irish Parliament had no legal or moral right to vote away its own existence in 1800, and that consequently the Act of Union was null and void. Any Irish Nationalist who went to Westminster and took an oath of allegiance was a traitor to Ireland, though Mr. Ginnell seems now to be regarded as an exception. While demanding the Repeal of the Union, Sinn Fein was careful not to define its ultimate political aim. Mr. Griffith seems to have held that all anti-Parliamentarians could unite upon the programme of restoring the Irish Constitution of 1782, King, Lords, and Commons. It was a curious programme, for as regards the Crown the Sinn Fein spokesmen have never made any pretence of loyalty ; while the restoration of

the Irish House of Lords could hardly be expected to appeal to an Ireland that had supported the Land League, and still less to the Irish Americans.

The Dungannon Clubs, started amongst Ulster Nationalists by Mr. Bulmer Hobson, while endorsing the Sinn Fein policy so far as it went, were more explicit, and expressed a creed that Mr. Griffith could hardly have countenanced. In a pamphlet of 1907, entitled 'The Creed of the Republic' (published at the Republican Press, Belfast), Mr. Hobson wrote:

'National independence is our right; we ask no more and we will accept no less. An independent Irish Republic, then, is our goal—governed by the whole people of Ireland, in the interests of the whole people, without let or hinderance (*sic*), supervision or interference on the part of England, or any other power under heaven. We owe allegiance to no country save Ireland, and we will yield none to any other.'

The Manifesto of the Provisional Government of the Irish Republic in April 1916 expresses much the same doctrine: 'We declare the right of the people of Ireland to the ownership 'of Ireland, and to the unfettered control of Irish destinies, 'to be sovereign and indefeasible.' It is explained in this manifesto that Ireland 'has organised and trained her manhood 'through her secret revolutionary organisation, the Irish 'Republican Brotherhood, and through her open military 'organisations, the Irish Volunteers and the Irish Citizen 'Army.' The Irish Republican Brotherhood here mentioned is the Fenian organisation, now sixty years old. Thomas Clarke, one of the seven signatories of the manifesto, was a member. It was probably in closer touch with Germany than were the genuine Sinn Feiners.

Mr. Griffith, in fact, seems to have been driven into the background by younger and more hot-headed men who saw in the repeal of the Arms Act in 1906 a new opening for physical force. His avowed programme excluded its necessity. His interests were mainly economic: he handled statistics—real statistics—with a voluptuousness rare among Irish Nationalists. He dwelt upon the Protectionist ideas of Friedrich List and applied them to Ireland, and he supported the Irish industrial revival. The 'Irish Year Book' which 'the National Council' (the central Sinn Fein body) published annually between 1908 and 1911, while labelling the Parliamentary Party as a

species of bastard Unionist and explaining the political creed of the new party, devoted many pages to such subjects as the Co-operative movement, agriculture, forestry, railway and canal communications, trade and manufactures—all the topics, in fact, of practical interest in the ordinary life of Ireland which the majority of the Nationalist members thought it unnecessary ever to mention to their constituents except in the vaguest way. These little volumes—each a remarkable shilling's-worth—contain many really good articles on Irish antiquities and natural history, as well as on the special spheres of interest of the Gaelic League. As a means of interesting Irish people in their own country, and putting before them information not easily accessible, they possessed real merit. For example, this Year Book contained short essays on the Roman Catholic Church, the Church of Ireland, Irish Presbyterianism, and Irish Methodism, each written by a clergyman or minister who set out without controversial bitterness the distinctive tenets of his own communion. Very few Irish laymen know much about the doctrines of any Church save that to which they belong

But on the question of recruiting for the Army and Navy Sinn Fein took a very decided attitude—though one that no Nationalist Member of Parliament ventured to denounce in public before 1914. The South African War had given rise to an anti-recruiting propaganda which was developed in the succeeding years. A very bitter pamphlet, 'Ireland and the 'British Army,' by 'O,' published in Dublin in 1909 jointly by the 'National Council,' and Duffy, Gill, Sealy Bryers and Walker, gloried in the apparent decline of Irish recruiting, denounced the British Army as a school of immorality and a hotbed of disease, and maintained that no Irishman would take any pride in the achievements of an army 'which has 'never been an Irish Army, save as a hostile force quartered 'in or upon Ireland to quench in blood the flame of Irish 'patriotism.'

In 'The Resurrection of Hungary' it was laid down that 'It is the duty of our public bodies to aid' the Anti-Enlisting Movement 'by rendering ineligible for any post in the national 'service Irishmen who have—at least since the date of the Boer 'War—joined the army of England.' After the Boer War ex-soldiers and their relatives were treated with marked

coldness even by the local bodies which supported the Constitutional movement.

The Sinn Fein attitude towards service under the Crown in civil departments is very different :

'The Irishman who joins the British army, the British navy, the British "Royal" Irish Constabulary, necessarily becomes from that moment the active enemy of his country. He has taken up arms against Ireland. The position of the Irishman who joins the British Civil Service is a passive, not an active one. He is not employed in keeping his own country down, but he is employed to an extent in keeping a hostile country up. It is objectionable and regrettable, but whilst we must continue to deprecate Irishmen entering the British Civil Service, we must distinguish between the armed oppressor and the passive instrument of alien administration.'

It was no doubt expedient to retain as Sinn Fein propagandists the half-educated young men, genuinely inspired by patriotic impulses, whom the educational and industrial conditions of Ireland send in undue proportion into the lower grades of the Civil Service. The strange fact that no declaration or covenant is required by the State from civil servants enabled lower-division clerks who devoted their energies to seditious writings and speeches to assume an attitude of moral superiority to Nationalist Members who had taken an oath of allegiance to the Crown. Yet it is obvious that the civil servant is as closely bound as the soldier or sailor to the State ; the fact that he is not called upon to risk his life is hardly sufficient to release him from the moral obligations of the public service. When the crisis came many subordinate civil servants were untrue to their salt.

As a political force in Ireland, Sinn Fein was less wide-reaching than the Gaelic League and for some years did little except to swell the rising volume of criticism against the Parliamentary Party. In Dublin, which has for a century been a Paris rather than a London in taking more advanced political views than the provinces, the new party succeeded in securing representation on the Corporation and other local bodies, in making its influence felt on such occasions as Royal visits, and in rendering moderate Nationalists uncomfortable by proclaiming the irreconcilability of Ireland. In 1908 a Nationalist member for Leitrim renounced his party and stood again as an avowed Sinn Feiner, but was overwhelmingly defeated.

There was a certain difficulty in standing for Parliament on the platform that no Irishman should go to Westminster. An attempt to supplement the weekly newspaper 'Sinn Fein' by a halfpenny evening paper on the same lines led to complete financial disaster, and the 'Sinn Fein Bank' of Dublin does not seem to have been much of a practical success. During the period 1906–1910, when a Liberal Government supported by the Nationalist Party refused to re-introduce a Home Rule Bill, the extremist critics found constant material for denouncing Mr. Redmond's policy as ineffective, and the 'Not Far Distant Day' which must see the achievement of Home Rule became a byword. In the contemptuous rejection by an Irish Nationalist Convention of the Irish Councils Bill of 1907 Sinn Fein criticism undoubtedly counted, though it may be doubted whether clerical opposition to the educational provisions of the Bill was not a more effective factor.

Why the Sinn Fein party should not have tacitly consented, 'without prejudice,' to the acceptance of a measure which, for all its safeguards and restrictions, would for the first time have given them the framework of a National Council and made it possible to set about the establishment of their pet scheme for a National Civil Service, is a riddle not easily answered. Presumably they could not neglect the opportunity of reaffirming—this time with the general acquiescence of Nationalist Ireland—a non-compromising attitude which inflicted simultaneously a rebuff on the British Cabinet and a practical vote of censure on the Nationalist leaders for resting even for a moment in the portals of a half-way house. The temporary alliance of Mr. T. M. Healy and Mr. Arthur Griffith against Mr. Redmond was followed by subterranean intrigues for an electoral working partnership between Sinn Fein and Mr. William O'Brien's 'All for Ireland League.' This came to nothing because the principles of the two were fundamentally diverse, though they felt a common indignation against the growing influence exercised in Irish politics by Mr. Joseph Devlin and his Ancient Order of Hibernians. The recognition by Government of this purely sectarian association as a Friendly Society for purposes of the Insurance Act gave it for the first time a strong position in the South of Ireland. But the general election of December 1910 and its consequences, the Parliament Act and the new Home Rule Bill, strengthened

Mr. Redmond's position immeasurably. Sinn Fein, while abating nothing of its peevishness, saw that for the time being its game was up, and announced that it would stand aside and give the Parliamentary Party a fair chance of winning, in Home Rule, the first instalment of Irish independence. The sudden recrudescence, after five years, of a moribund party is a direct consequence of the war with Germany.

As regards purely domestic concerns, the Sinn Fein party had from the first shown a spirit which contrasted favourably, in the minds of many Irishmen, with the actual policy of the Nationalist Party. The new movement had no agrarian past and no sectarian propensities. It protested against the undignified practice of looking to the Imperial Parliament for the fulfilment of Irish needs, and really tried to convert Irishmen of all classes and creeds to the doctrine of Nationality. The constant appeal of the party for subscriptions, until the payment of members gave it £30,000 a year, was a peculiar object of Sinn Fein derision.

Again, in dealing with Ulster the Sinn Feiners showed a better appreciation of the meaning of moral force than the Parliamentarians. It is worth while here to quote the definition of moral force given seventy years ago by Thomas Davis, the friend and associate of Mr. John Dillon's father:

'For moral success internal union is essential. . . . Conciliation of all sects, classes, and parties who oppose us, or who still hesitate, is *essential* to moral force. For if, instead of leading a man to your opinions by substantial kindness, by zealous love, and by candid and wise teaching, you insult his tastes and his prejudices, and force him either to adopt your cause or to resist it—if, instead of slow persuasion, your weapons are bullying and intolerance,—then your profession of moral force is a lie, and a lie which deceives no one, and your attacks will be promptly resisted by every man of spirit.'

It would be impossible to deprecate more tersely the political attitude of Mr. John Dillon, who has always carried more weight than Mr. Redmond in the inner councils of their party. The Nationalist Parliamentary party has never attempted to understand the Belfast point of view. The Extremists, however, have always felt a sort of Platonic affection for the dour, independent Orange spirit, and have dreamed of enlisting

against England the tough breed of the North.* The Sinn Feiners have equally been anxious to convert ex-landlords into 'good Irishmen,' thus showing a marked contrast to the sour suspicion with which Mr. Dillon met the overtures of Lord Dunraven and his Devolutionists. The same contrast comes out in connexion with the Co-operative movement. The Nationalist Party opposed that movement because it was afraid of 'red-herrings drawn across the trail of Home Rule' and because it was committed by close ties to rival commercial interests; the Sinn Feiners had the wit to see that co-operation gave the best promise of prosperity to Ireland, whatever her form of government, and that the professed Nationalist who declared that Home Rule must be an essential preliminary to better farming was not doing much good to his country's cause.

But sooner or later to every Irishman comes the question whether he is for or against the British Empire, and the frank treason of many adherents of Sinn Fein alienated from them Irish Unionists, who sympathised with their evident desire to oppose both corruption and sectarian intolerance in municipal life. The extravagances of the Gaelic League—not a whit mollified by large indirect subsidies from the Imperial Treasury for the teaching of Irish in schools—in its campaign for compelling other people to learn the language, further alarmed Irish Conservatives. They resented the successful demand, in the face of opposition from Roman Catholic Bishops and from Mr. Dillon, for Irish as a compulsory subject at matriculation in the new National University, which is the one positive achievement of Mr. Birrell's rule in Ireland, and supplied recruits to the Dublin rebels of 1916 both from its teachers and its students.

Meanwhile the Gaelic Athletic Association, founded in 1884, and quite distinct from the Gaelic League, though they have many members in common, had caused bad blood by its unceasing campaign against 'the English garrison' and against the Irish Amateur Athletic Association, the body that

* Mr. Riobard Ua Fhloinn (*Anglicé* Robert Lynd), in a pamphlet, 'The Orangemen and the Nation,' published in 1907 at the Republican Press, Belfast, appealed to Orangemen to join the Nationalists and be no longer 'the dupes of those contemptible mercenaries' the Ulster Unionist members, by whom Irish Protestants had, as he put it, 'been bought and sold like tripe over a counter.'

regulates Rugby football, cricket, and other 'unpatriotic' exercises. A more serious objection to the Gaelic Athletic Association was the rule that no soldier, sailor, or policeman in the service of the Crown might take part in any of its athletic meetings. The part that athletics may play in nationalist propaganda was recognised in the Sokol of the Slav nationalities of Austria-Hungary, and the Gaelic Athletic Association has captured the most physically vigorous of the Irish peasantry,* and has effectively worked amongst them to discourage recruiting. It is interesting to find that the Nationalist Party not only countenanced this association, in spite of its political complexion, before 1914, but that in the present year a Nationalist Member pressed upon the Chancellor of the Exchequer the claim of the Gaelic Athletic Association to be exempted from the amusements tax under which all English, Scottish, and Irish Amateur athletic meetings are to contribute to public revenues.

Thus, before any question of Volunteers arose, there existed in Ireland the materials for serious political trouble. The greatest piece of good luck that attended Sinn Fein was that its rise coincided with the Viceroyalty of Lord Aberdeen and the Chief Secretaryship of Mr. Birrell. The former diminished the dignity of his office to an unprecedented point, while his Chief Secretary, with airy *insouciance*, belittled or denied every inconvenient fact that ought to have disturbed his complacency. Mr. Birrell's utterances on Irish affairs—until he spoke frankly before the Hardinge Commission, and even then he made one statement of fact which was promptly denied by the War Office—were distinguished by the same degree of accuracy as inspired his earlier declaration that our conduct of the war in South Africa had been marked by 'hecatombs of slaughtered 'babes.' Before Mr. Birrell s advent the Liberal Government had repealed the Peace Preservation Act of 1881, thus allowing the unlimited import of firearms, while it neglected the opportunity afforded by the Haldane Territorial scheme of establishing Irish Volunteers as part of the forces of the Crown.

In Mr. James Larkin's labour agitation a new movement, more bitter and more dangerous than any of the purely political

* The Boy Scout movement was imitated in the establishment of the 'Fianna,' an organisation of children on Separatist principles.

phenomena, had made its appearance. In 1908 serious rioting was provoked in Belfast, in which troops had to be employed, and in 1913 the Larkinites paralysed the business of Dublin and inflicted many casualties on the police. The appalling conditions of Dublin housing, revealed to the general public by the inquiries that followed the great Dublin strike of 1913, came as a moral shock to thinking men in Ireland. Here, in a capital administered for thirty years by a predominantly Nationalist Corporation which professed enthusiasm for the cause of the people, close to the residence of a Roman Catholic Archbishop who has played an important part in public affairs, thousands of Roman Catholic working people were living under conditions of abject poverty and squalor, which defied sanitary laws and made domestic decency impossible. The Corporation's officials were handicapped by the financial interests of Corporation members: houses belonging to the latter, condemned as unfit for human habitation, were left undisturbed.

Here, in fact, were all the conditions which in Paris produced the Commune in 1871. And in James Larkin and James Connolly the submerged mass found leaders. The fierce strike of 1913 singled out for special attack some of the best employers, precisely as the Land League had concentrated its forces thirty years earlier against some of the best landlords: for revolutionaries often think it good tactics to assail the best representatives of a social system regarded as fundamentally iniquitous. Larkin, a wild and unscrupulous demagogue whom sympathetic English Trade Unionists had to repudiate as soon as they saw him at close quarters, was handled in the most futile way by the authorities, his periods of imprisonment being most obviously determined by purely political considerations. Bitterly anti-British during the war, Larkin made his way to the United States, where he utilises his position of personal safety to denounce the British Empire. He left in Dublin his lieutenant James Connolly, a man of far greater ability and driving power, who carried his principles to a logical conclusion and paid the penalty with his life.

For the recognised Nationalist leaders, from O'Connell downwards, Connolly had nothing but contempt. In his eyes a political revolution was necessary, but a merely political readjustment which left unchanged the basis of social order and the existing distribution of property must be futile. A small group of Irish Socialists had already criticised Sinn Fein

as identified with the capitalist system of economics. In a pamphlet, 'The Re-Conquest of Ireland,' published in 1915, Connolly called for a union of Ireland, North and South, in an advanced Labour movement. Meanwhile Larkin's followers had established a volunteer force of their own, the 'Citizen Army.'

The story of the Nationalist and Sinn Fein Volunteer movements is told with obvious bias in 'The Secret History of the 'Irish Volunteers,' published in April 1915 by O'Rahilly, killed a year later in street fighting in Dublin. As a counterpoise to the Ulster Volunteers, the National Volunteers were formed in November 1913 by a group of Sinn Fein and Gaelic League enthusiasts. The movement was to be what its promoters called 'non-political,' embracing all Nationalist organisations. But the Parliamentary Party, which had assumed with delight in England the rôle of standing for law and order as against Orange 'seditionists,' was much embarrassed. Finding it impossible to stop the movement, the Parliamentarians resolved to master it. Mr. Redmond, accepting the National Volunteers as a National concern, declared that their Provisional Committee was not representative, and successfully insisted that he must be allowed to nominate twenty-five new members, all adherents to his own party.

According to O'Rahilly, the Extremist members of the Committee took no exception to Mr. Redmond's declaration in Parliament in August 1914 that the National Volunteers would defend Ireland if British troops were withdrawn, bitterly as they resented his subsequent recruiting efforts. From their point of view, of course, the withdrawal of British troops was eminently desirable: it would afford the National Volunteers the opportunity of repeating the history of 1782, when Volunteers, raised to defend Ireland during a great European war, were enabled to secure legislative autonomy for their country.

Still, the outbreak of the great war found Ireland, so far as surface appearances indicated, in a far better mood than could have been anticipated. The Ulster Volunteers, though full of suspicion against the Liberal Government, readily offered their services for the Imperial cause. Mr. Redmond pledged Nationalist Ireland to co-operate, and the immediate response to his appeal was striking. Nationalist families that would have refused to fight against the Boers sent their sons into the British Army. Mr. Redmond and his kinsmen, and a few of his Parliamentary colleagues, threw themselves whole-heartedly into the

work of recruiting. The unusual spectacle of Nationalist members in khaki was witnessed in the House of Commons.

Unhappily, neither the British Government nor the Nationalist party had much moral authority left in Ireland. Mr. Birrell, seldom in the country, had shown energy only when some public servant who tried to do his duty fearlessly fell to be repudiated. An elaborate system of political preference in public appointments permeated Ireland: while the practical result of the democratisation of the unpaid magistracy, inaugurated by Mr. Morley as Chief Secretary, finds an excellent illustration in the story told before the Hardinge Commission of a litigant who found it cheaper to buy two magistrates than to employ a solicitor.

It was generally understood that Mr. Dillon (not, it is to be noted, Mr. Redmond) was consulted in all matters of Irish administration. A period of secret power without open responsibility would have tried a tougher moral fibre than the Parliamentary Party has as yet displayed. During recent years this party has evaded responsibilities with conspicuous success. It neither supported nor denounced cattle-driving, and its members kept carefully aloof from Dublin during the strike of 1913. Its policy was obviously to stand dumb during any outbreak of violence, and, when the violence was over, to criticise the action of the authorities and so try to regain popularity. Parliamentary denunciation of Sinn Fein, before August 1914, had taken the form of criticising its methods rather than that of repudiating its aims. The Parliamentarians could not afford to be less intensely Nationalist than their Extremist critics, and such patriotic anniversaries as that of the Emmet rising and the execution of the Fenian 'Manchester 'Martyrs' of 1867 were as enthusiastically celebrated by the Constitutional Party as by Sinn Fein.

But the fusion between the Sinn Feiners and the Parliamentarians for the joint control of the National Volunteer movement was not of long duration. As early as the 24th September 1914 the anti-Parliamentarian members of the National Volunteer Committee issued a manifesto in which they declared 'that Ireland cannot, with honour or safety, take 'part in foreign quarrels otherwise than through the free action 'of a National Government of her own.' Henceforth there were two bodies, each with a weekly paper of its own, the 'National 'Volunteers,' which followed Mr. Redmond, and the 'Irish

'Volunteers,' directed by Mr. Eoin MacNeill. The best men in the former body joined the Army ; those who were left behind tended more and more to desert to the 'Irish Volunteers.' The entrance of Sir Edward Carson into a Coalition Ministry, which Mr. Redmond refused to join, alarmed the mass of Nationalists, already perplexed by the position of the Home Rule Act.

It was not to be expected that Germany, having dabbled in attempts to raise rebellions in South Africa and India, would neglect a country with which it was easy to establish connexion by means of those extremist Irish Americans who had for some years past worked in close touch with German Americans. How far direct communication was maintained the authorities alone can say, but it is notorious that much German money has reached Ireland.

While no two racial characters could well be so mutually antipathetic as the German and the Irish, the growing estrangement between Germany and England had for some years past caused Irish seditionists to look towards the new enemy of the British Empire. The paper 'Sinn Fein,' for instance, had pretended that Alsace-Lorraine had been freely granted a far more comprehensive system of home rule than any that the Parliamentary Party could possibly win for Ireland, and had minimised Prussian oppression of the Poles. In a remarkable article in 'The Irish Review' for September 1912—(a monthly magazine that was directed in its later days by Thomas MacDonagh and Joseph Plunkett, P. H. Pearse being a constant, and Sir Roger Casement an occasional contributor)—a bolder line was taken in an article styled 'Ireland and the German 'Menace' by Batha MacCrainn.

'Ireland is not weak while Germany menaces, but strong, and in her strength she should speak out . . . with the voice of a nation knowing its own mind and free to ally itself with any other nation that may help it to the place it should occupy among the nations of the earth.'

Even more significant is an article, 'Ireland, Germany, and 'the next War,' signed 'Shan Van Vocht,' in the number for July 1913, arguing that even if Germany annexed Ireland it was not at all clear that she would (or even could) treat Ireland worse than Great Britain had done. Her interest would be to secure Ireland's freedom. At the European Congress at the close of the war :

'Nothing advanced on behalf of England could meet the case

for a free Ireland as stated by Germany. Germany would attain her ends as the champion of national liberty, and could destroy England's naval supremacy for all time by an act of irreproachable morality.'

The active interest of a few German scholars, like Professor Kuno Meyer, in those Celtic studies which had notoriously been neglected at English and Scottish Universities, impressed ignorant young enthusiasts of the Gaelic League with an idea that Germany was sympathetic with Irish aspirations.

Meanwhile Mr. Birrell designedly let things drift, and an able and conscientious public servant, Sir Matthew Nathan, was compelled by his Chief for political reasons to watch inertly the growth of treason. But the worst of a policy of peace at any price is that it seldom attains its main object. In time of war it is impossible for military authorities to allow sedition to go beyond certain bounds, and, while the Irish Volunteers of Mr. Eoin MacNeill were allowed to parade Dublin in uniform with fixed bayonets, a few proceedings taken under the Defence of the Realm Act against individual Irish Volunteers and certain peculiarly outrageous prints* were misrepresented to Irish Americans in the guise of a reign of terror established in Ireland by Mr. Birrell! The exception of Ireland, on the advice of the Nationalist Party, from almost all the special measures applied to Great Britain, was claimed by the Extremists as a token of their own success. An Irish Race Convention held in the United States last March, from which the more moderate Irish Americans held aloof, announced that large funds had been obtained for arming the Extremists in Ireland, and formally incorporated a new League of Irish Freedom. The San Francisco 'Leader' had announced in February that the Irish by that time had enough arms 'to ratify the contention that 'they are not part of the British Empire.' The farmers and shopkeepers of Ireland—the farmers made unprecedentedly prosperous by war prices—had no wish for revolution; but among the young Nationalists Mr. Redmond's party had become as powerless as the Girondins were in face of the Jacobins.

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* One of the numerous sheets which appeared during the war announced that 300 Ulstermen had been executed by the Dublin Fusiliers for cowardice in the field. Another described British troops in action as doped with rum and charging 'like human gorillas.'

The actual rising in Dublin reproduced with curious fidelity some of the features of Emmet's rebellion, which had relied on French aid while disclaiming any desire to let Ireland be annexed. The similarity, in fact, is so close that the Chief Secretary in June 1803 had received and tossed aside an explicit warning of the rebellion that broke out the following August. In both cases discontented workmen were led by political idealists to street murders. The arrest of Sir Roger Casement and the miscarriage of the plan to land German arms in Kerry—events known to the Dublin leaders—probably upset the plan for a general rising. The Intelligence Department of the Admiralty saved Ireland.

But the Connolly element seems to have got out of hand, fearing that delay would mean the arrest of the leaders. The older Extremists were either put aside or forced against their judgment to endorse the call for action, and an amazed Dublin found on Easter Monday that the Post Office and other public buildings were in the hands of the rebels. With an ounce of pluck, they could have stormed the Castle. They preferred to murder wounded soldiers and unarmed policemen in the streets, to fire upon harmless civilians, while the unorganised rabble looted shops, and to make a treacherous attack on a Volunteer 'Veterans' Corps' returning without ammunition from a route march. This body, which has no connexion with Ulster or National Volunteers, but is affiliated to the Central Association of Volunteer Training Corps, threw itself into a military barracks, procured ammunition, and through three days' fighting gave an excellent account of itself and incidentally saved the Dublin gas-works. Trinity College—though only a handful of undergraduates were in residence—fought with skill, reinforced by a few soldiers, and cut the rebels off from the Bank of Ireland.

Connolly is said to have been certain of Germany's immediate victory, and to have believed that at the end of the war the German workers would join with those of every European nation to destroy monarchy and capitalism. But the rank and file of the insurrectionists undoubtedly thought that German submarines could prevent the crossing of troops from England and that the rising would succeed. Of the leaders, some, it is said, felt bound to throw in their lot with the ignorant men whom they had brought to the edge of the abyss; others

refused to take part in an outbreak that had, so to say, gone off at half-cock.

The fighting was soon over, and martial law succeeded. The Nationalists are loud in their criticisms of the military authorities for executing as many as fourteen ringleaders, including all the signatories of the proclamation of the Irish Republic. But those who (like Mr. Dillon) sentimentalise over the fate of the poets like Thomas MacDonagh and Joseph Plunkett, and schoolmasters like P. H. Pearse (who, with their comrades, met their death with absolute calmness and courage), might extend some sympathy to the hundreds of innocent loyal families bereaved by the murder of their relatives, to soldiers, home wounded from France, clubbed to death or shot in the Dublin streets, to policemen deliberately murdered, even if they have no compassion to spare for the Irish Rifles or Sherwood Foresters killed by rebels at a moment when the Empire needs every fighting man. Let it be remembered that in this rising no section of the insurgents had any actual grievance except those slum-dwellers of the ' Citizen Army ' whom Connolly led to their fate in the hope of relief from poverty and municipal misgovernment. The Irish regiments at the front, largely recruited from Nationalists, whose achievements in the field were so markedly ignored by the War Office—so far as giving tidings to Ireland goes—until it was too late to fire their countrymen to enthusiasm, will pass the most severe condemnation of all upon the traitors who tried to tarnish the good name of Ireland and to stab the Empire in the back.

Much of Dublin is in ruins, hundreds of Irish homes are desolate, and the seed of new bitterness has been sown. But Mr. Birrell, who has drawn £40,000 of public money for conducting the affairs of a country which he neglected as completely as he misunderstood it, delivered an *apologia* that touched the heart of the House of Commons. The exposure and open confession of a colleague's incapacity moved to emotion a Prime Minister who had faced with unbroken stoicism the Gallipoli slaughter, the destruction of Cradock's squadron, the sufferings and surrender of the garrison of Kut. After weeping over the fall of a politician whose wilful neglect of duty had caused the loss of hundreds of lives, Mr. Asquith visited Ireland, looked at the situation, and transferred it to Mr. Lloyd George.

AVIATION, PRESENT AND FUTURE

WHATEVER may be the merits or demerits of recent criticism of the Royal Naval Air Service and the Royal Flying Corps, there is no doubt that it has stimulated both services to a marked degree and produced many signs of reorganisation and renewed energy. The establishment of the Air Board under Lord Curzon is alone witness to this fact. That the Cabinet should have detailed the brilliant ex-Viceroy of India for this special work, and should have given him power to deal direct with the War Committee and the Cabinet, is proof that the need for better organisation has been admitted even by those who were its bitterest opponents. That there should have been an inquiry into the Royal Aircraft Factory at Farnborough—one of the weakest points, to put it mildly, in the administration of the Royal Flying Corps—is again evidence of the correctness of the information of the critics and of the instinct of the public as to what is 'wrong with the machine.' The report by Sir Charles Parsons, F.R.S., of turbine fame, Sir Frederick Donaldson, late head of Woolwich (who unfortunately went down with Lord Kitchener), and Sir Richard Burbidge, the head of the well-known firm of Harrods, is far from complimentary to the Farnborough factory. In the cold and formal terms of an official report there is no room for fervent denunciation or sarcastic criticism, but if these two methods of attack have been used by outside critics they have been justified by that verdict and by what can be discerned beneath its surface.

Again, the treatment of the aircraft trade has been totally different during the last month or two. Manufacturers now find their views welcomed; they are even pressed to give opinions. Orders so large that perhaps they are almost injudicious, and for some types of doubtful value, have been distributed, I will not say to keep the trade quiet, but at any rate to keep it busy. With the advent of Lord Curzon's influence other reforms will come in good time which have been either denounced or insufficiently considered by the high officials of both services.

Thus, it may be said with truth that while some critics may have been impetuous and have not yet corroborated all their facts, and while much that has been said about the obstinacy, jealousy, and obstructiveness of the heads of both services has been exaggerated, there is no doubt that in this, as in other things, the instinct of the public, generally speaking, has been right. The British people have a curious intuition —often knowing nothing of why or how it has arisen—which at times seems almost like an inspiration of the national mind. In this matter of aviation the weight of this opinion, largely guided by faith in the disinterestedness of most of the critics, has brought about changes which the two departments, left to themselves, would never have initiated and would always have opposed. That something has been done and that more is going to be done shows how necessary it is that public criticism, especially in the absence of a regular Opposition, should exist for keeping our departments up to concert pitch.

Let us now consider the position to-day in view of our air forces by sea and land. To deal with the Navy first as the senior force. When the true history of the recent battle of the Horn Reef comes to be written it will be found that owing to their Zeppelins (five were noted hovering round the edges of the battle and reporting everything coming up from miles away) the Germans were enabled to beat an ignominious but essentially wise retreat into their harbours before the main fleet of Sir John Jellicoe came up. On the other hand, not one single British airship was available, and only one seaplane was used by our fleet, with striking success. Had the position been reversed and had we possessed rigid airships for scouting and the Germans none, the probability is that the greater part of the German fleet would have now been at the bottom of the sea, and German sea-power would have been scotched for half or a whole generation to come. Such a crushing defeat at sea would have affected the position in Germany on land so seriously for the worse that the ending of the war would have been much accelerated. When the Admiralty choose to reveal the real facts about Germany, if they ever care to do so, I assert that this conclusion, bold as it may seem to-day, will receive ample proof, and I may add that the conclusion is not arrived at without knowledge derived from both inside and outside this country.

Again, consider the immense saving effected by airships in the use of cruisers and destroyers which are necessary now to maintain our intelligence at sea. What do the Germans do? In anything like moderate weather there is a chain of Zeppelin scouts from the south of Norway to Borkum—one might almost say to Ostend. Except in rough weather, when the sea eyes of the Fleet come into their own again, as opposed to its air eyes, these Zeppelins can not only see further as regards submarines, and more accurately, but they cover more miles in a given time; they employ fewer men at a much less cost, and would save our crews and ships for other work.

To chortle as is sometimes done in this country over the destruction of a Zeppelin indicates that the national mind is considerably lacking in a sense of proportion. The cold facts are here set out. A Zeppelin of the newest type does not cost more than £125,000, or a good deal less than the cost of a first-class destroyer. The number of men lost, even if they all perish, is infinitesimal compared with the loss of those who may perish in a cruiser or even in a destroyer. Even if the Germans have lost since the beginning of the war twenty such ships, the total loss in money would not be more than £2,500,000, though the trained men lost count for much more in the balance-sheet of war. Germany, moreover, is turning out these air-ships somewhere about the rate of three a month, and is making preparations to increase this output. Probably she has well over forty now available for naval and bombing purposes.

As to the future, small Zeppelins for scouting are in our enemy's programme, and bigger machines up to 750 feet in length for bomb-dropping and long-range work. Six engines are now being used in the larger type with a combined horse-power of about 1500 h.p. The radius of action is governed by two factors: the gas-holding capacity of the envelope, and the supplies of petrol and lubricating oil which can be carried to suffice for a consumption up to 7lb. per mile flown. Voyages can now be made up to 2000 miles theoretically, and 1500 miles is certainly practicable in ordinarily favourable weather. This distance divided in half and planned out on the map makes all the vital spots in England and France vulnerable to attack by airships. It is the custom of some ministers to deride Zeppelin attacks and to talk blandly of

results being of no military value. But while the direct results may be small, the indirect effects are serious.

As regards Germany's naval operations, her numerical inferiority in ships, more particularly in the cruiser class, is largely compensated for by her superiority in Zeppelins, especially when near the German coast-line. The German fleet in the future will doubtless come out, not in weather which necessarily suits the fleet, but in weather that suits the Zeppelins. The visibility was low at the time of the last battle and there was no wind to speak of, conditions half unfavourable, half favourable to airships. When the winds do blow the German fleet will remain at home in all probability, for the airships will be unable to scout and report; but whenever the sea is calm, and anti-cyclonic conditions prevail, then we must look out for a chance of renewed naval activity on the part of our enemies. Air conditions will be the governing factor, not sea conditions, for it is in the air that our enemies are superior.

As regards the heavier-than-air programme of the Admiralty, prudence forbids going deeply into the subject, because of the risk of saying something that might be injudicious; but it may be remarked that the functions of the seaplane and the necessary mother-ship, the seaplane carrier, are as yet imperfectly understood and certainly not sufficiently developed. It is my firm belief that, given a specially prepared deck and a properly designed ship for the purpose, it will be practicable before long for a great deal of the patrol work now done by light cruisers to be done by seaplane carriers, which should possess a certain amount of armament themselves, or be protected by other vessels. In peace, such will be the nests from which the sea-birds will fly to report on coast-lines and to carry out police duties round distant possessions.

In this war, the fact that naval squadrons are working on certain portions of the line in Flanders indicates that the Royal Naval Air Service has wide views of its duties, and that it aspires to conduct operations not only on sea but on the land as well. There are indeed many loyal and far-seeing spirits in the Navy who are convinced that if the air service is to be one service it is the naval branch that should take over the military branch, if only for the reason that those who navigate the sea are naturally apt pupils in navigating the air. Moreover, the tradition, training, and administration of the Navy are more

in accordance with the demands of the new service than the more formal and red-tape customs of the War Office. Individuality and independence are encouraged in the Navy, and one can recognise in this new ambition the echo of the splendid naval tradition of 'The Service first.' But though on other grounds this aspiration of the naval air service may be unrealisable, that service will bring to the combined Imperial Air Service, which I hope to see before long established, all the splendid English qualities of which the Navy is rightly proud.

The position of the Royal Flying Corps is at the present moment subject to the consideration of a Committee appointed by the Government to inquire into charges brought against the Corps by members of Parliament and other persons. As a consequence, the scandal is presented of the general commanding the Flying Corps and some of his most able advisers spending much of their time and energies in meeting these 'charges.' What is even more foolish is that everyone who has made 'charges' has been invited to prove them at great length and in detail, an invitation which was somewhat reluctantly accepted by the reformers after a moment's hesitation due to mistrust of the composition of the Committee. Some of them realised the undesirability of opening up old sores, or saying much that had better be left unsaid in public. Those who like the use of strong words and phrases, and know they can hit hard enough for the effect of the blows to remain for some time, rejoice in their opportunity. Nor will the appointment of this Committee silence the critics of the Royal Flying Corps. They will continue to criticise while the Committee is sitting and even after it has reported, just as if it had not sat at all; and some of those who have made the most serious 'charges' will renew their attacks. In the present state of the public mind, and in view of the distrust of most official declarations and reports, whatever may be said in justification of the administration of the Royal Flying Corps and of the Royal Aircraft Factory or of matters connected with them, the verdict, even if favourable, will carry little weight, and some of the important points in the criticisms made will be confirmed.

The Admiralty has certainly shown a wise discretion in keeping out of the fray. There is only one standard by which everything should be judged now. Will it help to win

the war? No one can say that this Judicial Committee will either by its investigations or its report assist in beating the Hun, and in the meantime heads of departments who should be organising, administrators who should be administrating, generals who should be commanding, staff who should be thinking, are occupying a large proportion of their time in trying to justify their past. Even if they do it successfully, the public will still remain incredulous, and the Royal Flying Corps pilots who are doing the actual work will still remain dissatisfied.

It has to be remembered that in every new development in practical science, such as aviation, mistakes are inseparable from progress. Many mistakes have been made in the past of which it is best that the uninformed public in general should be ignorant, because they cannot understand that in this sense mistakes are milestones in the path of progress. There are unsolved problems whose best solution lies in making experiments, failing, and trying again. In this matter those who know the difficulties can sympathise with those who have made mistakes in the course of their duties, but the general public, who are unaware of the problems that surround the study of aviation—and it has many unsolved problems—would want to condemn many of the experimenters.

The criticisms of the flying services, most of them well informed, which began in the autumn of 1914 and were at their height in the spring of this year, have, as mentioned in the beginning of this article, on the whole produced good results. But the criticisms have dealt mainly with certain classes of engines, and with the failure of certain types, while questions of greater importance have been left out of sight. The main question is whether our present programme of military aviation is adequate. I cannot, of course, make public the actual figures, which I know, but I may say in general terms that till recently the programme was distinctly inadequate. We have not enough airplanes at the Front to-day to do the work without overstraining men and machines. Most pilots at the Front will agree with me, and I may add that did the public know the late numbers and resources of the Royal Flying Corps at the Front, even those most opposed to recent criticisms would revise their opinions. If there have been in some respects want of vision, lack of coherent policy, and an absence of real

engineering ability, there is one redeeming feature—the enduring and unadvertised gallantry of our pilots, an efficient shelter behind which many faults are hidden.

But behind this somewhat dark background there is a dawn coming up in brighter hues. We are training more pilots; there are better machines at the Front now (we will not argue from what cause); our home factories are being better organised. On the other hand, some of the new *personnel*, to be frank, is not all that one could wish. But it, too, will improve, given time, discipline, and danger. In the middle of a great war many things have to be done in a hurry which in theory should be done deliberately. To some extent this excuse justifies first blunders. But the war has been with us now for nearly two years, and the training of pilots should have been on a bigger scale, simplified, and better organised. I recently asked a youthful officer how many subjects he was being taught. 'Seventeen,' came the frank answer. In about three months, at the outside six, this boy was supposed to be a fully qualified pilot and to have a fair grounding in all the arts of his profession, including military history, tactics, meteorology, engine construction (many types), geography, compass and map reading, army organisation, observation of trenches and fortifications, photography, wireless telegraphy, artillery observation, use of machine gun, theory of flight, and a certain amount of drill. Would it not be better that in the training of the *personnel* certain necessary subjects should be taught universally, and as regards the rest that specialisation should occur in the case of certain individuals, following the precedent in the Navy?

Then again, the present system of the selection of officers leaves much to be desired. The applicant now interviews a certain official at the War Office. If the official approves, the applicant's name is entered on a waiting list, from which he may be called up at any time. This official is not closely in touch with actual pilots, and very often knows but little of the antecedents or family of the applicants. If the applicant comes recommended by someone who is trustworthy the chances are that his selection is certain, as is right; but if a boy, perhaps extremely suitable, appears without strong credentials, though he may be a born pilot, possessing an innate love of mechanics, and feeling within himself a 'call,'

he may be rejected if he is nervous and finds it difficult to express himself. Yet good pilots are largely unvocal. At certain selected aerodromes all over the United Kingdom it should be possible for applicants to take their credentials for examination by senior officers there residing before they are sent up to the War Office and placed on the list for commissions. A few minutes' talk in the mess and the behaviour of the candidate at meals may reveal a good deal.

The flying service demands the highest qualities of character, skill, and pluck, and it is essential that the greatest care should be taken in selecting officers. The service is now growing rapidly, and the subalterns of to-day will become the guiding spirits in ten or fifteen years, or possibly in less time. And once more England must be saved by her youth.

There has been much criticism, not wholly undeserved, of the Royal Aircraft Factory. The output of that factory compared with the number of planes and engines in use is negligible. It has had, on the whole, a discouraging influence on the development of aircraft here. It has quarrelled with a young trade keen and anxious to do well, and a trade which, let it be added, will be very powerful ere many years are over, and on which our efficiency in the air will depend. The Aircraft Factory has made mistakes and persisted in them with a curious obstinacy for many months past. It will be interesting to see whether the Government intend to carry out the recommendations of the Committee which investigated the affairs of the Royal Aircraft Factory, and whether they will have the courage to publish the Committee's report. There is at least a danger that they may refuse to let the public know the terms of the report on the ground that it is 'not in the 'interests of the public service.' Put into plain English, this means that no departmental maladministration is to be admitted for fear that it may justify a critic or discourage a friend.

There are some who hold that after the war the flying services will be severely retrenched, and that there will be restricted use for airplanes as well as for officers and men. Such is not my belief. After this war every European nation will be impoverished, and the problem will be how to obtain the maximum powers of offence and defence with the minimum of money expended.

War in the air will be cheap compared with other methods of waging it. Provided the engines and planes are reasonably standardised, £1000 a plane should be the outside figure so far as Government contracts are concerned, if businesslike methods are adopted by the Royal Flying Corps branch of the War Office. Therefore, taking the cost of a post-war Dreadnought at £3,000,000; we shall be able to build 3000 planes for the cost of one Dreadnought.

In the past our ancestors built martello towers on the south coast, and heavy fortifications on some of our narrow straits. The former have long been obsolete, even if they were ever of any real value. The latter are equally useless against attack from above. The coastguard stations of the future should be air stations. These will probably have to be established at intervals of every ten or twenty miles, linked up by telephone and wireless telegraphy, and used as were the coastguard stations in years gone by, to watch the sea and to stop smuggling.

When the air becomes a means of general communication, articles such as saccharine, of small bulk but of great value, will become more attractive than ever to the smuggler. That we are no longer an island in the old sea sense is a momentous fact at present not half sufficiently realised by our people. Now that the air is navigable, our frontier is our own coast-line —not the enemy's coast-line, as it used to be. Stations with fan-like beams of light at night will be needed to detect and catch intruders. By day there must be aerial patrols. We must also possess anti-aircraft guns with a vertical range of not less than 20,000 feet. And all this the air services will have to undertake—this and much more. There will be little chance of retrenchment in aviation.

There is a good deal of controversy among experts at the present moment as to whether the State should have a large aircraft factory of its own, or should adopt the alternative method of giving contracts to the aircraft trade. There are examples of both systems in both our services. The ships of the Navy are built by private firms as well as by the State dockyards. There can be no question which the Navy prefer, as a rule, nor is there any doubt which is the cheaper ship. It is well known that the private-built ship is nearly always the faster as regards contract speed, and is possessed of more

small conveniences which tend so much to comfort in ship life. As regards cost, there is little doubt that the dockyard-built ship, built by the State, is the more expensive of the two, especially when it is noted that the State does not charge itself with interest on capital. In the Army we see the same thing where both systems are employed, and where Woolwich and private firms make guns. Here, again, it is the private firms as a rule who turn out the best article, and probably, gun for gun, at a cheaper price. If efficiency and economy be desired, the factories of the State are inferior to the factories of private firms.

On this score, therefore, a national aircraft factory, dear to the heart of some of the administrators of the Royal Flying Corps, would be a mistake. To them it may mean more power, greater secrecy, and less chance of exposure of mistakes, and perhaps these advantages recommend it to some of the higher authorities. But in most modern developments of war we have got on much better without State interference, notably in the mechanical transport, which has been one of the greatest successes of the war. In this respect this country has been more fortunate than any other belligerent, for it should be noted that we have had no State factory for the making of motor lorries. In consequence, the whole trade has co-operated from the first most cordially with the Mechanical Section of the Quarter-Master-General's department, and the immense number of excellent motor lorries at the Front bear testimony to the efficient work of the private maker both here and overseas. The favourite argument for State dockyards and State factories is that they act as a check on prices, but it is very doubtful whether this argument can be sustained by facts. It is certainly conceivable that the State could find some way of checking the prices of the trade which would be at least as efficient and less costly than running naval establishments.

The State may with advantage devote itself to scientific investigation and research, to carrying out extensive experiments with all the resources that it alone can command. But the establishment of a State aircraft factory, whether large or small, would mean waste of public money; while it would prolong the suspicion entertained by the majority of the trade that private firms are unfairly treated in order to make business

for the State undertaking. Nor have the majority of pilots any confidence in the products of the present State factory.

State management of other business concerns does not encourage us to make fresh experiments in the same direction. The State telegraph system involves a loss of over a million a year; the telephone system, since it passed into the hands of the State in 1911, has not improved in character, while the revenue produced is less than that yielded under the old royalty system, in which the State had an assured income free of risk. It is almost invariably true that if the State manages a business of any kind there is a worse service at a higher cost than under private management. I believe that from every point of view the setting up of a large national aircraft factory would be a mistake. We have already paid too dearly for the small amount of aircraft and the many mistakes made by the State. Tenders for designs and machines should be invited from the aircraft trade as a whole, and we should aim at the creation in this country of a sound aircraft trade which would in time of war be capable of immediate large expansion in order to meet emergencies. Every trade, moreover, pays in income-tax a percentage of its profits to the State. In design and construction competent private engineers should have a larger influence than at present, for soldiers or quasi-soldiers may be gallant and learned in their profession, but in a special branch of engineering, such as the construction of airplanes and engines, they make costly mistakes. It is sufficient to mention as an example that certain Royal Aircraft Factory engines used in many of our planes have become almost a jest. They are heavier in weight per horse-power developed on the basis of a six hours' flight, and thirstier in point of petrol consumption than any other well-known air-cooled engine on the market. Nor is the new and long-heralded 200-horse-power water-cooled engine a success so far. The Royal Aircraft Factory and its friends will have to do a good deal better than this before they convert engineers, designers, or those who know, to the idea of a State factory. The statements here made are based upon the exact figures of comparative tests of some of the best of the well-known engines, carried out in a scientific and careful manner.

As to the future, no one can tell how far aviation is going

to affect the destiny of nations in war or in peace. But that it will affect all of them profoundly there can be no doubt. It may seem fantastic to-day to assume that millionaires in a hurry, or ordinary private people in search of change or out of love of travelling, will use airplanes as we use motor-cars, trains, and steamships to-day. It may be accounted mere imagination to say that important mails will be conveyed inland and overseas with comparative regularity in future years by means of the air. Oversea and overland communication will be rendered quicker and simpler, and the more distant portions of the Empire will be brought appreciably closer, by the airplane or by the dirigible.

Before the war mails took fourteen days from Bombay to London, and sixteen days from the North-West Provinces of India. Seventeen days was the length of time to South Africa, and sometimes, at the quickest, six days to America. An average speed throughout of 26 m.p.h. from London to New York has, I believe, never been exceeded. The average speed of the train may have reached 50 m.p.h. and of the steamer 27 m.p.h., but the inevitable delays of transhipment and handling bring down the total average. To India by sea as the mails go is somewhere about 5000 miles. But the air mail route would be much shorter via the Low Countries, skirting the back of the Carpathians, over the Caspian and Ural seas, towards the valley of the Oxus and over Afghanistan by the gateway of the Peiwar Kotal or the Khyber Pass to Peshawar, Lahore, and Delhi. Assuming this distance to be 4000 miles and the average rate of travel 100 m.p.h., a safe estimate ten years hence, and allowing five hours for stoppages to take on fresh fuel, forty-five hours should be the travelling time of a letter from London to Delhi, or less than two days. A letter written on a Monday evening in London should be delivered in Delhi on a Thursday morning. To South Africa there is no difficulty in a route crossing the Continent to the Strait of Gibraltar, thence through Morocco, along the west coast of Africa, over the corner of the Bight of Benin, past the mouth of the Congo, through the north-west corner of Damaraland to Johannesburg and Pretoria.

Over the Atlantic from Blacksod Bay to St. John's, Newfoundland, is only 1900 miles, and nineteen hours should suffice for crossing. The problem here to be solved is the

carrying of sufficient liquid fuel for such a long flight. In the matter of light, only fourteen hours of daylight will be needed, for four hours will be gained on the sun in the difference of time. Sun-chasing will thus be of value. An airship or airplane will be able to leave Blacksod Bay on a summer morning at 4 A.M. and be in St. John's, Newfoundland, at 7 P.M. (American time) the same evening. Thence it is but a few hours westwards to Montreal or south-westwards to New York. My critics will urge that, given a couple of cyclonic storms coming across the Atlantic at a mile a minute, the air posts will be irregular and therefore unreliable. That criticism is answered by the question, Are even the leviathans of the Atlantic always punctual? In order to obtain the convenience of the higher average of speed, which the air post will give, a price must be paid, and part of that price will undoubtedly be some irregularity during periods of storms. Admittedly our most powerful efforts are yet puny in comparison with the powers of nature.

This great, new problem, the safe and swift navigation of the air, needs not only inventors, designers, and constructors, but apostles, prophets, and martyrs. It needs also thousands of disciples, for there is yet but a small band who see with the eye of faith. But no amount of abuse or insult, no official declarations of complacent satisfaction with the present, no heart-breaking failures of promising inventions—none of these things will put out the sacred fire.

The last dominion to be gained by man, the dominion of the air, will not be easy to win. Its secrets will not be revealed except to those who are prepared patiently and bravely to work on in their different spheres to solve the greatest of problems.

MONTAGU OF BEAULIEU.

THE ROUMANIAN FACTOR IN THE PROBLEM OF THE NEAR EAST

1. **Histoire des Roumains.** By A. D. XÉNOPOL. (French translation from the Roumanian.) Paris. 1896.
2. **L'Influence française sur l'Esprit public en Roumanie.** By P. ÉLIADE. Paris. 1898.
3. **Histoire de l'Esprit public en Roumanie au xixe Siécle.** By P. ÉLIADE. Paris. 1905.
4. **Données politiques et économiques sur la Roumanie moderne.** By G. G. GIURGEA. Bukharest. 1913.
5. **La Roumanie contemporaine.** By C. D. MAVRODIN. Paris. 1915.
6. **Histoire de la Roumanie contemporaine (1822-1900).** By F. DAMÉ. Paris. 1900.
7. **Quinze Ans d'Histoire (1866-1881).** By Baron JEHAN DE WITTE. Paris. 1905.
8. **Roumania and the Great War.** By R. W. SETON WATSON. Constable and Co. 1915.
9. **Roumania.** By D. MITRANY, in 'The Balkans.' Clarendon Press. 1915.
10. **The Ottoman Empire, 1801-1913.** By W. MILLER. Cambridge University Press. 1913.

TO Carmen Sylva, first Queen of Roumania, we owe the story of her husband's acceptance of the Crown. When the offer reached him, so the tale runs, Prince Charles of Hohenzollern had never heard of the existence of the State which he was destined to rule and recreate. But, like the methodical Teuton he was, he opened his atlas, took his pencil and traced a line from London to Bombay. Finding that the line passed through Roumania, he exclaimed 'That 'is a country with a future,' and promptly accepted the offer. The story, whether apocryphal or not, may serve to illustrate the point which the following pages are designed to emphasise.

The ignorance displayed by the German princeling would have found plenty of parallels in England. Until quite recently the Government and the people of this country have alike been curiously indifferent both as to the past and

the future of the Danubian Principalities. Even now, if they desire to satisfy their recently awakened curiosity, they will find themselves compelled to rely almost entirely upon foreign sources.

Dr. Seton Watson's enlarged lecture 'Roumania and the 'Great War,' published last year, is, as far as I know, the only work in English dealing exclusively with the history and politics of Roumania.* Of the four essays contained in 'The Balkans,' a volume recently issued by the Clarendon Press, one—and not the least excellent one—by Mr. Mitrany is devoted to Roumania. Mr. Miller has dealt with the subject admirably but incidentally in 'The Ottoman Empire, 1801–1913,' and there are, of course, scattered references to the history of the Danubian Principalities in general historical works. For the rest, a singularly interesting people and a most romantic history have received scant attention from English publicists and historians. A country already prosperous and with immense economic potentialities has been stupidly neglected by our merchants; a factor of high significance in the Near Eastern problem has been persistently ignored by our diplomatists.

It has long been otherwise with the French. Drawn to a Latin people by racial affinities; finding in the Principalities, as in Poland and in Turkey itself, a promising field for the exercise of their diplomatic activities first against the Hapsburgs and later against the Romanoffs, the French have always manifested a lively interest in the now happily united Principalities. Napoleon III. would gladly have seen their union effected in 1856, and he did much towards persuading the Powers to recognise the accomplished fact in 1859. Inheriting, in this respect, the tradition of the Bourbon Monarchy, Napoleon III. has transmitted it to the Third Republic. Nor have the social and intellectual relations between France and Roumania ever been closer than since the accession of a Hohenzollern Prince to the Roumanian throne. Several French journals and reviews are published in Bukharest; each

* As these pages go to press I notice two works mentioned in Mr. Miller's admirable bibliography: 'Roumania Past and Present' by J. Samuelson, London, 1882; and 'An Account of the Principalities of Moldavia and Wallachia' by W. Wilkinson, London, 1820.

of the three parties into which Roumanian politicians are divided has its own official journal published in French; at least one Roumanian journal is published in Paris. French is the language of the Court and of society at Bukharest, and the language is so generally understood that no translation of French Classics exists in Roumania. Out of nine members of the Roumanian Cabinet six were, in 1913, *diplômés* of French Universities, and the Roumanian Colony in Paris is, proportionately to population, the largest foreign colony in France. The claim made by Baron de Witte in his 'Quinze 'Ans d'Histoire' (p. 8), though large, cannot be regarded as extravagant: 'C'est sous notre influence que la nation 'roumaine s'est formée et a grandi; ce sont les travaux de 'nos écrivains, de nos historiens, qui ont révélé sa véritable 'origine, alors ignorée en Europe.' Again, M. Georges Lacour-Gayet writes in his preface to M. Mavrodin's 'La Roumanie 'contemporaine': 'La France est certainement le pays, en 'dehors de la Roumanie, où les questions roumaines provoquent 'le plus de sympathie, où les intérêts roumains sont le mieux 'sentis et le mieux compris.' The same point is brought out in the elaborate studies of M. Éliade. Nor is the claim repudiated in Roumania itself. Roumanian historians love to recall the Roman origin of what Baron de Witte happily calls 'un îlot latin au milieu de l'océan slav et finnois 'qui l'environne'; while in the same spirit V. A. Urechia, cited by M. Mavrodin, writes: 'Nous sommes ici pour dire à 'tout le monde que Rome est notre mère.' Strangers have christened Roumania 'the Belgium of the Balkans,' and its constitution is a faithful copy of that of Belgium. Nevertheless, the primary debt felt and acknowledged by the great mass of the Roumanian intellectuals is to France. Thus a typical Roumanian, Alexandre Sturdza, writes:

'La Roumanie est latine d'origine et d'aspirations: elle a constamment mis son orgueil à le dire et à le répéter. . . . Nous ne sommes ni Slaves, ni Germains, ni Turcs; nous sommes Roumains, c'est-à-dire Latins, et, parlant ethniquement, apparentés à la France. La Roumanie moderne poursuit la réalisation d'une œuvre éminemment nationale, mais elle aime sa sœur aînée, sa bienfaitrice, la France.'

Yet, notwithstanding the traditional tie which ever since the seventeenth century has united the Danubian Principalities

with successive governments in France; despite the racial community and intellectual affinity which have drawn the two peoples together; despite the ardent sympathy exhibited in Bukharest for the cause of France in 1870; despite the profound antagonism between the trans-Carpathian Roumans and the Magyars; despite the persistent persecution suffered by the former at the hands of the Dual Monarchy, Roumania has for the last thirty years tended to look to Berlin and Vienna rather than to Paris for leadership both in politics and in trade. Since 1882 Roumania has become, indeed, 'a sleeping partner' in the Holy Alliance.

How is the paradox to be explained? A facile explanation is offered, of course, by the dynastic connexion between the reigning families of Roumania and Prussia—'Bien que je 'sois aujourd'hui prince de Roumanie, je suis et je reste toujours 'un Hohenzollern.' Thus wrote Prince Carol to King William of Prussia in 1869. But dynastic affinities afford only a partial explanation of a notorious fact. The words of Baron de Witte cited above may afford a clue to the contradiction. 'Un îlot latin *au milieu de l'océan slav.*' The fear of Russia has exercised upon Roumanian politics a more potent influence even than traditional friendship with France. The dread of political Pan-Slavism is still the dominant sentiment among the Roumanians. The *Drang nach Osten* of *Mitteleuropa* does not immediately threaten Roumania so long as the objective is Salonika, but none of the Balkan States would suffer more material and moral damage from a German occupation of Constantinople. On the other hand, Russia can reach Constantinople by land only by an infringement of the territorial integrity of Roumania. Her ingratitude for the facilities and generous assistance rendered to her by Roumania in 1877 was largely responsible for the gravitation of Roumania towards the orbit of the Triple Alliance.

Yet that gravitation has not been without its embarrassments for the Roumanian nationalists. Russia, it is true, imposes her yoke upon two million 'unredeemed' Roumanians in Bessarabia. But there are four million men and women of the same race living in Transylvania and the Bukovina ardently anxious for reunion with their co-nationals in the kingdom. A victory of the Central European Powers in the present war would be the death-blow to their hopes.

Dare they anticipate with more confidence the triumph of Pan-Slavism in the Balkans? Would it be the part of wisdom to throw in their lot with the Powers of the *Entente* or does prudence dictate an adherence to the path of neutrality, so long as the path remains open to them? That is the vital problem for the Roumania of to-day.

It would be idle to pretend that it is easy of solution. A brief sketch of the evolution of the Danubian Kingdom in the past may, however, throw some light upon the question of present and future policy, and may help to determine with greater precision the significance of the Roumanian factor in the general problem of the Near East.

The Roumanians occupy, in more ways than one, a unique place among the Balkan peoples. A Latin people surrounded by Slavs and Magyars, they were never really absorbed, like the Serbs, Bulgars, and Greeks, into the Ottoman Empire. Their early history has, however, been the subject of much controversy and is still wrapped in some obscurity. They are commonly supposed to be the descendants of the Roman colonists settled (*circ.* A.D. 101) by the Emperor Trajan in the province of Dacia for the protection of the Roman Empire against the Northern barbarians. This account of their origin was disputed by Dr. Freeman, who held that they represented 'not specially Dacians or Roman colonists in 'Dacia, but the great Thracian race generally, of which the 'Dacians were only a part.' The question is not one which can be permitted to detain us. It must suffice, for our present purpose, to say that just as the Hungarians represent a great Magyar wedge thrust in between the Northern and the Southern Slavs, so do the Roumanians represent a Latin wedge, distinct and aloof from all their immediate neighbours, though not devoid, especially in language, of many traces of Slav influences. Towards the close of the third century (*circ.* A.D. 271) the Emperor Aurelian was compelled by barbarian inroads to abandon his distant colony and to withdraw the Roman legions, but the colonists themselves withdrew into the fastnesses of the Carpathians only to emerge again, many centuries later, when the barbarian flood had at last subsided.

For nearly a thousand years (reckoning to the Tartar invasion of 1241) Dacia was nothing but a highway for successive

tides of invaders: Goths, Huns, Lombards, Avars, and Slavs. But, except the last, none of the invaders left any permanent impress upon the land. Still, the successive tides followed each other so quickly that the Daco-Romans themselves were completely submerged and for a thousand years history loses sight of them.

But though submerged they were neither absorbed nor obliterated. In words quoted by D. Mitrany in 'The Balkans,'

> 'The possession of the regions on the Lower Danube passed from one nation to another, but none endangered the Roumanian nation as a national entity. "The water passes, the stones remain"; the hordes of the migration period, detached from their native soil, disappeared as mist before the sun. But the Roman element bent their heads while the storm passed over them, clinging to the old places until the advent of happier days, when they were able to stand up and stretch their limbs.'

The southern portion of what is now Roumania emerged, towards the close of the thirteenth century, as the Principality of Wallachia (or Muntenia = mountainland); the northern, a century later, came to be known as the Principality of Moldavia. Both principalities were founded by immigrant Rouman nobles from Transylvania, and from that day to this Roumania has been distinguished from the other Balkan provinces by the survival of a powerful native aristocracy. In Serbia the nobles were exterminated; in Bosnia they saved their property by the surrender of their faith; in Roumania alone did they retain both.

Such was the position of the Danubian Principalities when the Ottomans began their career of conquest in south-eastern Europe. The Principalities had never been in a position, like their neighbours to the south and west of them, to aspire to a dominant place in Balkan politics. Nor were they, like the latter, exposed to the first and full fury of the Ottoman attack. Still, under its famous Voyvode, Mircaea the Great, Wallachia took part against the Ottomans, in the great Slavonic combinations which were dissolved by the Turkish victories at Kossovo (1389) and Nicopolis (1396).

Early in the fifteenth century the Ottomans crossed the Danube, and Wallachia was reduced to a state of vassaldom in 1412. But it was never wholly absorbed, like Serbia, Bulgaria, Greece, Macedonia and Thrace, into the Ottoman

Empire. Nor was Moldavia, which for obvious geographical reasons managed to maintain its independence for a hundred years longer than Wallachia. In 1475 Stephen the Great, Voyvode of Moldavia, won a resounding victory against the Turkish army at Rakova. In 1512, however, his son Bogdan, weakened by the attacks of Poland and Hungary, made a voluntary submission to the Ottoman Sultan. Bogdan agreed to pay tribute to the Sultan and assist him in time of war, but Moldavia was to continue to elect its own Prince and no Turk was to be permitted to settle in the Principality.

Towards the close of the sixteenth century there occurred a bright interlude in the somewhat sombre history of the Principalities. In the year 1593 Michael the Brave became Voyvode of Wallachia, and inaugurated his brief but brilliant reign by flinging down a challenge to the Ottomans, then hardly past the meridian of their fame. Engaged in their prolonged contest with the Hapsburg Emperors, the Turks quickly realised the importance of Michael's defection, and turned aside from their campaign in Hungary to inflict upon their revolted vassal the punishment due for so daring a defiance of their suzerainty. But Michael, though heavily outnumbered, won at Kalougareni a decisive victory over the Ottoman army under Sinan Pasha (August 13, 1595). Strengthened by reinforcements from Transylvania and Moldavia, Michael pursued his advantage with such effect as to drive the Turks in headlong rout across the Danube. At a single stroke the independence of Wallachia was brilliantly though temporarily achieved.

Victorious over the Turks, Michael then turned to the higher task of reuniting under one crown the whole Roumanian people. This also he achieved with singular success. Sigismund Báthory, Voyvode of Transylvania, suddenly resigned his crown to the Emperor Rudolph and transferred to the latter such rights as he supposed himself to possess over Wallachia. Michael nominally accepted the suzerainty of the Emperor, but the turn of events gave him the opportunity of conquering Transylvania for himself. He eagerly embraced it, inflicted a crushing defeat upon a rival claimant at Schellenburg (October 28, 1599), and established himself as Voyvode of Transylvania. He then turned his attention to Moldavia. That also was reduced to submission,

and thus for a brief space the whole Roumanian people were united under the rule of a single Prince.

It would be affectation to suggest that this achievement was regarded at the time as a triumph of the nationality principle. That principle had not yet emerged as a political force, and the sentiments of the Roumanians in Transylvania and Moldavia were entirely opposed to the rule of Michael. The significance of his achievement was wholly proleptic. Michael's reputation must in honesty and accuracy be dated from the revival of national self-consciousness in the nineteenth century. The Roumans of Transylvania and Moldavia regarded him in his own day as a meddlesome usurper. The Roumanians of to-day look to him as a national hero who for a brief space realised the unity of the Roumanian people. What Roumania was under Michael the Brave, that the Greater Roumania may be again. Michael's, therefore, is the name with which to conjure among the Roumanian Irredentists. The temporary union of the various Roumanian provinces was, however, dissolved by the assassination of Michael in 1601, and with him died for more than two centuries all hopes of unity or even of independence.

The fortunes of the Danubian Principalities touched their nadir in the eighteenth century. Solyman the Magnificent had in 1536 concluded an arrangement between them and the Ottoman Empire, by which the election of the ruling Princes was left to the Principalities themselves. But in 1711 even this remnant of independence was extinguished. The Hospodarships of the two Principalities were put up by the Porte to auction, and were invariably knocked down to Phanariot Greeks. For 110 years, therefore, (1711–1821) Moldavia and Wallachia were ruled by a rapid succession of Greek bureaucrats. The more rapid the succession the better for the Turks. In 110 years there were 37 Hospodars in Wallachia and 33 in Moldavia. Each Hospodar, knowing that his tenure would be brief, had perforce to make hay while the sun shone; the hay was made entirely at the expense of the unfortunate Roumanians, and the whole system was, as M. Xénopol has said, neither more nor less than 'organized 'brigandage.'

Meanwhile, paradoxical as it may appear, the immediate prospects of Roumania indisputably suffered from the weakening

of Ottoman power and the disintegration of the Ottoman Empire. A half-century of disastrous military defeats—at the hands of Montecuculi at San Gothard (1664); of John Sobieski before Vienna in 1683; of Prince Eugene of Savoy at Zenta (1697)—culminated in the conclusion of the Treaty of Carlowitz (1699). By that treaty the Turks were compelled to cede to the Hapsburgs the whole of Hungary except the Banat of Temesvar, together with the Roumanian Duchy of Transylvania. By the Treaty of Passarowitz (1718) the recovery of Hungary was completed by the cession of the Banat of Temesvar, while at the same time the Hapsburgs acquired the whole of the territory known as Little Wallachia, that is the portion of the Principality bounded by the river Aluta. The latter acquisition proved to be only temporary, for the Turks recovered it by the Treaty of Belgrade in 1739. In 1775, however, the Hapsburgs claimed and obtained from the Turks the Bukovina. The Moldavian Boyards energetically protested to the Porte against the cession of a district which was not merely an integral part of the Principality but contained their ancient capital, the mausoleum of their kings, and other historical monuments and associations. The Porte, despite a strong hint that the Moldavians might find it to their interest to seek a protector elsewhere, declined to reconsider its bargain with the Emperor.

Had the Moldavians carried out their threat they would not have had to go far to find their new protector. Russia had begun from the days of Peter the Great to interest herself in the affairs of the Danubian Principalities. That interest was not ethnographical but geographical and ecclesiastical. The appearance of Russia as a Black Sea Power raised an entirely new problem for the Roumanian peoples, while the geographical situation of the Principalities suggested to the Russian strategists questions of the highest significance. Russia had temporarily occupied Moldavia during her war with the Turks in 1736–1739, and both Principalities were occupied during the war which was ended by the Treaty of Kutchuk-Kainardji in 1774.

By that famous treaty Russia agreed to restore the Principalities to the Porte, but only on condition of better government, and she formally reserved to herself the right of remonstrance if that condition was not observed. Five

years later a *Convention Explicative* (1779) stipulated that the tribute payable by the Principalities to the Porte should be 'imposed with moderation and humanity.' A Russian consulate was, against the wishes of the Sultan, establishd at Bukharest, while the Prussian consul at Jassy complained of the activity of the Russian agents in Moldavia.* Clearly the policy of peaceful penetration had begun.

The Principalities occupied a conspicuous place in the agreement concluded between the Tsarina Catherine II. and the Emperor Joseph II. in 1781. The two sovereigns had decided that the time had arrived for the complete annihilation of Ottoman power in Europe, and for the partition of the dominions of the Sultan. Wallachia and Moldavia, including Bessarabia, were to be erected into a new kingdom of Dacia, and the Crown was to be conferred upon Catherine's favourite and minister, Count Potemkin. The grandiose scheme, of which this was only one though by no means the least interesting feature, was not destined to materialise. Six years later, however, Catherine and Joseph II. were again at war with the Porte, and when, in 1792, peace was concluded at Jassy, the Russian frontier was advanced up to the Dniester, the Tsarina acquired the great fortress of Oczakov and the surrounding districts, while Moldavia was restored to the Sultan only on condition that the Porte fulfilled to the letter the stipulations of the Treaty of Kutchuk-Kainardji and the *Convention Explicative*.

During the Napoleonic wars the Principalities were regarded merely as a pawn in the game of diplomacy and war. Thus in the war of the Second Coalition (1799–1801) the Porte found itself in temporary alliance with Russia against France. Russia improved the occasion to obtain for her clients an important concession, and for herself a still stronger position as protectress. The Sultan agreed in 1802 that henceforward the Hospodars should hold office for a fixed term of seven years instead of at the good pleasure of the Porte, and that they should not be deposed without the assent of the Tsar. Four years later a fresh turn of the wheel of fortune brought the Sultan into the grip of Napoleon, who compelled the Porte to declare war, in 1806, upon Russia and

* Miller, 'Ottoman Empire,' p. 8.

England. Russia's reply was an immediate invasion of the Principalities.

Before twelve months were over Napoleon had decided upon a new move in the diplomatic game. He came to terms with Russia at Tilsit and agreed to divide the world with the Tsar Alexander. The Tsar's share was to include the Danubian Principalities, and vague hopes were held out of a much larger prize, perhaps Constantinople itself. In subsequent negotiations Alexander insisted that he must have Bulgaria, Roumelia, and the command of the Bosphorus and the Dardanelles. Napoleon never actually admitted the Tsar's claim to Constantinople. That would have meant, as he averred, 'the Empire of the world'; and he was not prepared to concede so great a prize to his partner—even on paper. For the Tilsit concessions never materialised, and by 1811 the partners were on the eve of the complete rupture which culminated in the Moscow expedition. The Tsar, therefore, anxious to secure his left flank, agreed in 1812 to evacuate the Principalities and to accept from the Porte, in full settlement of all immediate claims, the province of Bessarabia. This arrangement, reached through the mediation of England, was embodied in the Treaty of Bukharest (1812).

The Treaty of Bukharest was, for the Turks, a colossal blunder; to the Moldavians it involved a painful sacrifice. Nor did it tend to assuage the bitter memory which the period of Russian occupation had implanted in the minds of the Roumanians. The Russians, on taking possession of the Principalities, had announced that they came as 'liberators,' but, as a fact, there is no period in the history of their country to which the Roumanians look back with greater bitterness. More particularly do they resent the fact that by the dismemberment of Moldavia a population which now numbers two million Roumanians exchanged autonomy under the Sultan for absorption into the Empire of the Tsar.

At the general settlement in 1815 the Porte made desperate efforts to recover Bessarabia; but Alexander was not likely to forgo the only and, as he might reasonably think, the wholly inadequate fruits of Russian diplomacy in the Near East, and Bessarabia therefore remained in the hands of Russia.

The next scene in the drama of Roumanian history opens

with the Greek revolution of 1821. The struggle for Greek independence was, as I have recently shown in this Review,* inaugurated in Wallachia. Prince Alexander Hypsilanti, to whom the leadership of the Greek cause was entrusted, was a Phanariot Greek, the eldest son of a man who had been Hospodar successively of Moldavia and Wallachia ; Alexander was himself a distinguished general in the Russian army ; it was natural, therefore, that he should have selected Wallachia as the appropriate locale for an insurrection which relied, though unwarrantably, upon the sympathy and assistance of the Tsar of Russia.

Nevertheless, the decision was singularly unwise. The Holy Alliance had already degenerated from the lofty ideals which had originally inspired it ; the Tsar had long since discarded the slough of liberalism ; his political confessor was now Prince Metternich, and consequently he frowned sternly on Hypsilanti's enterprise. Moreover, the Roumanian nationalists detested the Phanariot Greeks, and neither felt nor displayed any enthusiasm for the Hellenic cause. Still, Hypsilanti's insurrection had one important result. It led immediately to the extinction of Phanariot rule in the Principalities. After the outbreak of the Hellenic insurrection Greek Hospodars were no longer acceptable to the Porte, and, from 1822 onwards, the Hospodars of both Principalities were selected from the native nobility.

To the Roumanians, however, the change brought little advantage. It meant only a change of alien masters. From 1822 until the outbreak of the Crimean war Russia enjoyed a virtual protectorate over the Principalities. Thus the Convention of Ackerman, concluded between Russia and Turkey in 1826, guaranteed to Moldavia and Wallachia all their privileges 'under the guardianship of the Cabinet of 'St. Petersburg.' The Hospodars were to be elected for a term of seven years by the native Boyards, and were not to be deposed by the Sultan without previous notice to Russia. The Treaty of Adrianople (1829) virtually provided for a Turkish evacuation of the Principalities. It confirmed the Convention of Ackerman, and conferred upon Moldavia

* Cf. 'The Hellenic Factor in the Problem of the Near East,' Edinburgh Review, Jan. 1916.

and Wallachia practical autonomy. They were to pay tribute, at a slightly enhanced rate, to the Porte, and were to be free from all requisitions for corn, *corvées*, and the like. No Mussulman was henceforward to reside there, and those who owned real property were to sell it within eighteen months. Finally, the Turks were not to retain any fortresses on the left bank of the Danube, and undertook to sanction the administrative regulations made during the Russian occupation.

Those regulations were embodied in a *Règlement Organique* (1831), which the Russians bequeathed as a parting gift to the inhabitants when, in 1834, their occupation determined. The inhabitants, it is to be feared, were less grateful than they should have been for the unquestionable benefits they enjoyed under Russian rule, for in 1848 they appealed to their nominal suzerain the Sultan to deliver them from their liberators.

The insurrection which ensued in the Principalities was undoubtedly inspired by the example of Paris. Something has already been said of the influence exerted by French culture upon the Latin people of the Danubian Provinces, and much more may be learnt from the works of M. Éliade prefixed to this article. No apprehension of the position of modern Roumania—its political and ethnographic affinities, the origin of its culture, and the spirit of its people—is possible unless this factor in its evolution be adequately recognised. And never was the influence of France more potent there than in the year of European revolution.

In Transylvania the Roumans raised an insurrection against their Magyar masters, just as the latter were in revolt against the domination of Vienna. The Cis-Carpathian Roumans attempted, at the same time, to emancipate themselves from the influence of Russia. Neither movement achieved any immediate success. The rising was suppressed with ease by the Tsar Nicholas, and the Convention of Balta Liman (May 1849) deprived the Roumanians of many of the privileges secured to them by previous instruments. Nevertheless, the insurrections did something to stimulate national sentiment and self-consciousness among the Roumanian nationalists on both slopes of the Carpathians.

The next epoch in the evolution of modern Roumania is marked by the Crimean war, and it is one of great significance. As soon as the diplomatic situation at Constantinople

became really tense the Tsar sent Prince Gortchakoff to occupy the Principalities (June 1853). The Western Powers, thereupon, insisted on their evacuation, and in this demand they had the support of Austria. Russia refused to comply, but after her failure to take Silistria (June 1854) she retired across the Danube, and a few weeks later across the Pruth. Austrian troops then occupied the Principalities, the Emperor having pledged himself to protect them during the war, and to restore them to the Sultan on the conclusion of peace.

The future position of Moldavia and Wallachia proved to be a subject of acute controversy during the Peace negotiations at Paris. The Emperor of the French warmly favoured a union of the Principalities under a sovereign of their own choice, and converted Russia to his project.* Austria, obstinate in her adherence to the policy of *Divide et impera*, and justly fearful of the effect upon her own Roumanian subjects in Transylvania and the Bukovina, strongly opposed it, as did the Porte and Great Britain. Accordingly, it was decided to lay down in the Treaty of Paris only the general principles of the settlement, leaving their application to be determined in a subsequent convention. The Treaty of Paris provided that the Principalities were to remain under the suzerainty of the Porte, but that the Powers collectively should guarantee their privileges and immunities, the exclusive guarantee of Russia or any other single Power being expressly repudiated. They were to enjoy 'an independent and national 'administration, with full liberty of worship, legislation, and 'commerce,' and were to have 'a national armed force.' Southern Bessarabia was to be ceded by Russia to Moldavia. Finally, it was agreed that a national convention was to be held in both Provinces and was to decide the 'definite organisa-'tion of the Principalities.' †

These 'divans *ad hoc*' duly met and demanded the union of the Principalities under a foreign hereditary Prince. Great was the concern in the European Chancelleries. The Porte naturally saw in this audacious step the final extinction

* Cf. Louis Thouvenel, 'Trois Ans de la Question d'Orient (1856–59),' with important documents relating to the Union of the Principalities; Émile Ollivier, 'L'Empire Libéral,' vol. iii., and Martin, 'Life of Prince Consort,' iii. 464 *seq.*

† Cf. Arts. xx.–xxvii. of the Treaty of Paris, 1856.

of its power over the Principalities. Austria was not less vehemently opposed to it; Great Britain, though she took no part in the 'most outrageous acts' committed by the partisans of Austria and Turkey in the Principalities, acts designed to procure a decision favourable to their own policy, inclined very decidedly to the same opinion. Lord Palmerston and Lord Clarendon * were deeply committed to the formula of 'the integrity of the Ottoman Empire'; still more deeply was Lord Stratford de Redcliffe concerned to maintain it. All three were profoundly suspicious of the good faith of Napoleon III., and gravely disquieted by his obvious *rapprochement* with Russia. In a very illuminating conversation with the Prince Consort, the Emperor Napoleon expressed the sensible view that 'the union, by rendering 'those countries contented, and particularly if well governed 'by a European prince, would form an effectual barrier 'against Russia, whilst the present disjointed and unsatis-'factory condition of those countries would make them 'always turn towards Russia. The union was, therefore, in 'the interest of Turkey.' † Exception may perhaps be taken to the implication of the last sentence, but few people will now be found to deny that in his main contention the Emperor Napoleon was right, while the English statesmen were, in Lord Salisbury's classic phrase, 'putting their money on the 'wrong horse.' To this general rule there were one or two notable exceptions. The most notable was Mr. Gladstone, who, for once in his life, found himself in cordial agreement with Napoleon III., being drawn to the Emperor's views by his warm sympathy with the nationality principle. He was not in office during the height of the crisis, but in May 1858 he urged with characteristic vehemence that England ought to support the declared wish of the people of Wallachia and Moldavia. 'Surely the best resistance to be offered to Russia,' he said, 'is by the strength and freedom of those countries 'that will have to resist her. You want to place a living

* Lord Clarendon resigned office with Lord Palmerston in February 1855, and was not included in the Cabinet when Lord Palmerston returned to power in June 1859.

† A record of this most important conversation from the pen of the Prince Consort himself will be found in Martin's 'Life of the Prince Consort,' vol. iv. pp. 99 *seq.*

'barrier between Russia and Turkey. There is no barrier 'like the breasts of freemen.' * Mr. Gladstone carried with him into the Division lobby not only Lord John Russell but, as it is interesting in view of his subsequent declaration to note, Lord Robert Cecil. They were unable, however, to prevail against the official view.

Meanwhile, the diplomatic situation became so grave as to threaten a renewal of war in the Near East. Napoleon III. stoutly maintained his own views and was supported by Russia, Prussia, and Sardinia. That war did not actually break out was due partly to the sincere desire of the Emperor Napoleon to avoid any breach in the good relations between the English Court and his own; partly to the natural reluctance of Russia and England again to draw the sword so lately sheathed, but above all to the courage and adroitness of the Principalities themselves. In 1859 the National Assemblies at Jassy and Bukharest solved the question of union by both electing as Hospodar a native noble, Colonel Alexander Couza. The Porte and the Powers ultimately accepted the accomplished fact, and on December 23, 1861, the 'administrative' Union of the Principalities was proclaimed under the title of Roumania.

Between 1861 and 1866 Prince Alexander carried out a series of important domestic reforms, ecclesiastical, agrarian, and educational, but the position of a native Prince was beset by difficulties, and in order to maintain it Couza had to carry out a *coup d'état* in 1864. Two years later he was compelled to abdicate. The crown was thereupon offered to and refused by the Count of Flanders, and on his refusal was offered to Prince Charles of Hohenzollern-Sigmaringen, the second son of the elder and Roman Catholic branch of the Hohenzollerns, a distant cousin of the King of Prussia, and a connexion by marriage of the Emperor Napoleon. Prince Charles accepted the Hospodarship, and in 1881 exchanged the title of Prince for that of King.

The reign of Prince Charles synchronised with the making of modern Roumania. His first act was to summon a Constituent Assembly, which, taking the Belgian Constitution as its model, drafted a very liberal Constitution. Accepted

* Morley's 'Gladstone,' ii. 4.

in 1866 and considerably amended in 1879 and 1884, that Constitution is still in force.* It is, like its prototype, exceedingly meticulous, consisting of no less than one hundred and thirty-three clauses. Alone among the Balkan States may Roumania be said to possess a monarchy which is genuinely 'constitutional' in our narrow English sense. The person of the King is, by Article 92, inviolable; his ministers are responsible, no act of the Crown being valid unless signed by a responsible minister. Subject to this responsibility the Crown enjoys the rights and has to perform the duties usually vested in the Executive of a Constitutional State.† The Cabinet consists of nine members, who are responsible to the Legislature. The latter is bicameral in form, but both Chambers are elective. In both cases, however, the election is indirect, the elections being made through Electoral Colleges, composed of the tax-payers, who are divided into three colleges, according to the amount of taxes paid. The franchise is, however, higher in the case of the Senatorial electors than in that of electors to the popular Chamber. The Senate consists of 120 members, who must be at least forty years of age and possess an income of £376 a year, and their term of office is for eight years. It enjoys a position not only of dignity but real power. The Chamber of Deputies consists of 183 members, who are elected for four years, and must be at least five-and-twenty years of age.

Education in Roumania is compulsory and gratuitous, but the proportion of illiterates is large. The Church, which is Orthodox, proclaimed its independence of the Patriarch in 1865 and has since that time been autocephalous ‡; but the people, though jealously insistent upon ecclesiastical independence, have been too much accustomed to associate the Church with Russian influence to regard it with any special devotion.

The social and material progress made by Roumania during the reign of King Carol was remarkable. Unlike most of the

* The full text will be found in Damé, appendice, pp. 425 *seq.*

† The reality of the constitutional limitations upon the personal will of the Sovereign was strikingly manifested, to the great advantage of the *Entente*, on the outbreak of the present war.

‡ The independence of the Roumanian Church was not officially recognised by the Grand Patriarch until 1885.

Balkan States, Roumania, as has been said, possesses a powerful native aristocracy, but out of the population of seven and a half millions over one million are proprietors, and most of the peasants own the land they cultivate. Agriculture is still the main occupation of the people, only 20 per cent. of whom dwell in towns, and the birth-rate is said to be, next to that of Russia, the highest in Europe. According to M. Mavrodin, the population of the kingdom has an increment of one hundred thousand per annum, and it is estimated that in twenty years the population will reach twenty-five millions. Oil and cereals furnish the bulk of the exports, but industry develops apace. The external trade of the country—now about fifty millions sterling—exceeds that of all the other Balkan States together. Much of it is done with the Central Empires. The imports from Germany and Austria-Hungary are over thirteen millions; those from the United Kingdom are less than two. Of all the Balkan peoples the Roumanians are not only the most numerous but by far the most homogeneous alike as regards race, language, creed, and geographical distribution. The fourteen million Roumanians speak one language, virtually without dialects; they profess one faith, that of the Orthodox Church, and all but a remnant are to be found between the Theiss, the Danube, and the Pruth. On the other hand, among one and a half million Albanians, there are not less than three creeds, Moslem, Catholic, and Orthodox, and innumerable tribes; the Serbo-Croats likewise have three creeds, and the Bulgarians two; while out of ten million Greeks a large proportion are dispersed in four different continents.*

The foreign relations of Roumania, maintained by a very adroit and well-trained diplomatic service, largely recruited from native sources, though French by tradition and education, are conditioned mainly by geographical and racial considerations. The importance to Russia of a friendly Roumania, always sufficiently obvious, was proved to demonstration in the crisis of 1876–77. On the outbreak of the war against the Porte, Prince Carol offered to the Tsar free passage for the Russian army through the territory of Roumania. Russia has indeed no other way by land to Constantinople. But

* Mavrodin, op. cit. pp. 3, 4.

the further offer of the co-operation of the Roumanian army was declined with some hauteur by the Tsar. All the greater, therefore, was the humiliation of the Russians when, finding themselves held up by the Turks before Plevna, they were compelled to ask for the assistance they had previously refused. Help was promptly forthcoming ; Prince Carol was appointed to the command-in-chief of the besieging army, and he and his troops contributed not a little to the fall of the great fortress, and to the ultimate victory of the Russian arms. If gratitude had any place in politics, the services rendered to Russia by Roumania would have been recognised in the Treaty of San Stefano. As a fact, Russia would not even admit her ally to the negotiations, and though the independence of Roumania was acknowledged by the Sultan, Prince Carol found himself deprived by Russia of those southern districts of Bessarabia which Roumania had recovered in 1856. The gift of the Dobrudscha was a mere mockery of compensation.

The Treaty of San Stefano was torn into shreds by Lord Beaconsfield. But the new arrangements concluded at Berlin brought no advantage to Roumania. Great Britain professed much platonic sympathy for the Latin State, but frankly confessed that she could not turn aside from the pursuit of the larger issues to befriend a State in whose fortunes she was not directly interested. Bismarck, despite the close dynastic ties which united Prussia and Roumania, was not, perhaps, sorry to see Russia neglecting a golden opportunity for binding Roumania in ties of gratitude to herself. A Roumania alienated from Russia would be the less likely to quarrel with the Dual Monarchy. Accordingly, the Roumanian envoys left Berlin empty-handed and bitterly chagrined by the ingratitude of Russia and the indifference of Europe.

Three years later, as we have seen, Roumania attained the dignity of a kingdom, and from that time onwards King Carol was drawn more and more closely into the orbit of the Triple Alliance. Nor was there any weakening in his allegiance until the Balkan wars of 1912–13. The intrigues of the Central Powers with Bulgaria in the interval between the two Balkan wars dealt it a serious blow. In the second Balkan war, Roumania's intervention, timed with singular adroitness, was inspired by two motives : to arrest a fratricidal contest, and to maintain the balance of power in the Balkans.

It is claimed, not without warrant, that by the Treaty of Bukharest Roumania attained to a position of quasi-hegemony in the peninsula. For herself, she obtained from Bulgaria the large strip of Dobrudscha including Silistria, thus greatly improving her strategical frontier on the south. More significant, however, was the political position which, by common consent, was conceded to her in the Balkans.

Will she be able to take advantage of current events to consolidate and extend it? The position of Roumania in regard to the present war is admittedly one of the utmost nicety. There is no doubt that the late King Carol, if he could have carried his ministers and people, would have joined the Central Empires, hoping to extort Bessarabia from Russia as the price of victory, and Transylvania, the Bukovina, the Banat of Temesvar, and perhaps a slice of Serbia as the guerdon of friendship. But the wishes of the King could not prevail.

Among the Latin peoples there was a hope and expectation that Roumania would follow Italy into the *Entente* camp. Had the diplomacy of the Western Powers in the Near East displayed any adroitness, she might well have done so. The temper of the people undoubtedly leans in that direction. But the lessons taught by the bitter experience of 1877-78 have sunk deep into the minds of the Roumanian people. Prince Carol refused to drive a bargain with Russia in 1877, and the result of his chivalry was only too plainly reflected in the position occupied by his country at the peace.

Roumania will not be guilty a second time of a similarly generous indiscretion. Her leading statesmen are ardently Gallophil and well disposed towards Italy, but their policy will be dictated by the interests of Roumania, and of Roumania alone. Those interests require a guarantee for free commercial navigation through the Bosphorus and the Dardanelles, while sentiment demands the realisation of the dream of a Greater Roumania. It is generally understood that M. Bratiano required from the *Entente* Powers, as the price of Roumanian intervention, a specific guarantee that she should be allowed forthwith to occupy and permanently to retain those provinces of the Dual Monarchy which are predominantly Roumanian in population—to wit, Transylvania, the Bukovina, and the Banat of Temesvar. Roumania was

perfectly justified in putting a high price upon her services, and, in view of her unfortunate experience in the past, in demanding 'cash down.' Nor is there any reason to suppose that the price would be withheld, assuming of course the decisive victory of the *Entente*, and provided the interests of Serbia were not jeopardised on the side of the Banat. It is further understood that Roumania has studiously refrained from making any claim upon Bessarabia, being perfectly cognisant of the fact that she cannot look for the recovery of the whole of Roumania Irredenta in less than two stages, if indeed she can look for it at all. But should the intervention of Roumania be as well-timed as we may anticipate, she may well look forward to the immediate annexation at least of Transylvania, the Bukovina, and the Banat of Temesvar. She would then form a homogeneous State of some twelve million people, and would at once assume that position of pre-eminence among the Balkan States to which her friends regard her as indisputably entitled. But it is to be ardently hoped that she will not, remembering the results of over-impulsiveness in 1877, fall into the opposite error of over-caution.

'He either fears his fate too much, or his deserts are small,
That dares not put it to the touch, to gain or lose it all.'

King Ferdinand and M. Bratiano should ponder the example of Victor Emmanuel and Cavour in 1855. Prudence is the first quality of statesmanship, but it is likely to be barren of fruit without a touch of the second, which is rashness. Roumania may wait upon events too long.

J. A. R. Marriott.

THE PRICE OF ADMIRALTY

1. **History of the Indian Wars.** By CLEMENT DOWNING. 1737.
2. **Calendar of State Papers.** Colonial Series. 1860–1913.
3. **History of the Indian Navy.** By C. R. Low. 1877.
4. **Select Pleas in the Court of Admiralty.** Edited by R. G. MARSDEN. 1885.
5. **Memoir on the Indian Surveys.** Introduction by Sir CLEMENTS MARKHAM. India Office. 1871.

MR. RUDYARD KIPLING stands fair to enrich the permanent treasure of the English language by certain names which tell their tale and certain phrases which put whole doctrines into a nutshell. The 'Price of Admiralty' is one of these neat caskets of words, full of meaning, 'significant,' as Mr. Carlyle would have said, 'of much'—of more indeed than the author thought it necessary to say in the verses we all know. Mr. Kipling is very well aware that 'blood' is not all the 'Price of Admiralty.' It is part, but 'Admiralty' does not come to those who leave the greatest number of their 'dead on the sands forlore,' nor pile most wrecks on 'the 'spouting reef.' If it did, then the Admiralty of the eastern ocean would not have passed from the Portuguese. The price they paid was high; one out of three of their huge carracks went down in the great seas below the Cape, or were shattered on the reefs of the Indian archipelagos, or tossed on to the shores of Africa by the monsoons. The Admiralty went to those who were not so often wrecked. Obtuseness, to be sure, lies this way, and the dense matter-of-factness attributed by English malice to the Scotchman who is puzzled by the unwelcome presence of a joke. We are not to ask what a song proves. It exists to suggest and not to demonstrate. But we may lawfully follow its suggestion and see what we reach. The Price of Admiralty is a pregnant phrase for this nation. No other has gained so much by the sea, has been from of old and is to-day so dependent upon it. No other surely has such pressing reasons for understanding what is the price paid for Admiralty, Sea Power, command of the sea, or any other

name use and wont may give to this possession to us so indispensable. Without it we are nought.

On the 31st of May the British Navy was again put to the great test, after an interval of all but one hundred and eleven years. Since the evening when the storm of battle was succeeded by the rage of the tempest in Trafalgar Bay, our ships and our men have had much work to do, and much fighting. They have fought squadron and frigate actions, have bombarded forts, cleared out pirate-strongholds, swept Malay and Chinese pirates off the sea, and have beaten down the slaver. But they have had no opportunity to measure themselves on a stricken field with an enemy, numerous, well appointed, well trained and resolute. Now this is the great test, and unless it can be encountered with success no victories gained in minor operations will avail. After so long a period during which the Navy has only had to exercise an enormous superiority of power, and when the foe now opposed to it is foreseeing, laborious in preparation, astute in the use of measures whether of attack or of defence, there was just reason for looking towards the day of trial with a prudent anxiety. There is a pride which goeth before a fall, the very fatal shadow of that other and sane pride which is based on achievement—not on ancient achievement of our fathers, but on our own. With the knowledge we now possess of what happened off the west coast of Jutland a few weeks ago, we are fully justified in feeling the second and honourable form of belief in ourselves.

The Admiralty is to be thanked in this case for allowing the country to learn the essential facts of the battle at a reasonably early date. The publication of Sir John Jellicoe's despatch and of the report made to him by the admiral in command of the advance squadrons, Sir David Beatty, on the 7th of July, say six weeks after the date of the action, is an example of promptitude which compares most favourably with certain instances in which the delays have been both long and unintelligible. With these papers in our hands we can form a clear conception of what took place on the 31st of May in the North Sea, and can draw the moral with confidence.

On that day the whole of the forces commanded by Sir John Jellicoe, the Grand Fleet, had been engaged in carrying out one of those frequent 'sweeps' of the North Sea on which

it has been employed for months in order to find the enemy, if he was to be found, and bring him to action, but if these objects were not to be obtained, then to keep him within bounds and incidentally to maintain the efficiency of the fleet, for that is the fruit of constant practice in open waters. The main fleet was well up to the north with the flag and the advance squadrons of battle cruisers, and one of battleships was to the south. The sweep had been carried out and Sir David Beatty was steering to the north at 2.20 P.M., when he was informed by the captain of the 'Galatea,' Alexander Sinclair, that enemy ships had been sighted to the north-east. Submarines, torpedoes, and mines have rendered the ancient way of keeping close up with a coast so perilous that the large British ships were well out to sea. They were so high up as to be off the point of Jutland, that is to say about on a level with the Firth of Tay. Since our fleet must keep a prudent distance it follows that there was a belt of water along the coast of Denmark in which the enemy was free to move. All Sir David Beatty could know on the early afternoon of the 31st of May was that some enemy ships were within this space, to the east of him. The course which was the proper one, and therefore was at once taken by Sir David, was to go to look after them. He did not steer directly for the point at which they were reported to be. If he had followed this line he would simply have given them a chance of escaping by running away southward at a right angle to him. He steered to south-south-east in the direction of the Horn Reef, a string of rocks, sand-banks, and shallows on the coast of Jutland, lying in a latitude a little more southerly than the Farne Islands on the Northumbrian coast. Any German ships of more than very small size coming from the north must steer well out to clear the Horn Reef. His plan was either to catch the enemy between his squadrons and Sir John Jellicoe or to bring him to action while he was trying to escape. Of course there was an obvious peril in the course he adopted. If the enemy were very numerous, or if he were supported by a powerful force, then the British advance squadrons might find themselves in the presence of superior numbers. A good deal has been said, by people who could not know the facts, about the impetuosity of Sir David Beatty. Sir John Jellicoe's despatch makes it perfectly clear that there was no 'impetuosity,' but only the

prompt and perfectly intelligent discharge of the proper functions of 'advance squadrons.' They were formed of swift ships in order that they might scout boldly, choose their own distance to engage, and 'lead ahead' when there was a possibility that they might be entangled in an engagement with an overwhelming number of opponents.

The enemy was sighted at about half-past three—five battle cruisers and small craft coming south. With his two battle cruisers and one battle squadron Sir David had a great superiority of force. For an hour or so there was a chase to the southward, and a 'long bowls' affair with the fleeing German ships, varied by the use of aircraft, and furious torpedo attack, and repelling of the same on both sides. Then it turned out that the enemy was supported. The German Battle Fleet came in from the south, and now the superiority of numbers had passed to the other side. But it was more apparent than real. As the British advance squadrons were of greater average speed than the Germans they had but to reverse their course and lead ahead. They could now not only keep opposite what by the reversion of course on both sides had become the base of a pursuing enemy but they could gain on him, turn eastward, cross his path, and in doing so, both concentrate a heavy fire on his leading ships, force them to turn east, and by curling round get between the foe and the land and win the power to cut his line of retreat. This was the manœuvre which was performed, not with impetuosity, but with judgment and at the speed which can be maintained by a great number of ships acting together only when all are handled with instant decision and unfailing accuracy of movement.

Meanwhile the Grand Fleet had naturally been informed in time and was coming into action. From soon after 6 P.M. to soon after 8 P.M. it threw its deciding weight into the scales. Space and plans would be required to give a full account of the final stages of the battle, and we are still lacking much information which it has not been thought proper, and is indeed not proper, to reveal as yet. The main results are for the moment enough. What are they? That Sir David Beatty fulfilled the function assigned him. He found the enemy, followed him, brought him to action, led him on and drew him to the 'stricken field' where he would be over-

powered. And this he did, not by exercise of mere headlong valour but by judgment and by virtue of that skill which is born of previous thought and long practice. He had to deal with a foe whose gallantry he acknowledges, and one who is himself a thinker and indefatigable in preparation. Numbers alone would not have given the British Fleet victory, but only the dexterous use of numbers. The price paid for our success on the 31st of May was not the lives we lost. That was the sacrifice. We earned success by preparation and by right thinking. If the victory was less complete than some who think too exclusively of the Revolutionary and Napoleonic wars had come to assume that every British naval victory must be, let us not forget that our enemy also had looked well before him, had practised, and was strong.

A people does not justify its claim to rule at sea by losing life in shipwreck or in battle. The least foreseeing, careful, and skilful are those who lose most. They may, by virtue of a favouring opportunity, hold the power for a time, but it does not remain in their hands. Discovery itself is no sufficient title. We English have not been great discoverers. This statement may possibly shock the patriotism of a reader here or there. Yet if he asks himself the question : ' Into what ' sea has an English ship been the first to sail ? ' he will be forced to answer ' Only into the icebound seas of North ' America.' The discoverer is the first comer. Now the Scandinavians were the first in the North-East, the Spaniards in the West Indies and South America and the Pacific, the Portuguese at the Cape, in the Indian Ocean, on the Malabar and Coromandel coasts, in the Strait of Malacca and the China Sea, the Dutch in Australasia. We cannot honestly claim the voyage of Cabot as an original discovery. Apart from the fact that the man was a Genoese naturalised in Venice, he only followed the example set him by the other Genoese who was naturalised in Spain. When Columbus had once shown that land could be reached by sailing due west, no originality was needed to repeat the feat on a more northerly line. Drake was the first Englishman to sail round the world, but not the first circumnavigator. He followed the route of Magellan closely, and he had the aid of the Spanish pilots he captured. Neither he nor his successor, Cavendish, showed so much of the originality of the true discoverer as the Dutch-

men, Schouten and Lemaire, who first entered the Pacific by passing between Staaten Island and the mainland and then round the Horn. But the list of instances could be spun out to all lengths. Wherever Englishmen have sailed, always excepting the North-West Passage, which no man can use because of the ice, they have had before them the shades of some Spaniard, Italian, Portuguese, or Dutchman.

Yet it has been our achievement to enter into their inheritance and make it a possession. Hasty criticism inspired by malignity is inclined to explain our success by the use of mere force and fraud. If that were all we should have repeated the deplorable history of the Portuguese in India. But the true explanation is something very different. Mere discovery may be as barren as a mere idea. '*Il pleut des idées*,' said M. Brunetière in his impatient style. The useful achievement is not to have the idea, but to embody it in an action and make it operative. Your idea, your discovery, may be no use even to yourself if you do not follow it by occupation, and if you hide away what you have thought or done, miserly, lest another should profit by your labours. What did it avail the Spaniards that Quiros was a discoverer when they concealed his work lest it should be useful to some Dutchman or Englishman? They did not so much as secure the credit of having been the first. Now our method has been to give little honour to the mere idea, and much to the practical application. We have been content to go in the track of others, and slowly, if only we could take the firmer hold.

Nothing is more noticeable in the early history of our colonisation and our dominion in the Eastern seas than their slow progress. Spain and Portugal had overrun America in less time than it took us to get well settled in Virginia and New England. The Portuguese had spread themselves from Mombasa to Macao in fewer years than the Company of the Merchants of London trading to the East employed in planting themselves solidly at Bombay and Madras. But because we went slowly we had time to strike the roots deep. We created communities which had a life of their own and could grow by their own force. Our predecessors spread themselves so thin that they were everywhere weak, and everywhere swamped.

Then it has been to our honour and our great advantage that we have not been miserly with our knowledge—not

secretive. It has always seemed a small matter to us that a possible rival should learn what was known to ourselves, but a great thing that the greatest number of Englishmen should know what was useful. Even if we acted in mere carelessness we did well. The Portuguese were so jealous of their information that they kept it from the bulk of their own people, as a secret in the breasts of a close corporation of sailing masters. So when disease or accident took away the man who knew, there was nobody to replace him. The carrack ran on some reef of which nobody else in her had been allowed to hear. Captain Alexander Hamilton, in his 'New Account of the East Indies,' scoffs at the greedy secretiveness of the Dutch who tried to hide the navigation of their islands in the Indian Ocean. Our rule, whether consciously framed or only acted on by instinct, was to let all men learn, for then there would be the greatest attainable number of such as could do the work. Therefore our level of capacity was higher.

Hamilton notes that 'the Mogul's subjects have a good many 'fine large ships that trade all over India. The owners of these 'ships have a very great regard for the courage, conduct and 'art of navigation of the English above any other European 'nation in India.' They would not have had that regard, nor any reason for having it, if that 'art' had been confined by us to be the 'mystery' of a limited and privileged corporation. Yet every man who navigated the fine ships of the Mogul's subjects was in his place doing something to spread the reputation of the English in India, and to promote the disposition of the peoples of India to trust and to follow them, as surely as every insect working on a coral reef is helping to make a barrier which will hold the ocean. To themselves they appeared to be only earning their ten pounds a month and 'lining their 'pockets' by their own trade ventures, but they were helping to found the British Empire in India. It is based on the work done by the Company's Marine Service and the 'Free Mariners' who sailed in the port-to-port trade on their own account in their own vessels when they had them, or in the 'fine ships' of the Mogul's subjects. Without them there would have been no Company's factory nor factor anywhere from the Persian Gulf round to the Hoogli. We look too exclusively to Clive and Warren Hastings, the Governors-General and the Generals, when we think of the Indian Empire. They

would never have set foot in India if those other 'generals' who commanded in the Company's Marine Service, Lancaster, Best, Downton, the Middletons, or even the 'Free Mariners' like Hamilton himself, had not made the opening for them.

Moreover, the magpie secrecy of Spaniards and Portuguese was purblind, for there was nothing to prevent others from sailing where they had sailed, and learning as they had learnt. Even in their own despite all those who have ruled the sea have also served whatever seafaring men there were in their own time or were to come after them. By the very nature of their work they have extended knowledge. The Carthaginian Senate might reward the loyal skipper who deliberately ran his ship on a reef in order to spoil sport for the stranger whom he detected following in his wake. And he earned his reward fairly, if the story is true, for he served his masters as they wished to be served. Yet the Carthaginians, and later peoples who have imitated their jealousy and secretiveness, could not, let them try as artfully as they pleased, conceal the essential fact. They were forced to tell the world that they sailed in this or that direction, found a sea route to navigate, and ports of trade at the end. The very ivory, gold dust, oil, tin, or amber, and the kidnapped slaves they brought to some exchange and mart in Sicily betrayed their secret to Greek or Etruscan or Roman. The way and the how to reach the source of supply these peoples could find for themselves as soon as they had the spirit to adventure. The Venetian galleys of the Middle Ages which came to English and Flemish ports taught Englishmen and Flemings that the riches of the East could be traded for at the ends of the caravan routes in Syria or Egypt. The news that Columbus had reached land by sailing west re-echoed over all Europe. So did the story of the voyage of Vasco da Gama by the Cape of Good Hope to the coast of Malabar. The exploration of ocean routes and the transport of saleable goods were not acts which the most jealous of monopolists could keep to themselves. They were forced to let all mankind know at least enough to show rivals that the thing could be done. And then these undesigned disciples of theirs could set about to imitate them. The time always came when force must be used to shut out the interloper, and then the monopolist became a general enemy. He had to fight all the

world to keep his preserve to himself, and nobody has ever been able to fight all the world for long successfully.

Two conditions have combined to be fatal sooner or later to the would-be monopolist of the sea. He has never been able to work with his own race alone, and because he must needs train his own servants, the knowledge he must impart to them was of necessity written down. From the moment it was recorded on paper it became subject to be lost, captured, or stolen, or betrayed. Each successive great sea Power has been forced to make up its crews by employing foreigners. The Spaniards and the Portuguese were bitterly jealous of allowing strangers to visit their oversea possessions, and yet they were forced to employ Levantines. Dutchmen found their way to Goa. There was at least one Englishman in Magellan's crew. Foreigners sailed with Drake. Holland drew on Scandinavia for seamen. The London East India Company had not been trading for ten years before its ships were coming back full of Lascars and Chinamen. The sea Powers could not help themselves. In tropical seas men died in awful numbers, and had to be replaced, and their substitutes could be found nowhere except among the inhabitants of the country where the ship happened to be. When a ship is lying more than half unmanned at Java Head or in the Hoogli, she must take Lascars or she will never get home.

It was our distinction that when faced by some solid fact of this nature we could always find ways of drawing the teeth of our Navigation Laws. Our 'natural born' were made to include all natives of possessions, negroes in the West Indies, Lascars within the charter of the East India Company, and all who would accept letters of naturalisation offered on easy terms. Part of the price we paid for Admiralty was that we could on a pinch put prejudices in our pockets. We were never such pedants as the Spaniards and the Portuguese, who withered largely because they would not recruit. We did not reflect with greedy spite that Linschoten learnt the way to Indian markets in Portuguese ships and then told his countrymen, or that our James Lancaster learnt the same secrets when he was trading in Lisbon and then sailed to the East Indies himself. We were not afraid of what other Linschotens and Lancasters could do to us. We absorbed them and made useful true-born Englishmen of them by the thousand. If a

man will look only to what we said and wrote in Acts of Parliament we were just as monopolist as anybody. In practice we were liberal—more liberal at least than any other great sea Power has been.

In one respect—our readiness to share knowledge with all comers—we have shown an example to the world. Every people that uses the sea must, let it be repeated, train its own servants, and the predominant nation for the time being has always shown the way in treatise-writing and chart-making. Sailing directions are as old as water-borne commerce. They have been called by many names—Periploi, Portulane, Rutters, Waggoners, Mirrors, Beacons. But whatever fancy titles have been put to them they were just 'sailing directions' and 'pilots' such as are issued by the Admiralty, and are on sale for all men to buy to-day. It would be a by no means fantastic enterprise, nor an unfruitful one, to follow the transmission of leadership on the sea by the aid of these text-books. The leader of the age was always the great compiler of the seamen's school books. It is the fate of school books to be thumbed to pieces, and then thrown aside when they are superseded by better. Therefore great numbers of these books have vanished entirely. Those used before the invention of printing are represented by a few survivors. Even some of those which were printed have been wholly lost, or are now represented by a single example. There is but one of the 'Kaert Vander Zee' of Jan Seuerzoon of Schelling, published in 1532, and it belongs to the Royal Library of Brussels. It probably owes its escape from destruction to the piety of successive book-hunters and librarians who would not commit the sacrilege of destroying any book, however useless it might appear to the mere business man.

The treatise of the Spaniard Alonso de Chaves is now known only by the help of the copy which he deposited in manuscript when he applied for and received a licence to print. He needed the consent of the censor of the Inquisition, who stood on guard over all printing lest heretical doctrine should be artfully conveyed in disguise. That he did not print his treatise by no means proves that he did not sell manuscript copies. The explanation probably is that the 'men of the row' in Seville told him that it would be a drug in the market. But he could sell manuscript copies to the candidates for certificates who

attended his class, for he lectured on navigation, and was an authorised maker of nautical instruments by licence of Charles V. Whether his work ever fell into foreign hands or not, the treatises of his countrymen Cortes and Nunes which were printed most undoubtedly did. They were translated into English, and helped to educate our own John Davis 'the 'Navigator,' who speaks of his Spanish predecessors with great respect. The manuscript books of pilotage and sailing directions, which the Portuguese guarded so jealously, were captured in war, or stolen by some rascally deserter and sold to the enemy.

These two peoples were not always equally intent on keeping their knowledge to themselves. In their early days, when as yet they had no serious rival to fear, they were more open. It was only when the French seamen of Le Havre and La Rochelle, and then our Elizabethans, began to poach on their preserves that they betook themselves to the poor device of concealment. Their meanness brought its own punishment with it, for in exact proportion as they strove to hide the light they themselves fell into the dark. The later history of Spain is rich in proofs of the deadly consequences which a policy of obscurantism never fails to have on those who try to use ignorance as a protection. The Spaniards almost forgot the way to their own Indies. When they endeavoured to regain their lost knowledge in the eighteenth century they were compelled to call in foreigners, and in particular Frenchmen, to teach them—Frenchmen who had learnt by smuggling and buccaneering in 'the Spanish West Indies.' Again the Dutch, when their first age of vigour and reliance on their own native superiority was over, grew nearly as obscurantist as the Spaniards and Portuguese, and as they travelled on that bad road they grew torpid. But they never ceased to be good seamen and are so still. No liners are better navigated or better organised than the Dutch since their great revival of maritime activity of the last few years. A nation which strives to keep what it knows to itself acts like one which should refuse to light its coasts lest another should sail along them in safety and so compete in its trade. It only puts danger in the way of its own seamen. Admiralty is not to be won by dreading the knowledge of others.

We can claim to have been very free from such poorness

of spirit. If indeed a man will look only at what government has done he will be forced to come to another conclusion. Whereas the Spanish Council of the Indies provided itself with an official hydrographer at the very beginning of the sixteenth century, our hydrographer's department dates from the very end of the eighteenth. The attitude of the Admiralty to such of its own officers or other seamen who made charts was of the snubbing kind. It declined to bear the expense of engraving the needful plates for reproduction, and told the troublesome fellow who asked its help to pay for the engraving of his plates himself and make his profit on selling copies of his chart. And for that the old officials may be despised—and thanked. If we had had our hydrographer's department in the seventeenth century, it would most assuredly have insisted on a monopoly, and would have secured a nice little Act of Parliament to impose fine and imprisonment on any audacious seaman who should dare to infringe its patent. Not being helped from above, our sailors helped themselves. As their work was not paid for by the Admiralty, they had to 'appeal to the public,' engrave their own charts, or get a tradesman to take the risk of engraving for them, and then recoup themselves by selling to all buyers.

It may not have been to our credit—or not at any rate to the credit of the Admiralty—that generations after we were firmly fixed in the Mediterranean by the possession of Port Mahon and Gibraltar we were still using the old Italian 'portulane,' improperly so called, for a 'portulano' was a book of sailing directions, not a chart. They were too often only mechanical and careless reproductions of charts made by medieval Italian seamen who had no better instrument than the mariner's astrolabe wherewith to fix the latitude, and virtually no means at all for finding the longitude. They were highly creditable to the ill-equipped men who made them originally, but they were inaccurate, and in hands of mere copyists they tended to grow more inaccurate. When Admiral Smyth was at last set to chart the Mediterranean at the end of the Napoleonic wars he found them full of errors. Such as they were our seamen did not always possess them. When Nelson was standing in to attack the French fleet at Aboukir, he had no means of knowing whether there was water enough between the enemy and the shore to allow us to double

on his line. There was no chart, but there was the readiness and the capacity to ' stand in and try,' and Captain Hood of the ' Zealous ' stood in.

Again, there was no chart of the St. Lawrence when Saunders and Wolfe came against Quebec. The French had taken care there should be none, and little good their prudence did them, for there was a sailing master in the British fleet, James Cook, who could make a chart as they went along, and make it so well that it did not need to be redone at leisure. But if a Hood or a Cook has rarely failed us, one reason is that knowledge has never been treated in British sea activity as the profitable mystery of a privileged body. Competence has been respected. The men have thought and acted for themselves. They have forced their government to follow their lead. I know few documents which will tell more of the causes which have given us the command of the sea than certain passages in Sir Clements Markham's introduction to his report on the Indian Surveys. They are the paragraphs in which he treats of the work done by the Company's naval servants in the Red Sea and the Persian Gulf. The officers led their government. A history of marine surveys has yet to be written, and perhaps it never can be, for who can tell the story so as really to convey the meaning of long months of solitude and of days filled by minute observation and no less minute records? No glory comes to those who do it, and yet it gives the knowledge which makes navigation safe. Many a man who has fought a successful frigate action has done less to win Admiralty than he who charted a reef.

That we have also paid largely in life for our Admiralty of the seas is true. We have died in shipwreck often, in battle comparatively little, strange as it may seem that it should be so; but by disease in terrible numbers. There would be no great difficulty in quoting cases in which our enemies lost more men in one of their ships than did the whole British squadron engaged. But disease spared us as little as it did others, and there were times when we invited it as much or more. We can afford to acknowledge this truth, for in the end no nation did so much as we have done to make the sea life healthy. History which looks at the battles and the results does not stop to explain in what conditions the first were won and the second attained. It is only in a professed naval history

that the reader will be told how a fleet commanded by, say, Sir Cloudesley Shovell had to come home because at the end of a few weeks of cruising it was 'sickly,' or how Admiral Byron carried the jail fever to North America with him and infected Nova Scotia.

As a typical example take the case of the squadron commanded by Admiral Watson when he was co-operating with Clive against the Malabar pirates and against Suraj-ud-Dowlah. Admiral Watson was a good officer and careful of his men. His squadron was neither worse appointed nor less fortunate than others. The surgeon of Admiral Watson's flagship, the 'Kent,' was Mr. Edward Ives, a personal friend of the Admiral. He remained in the 'Kent' till Watson died, and then came home overland by Bagdad and Aleppo. To his book, 'A Voyage from England to India,' he added an appendix of 'Medical and Chirugical Observations.' This is how he begins his 'Observations':

'On this occasion I beg leave to carry the reader as far back as the 9th of March 1754 when Mr. Watson left Plymouth with all his ships' companies in perfect health. In the months of May and June following several disorders [i.e. diseases] took place in the squadron, and in spite of the united efforts of all our officers, who ordered the decks to be constantly swept and scraped, and the ventilators to be daily used, by the 9th of July when we arrived at Madagascar they had increased to so great a degree that the "Kent" alone had buried twelve men besides a large number who were reduced to such an extremity that they must have died had we continued only a few days more at sea.

'The disorders under which the "Kent's" people laboured at this time were principally Putrid Fevers and Putrid Fluxes, which though common to hot climates were, I believe, considerably increased by the great quantities of stock fish and other provisions stowed in the fish room and between the guns of the lower deck; the fish becoming putrid by the heat of the weather and by their long continuance there emitted such a noxious smell as made the air in every part of the ship below unfit for respiration. Besides by this time the sea water had unavoidably made its way through the chinks of the ports and hawse holes, and by its stinking effluvia had greatly added to the contagion.'

Here we see in what conditions a squadron then considered as well appointed was sent to do important work in the middle of the eighteenth century.

When the squadron reached India there was no improvement. At no time during rather more than three years, from

September in 1754 to November in 1757, was the squadron free from disease. Mr. Ives, in giving a summary of the work of the hospitals under his direction, says that they had to deal with 1819 cases of dysentery, of which 97 were fatal ; 900 of fevers, of which 42 ended in death ; and 1103 cases of scurvy, of which 11 were mortal. He is careful to point out that these figures do not stand for different patients but for different cases. The same man was in and out of hospital several times. Indeed all the complements of Admiral Watson's six ships only amounted to about 1800 men. But he adds that these figures were not exhaustive, for that some cases were treated in the ships, and these he does not include. Nor have I quoted all the unsavoury names he gives. And against this swarm of the victims of disease are to be put 5 men killed by accident and 142 hurt ; 17 men killed and 114 wounded in action. It would be difficult, or even, in the absence of evidence, impossible to say with confidence whether the lists of Mr. Ives do or do not fairly represent the average relative proportions of loss by disease and casualties in action. My own impression is that they do. If there were healthier squadrons than Watson's there were many which were far more sickly. Trading ships were at least no better off than men-of-war. Some of them were worse. It was calculated that one-third of the crew of the slave ships died in every year. The losses of the Indiamen in the earlier times and among the Spice Islands were huge.

Ought we to count this frightful expenditure of life as part of the price we have paid for Admiralty ? I should say not. It was not by honest ignorance of how to keep healthy, and still less by dishonest toleration of dirt, and least of all by excess in strong drink, which was a great cause of disease, that our fleets ' ruled the ocean.' It was precisely by assuming that none of these errors were incurable and by setting to work to cure them. The reform came late, but when it came it was thorough and it was rapid. Captain Cook began with his experiments in diet. Rodney went on with the good work when he allowed his doctor Gilbert Blane to introduce sweeping reforms in the fleet in the West Indies. Just ten years after this beginning Nelson sailed to the Mediterranean with Hood. He tells how they met the Spanish fleet and how its officers excused the sickly state of their crews by saying that they had been long at sea. He added that the British

officers attributed the good health of their men to this very cause. Yet he had been in the navy when Byron carried pestilence to Halifax, and he had himself when a young frigate captain in the North Atlantic suffered so cruelly from scurvy that he had to be carried ashore in his cot. So rapid had the change been and so thorough, that men could hardly conceive in 1793 of the existence of conditions which they had actually experienced in 1783.

And if that change had not been made the British Navy would never have been able to maintain its year-long blockades in the Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars. Care and foresight, unwearied attention to detail, the humanity which is also good sense and keeps men healthy that they may have strength for their work, were the price we paid for Admiralty. And observe that it was paid by admirals and captains of their free will and mere motion, and was not forced on reluctant men from above. Love of cleanliness might now and then degenerate into a mere passion for smartness, for what the slang of the sea calls 'spit and polish.' We are told of navy captains whose ambition it was to make their ships look like yachts, and who neglected the gunnery. No doubt it is possible for an officer not to know where to stop even on the right road. But, after all, even an excessive devotion to smartness is only the exaggeration of a good quality, and was on the side of wisdom. It is said that Sir William Parker, who set up a standard for the discipline of the modern navy during his commands in the Mediterranean and elsewhere, had a favourite maxim. It was not elegant, but it was wise. 'Where 'there is hair,' he was wont to say, 'there is dirt, and where 'there is dirt there is vermin.' The admiral cannot be credited with a prophetic vision of the scientific discovery that the little beings he reprobated carry the germs of disease, but he was sure they were mischievous, and he arrived at truth by intuition. Therefore he would not tolerate beards, nor exaggerated whiskers, nor uncropped heads. Perhaps he went too far, but the general view was sound. He would have everything clean from the decks and guns to the chins of his officers and men, and cleanliness brings health.

Indeed, if one were in search of a brief formula wherewith to concentrate the whole purpose and work of the British navy in a nutshell, one might say that it has existed to make

the sea clean. It had to begin by getting the power, and that it did through centuries of war. But it was always doing its cleansing work from the first. The successive steps in the spread of our naval power might be critically marked by stages of the suppression of pirates, the human equivalents for the pests hated by Sir William Parker. When Edward III became King, the English Channel was as much a 'pirate 'coast' as ever were the shores of the Persian Gulf. In confirming and extending the office of Admiral the King's aim was not to provide himself with a commander for his fleets, but with an armed judge whose chief function was to be the suppression of water thieves. We cannot say that the work was done either quickly or that for long it was well done. Piracy was not unknown on the south coast of England when the Stuart dynasty succeeded Elizabeth. But it was in the end stamped out by the Winter and Summer Guards of the Channel. Then it betook itself to the west coast of Ireland, where it acted in combination with the Barbary pirates, and lingered till Strafford became Lord Deputy. From Ireland piracy was driven to the American plantations and the West Indies. The navy followed it, and in time drove it to the west coast of Africa, and thence to Madagascar. It was not until 1816 that the piracy of Algiers and Tunis was beaten by Exmouth's fleet. Here we had the aid of a Dutch squadron, just as in Cuba we had the aid of the Americans. But while the efforts of others were weak we were everywhere active and successful. In the West Indies and among the islands of the Eastern Mediterranean, on the coasts of the Persian Gulf and the Red Sea, in the Straits of Malacca, on the shores of Borneo, and along the China Sea, there were always British men-of-war busy, till piracy had been made so harmless that it could be turned into romance. A less romantic creature than a real pirate never existed. Like the Red Indian as defined by the American backwoodsman, he was poison wherever you met him, and the British navy more than any other has been the antidote.

When we try to estimate what 'the Price of Admiralty' has been, and must be, even in a necessarily rapid survey, one truth becomes patent. Many and varied parts go to make up the purchase. The readiness to fight is indispensable, but it is not sufficient. The quality of British valour by land

or sea is of the best, and is not disputed except by mere folly, but courage cannot turn an armed mob into an effective force. It cannot make an army, and still less a fleet. A man trained to fight is a good soldier though he be taught nothing else. But to make a good fighting sailor you must teach him other arts than the use of arms. His whole life, every faculty he has, must be turned to the sea. She is a very jealous bride, and will tolerate no divided allegiance. And if that is true of each seafarer, it is no less true of the community he belongs to. The nation which will have the command of the sea must let no other ambition divide its aims. '*Il faut savoir se borner*,' said Napoleon, and the Power that rules the sea must know how to fix prudent limits to any other form of its activity. The price you pay for being master of the sea is that you have no other mistress. All maritime nations have not been free to choose. For them it has been a case not of *savoir* but of *pouvoir se borner*. But for them necessity has had the same consequences as error. They were forced by their geographical position or by political obligations to think of the sea only in the second place, and therefore they have never kept the rule even if they had it for a time.

David Hannay.

A COMMERCIAL LEAGUE OF DEFENCE

1. **Recommendations of the Economic Conference of the Allies.** Board of Trade. June 1916.
2. **Les méthodes allemandes d'expansion économique.** By Professor HENRI HAUSER. Paris: Armand Colin. 1916.
3. **German Policy before the War.** By G. W. PROTHERO. John Murray. 1916.
4. **The Foundations of Germany.** By J. ELLIS BARKER. Smith, Elder. 1916.

WHATEVER may be the ultimate fate of the decisions reached by the Paris Economic Conference, the formulation of such a series of proposals marks a new departure in the policy of the Allied Powers. It involves a definite acceptance of the proposition that warfare can be carried on by commercial as well as by lethal weapons, and a definite recognition of the necessity of making preparations for this other kind of war. On these primary points there is little room for differences of opinion. However badly the German armies may be beaten on the battlefield, the German people will still exist, and it is highly improbable that their national spirit will be greatly changed. They were singing 'Deutsch-'land über Alles' long before this war began, and they will probably be singing it, or at least thinking it, whatever may be the conditions of the treaty of peace which concludes the war. It is therefore reasonable to assume that they will use to the full any opportunities left to them in order to try to recover their previous position.

Admittedly this is to a certain extent a new assumption. In the case of most previous wars it has been assumed that the treaty of peace would put an end to hostilities of every kind. Some of the fiercest wars in history have ended in treaties drawn with the purpose of establishing relations of permanent friendship between the belligerents, and in almost every case the treaty of peace has provided for the immediate recommencement of commercial intercourse. It is worth while to recall the fact that in 1871, at the end of the Franco-

Prussian War, while the Peace of Versailles was being negotiated, French commercial travellers with their samples gathered in the villages on one side of the frontier, while their German counterparts gathered on the other side, waiting to dash across the line the moment peace was declared in order to open up business again. This eagerness to resume peaceful commerce at the first possible moment did not at that date excite any general surprise ; for the world was then accustomed to the conception that the ending of actual warfare meant the establishment of real peace.

To-day we cannot take that view. The present war has revealed to the world the fact that Germany regards commercial enterprise as a form of preparation for military action. In Germany the State dominates the life of the nation more completely than in any other country, and the German State systematically directs the activities of the German people towards the advancement of national ambitions. Full evidence of Germany's military preparations under the guise of friendly commerce is not yet forthcoming, for it is undesirable to reveal to the enemy which of her well-placed spies has had to face a firing squad. It is sufficient to state that in all parts of the Empire it has been discovered that German residents were combining commercial or industrial enterprises with the provision of military intelligence to the German Government or with the work of stirring up sedition. Similar discoveries, and probably on an even more extensive scale, have been made in France and Russia. From this point of view the war is a new fact. Before the war it was not uncommon for Englishmen to remark that the German seemed to be able to denationalise himself more easily than either Englishmen or Frenchmen. That confession may still be justified, but we now know that many of the Germans who appeared to have denationalised themselves most completely were craftily pretending to have changed their souls with their skies in order that they might the more easily worm themselves into the confidence of the people among whom they were settled.

There is no possibility of any permanent friendliness with Germany as long as these are her ethics, and there is no reason to believe that she has any immediate intention of adopting a different code of morality. Indeed her press openly proclaims the necessity for reorganisation of German commerce and

industry when peace returns ' in anticipation of a fresh war.' * We also know that the German Government is bringing great pressure to bear upon the Austro-Hungarian Government with the object of creating a close commercial union with her present military ally. That project obviously rests upon the assumption that military effort and commercial effort should go hand in hand.

The combination is not, of course, entirely novel. In past centuries England has fought many wars to secure trading rights for her people, and reciprocally the commercial enterprise of Englishmen and Scotchmen in remote parts of the world has formed the main foundation of the British Empire. The Germans may, if they like, quote these facts as a justification for their policy, but their use of that argument would only strengthen our case for defensive measures against them. Even if we were to admit, as the Germans politely assert, that the British Empire has been entirely built up by force and fraud, that would furnish no reason why we should look on passively and see our Empire filched from us by similar methods. No moral defects in our title to Empire can give the Germans a moral claim to become our successors. Nor is there any reason to believe that the authors of German *Weltpolitik* ever wasted their time on any such sophistical reasoning. They wanted to become Lords of the World, and they were willing to use any means to attain that end. We have discovered that one of their most effective methods was commercial penetration. That method they will certainly try to employ again after the war, and the practical question is how best can we counter it.

In considering that question it is imperative that all Englishmen should be willing to lay aside their preconceived notions with regard to commercial policy. It may be that free traders were right before the war, but it does not in the least follow that their principles can be applied now. Equally, tariff reformers must concede that proposals which they held to be sound before the war may prove to be quite unsuited to the

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* This phrase is taken from an issue of the Cologne Gazette in November 1915, quoted in the Report of the Committee on Edible and Oil-producing Nuts and Seeds, over which Mr. Steel Maitland presided. (Cd. 8247.)

conditions which will have to be faced after the war. We ha to deal with a new set of facts, and though we must be, or oug to be, guided by past experience, we certainly ought not be dominated by any mere shibboleths—whether they be th of the nineteenth-century pacifist free trader, or the s surviving shibboleths of the eighteenth-century mercantilist

The object in view is to prevent the Germans obtaining throu commercial methods authority or influence which they can for military ends. The matter goes far beyond the m question of the importation of German goods into the Unit Kingdom or other parts of the Empire. It might even happ that the exclusion of German goods actually increased Germ influence in our country. To a certain extent indeed t did happen in Russia. The importation of many Germ commodities into Russia was prevented by the Russian tar Partly as a direct consequence of that exclusion the Germ manufacturer established himself in Russia, and secured position there which he was able to use for the milita advantage of his country. It is not suggested that there wou have been no Germans in Russia if there had been no Russi tariff. Doubtless in any case many enterprising Teuto would have crossed the frontier to establish themselves amo a less enterprising people whom they were able to treat hewers of wood and drawers of water. But the purpose the Russian protective tariff was to encourage the develo ment of the protected industries within the Russian Empi and as native capital and native enterprise were insufficie to achieve the end desired it was necessary to secure he from outside. In this sense the highly protective Russi tariff may fairly be described as an invitation to German ca talists, German managers, and German foremen to establi themselves in Russia.

Similar, though not identical, considerations apply France. The French tariff may have kept some Germ goods out of France, but it did not exclude German banke German commercial agents, and German organisers of i dustry. The whole subject of Germany's commercial penetr tion is very fully dealt with in Professor Hauser's 'Méthod 'allemandes d'expansion économique.' M. Hauser certain is not affected by any 'free trade shibboleths,' but he emphatic that tariffs alone are no sufficient protection again

German methods of penetration. After describing how France had lost certain industries through German dumping, he goes on to point out that other countries, and Italy in particular, had suffered even more although defended by high tariffs :

'C'est ainsi que l'Italie est le champ d'expériences que l'Allemagne a choisi pour appliquer ses peu légitimes systèmes de concurrence. Grâce à une très habile politique de chemins de fer, à l'application en grand du *dumping*, et à un troisième moyen (la transplantation industrielle), l'Allemagne rendait absolument illusoire toute défense douanière italienne' (p. 131).

Nor is a tariff merely insufficient. It may even, M. Hauser argues, serve as the base for one particular form of German industrial invasion, namely the establishment of branch factories in the country to be invaded. An 'usine-fille' is established abroad to work up or to 'assemble' materials sent from the 'usine-mère' in Germany, and these operations are definitely facilitated by the very tariff which the invaded country has imposed to protect its home industries :

'Pourquoi tant d'usines allemandes de matières colorantes ou de produits pharmaceutiques en France ? Parce que nos douanes taxent les produits fabriqués d'un droit proportionnellement supérieur à celui des matières premières et des produits semi-ouvrés. Elles croient ainsi implanter en France les industries de perfectionnement. Le résultat, c'est l'établissement chez nous de certains industriels allemands qui ont tourné la difficulté en utilisant quelques subterfuges dont le principal était l'introduction, comme produits non dénommés, de substances chimiques à l'avant-dernier stade de fabrication. Pourquoi tant d'usines de construction mécanique en Italie ? Parce que les machines paient des droits très supérieurs aux pièces détachées' (p. 247).

There seems indeed to be little doubt that France, Russia, and Italy have all been more subject than England to German commercial methods of penetration. In the case of Russia and Italy this is not surprising, for their industrial development is relatively modern, and in both these countries Germany would probably have been able to make great headway even without the assistance of tricky methods of trading. German successes in France are less easy to explain, and the only definite lesson we can learn is the negative one that an ordinary protectionist tariff does not prevent German penetration.

This point is specially important when we are considering the question of dumping. There is no feature of commerce that is more resented when it assumes a political shape than the practice of dumping. What may be called non-political dumping is an occasional incident of all commerce. A shopkeeper who has accumulated a stock which he cannot dispose of at ordinary prices will dump the surplus at any price he can get. This practice, so far from revolting the public, attracts customers in shoals to summer and winter sales. For similar motives, if a manufacturer is slack he will take orders at a price which leaves him no direct profit, or may even leave a direct loss, rather than shut his mills down and dismiss his workpeople. This practice is so common that it may be described as almost universal. Indeed it is difficult to see how business could be carried on continuously unless manufacturers occasionally accepted orders at less than the normal rate of profit. By no one is the practice regarded as objectionable, except where the political element intervenes and the dumping of the individual manufacturer is assisted by the legislation or by the money of the State.

That import duties can be used to assist export dumping hardly needs demonstration. So far as import duties protect the home manufacturer in his home market, they relieve him of the full force of foreign competition, and thus enable him to charge a higher price for his goods in the home market than he would be able to charge if competition were free. To this extent his profit is enhanced, and if the increase in profit is substantial he can use that extra revenue to diminish the price he is charging for goods sold abroad. It is alleged that German manufacturers have systematically acted on this principle. Aided by the protection which the tariff gives them, they have sold dear at home in order to be able to sell cheap abroad. The German Government, in facilitating and encouraging this practice, has apparently proceeded on the theory that a country which is to some extent a new-comer in the commerce of the great world ought to exert herself to get foreign business at any cost. The soundness of this theory has long been recognised by enterprising private firms in our own country. Such firms will frequently work for years at less than no profit, living meanwhile upon their own or borrowed capital, in order to build up a business. But what

is tolerable when practised by a private firm at its own risk or expense becomes intolerable when organised into a system by a powerful State. There is clear evidence that the German Government, quite apart from the facilities afforded by means of the tariff, has also assisted German manufacturers to export at low prices by giving them concessions in the matter of railway rates and in various other ways.

The working of the system has been immensely aided by the extensive organisation of kartels in Germany. A kartel may be briefly described as a form of trust. It is an organisation created by the leading firms in any industry for the prevention of competition. The kartel decides what prices shall be charged to the consumer, and distributes the business to be done among the different firms comprising the league. With such an organisation in existence it is an easy matter to cut prices on foreign orders in order to secure an entry into some foreign market, or to prevent the entry of a competitor into that market.

Of necessity such a system involves loss as well as gain to the country that adopts it. For many years complaints have been common in Germany that the essential raw materials of important German industries were being sold at a higher price to German users than to their competitors abroad. For example, German engine-builders had to pay more for German steel than Scotch engine-builders paid for the same steel. In the case of locomotives, it is alleged that the resulting injury to the German export trade was partly, or wholly, met by the action of the German State railways in paying high prices for German-built locomotives, so that the German builder could sell at lower prices abroad. M. Hauser states (p. 129) that in Spain, although most of the railway companies are French and the locomotives were formerly bought from France, the business had passed before the war to the German kartel of engine-builders who tendered below cost. He also states that in France itself German locomotives were sold at lower prices than the equivalent French machines after paying carriage and customs duty :—' Et c'étaient les administrations ' d'État des chemins de fer allemands qui faisaient les frais ' de la différence.'

It is, of course, more than possible that these statements are not entirely justified by the actual facts. Every individual

who is beaten in a commercial contest is tempted to explain his defeat by imputing unfair methods to his opponent, and it may be that the success of the German engine-builders in France and Spain was due to superior design, or to better organisation of labour. We have in this matter our own experience to judge by. British manufacturers receive no direct assistance from the British State, yet they are able to carry on a flourishing export business to all parts of the world in defiance of hostile tariffs and State-aided competition. We may indeed safely assume that the efforts of the German State to encourage German export trade would have been futile if they had not been backed by the intelligence of the German manufacturer and by the skill and industry of his workpeople.

But while this consideration is a useful corrective to a good deal of the rather loose talk about German State-aided dumping, it does not in the least dispose of the case for taking precautions against Germany's commercial methods. On the contrary, it strengthens that case. If the German manufacturer were inefficient we should have no cause to worry about him, whatever the German State might do. It is the combination of a highly efficient industrial organisation with an aggressive military State that we have to fear. The greater the efficiency of the German manufacturer the more dangerous is the weapon that the German State wields.

Our home tariff reformers are entitled to take credit to themselves for having appreciated this danger before the war, and for having urged that means should be taken to deal with it. But the actual methods they advocated had the fundamental defect that they depended entirely upon a system of import duties for the United Kingdom. Clearly such duties can only assist the British manufacturer in his home market. They do not help him in his export trade, except so far as they act upon the German principle, and enable the manufacturer to sell dear at home in order that he may sell cheap abroad. But a device which taxes the home consumer for the benefit of the foreign consumer is difficult to defend, and many tariff reformers were in the habit of urging that the home consumer would not really lose anything, because the increase of business would permit of production on a larger scale with a resulting economy in cost.

The fallacy underlying this argument is always apt to arise in any discussion of the problems of international trade. For convenience we speak of the trade of the United Kingdom, or the trade of Germany, or the trade of France, when what we really mean is the sum total of a multitude of trading transactions carried on by separate firms in the United Kingdom, in Germany, and in France respectively. We consequently get into the habit of unconsciously thinking of each of the countries concerned as an industrial unit, when in reality it is only the political and geographical framework for a multitude of separate units, mostly engaged in competing with one another. There is no reason why a tariff to protect these separate firms against foreign competition in their home market should diminish the number of them or should convert small firms into large ones. It might have the effect of inducing more firms to come into the business, thus increasing internal competition; or, on the other hand, it might stimulate the existing firms to form a close ring and to divide the profits of the home market among themselves. But there is absolutely no ground for the assumption that the whole product of a number of separate firms, whether working in competition or whether bound by a kartel, will be turned out more cheaply if they are all protected against foreign competition. Nor is there in practice any relation between the size of industrial firms and the fiscal system of the country. There are big firms as well as little firms both in free-trade countries and in protectionist countries. Some of the largest firms in the world are to be found in England and Scotland.

It is indeed impossible to escape from the proposition that protective import duties can only assist an export trade by enabling the protected manufacturer to sell cheaper abroad than he sells at home. Conceivably this policy may be at times defensible. It may be worth while, even for an old industrial country like Great Britain, to adopt this policy for the sake of repelling aggression on the part of a commercial rival. But obviously a very strong case has to be made out on national grounds before any such policy is applied for the benefit of individual manufacturers.

It is not as if the home consumer, whose interests are at stake, were an idle person who could quite safely be mulcted of part of his unpatriotic enjoyment of imported foreign

commodities. German steel billets are not imported for street loafers to play with, nor are German dyes a luxury of the idle rich. These and other commodities that Germany used to dump here are the raw materials of important British industries. The dumping of German steel in this country is a matter of long date, and was distinctly beneficial to some of our engineering and shipbuilding industries. The present writer recollects visiting, some fifteen years ago, a Scottish town in which the principal industry was a large engineering business. While going round the works the proprietor stated that the whole business had been built up on German dumped steel. The German steel was delivered to this Scottish town at a lower price than it could be bought by any engineering firm in Germany. It was converted into machinery which was sold back to Germany at a handsome profit. That industry provided well-paid employment for hundreds of Scottish men and women. 'What is to happen to these 'people,' said the proprietor, 'if the Government stops German 'dumping?' As regards shipbuilding, M. Hauser, in the book above referred to, quotes a speech of the chairman of the Palmer Shipbuilding and Iron Company, who in 1903 declared that the increase in the business of the company was largely due to the purchase of German dumped steel. M. Hauser also notes that some French manufacturers welcomed German dumping.

These illustrations are quoted, not to prove that the problem of dumping ought not to be attacked, but to prove that it ought to be approached with caution. We do not want to hurt ourselves more than we hurt our enemy. Above all, it is essential that we should not deal with the problem as affecting this country alone. If we do we may lose doubly. For not only shall we lose the artificial advantage which certain of our industries have derived from German dumping, but there is a danger that the German dumper, expelled from our home markets, may dump instead in the foreign markets in which we were previously holding our own. We have always to remember that the industrial characteristics of our little island make our external trade of peculiar importance to us, and that consequently it is seldom worth our while to protect our home market at the expense of destroying an export industry.

For this reason, if we wish to deal with German dumping, our clear interest lies in taking joint action with other Powers. Happily the ground has been prepared for such joint action at the Paris Conference. The resolution agreed to on this subject reads as follows :

'In order to defend their commerce, their industry, their agriculture, and their navigation against economic aggression resulting from dumping or any other mode of unfair competition, the Allies decide to fix by agreement a period of time during which the commerce of the enemy Powers shall be subject to special treatment and the goods originating in their countries shall be subjected either to prohibitions or to a special régime of an effective character.'

This resolution clearly declares for common action in order to secure common defence against unfair methods of industrial competition. Without common action very little can be done.

In 1907 Canada established a very ingenious system for dealing with dumped goods by imposing a special duty on articles imported into Canada in cases where 'the actual 'selling price to an importer in Canada is less than the fair 'market value of the same article when sold for home con- 'sumption in the usual and ordinary course in the country 'whence exported.' * This special anti-dumping duty was to be levied in addition to the ordinary duty, and was to be equal to the difference between the dumped price and the market price. In addition it must be noted that the ordinary Canadian duties are intended to be levied, not on invoiced prices for export, but on the fair market prices for home consumption in the countries whence the goods are exported.

Taken together, these provisions appear to destroy the possibility of any dumping in Canada. But the anti-dumping legislation of Canada is not quite so water-tight as it seems. To begin with, the special duty is only applied to articles 'of a class or kind made in Canada.' Anything else may be freely dumped. Again, this duty is not to be levied in cases where the ordinary duty is equal to 50 per cent. *ad valorem*,

* See Return of Colonial Import Duties for 1915 (Cd. 8094), p. lix.

or in cases where the goods are of a class subject to an excise duty in Canada. Finally, the Minister of Customs is authorised to exempt from the anti-dumping duty articles which he finds are not being made in Canada 'in substantial 'quantities and offered for sale to all purchasers on equal 'terms.'

It need hardly be pointed out that unless the Powers and Dominions represented in Paris are prepared to go a good deal further than this they will do very little towards suppressing German dumping. Take, for example, an industry such as the production of dyes, which presumably does not exist in Canada, but does exist in the United Kingdom. On the principles of the Canadian anti-dumping law German dyes would be shut out of the United Kingdom, to the very great injury of our textile industries, but would be admitted freely into Canada, to the advantage of the Canadian textile manufacturers, who already have a heavy tariff in their favour against their competitors in the United Kingdom. A similar argument applies to almost every important commodity which is liable to be dumped. Unless the Allied Powers and Dominions are prepared to take identical action against specified dumped products they are more likely to create a feeling of irritation among themselves than to stop German dumping.

To arrive at an agreement for such identical action will, unfortunately, not be easy, for the interests involved are so widely divergent. The best illustration of an international agreement to put down dumping is the Brussels Sugar Convention of 1902. In this case agreement between the Powers was only reached because Great Britain, as the largest consumer of sugar, threatened to impose countervailing duties if the bounty system were continued. Looking back upon the political controversy which arose in connexion with this proposal, it is somewhat amusing to note that countervailing duties were defended on the ground that sugar bounties were an interference with free trade. This argument was used both by Mr. Joseph Chamberlain and by Mr. Bonar Law in a debate in the House of Commons on the 31st of July 1902.

But the primary motive of the Government of that day was to help the West Indian sugar industry. At that time the West Indies were exporting to this country 46,000 tons of

sugar per annum. Mr. Joseph Chamberlain, in the speech above referred to, calculated that the bounty system injured the West Indian sugar growers to the extent of £5 a ton, and on that account asked the House of Commons to renew the grant of £250,000 a year to the West Indies pending the operation of the Convention. But while the continental bounties, by lowering the price of sugar, injured the West Indian producer, to exactly the same extent they benefited the British consumer—with this difference, that the British consumption involved a total of 1,700,000 tons. Thus, taking Mr. Chamberlain's figure of £5 a ton, the gain to the British consumer was over £8,000,000, compared with a loss of something under £250,000 to the West Indian producer. Mr. Chamberlain's calculation is confirmed by the official figures of the French Government. In an 'exposé des 'motifs' issued by the French Government with the Bill for the ratification of the Brussels Convention; the cost of the sugar bounties to the French tax-payer in the year 1900–01 was put at £4,659,000.* Corresponding sums were expended by the German and Austrian Governments to the advantage of the English sugar consumer. The common-sense way of dealing with the matter would have been to impose a small duty on all bounty-fed sugar, and out of the revenue thus obtained to pay a bonus to the West Indian sugar growers. A similar device could have been applied to meet the grievance of the sugar refiners in this country. By this method we should have secured equity for our colonial fellow subjects and our home sugar refiners, while retaining a magnificent financial advantage for ourselves—an advantage equivalent to a free gift to this country of four new Dreadnoughts per annum.

While sacrificing this advantage our Government secured by the Brussels Convention none of the ends which it had in view. It was hoped that the West Indian sugar industry would be developed. As a matter of fact it has since tended to decline, because the West Indies found other crops more profitable. Nor did the Convention make this country less dependent on foreign sources of supply. The following comparison between 1902 and 1913 shows how in both these directions

* Quoted in 'Commerce,' 16th of July 1902.

the policy of the British supporters of the Convention completely failed :

IMPORTS OF SUGAR INTO THE UNITED KINGDOM.
(Refined and unrefined.)

Countries of Origin.	1902.	1913.
	Cwts.	Cwts.
British West Indies . . .	845,000	587,000
All British Possessions . . .	1,807,000	1,440,000
Germany and Austria-Hungary .	20,495,000	25,928,000
All Foreign Countries . . .	29,779,000	37,945,000

Yet in order to secure this disappointing Convention we not only sacrificed the material interests of the United Kingdom and of the Empire by giving up £8,000,000 a year in exchange for £250,000, but we also sacrificed our fiscal liberty. The Convention bound us to refuse to admit Russian sugar into this country, and by way of retaliation Russia imposed a special duty on Indian tea. The Convention further bound us not to give preferential treatment to sugar imported from British Possessions, thus closing the door, so far as this important commodity was concerned, to the project of inter-Imperial preferences announced a few months later by Mr. Chamberlain. Against these disadvantages we had nothing to set off—not even the establishment of that theoretic free trade for which Mr. Joseph Chamberlain and Mr. Bonar Law were so much concerned in 1902. For the continental Powers still retained the right to impose a surtax of 2*s.* 6*d.* a cwt. on imported sugar in order to secure ' the efficacious protection ' of the market of each producing country.' We failed even to stipulate that our sugar-using manufacturers should be entitled to equitable treatment in continental markets. While tying our hands, the Convention left continental countries free to put even prohibitive duties on British confectionery.

It only remains to add that the working of the Convention was regulated by a permanent Commission sitting in Brussels, and that on this Commission, which had power to control our

tariff, Great Britain had only one vote out of ten. In 1913 we finally withdrew from the Convention in order to obtain liberty to buy Russian sugar.

This brief summary of the main facts with regard to the Sugar Convention is here given, not for the sake of reviving old controversies, but to serve as a warning. The success of British commerce throughout the world is due to the practical character of our race, ever seeking practical ends by practical means. But directly politicians begin to interfere with commerce, either internal or external, the nation is led away by high-faluting phrases such as 'the sanctity of free trade,' or 'the British market for British men,' or 'the land for the people,' and so on. For the politician lives upon phrases, and if he can only get his favourite phrase embodied in a statute or a treaty he is quite content, and never troubles to ask how much the country has had to pay for his shibboleth.

The present problem is essentially a practical one, and the less rhetoric employed in dealing with it the better. In the first place it is well to try to get some measure of the evils from which we have suffered in the past. On this point there has been a great deal of ludicrous exaggeration. Many speakers upon the subject have decorated their harangues with the frequent assertion that Great Britain had been 'ruined' by German dumping. The signs of 'ruin' are not very apparent. Since the war began Great Britain has borne without flinching the principal financial burden of the war; she has diverted over 4,000,000 able-bodied men from the business of producing wealth to the business of war; yet at the end of nearly two years her credit stands supreme throughout the world. Nor if we examine the particular industries which were the main objects of German aggressive methods before the war is the position quite so bad as has been made out by rhetorical speakers and writers. The most remarkable fact is the rapidity with which our manufacturers adapted themselves to the conditions of war, and the comparative ease with which they recovered the very industries which had been abandoned to the Germans. Take, for example, the question of magnetos. Before the war Germany had secured what almost amounted to a complete monopoly of this 'key' industry. But what has happened since?

In an article published on February 11, 1916, the 'Morning 'Post' wrote:

'So completely was the trade in magnetos in German hands that the articles were not actually produced in this country. . . . Quite half a dozen firms are making magnetos now, and it is a source of satisfaction to know that their efforts have been eminently successful.'

Take again the question of tungsten. There is a certain alloy of tungsten which, in the words of the 'Sheffield Telegraph' (March 14, 1916), 'is absolutely essential to the making of 'the high-speed steel for which Sheffield is famous the world 'over.' The article goes on:

'Until the war the secret of the manufacture of this alloy reposed in the factories of Germany. It reposes there no longer. . . . In this matter the experimental stages were passed long ago, and a new, sound, profitable industry has been placed to the account of Great Britain and lost to that of the enemy.'

Laboratory glass is another case of a key industry. The Germans had captured the key before the war, but we have quickly fashioned a duplicate. On this point the 'Sheffield 'Telegraph,' in the article already quoted, writes:

'In fewer weeks than the Jena people can claim years, British manufacturers have discovered the methods of our enemy to the extent of being able to meet the urgent needs of British laboratories so far as glass utensils are concerned.'

In the case of glass bottles, which we imported largely before the war, not only from Germany but also from France, Belgium, and Holland, the relative failure of our own industry seems to have been due to the refusal of the Glass Bottle Makers' Trade Protection Association to allow the use of bottle-making machinery. That attitude has now been abandoned. (See 'Times Trade Supplement' for June 1916.) On the glass industry generally the 'Morning Post' of 7th February 1916 quotes the remark of a glass manufacturer who, while insisting that British manufacturers must not be left defenceless against attacks, adds:

'The war has at least had this good result, that it has taught all of us to be more self-reliant and has shown the Government that when British industry is put upon its mettle it is able to cope with any emergency.'

The question of dyes, already alluded to above, is a peculiarly difficult one; it is also one of extreme importance. The principal raw materials requisite for the manufacture of synthetic dyes are also required for the manufacture of high explosives. Thus the Germans, by building up a gigantic dye industry before the war, were able to accumulate the means for the rapid production of high explosives when the war began. The very factories which had previously been employed on producing dyes produced high explosives instead. In addition to this purely military consideration there is also the important question of the dependence of our textile industries upon an adequate supply of dyes of the best quality. The value of the export of yarns and fabrics of cotton, wool, silk, and linen of British manufacture in 1913 was roughly £177,000,000, or just over a third of our total exports in that year. If we take cotton alone and confine our attention to exported cotton piece goods in which dyes were employed, we had in 1913 a value of £26,000,000. On the other side of the account the total value of the aniline dyes imported in that year was only £1,892,000. Even if cotton piece goods alone were at stake it would not be good business to risk £26 for the sake of 38*s*. The Italians, whose policy is strongly protectionist, admitted aniline dyes free of duty in order to encourage the export of textiles.* Aniline dyes were also admitted free of duty into Germany, into Austria, and into Switzerland. Even the United States admitted some synthetic dyes free of duty, but imposed a duty of 30 per cent. on others. France taxed nearly all dyes except certain natural dye-woods. There is absolutely no evidence that this country has suffered more than other countries from the cessation of the supply of German dyes during the war. The American textile manufacturers have suffered heavily. Since the war began some steps have been taken in this country to fill the gap left by the cessation of the supply of German dyes, and the healthy activity of our export trade in dyed piece goods during the current year shows that we are doing fairly well, though apparently the finer dyes of which Germany had the secret are still

* See statement by the Chairman of the Board of Directors of the Bradford Dyers' Association ('The Times,' 29th Feb. 1916). See also Foreign Import Duties for 1913 (Cd. 7180).

unobtainable. That we should make ourselves independent of Germany in the future is desirable, and to accomplish that end State assistance in the shape of a bonus on production or a grant for technical research may be necessary, and if so would be justifiable. In other words, in this instance the best way to meet German bounties is by bounties of our own.

This consideration shows the necessity of approaching each separate problem from a purely practical point of view. In many cases the means to do this are not yet available, for we do not know what will be the condition of the industries of Germany or of the rest of the world when the war is ended. Therefore, for the present, perhaps the most important of the resolutions reached at the Paris Conference is that which deals with the question of most-favoured-nation treatment. In 1871, when the Treaty of Frankfort was being negotiated, the French representatives strongly pressed that the treaty should contain a permanent clause binding Germany and France to give most-favoured-nation treatment to one another for all time. Germany consented with some reluctance, for this proposal prevented—as France hoped it would prevent—the establishment of anything in the nature of a Zollverein between Germany and Austria. The position is now completely reversed. It is Germany who now hopes to secure a renewal of the most-favoured-nation clause ; it is France that wishes to get rid of it.

At Paris the Entente Powers agreed that they would after the war, ' during a number of years to be fixed by agreement ' among themselves,' refuse to grant most-favoured-nation treatment to the Enemy Powers. This matter is essential to our freedom of action after the war, and whatever else may happen it is to be hoped that on this point the Allied Governments will endorse the decision of the Paris Conference. The Entente Powers will then be free to make with one another any arrangements they find necessary or convenient for blocking out German trade either by absolute prohibitions, or by heavy anti-German tariffs, or by preferential tariffs for the benefit of one another.

There is, however, in this connexion one important point which must not be overlooked. The resolution of the Paris Conference is directed against 'the Enemy Powers.' But though we are at present at war with Austria-Hungary, with

Bulgaria, and with Turkey, as well as with Germany, it is only against the last named that we need to take any special precautions in the industrial sphere. It may be that Germany will succeed in her ambition to absorb Austria, and in that case the enlarged Teutonic Empire will have to be dealt with as one whole. But it is clearly not desirable that we should do anything to facilitate this project or to force Germany's present military Allies into a permanent economic alliance with her. If we were to do this we should ourselves be contributing to the realisation of pan-German ambitions. As Mr. Prothero writes (p. 30) :

> 'The idea of an immense expansion of the existing Customs Union hovers before the eyes of many German writers. We find it at least as far back as the year 1892 in a work by Julius von Eckhardt, entitled "Berlin-Wien-Rom." A great *Mitteleuropäischer Zollverein* is to be formed, embracing Austria, Italy, Switzerland and other small States, which will be either forced to join or economically starved into adhesion.'

The more modern pan-German conception looks to Constantinople rather than to Rome, and from the pan-German point of view the war will have failed if Germany is cut off from the control of the Balkan peninsula and Asiatic Turkey. How our diplomats managed to throw first Turkey and then Bulgaria into the arms of Germany has yet to be explained, but at least let us avoid a repetition of past blunders. In the economic sphere our business is to isolate Germany, not to force other Powers into alliance with her.

It is this consideration which must dominate the policy of the Entente Powers when they come to consider the question of their commercial attitude towards neutral Powers as well as towards Germany's present allies. Our natural impulse is to desire that the nations who have shed their blood side by side during the war, in defence of their own liberties and the liberties of the world, should after the war create a privileged circle among themselves for themselves. But, looking to a more remote future, it is probably better to resist that natural impulse. We do not wish to give the rest of the world an excuse for saying that we have substituted for the threatened tyranny of the Central Powers an actual tyranny by the Powers of the Entente. We entered the war with high ideals; do not let us forget them before it is finished.

The point on which we have to concentrate our efforts is economic defence against Germany. It is sometimes argued that anything in the nature of an economic boycott of Germany would deprive us both of the German goods and of the German customers that we may need after the war as we did before. The answer is, first, that we have got on comfortably enough without Germany during the war, and secondly, that it is wiser to forego a good deal of economic gain rather than to risk national security. Again, it is argued by the advocates of the 'Kiss-and-be-friends' policy that if we curtail Germany's trade after the war we shall diminish her power to pay a war indemnity. A debt by one country to another cannot be finally discharged except by the export of goods. Gold coins, like paper bills, are merely counters. Therefore if the Entente Powers refuse to receive German goods, either directly, or indirectly through neutrals, they will not be able to recover a war indemnity. This is a practical consideration, but its importance can be exaggerated. In any case, it is to be hoped that the Entente Powers will aim at recovering as large an indemnity as possible in the shape of the immediate surrender by Germany of such materials as she may possess at the close of the war—especially machinery and ships—for the replacement of what she has stolen or destroyed. Beyond this the Allies will do wisely to seek for payment in territory rather than in cash. Provided our enemy remains weak, we can dispense with her assistance in paying our war debts. It would profit us nothing to draw an annual tribute from Germany if she remained so powerful, territorially and commercially, that we had to spend more than the whole of the tribute on preparations for an early renewal of the war.

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CHURCH AND STATE IN ENGLAND

1. **The Report of the Archbishops' Committee on Church and State.** S.P.C.K. 1916.
2. **Report of the Royal Commission on Ecclesiastical Discipline.** 1906.
3. **Essays in Aid of the Reform of the Church.** Edited by CHARLES GORE, M.A. John Murray. 1898.
4. **Churches in the Modern State.** By JOHN NEVILLE FIGGIS. Longmans, Green. 1913.
5. **Our Place in Christendom.** Lectures delivered at St. Martin's-in-the-Fields in the autumn of 1915. Longmans, Green. 1916.
6. **The Character and Call of the Church of England.** A Charge at his Second Visitation of the Diocese of Canterbury by RANDALL THOMAS DAVIDSON, Archbishop of Canterbury. Macmillan. 1912.

FOR many years past the Church of England has been moving towards some great revolution of status and type, and now the war is visibly hastening the pace of its motion. For, rightly or wrongly, the war is assumed to reflect great discredit on the Churches of Christendom, and, accordingly, it has given meaning and volume to the discontent with ecclesiastical institutions, which is always latent in religious societies, and which many circumstances of modern life have for some time past tended to stimulate. All the

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national institutions, indeed, have been brought into question, and large schemes of reconstruction are in the air. But for intelligible reasons Churches, especially national Churches, are the most questioned and the most questionable of all institutions. Every Christian Church suffers in strength and reputation when the theory and the practice of Christianity seem to be in violent conflict. An established Church not only provokes against itself the deep, continuing resentment of unestablished rivals, but also lies open, or seems to lie open, to the damaging suspicion (all the more damaging for being extraordinarily vague) of 'Erastianism.' An endowed Church is the magnet of all those predatory appetites which provide the motive power of most popular policies. The Church of England, national, established, endowed, unites in itself every title to severe criticism.

In these circumstances a special interest and importance attach to the 'Report of the Archbishops' Committee on Church and State,' which has just issued from the press. Even before the war Anglican affairs were in a bad way. The disestablishment and disendowment of the Church in Wales had become a political certainty, and the controversy which had risen thereupon had had the effect of fastening attention on the relations of Church and State. There is something more than an echo of the political conflict in the resolution of the 'Representative Church Council,' which was the immediate occasion of the appointment of the committee:

'That there is in principle no inconsistency between a national recognition of religion and the spiritual independence of the Church and this Council requests the Archbishops of Canterbury and York to consider the advisability of appointing a Committee to inquire what changes are advisable in order to secure in the relations of Church and State a fuller expression of the spiritual independence of the Church as well as of the national recognition of religion.'

Their Graces proceeded to appoint a committee of twenty-five members, of whom nine were clergymen and sixteen laymen; but of the latter four were removed: two, Sir William Anson and Sir Foster Cunliffe, by death, and two, Mr. Torr and the Hon. Edward Wood, by the pressure of military duties. Omitting the secretary, the committee really consisted of twenty persons. The episcopate was represented by the Bishops of Oxford and Liverpool, and by Dr. Browne, lately

Bishop of Bristol. History and law had effective exponents in Dr. Frere, the Master of Balliol, Dr. Gee, the Dean of Christ Church, Sir Lewis Dibdin, and Lord Parmoor. Politicians were weightily represented by Mr. Balfour (who, however, is a Presbyterian), the Duke of Devonshire, Lord Selborne, Lord Hugh Cecil, Viscount Wolmer, and Colonel Williams. The parochial clergy were only represented by Mr. Temple, who was ordained as recently as 1908, and whose parochial experience began in 1914. Dr. Guy Warman is the head of a Theological College. Labour has two spokesmen, Mr. Kemp and Mr. Mansbridge, with whom, perhaps, should be reckoned Mr. Douglas Eyre, who stands for 'Christian 'Socialism' by the best of titles, his own life-long devotion to social work. The Convocations were completely ignored. It must be allowed that the committee contained many distinguished names, though there were some strange omissions; but there is another aspect of its composition which cannot be disregarded.

It is the misfortune of the Church of England that the profound internal dissidence, which is really its salient characteristic, can never be formally recognised, and in all official proceedings is almost necessarily ignored. This internal dissidence is comparatively a new thing. It is not to be identified with that difference of temper and outlook between the conservative and the progressive sections of the clergy, the 'High' and 'Low' Churchmen, as they came to be called, which existed from the time of the breach with Rome, and ran through the nation. For this difference never went to the length of challenging the Reformation itself, or repudiating the Settlement of Religion expressed in the legal standards of the Reformed Church. It rested on a substantial foundation of agreement. With the Tractarian Movement, however, came a change of attitude and temper, above all, of tendency. A rift was made which has steadily widened, until to-day the stability of the Established System is visibly imperilled. There exists no longer any common agreement between Anglicans strong enough to harmonise differences of opinion, feeling, and habit in a common loyalty to the national Church. That is the salient feature of the religious situation, none the less such because it is consistently obscured, and sometimes officially denied.

Many circumstances of the national life have assisted the advance of the Tractarians, and concealed from them the unreal nature of their apparent success. The decay of theology, the dying down of the old 'No Popery' sentiment as the political importance of the Papacy declined, the quickened interest in the history of the past, above all the rise to power of the working classes, who have no ecclesiastical traditions, little fondness for established systems, no inbred respect for law, and powerful if crude emotions—all tended in the same direction. Yet it remains the case that the sacerdotal presuppositions of the new Anglicanism have but a limited acceptance in the nation. The self-styled 'Catholic' party in the Church of England is mainly clerical. The growth of Socialism may, perhaps, alter this, for there is an apparent affinity between a religious doctrine which subordinates the individual to the organised Church, and a political doctrine which subordinates him to the organised State. In both cases the enemy is the same—private judgment, the claim of the individual conscience, personal rights. It is not without significance that the Tractarian Movement in its most recent phase has exhibited a markedly socialistic tendency. A similar phenomenon is observable on the Continent. Sacerdotalism, as well Roman as Anglican, takes kindly to Socialism. This alliance, so portentous and full of sinister promise for mankind, is yet in its infancy. It is still the case that the English laity are, in the substructures of their personal religion, evangelical or Protestant, and that the 'Catholic' teaching and practice of the clergy are rather tolerated than accepted or understood. Now and again, indeed, as in the 'Kikuyu' episode, the internal dissidence flames out suddenly with a distinctness which admits of no concealment, but commonly it is covered up more or less successfully. Yet it remains the salient fact of the ecclesiastical situation, and provides the test by which all proposals for ecclesiastical reconstruction must be judged.

So, with respect to the Archbishops' committee, the question suggests itself inevitably—What relation does its composition bear to the actual distribution of religious opinion among the English people, and within the English Church? Were the members representative in that sense? The answer can hardly be affirmative. The names seem to be drawn from too narrow an extent of the national life. If the Anglican laity are to be

fairly represented by eleven individuals, ought there to be nobody but peers, dons, lawyers, and labour men? Has the national Church no hold on the middle classes? Apart from this, the names suggest the dominance of a single party, almost of a single *family* party. Lord Selborne, as he viewed his colleagues from the chair, must have felt a legitimate pride in the fact that the chosen eleven should include not only himself, but also his son, his brother-in-law, and such intimate political associates as his kinsman, Mr. Balfour, and the Duke of Devonshire. The atmosphere of the committee was not so much national as domestic.

It is, moreover, very regrettable that the committee did not include in their report a register of attendances. The public is concerned to know whether the discussion of these proposals included any contribution from Mr. Balfour, or the Duke of Devonshire, or the Bishop of Liverpool, or whether the appending of their names to the report did not really constitute their entire concern with it.

The report on the whole justifies the misgiving which the composition of the committee must needs suggest. It discloses no adequate grasp of the religious situation, and contents itself with endorsing the too-familiar programme of an ecclesiastical party.

The committee began by adopting the narrowest possible view of their reference, and then sought to compensate for this initial and governing blunder by launching out into legal and historical inquiries, largely indeed irrelevant, but always learned and sometimes informing in no common degree. The true (though unconfessed, perhaps unperceived) defence of this strange procedure lies in the paradoxical character of the task entrusted to them. For they were committed to nothing less formidable than the attempt to reconcile 'establishment' with 'autonomy,' that is, to recreate the medieval duality of Church and State (omitting always the Pope, the keystone of medieval churchmanship), and to do this without at the same time destroying that 'Reformation Settlement,' which was designed to replace the medieval duality by the strength and simplicity of a single allegiance. The Committee did not, of course, perceive the hopeless nature of the task to which they were committed. Yet it may be conjectured that the Bishop of Oxford, who is known to advocate disestab-

lishment, was without illusions on the point. Sir Lewis Dibdin also has confessed his own misgivings in an acute and illuminating memorandum, which is, perhaps, the most valuable element in the report. But all the politicians had been prominent in the 'Church Defence' campaign against the Welsh Church Bill, and, perhaps, there was no member of the Committee so frankly 'liberationist' as to *refuse* 'establishment' if he could have it on his own terms, that is, in the language of the report, on such terms as would secure 'the spiritual independence of the Church.'

There is some reason for thinking that the case of the Church of Scotland helped to mislead the Committee. That Church is described as a 'remarkable illustration of the principle of 'spiritual independence,' and the Report quotes with emphatic approval the 'Articles declaratory of the Constitution of the 'Church of Scotland in matters spiritual,' which have been put forward in the course of the negotiations for Reunion between the two Presbyterian Churches. Whether those Articles are not more illustrative of the general sentiment of Scottish Churchmen than of the actual state of the law may perhaps be questioned, but there is no doubt that the Church of Scotland has always been far more independent of the State than the Church of England. Scottish precedents, however, are rarely relevant to English cases, for not only (as the Report allows) have the historical circumstances of the two national Churches been widely different, but also there is a deep difference of temperament between the two peoples, which is nowhere more apparent than in their religion. The Scotchman, be his religious description what it may, is always at bottom an Ultramontane: the Englishman, under every ecclesiastical label, is ever essentially an Erastian. This states tersely, but not untruly, the fact that, whereas the Scottish Churchman tends naturally to emphasize the separateness of Church and State, the English Churchman inclines rather to lay stress on the essential unity of the national life. It is, perhaps, something more than a coincidence that the agitation for autonomy in the Church of England has attained such considerable proportions under the continuing régime of Scottish Primates. Apart, however, from speculative considerations, there is this vital difference between the two Churches. The Church of Scotland is united: the Church of England is divided. Had

there been in the Northern Church any such deep internal dissidence as that which weakens and paralyses the Southern, it is not unreasonable to conjecture that the relatively complete autonomy which the Church of Scotland boasts would either never have been conceded at all, or would long ago have broken down. In any case it is not from Scotland that English Churchmen can hope to receive the model of 'the spiritual 'independence of the Church' for which they are sighing.

'The spiritual independence of the Church' is a taking phrase, but elusive and ambiguous. What is meant by 'spiritual'? by 'independence'? by 'the Church'? The report is enriched by a long and careful essay on 'the principle 'of spiritual independence,' but it provokes more questions than it answers, and leaves us in deeper perplexity than before. Yet the committee can say:

'The propositions which we advance seem so elementary and so self-evident that perhaps we should not have thought it necessary to restate them had not prevailing political opinion in England, *until quite recent times*, been unwilling to recognise them' (v. 'Report,' p. 31).

So we are prepared in advance for something which, albeit 'elementary' and 'self-evident,' has not 'until quite recent 'times' succeeded in obtaining recognition. Yet our ancestors were neither ignorant, nor inexperienced, nor irreligious.

Before the disease of the Established Church can be remedied, it must be rightly diagnosed. What is the diagnosis adopted in this report? and what are the remedies therein prescribed? Both are broadly stated thus:

'The Church of England is paralysed in some directions because it has not power to adjust the organisation and the rules and manuals of worship which it inherits from past centuries to the deeply changed conditions of the present day. The wheels of the ecclesiastical machine creak and groan and sometimes refuse to move. Corporate discipline is ineffective because our rules and procedure are in many directions quite antiquated.

'Parliament, especially the Parliament of the present day—which is in no sense a church assembly—is not the right body to undertake the task of adjustment; and it could not, even if it would, find time for the work. If the Church is to adjust itself adequately to the needs of the present and the future, that is to say, to do what every living society must do, it must be free to legislate and judge and act for itself, though subject to a reasonable measure of control by the State which still accepts it as the minister

and teacher of religion. We have, therefore, concentrated our attention on devising means for this free action of the Church, and at the same time on providing a sufficient check on the side of the State. We are sure that nothing but a restoration of self-government to the Church such as we contemplate will enable it to act effectively as the organ of the spiritual life of that great part of the nation which looks to it for guidance and help. It is a great and not a petty task to which we have applied ourselves. The right not only of individuals but also of corporations within the State to make the best of themselves is involved in any true conception of freedom, and the power of self-government in spiritual matters is so essential a part of the very idea of the Christian Church that any part of the Church that lacks this power lacks something which is vital to its welfare. For the State, which asks much of the National Church, to withhold from it this power would be a failure on the part of the State to recognise an essential principle of healthy national life' (v. 'Report,' p. 2).

What, we must ask, was the 'self-government' which is to be 'restored,' and which is 'vital' to the Church's welfare? When did it exist? Why did it cease? By way of assisting the public to answer these questions the report includes a careful, learned, and well-written monograph on 'the Relations' of Church and State in England.' It needs only to say that the joint authors are the Master of Balliol and Sir Lewis Dibdin to certify the value and interest of this monograph; but what is its relevance? In the Middle Ages the sense of 'spiritual' is merely 'ecclesiastical' or 'clerical,' never what we mean now by the word. The 'Church' is the clerus, or clerical order, never what the XIXth Article calls 'a con-'gregation of faithful men.' We are, indeed, warned that 'it 'would be a mistake to regard the Middle Ages as a continual 'fight between spiritual and temporal,' and, perhaps, the warning is not unneeded. It is no doubt true that the main issue was crossed by countless side-issues which obscured it. Nevertheless the continuing conflict between 'Church' and 'State' in the Middle Ages was a conflict between 'spirituality' and 'temporality,' that is, between 'clerk' and 'layman.' The 'independence' fought for was a privilege of the clerical order, not anything essentially 'spiritual' in the true sense. Both parties in the great controversy agreed on the main postulate of sacerdotal religion, viz. the essential distinction between 'priest' and 'layman.'

Friction arose when the frontiers of the two jurisdictions

had to be delimited. For human life is a single process, and the attempt to allocate human action in two categories is artificial, and cannot long be maintained. The 'spiritual' merges subtly in the 'temporal': and there is no obvious, natural, or permanent segregation of the 'moral' from the 'political.' Medieval dualism broke down before national feeling. As national self-consciousness emerged and waxed ever stronger, there was increasing friction, because the clerical order was essentially non-national, and might even become anti-national. This was the core of the resistance to the Papacy, which necessarily embodied the 'catholic' or non-national aspect of the Clerus. There were many illogical make-shifts which screened the fundamental dissidence of principle, but in the end the issue had to be fought out. The Reformation terminated the long conflict by the victory of the State. 'It was no abrupt break with the past, but 'a working out of historical tendencies which are traceable 'in varying degrees throughout the whole period' from St. Augustine to Henry VIII.

It is probably the case that Henry VIII. conceived himself to be within the lines of precedent when he declared the 'spiritual independence' of his 'national Church.' The reason why his work stood, and now has a revolutionary aspect, would have been equally unintelligible and unpleasing to the gross Tudor. Close on the heels of the political changes which he effected there followed a drastic religious process, begun under Edward VI., interrupted by a reaction under Mary, resumed and completed under Elizabeth. The Reformation in England (to borrow a military expression which has become familiar) 'secured a decision' because it displaced the religious assumption of the medieval Church by another. Christianity ceased to be 'sacerdotal,' and became 'evangelical': the Church was no longer in the old sense 'Catholic,' but 'national.' The 'mass-priest' vanished, and was replaced by the 'minister 'of the Gospel.' It is the separation of the two processes, the establishment of a national Church, and the change of religion, that gives the key to the unique features of the Church of England. Everywhere else the two processes were synchronous and connected. Only in England did they follow one another, and have no logical relation. 'The English 'Reformation,' it has been said truly, 'only started after the

'national Church had become an accomplished fact.'* This explains the notorious discrepancy between the hierarchical system and the doctrinal standards of the Church of England. The first is medieval: the last are modern. The hierarchy is a monument of the 'Catholic' past: the 'Settlement of 'Religion' is Protestant and national.

Of all this the report is serenely unconscious. The vital religious changes embodied in the Elizabethan 'Settlement' are ignored. Even when the coronation oath is quoted, the report omits the significant paragraph which pledges the sovereign to 'maintain the laws of God, the true profession of 'the Gospel, and the Protestant Reformed Religion established 'by Law,' although it is this paragraph which discloses the essence of the Reformation. It has, indeed, been argued † that this paragraph is balanced by the phrase 'defence of the 'Catholick faith' in the delivery of the ring to the sovereign, but such 'balancing' would have been unnecessary and unintelligible in the pre-Tractarian epoch, for no English Churchman would then have perceived any contradiction between the contrasted phrases. 'The Protestant Reformed 'Religion' was for English Churchmen nothing else than 'the 'Catholick Faith' rightly understood. The horror with which so many Anglican clergy now regard the venerable word 'Protestant' is as recent as it is irrational. Even so strong a Tractarian as the late Bishop Stubbs thought 'that there 'ought to be no hesitation in admitting that the Church of 'England since the Reformation has a right to call herself, 'and cannot reasonably object to be called, Protestant.'‡ The Archbishops' committee, however, succeed in avoiding the perilous word, though only at the price of grave confusion.

The committee adopted the theory of corporations which was put forward in Germany by Dr. Gierke, introduced into England by Professor Maitland, and adapted to the purposes of Tractarian propaganda by Dr. Figgis. Indeed it is no extravagant conjecture that Dr. Figgis's 'Churches in the 'Modern State' provided the theoretical substructure of the

* v. Meyer, 'England and the Catholic Church under Elizabeth,' p. 4.

† E.g. by the Rev. D. Macleane in the article 'Coronation' in the 'Prayer Book Dictionary.'

‡ v. Visitation Charges, p. 341.

report. Are 'corporations' merely legal figments, to which the State has 'conceded' such powers as it permits them to exercise? or are they rather spontaneous products of the human spirit, and therefore possessed of a genuinely 'personal' life of their own, which the State could not give, and ought not to suppress? It is an interesting speculation, though less practically significant than Dr. Figgis supposes, for since the State admittedly 'restrains' and 'controls' corporations, it seems a matter of little real importance whether the powers they are suffered to exercise are held to be spontaneous or conceded. When, however, this notion of corporate personality is boldly transferred from the sphere of legal antiquities into that of ecclesiastical politics, there are some considerations which must be kept in mind. Dr. Figgis boldly classes the Church with other corporations. It should be regarded and treated as a college, a guild, a trade union, a company, a club! 'Religious bodies,' he says, 'are only one class of a number of 'other societies, all laying claim to this inherent life.'* He would have us shake off the tradition of Roman law, which inspired the autocracy of the Tudors, and still infects the minds of lawyers and statesmen whenever they approach ecclesiastical questions: and revert to 'the Teutonic polity and habit of 'mind' which created the rich variety of medieval society. 'The essential minimum of any claim we make for the Church 'must depend on its recognition as a social union with an 'inherent original power of self-development acting as a 'person with a mind and will of its own.'† On this view ordination vows and clerical subscriptions might be swept away, and the position of the clergyman made clear to himself and the world by a single and simple pledge in the terms of the *fides carbonarii*! This doctrine is accepted without reservation by the committee: and, as Dr. Figgis is at no pains to conceal, it is frankly medieval.

Identity of forms and names may but too easily conceal the vital difference of substance and sense. Laymen, freshly introduced to ecclesiastical discussions, are peculiarly exposed to deception from this cause. When medieval precedents are adduced or suggested, important reservations must be made,

* v. Churches in the Modern State, p. 40.
† Ibid. p. 99.

reservations so important that, more commonly than not, the entire relevance of the precedents is destroyed. Three new factors must be allowed for before a medieval reference can be admitted as relevant to the Church of England. First, the abolition of the Papal authority; next, the change of religion; finally, the change in the clergy. The committee allow for the first, but hardly recognise either of the other two. This goes far to vitiate their whole reasoning. Take the change in the clergy. The clerus or clergy of the Middle Ages was a vastly more considerable factor of society than the modern clergy. Its modern parallel would more nearly be found in the 'learned' professions' as a whole, including Diplomacy, Education, and the Civil Service, and not excluding the mingled multitude of Dissenting ministers. Nor is even that an adequate parallel, for the medieval clerus included practically the entire reading class. If the claims of 'the Church' (i.e. the clergy) in the Middle Ages did not seem exorbitant to the best men of the time, it was precisely because it was then broadly true that 'the Church' represented the higher life of the whole community, intellectual, artistic, moral, spiritual. When this had ceased to be the case (and it was less and less the case as time passed), the 'Church' failed to maintain, because it failed to justify, its independence. When 'the State' had withdrawn from the 'Church' so much of the higher elements of the national life that the traditional subjection of 'temporality' to 'spirituality' had become plainly unreasonable, then the facts reacted on the theory. The medieval system was stricken, and, after an interval of confusion, was cast aside. Of all this the report discloses no adequate perception, though it bears directly and vitally on the whole conception of 'corporate witness,' 'corporate authority,' 'corporate 'independence,' on which so much emphasis is placed. Are the clergy now competent to serve as the organ of 'corporate 'life' in the old sense? The importance of the question may be perceived in connexion with the specimens of alleged 'inconsistencies between statute and church law' which are set out in the report as proofs of the failure of 'Establishment':

'The Clerical Disabilities Act, 1870, provides for the relinquishment of Orders by a clergyman and his exemption from ecclesiastical censures, notwithstanding the canonical prohibition against such relinquishment, probably based on the view that the spiritual effects

of ordination are indelible. In 1857 Parliament made it possible for married persons to obtain, under certain conditions, divorce *a vinculo*, legalised the re-marriage of divorced persons, and provided for such re-marriage according to the rites of the Church, although the Church of England itself has never varied from its ancient refusal to admit the possibility of divorce. In 1907 Parliament has legislated in a manner which brings rights conferred by the State into possible conflict with duties which the clergy may regard as imposed on them by the Church' (v. 'Report,' p. 24).

It is assumed throughout that the mind of the Church of England in these matters could only be expressed by the vote of Convocation. Failing such a vote the 'corporate 'witness' of the 'Church' had failed, and its 'corporate 'independence' had been insulted. Yet on all the points mentioned it is probably the case that the mind and conscience of the Christian Society in England applaud the action of the State, and would certainly have disapproved the action of the clergy in Convocation. Moreover, it is only on the medieval hypothesis that the clergy constitute the Church that it could be true to say that 'the Church of England 'itself has never varied from its ancient refusal to admit 'the possibility of divorce.' The indelibility of Orders, the absolute indissolubility of marriage, and the incestuous character of marriage with a deceased wife's sister are unquestionably insisted upon in the canons, and form part of the medieval tradition; but can it be really doubted that the Christian mind and conscience now disallow them all?

In respect to these matters is it not the case that the State rather than the Church (i.e. the Parliament rather than the Convocation) *may be*, in the present state of Christendom, the true organ of the 'corporate witness' of the Christian Society?

The report passes forward from the medieval to the modern period with no real perception of the gulf which parts the one from the other. The Reformation is classed with the Norman Conquest as a critical point in the history of the Church of England, but there is nowhere any recognition of the fact that the later crisis differed from the earlier, not merely in extent, but in kind. It was indeed the very completeness of the State's victory in England that made possible the survival of so much of the medieval system of the Church. It is the extent of the medieval survival that makes possible the

forgetfulness of the essential change effected by the breach with medievalism implied in the Reformation.

Everything turns finally on the definition of the Church which is credited with inherent self-governing and self-developing powers. What is the 'corpus' whose 'corporate independence' is of vital spiritual significance? The committee are on this cardinal point ambiguous and hesitating. Perhaps they hardly realised how vital to their whole scheme the point really is. They speak of the Church as 'an institution inherently progressive and developing,' but they do not define it. The difficulty is how to keep distinct, and yet not too distinct, the varying senses in which we are accustomed to think and to speak of the Church of England. A series of ever narrowing societies must be recognised and distinguished: and at every point in the series there is a margin of uncertainty, and a diminution of authority. There are at least six senses of the single word ranging in extent from the entire nation to a few thousand individuals. The Church of England may mean the nation itself in its moral aspect: or the multitude of English folk who 'profess and call themselves Christians': or such of them as have been baptised: or only such of the baptised as reaffirm continuously their baptismal profession by receiving the Lord's Supper in some organised society of Christians: or of these only the communicants in the national Church: or only the clergy. Which of these senses can be made the basis of Anglican reconstruction? The first is impracticably wide: the last is intolerably narrow. Which of the intermediate definitions will serve our turn?

The committee 'cut the Gordian knot' by simply endorsing the decision of the 'Representative Church Council.' The laity are for the purposes of the franchise restricted to parishioners of full age and of either sex who are either actual communicants, or have been baptised and confirmed and are admissible to Holy Communion, and do not belong to any religious body which is not in communion with the Church of England. For all practical purposes this is a communicant franchise, for the number of those who claim the vote but refuse to communicate will be infinitesimal. It could not be tolerated that the non-communicant should outvote the communicant, especially when his only title to vote was the potency of communicating which he possessed. Besides,

on the point of 'Catholic principle,' a non-communicant has really fallen out of operative membership. The only reason why non-communicants were included was the extreme fewness of communicants, but, when the point of principle is raised, numbers are irrelevant. Yet unquestionably numbers are vital to the success of any scheme of autonomy applied to the national Church. At the last census England and Wales contained 36,075,269 persons, included in 8,018,857 families. In the same year the communicants in the Church of England were estimated to consist of about 2,500,000 persons of both sexes and of all ages above twelve years. It has been calculated that on a favourable estimate the male communicants of full age numbered something less than 500,000. The registered Parliamentary electors, who, however, by no means included the whole of the adult males, exceeded six millions. Female communicants would outnumber the males very considerably, but even so it may be doubted whether the entire constituency projected by the report would exceed 1,500,000 persons. This hardly seems adequate for the purpose of representing the nation in spiritual and ecclesiastical concerns.

It is to be noted that the report abolishes the status of nonconformity. Henceforth communion in a non-Anglican Church will disqualify for Anglican membership. Men must make their choice. Either Anglican or Dissenting: no union of a lesser with the larger membership will be tolerated. Any adequate knowledge of our religious history will compel the opinion that this is a very grave innovation. The history of Methodism may indicate that it is also highly unjust. In any case a large view of our national life will suggest that it is extremely impolitic. To force the national Church into the denominational groove is to limit its sphere of influence, to narrow its spirit, and to reduce its resources.

Have the laity, thus limited in numbers, any adequate functions under the proposed scheme? Here again the committee were in the bondage of their medieval precedents, and dared not impinge on the monopoly of the clergy. Accordingly, though immense pains has been bestowed on the details of the constitution, everything comes back to the old medieval conception. The laity may 'serve tables,' provide funds, debate within limits, make complaints, all which they can do now, and could always do; but they may not *act* as

'spiritual' persons, although the report insists that they, not less than the clergy, have received 'those Gifts of the Spirit 'of God which make all Christians a kingdom and priests.' But, it may be urged, that even so small powers are better than none at all. It must be answered that these small powers are conditioned by the surrender of those large powers which the State at present wields, that the normal instrument of lay self-expression in the Church of England has been Parliament, and that this instrument will henceforward be practically withdrawn. The report takes a view of the State which is novel, surprising, and in some respects disconcerting.

While the conception of the Church which inspires the committee's report is essentially medieval, that of the State is essentially pre-Christian. The pagan State of the early Christian centuries provides the model on which, it is suggested, the Christian State of modern England may rightly be fashioned. Repeated quotations are made from Bishop Gore's Memorandum 'On the fundamental idea of the spiritual independence 'of the Church' (which the committee appear to have adopted, and regarded as a final authority), and always with the suggestion that the 'golden age' of ecclesiastical organisation was (as 'Liberationists' also are wont to insist from *their* point of view) prior to the conversion of Constantine, and the subsequent 'establishment' of the Church. It is supposed that 'until 'the Church was closely associated with the empire, the whole 'body of the faithful was recognised as concerned in the govern-'ment of the Church,' and the committee declare their desire to restore to the whole body of Church members its original position of authority.

'When we speak of the restoration to the Church of its proper autonomy, we mean by the Church not only the clergy but the whole Church in which every member has his vocation and ministry' (v. 'Report,' p. 32).

We ask again what was the 'proper autonomy' which existed in the pre-Constantinian age, and which the committee would 'restore'? The State then was pagan and persecuting; now it is neither. Who were the laity then? They were mostly converts from the pagan society, and reflected its levels of thought and habit. 'The mass of the laity,' wrote the late Professor Bigg of the imperial society of the third century,

'must have been very ignorant, while the slaves and *humiliores*, 'who must have formed the great majority, were used to despotic 'rule, and incapable of thinking and acting for themselves.' Can such a laity serve as a model for modern England? What was the conception of the clerical office which these imperial laymen accepted? We may find it stated clearly enough in the writings of St. Ignatius in the second, and of St. Cyprian in the third century. In the great polemic against the Presbyterians, St. Ignatius was for Anglicans a tower of strength, and his epistles are still quoted almost as a primitive draft of Anglican episcopacy as it ought to be; yet, polemics apart, could the doctrine of St. Ignatius be seriously maintained by any modern Anglican? As Bishop Lightfoot wrote:

'It need hardly be remarked how subversive of the true spirit of Christianity, in the negation of individual freedom and the consequent suppression of direct responsibility to God in Christ, is *the crushing despotism with which this language, if taken literally, would invest the episcopal office*' (v. 'Dissertation on the Christian Ministry' in 'Philippians,' p. 237).

Similarly, St. Cyprian was invaluable in the continuing controversy with the Papacy, and, indeed, is so frequently quoted that he might almost be described as *the* Anglican Father. The late Archbishop Benson was wont to represent him as a witness to the rights of the Christian laity. Yet will any considering Englishman be content to accept the doctrine of St. Cyprian as the foundation on which to reconstruct the Church of England? Bishop Lightfoot's careful summary of the Cyprianic doctrine is worth recalling when the Church of St. Cyprian is offered as an example of autonomous Christianity to be followed by Anglican reformers to-day:

'St. Cyprian regards the bishop as exclusively representative of God to the congregation and hardly, if at all, as the representative of the congregation before God. The bishop is the indispensable channel of divine grace, the indispensable bond of Christian brotherhood. The episcopate is not so much the roof as the foundation-stone of the ecclesiastical edifice; not so much the legitimate development as the primary condition of a church. The bishop is appointed directly by God, is responsible directly to God, is inspired directly from God. This last point deserves especial notice. Though in words he frequently defers to the established usage of consulting the presbyters and even the laity in the appointment of officers, and in other matters affecting the well-being of the com-

munity, yet he only makes the concession to nullify it immediately. He pleads a direct official inspiration which enables him to dispense with ecclesiastical custom and to act on his own responsibility. Though the presbyters may still have retained the shadow of a controlling power over the acts of the bishop, though the courtesy of language by which they were recognised as fellow-presbyters was not laid aside, *yet for all practical ends the independent supremacy of the episcopate was completely established by the principles and the measures of Cyprian'* (ibid. p. 243).

Yet it is precisely those principles and measures which the Bishop of Oxford has the courage to offer to the Church of England as providing a basis for securing 'the rights of the 'laity'; and, we must add, which the committee have the simplicity to accept as competent for that purpose.

What real value is there in the elaborate scheme of 'repre-'sentative' councils (parochial, diocesan, national) which are to give expression to a genuine autonomy, when everything is conditioned by one vital reservation?

'Nothing in this Constitution, nor in any proceeding of the Council, shall interfere with *the exercise by the Episcopate of the powers and functions inherent in them'* (v. 'Report,' p. 52).

What rights worth naming are bestowed on the laity when the only matters that have the slightest real 'spiritual' importance are reserved to the Episcopate?

'Provided further that any measure touching doctrinal formulæ or the services or ceremonies of the Church of England or the administration of the sacraments or sacred rites thereof *shall be initiated only in the House of Bishops*, shall be debated and voted upon by each of the three Houses sitting separately, and shall then be accepted or rejected by the Council in *the terms in which it is finally proposed by the House of Bishops'* (v. 'Report,' p. 52).

If *per impossibile* the lay mind on one of those subjects (e.g. marriage) respecting which lay opinion is notoriously apt to differ from clerical should succeed in wringing from the episcopate an acceptable resolution, and passing it into law, what security is there that it will not be neutralised by the exercise of the inherent powers of the episcopate which are so jealously guarded, and so vaguely defined?

If this doctrine of the 'inherent powers' of the episcopate be sound now, it must have been sound in the sixteenth century. But on that assumption can the Reformation of

the Church of England be anywise justified? Did the episcopate undertake, or assist, or approve it? It is notorious that the salient acts of the Reformation were carried in the teeth of episcopal opposition, and that the entire national episcopate had to be removed in order to 'establish' the Church of England. Bishop Browne in his Appendix on 'Church and 'State in English History' indicates the true nature of the reforming process when he writes shortly of Elizabeth's decisive action:

'It had been useless to approach the Convocation on the subject, for that body was decidedly in favour of Roman doctrines. The bishops voted unanimously in the House of Lords against the Act of Supremacy and the Act of Uniformity' (v. 'Report,' p. 231).

These two Acts were the Jachin and Boaz, the twin supporting pillars, of the Elizabethan Settlement. It was precisely because our ancestors ignored the 'inherent powers' of the episcopate that there exists to-day an independent national Church in England, so closely bound into the constitution of the country that the mere attempt to bring its system under the control of medieval precedents and primitive theory reduces everything to chaos.

Indefensible in its principles, as we must needs consider the scheme set forth in the report, would it be likely to succeed in practice? Englishmen are proverbially indifferent to theoretical considerations; they 'kiss the ground before a 'fact.' Is there any reason for thinking that, if this scheme were adopted by Parliament, passed into law, and set going, it would secure the objects which its authors have in view? Here we are at once brought again to the diagnosis of the existing situation which we accept, and which must determine our estimate of future probabilities as well as our judgment of present proposals. Why is there something like an administrative dead-lock in the national Church? Why are admittedly needful changes not made, admitted abuses not removed? Is it not mainly because the inner dissidence of the English Church is so deep and far-reaching that the agreement indispensable to effective legislation cannot be secured? Why are discipline Bills blocked, and extensions of the episcopate refused? Is it not because there is no confidence in the spirit which will determine the exercise of fresh powers? The

opposition comes, not from opponents, but from members of the Church. Why does the 'Establishment' seem paralysed? Is it not really because a great section of the clergy, and a waxing number of the laity, have adopted a conception of the relations of Church and State which is frankly incompatible with any possible Establishment? Will 'autonomy' exorcise this deep dissidence within the Church? Will men trust the new Council more than they did the old Convocations? Will the new 'parliamentary settlement' work better than the old?

On what ground of principle will the so-called 'Catholic' clergy, who now repudiate conscientiously the Courts as 'Erastian,' and disobey the bishops as the mouth-pieces of the Courts, and set at naught the opinion of their parishioners as so much Protestant prejudice, recognise the authority of the new constitution? And if, as seems probable, they will not, are they to be coerced? Where, then, is the improvement on the present state of affairs? The new Council which is to be clothed with legislative power will have no basis in 'Catholic' principles. Even the Lambeth Conference, which (although of very recent growth, and wholly unknown to the Law) is referred to by the committee as 'the chief instrument 'of Anglican unity,' answers to nothing 'Catholic.' On 'Catholic' principles the only possible development of Anglican Catholicism is towards reabsorption, on terms or unconditionally, in the parent Church of Rome. This is indeed now clearly perceived, and sometimes frankly acknowledged, by many Anglican clergymen.

Would the 'autonomous' Church be more attractive to the artisans? Would it be a more effective religious instrument? Would it bring the principles of the Gospel to bear more potently on society? Would it draw to its membership that numerous and increasing class of educated Englishmen who now stand aloof from all religious profession? Would it be better placed for essaying the difficult but indispensable task of 're-stating' the Christian tradition of Faith and Morals in such wise that the accumulated knowledge and experience of the modern world should be really correlated with the truth of the Christian Revelation? It is difficult to see how any of these questions could receive an affirmative answer.

We conclude, then, that such 'autonomy' as the report has

outlined could not possibly be reconciled with any form of national establishment, and would bring no advantages to compensate for the evident losses involved in disestablishment and its proper consequence, disendowment. Nearly four centuries have passed since the Reformation Settlement was imposed by the nation on a reluctant clergy. Now the wheel has gone full circle. The clergy will impose the destruction of the Reformation Settlement on a reluctant nation. Even this is an inadequate description of the extraordinary situation which is being disclosed. The 'Establishment' will have perished at the hands, not of the clergy as a whole, but of a minority of the clergy, organised and carried forward by the logic of a false ideal of 'spiritual independence.' This great wrong to the nation will have been wrought in the interest, not of the Church, but of a clericalist party in the Church; not of Religion, but of a perversion of Religion. The name and claim of the historic Church may persist, but its moral identity will have been lost. A Church of England which has deliberately severed its connexion with the national life, and absorbed itself in its own denominational concerns, will be unrecognisable, and can have but one future. It must shrivel ignobly into another sect, differing from the rest only in its episcopal polity, and in the extravagance of its spiritual pretensions.

H. Hensley Henson.

SIEGE BY WATER

1. **Wheaton's International Law.** Revised and rewritten by COLEMAN PHILLIPSON. Stevens and Sons. 1916.
2. **The Law of Contraband of War.** By H. REASON PYKE. Clarendon Press. 1915.
3. **The Declaration of Paris of 1856.** By THOMAS GIBSON BOWLES. Sampson Low. 1900.

IT is a remarkable and a significant circumstance that during the whole course of the war, from 4th August 1914 until the time of writing, neither the people of this country, nor the traders of neutral nations, have been able at any given moment clearly to understand in what consist the rules of sea warfare as decreed by the principal maritime nation, Great Britain. Such uncertainty is the more surprising, inasmuch as the Royal Navy is the main weapon of Great Britain and the sea her peculiar province. By the sea she stands or falls ; upon British supremacy at sea depends not only the success, but the very possibility of land warfare by her troops ; and upon her victory at sea hinges the ultimate issue of the war for her Allies.

When two nations go to war with each other, if either is dependent upon supplies brought by sea, the first object of the other is to stop those supplies and thus to establish a siege by water of the enemy. In order to establish the siege, the armed sea forces of the enemy must either be destroyed or made impotent. They may be destroyed by sheer fighting ; they may be made impotent by shutting them up in their harbours. As a rule, the Power possessing the stronger Navy begins by shutting the enemy fleet into its harbours. That operation is called a blockade ; it is a military blockade, not to be confused with the commercial blockade ; and it is performed by stationing a superior force outside the ports of the enemy. It may be a distant blockade, in which the superior force remains at some distance from the hostile coast ; or it may be a close blockade, in which the superior force cruises off the mouth of the enemy's harbours.

Under modern conditions of warfare, in which the mine and the submarine are employed, close blockade has become impracticable, but the principle remains the same. The British Fleet has blockaded the German Fleet during the war, although the main body of the British Fleet is far from the German naval bases.

Sooner or later, the stress of the siege, under which supplies are running short, forces the blockaded fleet to sea to challenge a general action. Such an action was challenged by the German High Seas Fleet on 31st May last. The result was the defeat, but not the destruction, of the German Fleet. The defeated remnant retreated to its bases, and the blockade was resumed. While that blockade is maintained, the British Fleet exercises control of sea communications, excepting for the casual depredations of enemy submarines.

But this military blockade, as it may be called, must be carefully distinguished from the kind of blockade which is one method of conducting the siege by water, and which, for the sake of clearness, may be termed the commercial blockade. A commercial blockade is a particular operation of war conducted under the rules prescribed by the law of nations. It consists in declaring a certain area of the coast of the enemy to be blockaded. In a state of blockade, no vessel, whether neutral or belligerent, is allowed to pass into or out of the specified area. Such a blockade, for instance, was declared in respect of part of the African coast early in the war.

The whole subject of the siege by water of the enemy, resulting from the control of sea communications by the Power superior at sea, has been so confused that it is no wonder the public are bewildered. The confusion is due to the naval policy of the present and of the late Government, for which Viscount Grey was and is chiefly responsible.

In order to obtain a clear perception of the situation, it is first of all necessary to understand what is and what is not permitted by the law of nations, as slowly evolved by centuries of experience, to the belligerent exercising the control of sea communications. That law consists of a few simple principles, concerning which there is no question, though there has always been some diversity of practice as regards specific points, which each belligerent has claimed the right to interpret at his will, provided that he could obtain a certain measure

of approval from other Powers. The sanction of international law is derived from the common consent of nations; but it is not as yet enforceable by physical means. It rests therefore upon a moral foundation, which, in case of its infringement, affords a sound basis for protest and, if necessary, gives a reasonable pretext for declaring war.

At the Hague Peace Conference of 1907, at the Naval Conference of 1908–9, and in the Naval Prize Bill rejected by Parliament in 1911, Sir Edward Grey attempted to alter some of the fundamental principles of the law of nations. In what those alterations consisted we shall presently see. But it is first necessary to understand that, as regards siege by water, the law of nations defining the rights of belligerents was explicit and, by reason of the common consent of nations, did actually represent before the Hague Conference began to tamper with it, and does represent now, a plain and a just code of law.

The belligerent may enforce the siege by water of his enemy by two methods: (*a*) by declaration of contraband and its seizure; (*b*) by commercial blockade.

The declaration and seizure of contraband are regulated by various rules. The word contraband, derived from the Italian word *contrabbando*, means 'in defiance of an injunction,' or 'contrary to a decree or proclamation.' Applied to cargoes carried by neutral or other ships and destined for the enemy, contraband signifies those goods which are liable to capture by the belligerent. By the universal consent of nations and by virtue of precedents extending over hundreds of years, all articles which are designed for purposes of war—such as guns, ammunition, and warlike equipment generally—may lawfully be declared contraband, if they are destined for the enemy. Therefore, given the articles in question, the criterion of their character, which determines their liability to seizure, is their destination. If, for instance, it was quite certain that a cargo of ammunition was being sent from one neutral country to another neutral country, and that the neutral customer would not re-export it to the enemy, it would not be liable to capture.

There is a large category of articles which may be used both in peace and in war. Such articles are cotton, copper, and foodstuffs. The rule is that, if such articles are destined for

the use of the civil population of the enemy, they are innocent goods, and may not be seized; but if they are destined for the use of the armed forces of the enemy, they are liable to seizure. This category is technically called conditional contraband, to distinguish it from war material, which is called absolute contraband. It is evident that in the days when war was an affair waged by small professional armies on either side the distinction was logical. It is also evident that the selection of conditional contraband by any one of the belligerents engaged makes an occasion for interminable disputes. But from the time that universal military service was instituted, so that when a country went to war the whole nation was involved in it, the distinction between absolute and conditional contraband became illogical; because the distinction between the civilian population and the fighting forces had virtually ceased to exist.

The proper course to have taken upon the outbreak of the present war was to declare that all commodities whatsoever which were destined for the enemy, with the possible exception of pure luxuries, should be treated as contraband. That course was indeed actually taken by the British Government, in a left-handed manner, seven months after the declaration of war, by the promulgation of the Order in Council of 11th March 1915. But, as a matter of fact, that instrument was inconsistent with other Orders in Council and has never been fully carried into execution.

The whole situation in respect of trade in contraband carried on by a neutral with any or all belligerents may be defined in a sentence: The neutral trader has the right to trade in contraband with any or all belligerents, and a belligerent has the right to stop him, but no neutral State, as such, may trade with a belligerent. Trade in contraband is therefore an adventure of the private neutral trader. He occupies the singular and attractive position of being privileged to break the law without incurring guilt, but at the risk of losing his venture. The State to which he owes allegiance takes no responsibility for him; but it is, of course, entitled to protest should a belligerent fail to treat him in accordance with the law of nations.

The chief players of the game are: the neutral merchant who trades with the belligerent, the neutral shipowner

who carries the goods of the neutral merchant who trades with the belligerent, and the other belligerent who prevents the neutral shipowner from delivering the goods to the enemy. There is also the neutral trader who, either in the capacity of merchant on his own account or of agent for the enemy, receives the goods in a neutral port and sends them thence inland across the frontier to the enemy.

In the present war, for instance, there is the American merchant. He ships his goods in a vessel belonging to America, or Sweden, or Norway, or Holland, for Germany. The other belligerent is Great Britain, acting in concert with France. In Sweden, Norway, Denmark, and Holland there are neutral merchants or agents, to whom the goods are consigned by the American merchant, and who send them across the frontier to Germany.

So many interests are involved that the rules of the game are necessarily complicated in detail, though they are simple in principle. Thus :

The neutral trader may trade with any or all belligerents.	But a belligerent may prevent him from so trading.
He may sell contraband of war.	But a belligerent may take his cargo and, in certain cases, his ship also.
He may sell non-contraband cargo to any belligerent.	And the belligerent, *unless he declares a blockade*, must let it pass.
He may sell any cargo whatsoever to another neutral.	But he must satisfy the belligerent that the said cargo is not in fact contraband destined for the enemy.
He may carry enemy goods as cargo.	But the belligerent had, prior to the Declaration of Paris, the right to capture and to confiscate all of them, and subsequent to that Declaration had the right to confiscate all contraband.
He may attempt to break a blockade by slipping through the blockading force.	But the belligerent may capture ship and cargo, and the ship may be captured, after she has discharged her cargo, on her return voyage.

He may sail anywhere he likes.	But a belligerent may order him to stop, may send an officer on board, and may send the ship into port.
He may resist or evade capture.	But a belligerent may condemn the ship as penalty for so doing.
He is entitled to enter any neutral port.	And the belligerent cannot blockade that port.
He may be protected by men-of-war convoy of his own State.	But the belligerent has still the right to visit, search and send the ship into port.

These rules, thus broadly stated (in non-legal terms, and subject of course to various qualifications according to the circumstances of each case), represent a fair working code, which has been evolved by centuries of practice, study, and experience. The reader is here referred for a clear and a concise exposition of the whole subject to ' The Law of Contraband of War,' by Mr. H. Reason Pyke, LL.B. The neutral trader, it will be observed, is subjected to severe restrictions. Of course he is. Those restrictions are founded on two principles, both of which are inherent in the nature of war. One is that the belligerent, fighting for his life, must of necessity use all means consistent with humanity to attain victory ; the other, that the neutral, as such, must help neither of the opposing parties in any way whatever. The law of nations prescribes a working compromise ; and it may fairly be said that under its terms the neutral gets considerable advantages. He enjoys, for instance, the privilege of trading as much as he will with the belligerent who exercises the control of the sea ; and, in default of a blockade, he may even trade with other belligerents without interference in goods which are not contraband of war.

The law of nations, which prior to the Declaration of Paris decreed that enemy property at sea, wheresoever found, was liable to capture and to confiscation, and that contraband of war carried in neutral vessels was also liable to capture and to confiscation, made naval supremacy the most powerful and also the least sanguinary weapon of war in the world. As it happens, this country has been for more than a century the supreme naval Power. Therefore it was and is to the

interest of all other nations legally to circumscribe that supremacy; to curtail by agreement and treaty what could not be restricted by force of arms. In 1780, and again in 1800, an Armed Neutrality was formed for the execution of that very purpose. In both instances England maintained her full maritime rights. Those rights were defined by the Government of the United States, in 1798, as follows: 'The 'rights of England being neither diminished nor increased by 'compact remained precisely in their natural state, which is 'to seize an enemy's property wherever found, and this is the 'received and allowed practice of all nations where no treaty 'has intervened.' America has always consistently followed the principle thus officially stated.

In 1856 occurred the first surrender of maritime rights, a surrender embodied in the Declaration of Paris, which was an attempt to alter the law of nations in favour of the neutral trader and of those nations which, possessing navies inferior to the British Navy, could not hope in the event of war to exercise the control of sea communications.

The Declaration of Paris consists of four principal clauses:

'1. Privateering is and remains abolished.

2. The neutral flag covers enemy merchandise with the exception of contraband of war.

3. Neutral merchandise, with the exception of contraband of war, is not capturable under the enemy's flag.

4. Blockades, in order to be obligatory, must be effective—that is to say, maintained by a force sufficient really to prevent access to the coast of the enemy.'

The comment of Lord Salisbury on the Declaration was that 'since the Declaration of Paris, the fleet, valuable as it 'is for preventing an invasion of these shores, is almost value-'less for any other purpose.'

Prince Bismarck merely observed that 'we must see how 'we are to get rid of this rubbish.' His successors have found the way.

It will be seen that the Declaration of Paris limited the power to stop enemy supplies, a power which is the main weapon of a naval nation, to the capture of contraband of war. The enemy's non-contraband commerce, if it were carried under a neutral flag, was immune from interference. Although the Declaration was of dubious legality, although it was not signed by America, it has been treated by lawyers

and politicians as a part of the law of nations; and the persistent efforts made by various patriotic persons to secure its repudiation have been ignored.

But during the present war the Declaration of Paris has in fact been made null and void. For privateering has been revived, and the neutral flag no longer covers enemy merchandise. By the terms of the Declaration, the violation of one clause invalidates the whole instrument. Therefore, it is difficult to understand why the present Government continue to refuse formally to denounce the Declaration of Paris, and thereby to place themselves in a sound legal position in relation to neutral powers. Probably the reason is that the Government, or the Foreign Office, wish to return to the terms of the Declaration of Paris at the earliest possible moment. For the policy of the late and of the present Government, which in this matter (as in others) is continuous, is avowedly to extend the privileges of the neutral, with the necessary result that the powers of the supreme maritime nation will be even further restricted than they were by the Declaration of Paris of 1856.

The naval policy of the late Government was declared in the instructions given to Sir Edward Fry, British delegate to the Hague Conference of 1907. They were not only injurious and even fatal to the interests and the security of this country were she a belligerent, but they were wholly contrary to the law of nations. Sir Edward Grey, in fact, attempted to replace the old law of nations, sanctioned by international consent and forming part of the common law of England, by a series of rules devised by the Foreign Office. When these rules had been drawn up, they were to serve for the guidance of an International Tribunal of Appeal, which would have power to overrule the decisions of the British Prize Court and of the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council.

'H.M. Government are anxious to secure the adaptation of the machinery of the existing tribunal which was created by the Convention (of 1899) to the purposes of an International Tribunal of Appeal from the decision of belligerent prize courts affecting neutrals. . . . H.M. Government recognise to the full the desirability of freeing neutral commerce to the utmost possible extent from interference by belligerent powers, and they are ready and willing for their own part, in lieu of endeavouring to frame new and more satisfactory rules for the prevention of contraband

trade in the future, to abandon the principle of contraband of war altogether . . . They would be glad to see the right of search limited in every practicable way . . . The abolition of contraband . . . should also extend to . . . the carriage of belligerent despatches and of persons in the naval and military services of a belligerent . . . to secure an arrangement under which mail packets or bags in transit on board a neutral ship, in accordance with the provisions of the Postal Conventions, should be inviolable, even though such mails should contain despatches for a belligerent. . . .'

Had these intentions been carried into practice, the sole remaining use of a Navy would have been to prevent invasion. Accordingly, at the same time as the naval policy of the Government was communicated to the British delegates at the Hague, the Navy was dangerously reduced. Incidentally, it may be noted that when Sir Edward Grey's declaration in favour of abolishing contraband of war was put to the vote at the Hague Conference, France, Germany, Russia, the United States, and Montenegro voted against it. Great Britain was supported by such powerful naval nations as Bulgaria, China, Cuba, Paraguay, Peru, Persia, Salvador, San Domingo, Serbia, Siam, and Switzerland. Nothing dismayed, Sir Edward Fry called a further meeting, at which Great Britain received the support of one country alone, that country being Haiti.

But the British Government succeeded at the Hague Conference in surrendering, not indeed all they had hoped to surrender (with the help of the Black Republic), but nearly all.

These surrenders are important, because some of them were embodied in the Declaration of London, which instrument, although it was legally null and void, was imposed upon the Navy upon the outbreak of war ; and although it has subsequently been formally withdrawn (by Order in Council, 7th July 1916), it does not follow that the Navy has been released from the instructions based upon the Declaration.

Before these innovations were embodied in the Declaration of London, they were expressed in the fourteen Conventions drawn up at the Hague Conference of 1907. Of these, the following are of importance :

Article 18 of Convention 5 authorises a neutral Power to furnish supplies and to make loans to belligerents, thus conferring upon a neutral State (as distinguished from a private neutral trader) a privilege wholly inconsistent with neutrality.

Convention 7 defines the conditions under which privateering may be practised, thereby violating the Declaration of Paris of 1856.

Convention 8 prohibits the laying of unanchored contact mines unless they become inoperative within an hour after they are out of control, and the laying of anchored mines unless they become inoperative so soon as they break loose from their moorings. In other words, the 8th Convention permits the laying of mines under conditions which could not be and which have not been observed.

Convention 9 permits the bombardment by naval forces of undefended ports and other places, should supplies have been refused by them to the attacking party.

Convention 11 prohibits the capture of enemy correspondence or despatches at sea.

Convention 12 sets up an International Prize Court, empowered to overrule the decisions of national prize courts, and consisting of fifteen judges, only one of whom was to be British, and of whom seven were to be drawn from the smaller Powers, such as Paraguay, Turkey, Guatemala, Mexico, Siam, and so forth. All questions were to be 'decided by a majority 'of the judges present,' and the sittings were to be held in secret. It was this amazing tribunal which was to be constituted by the Naval Prize Bill, rejected by Parliament in 1911.

Convention 14 prohibited the discharge of projectiles and explosives from balloons.

Some of these Conventions have been signed; some have been both signed and ratified by the Government without the sanction of Parliament. In the Order in Council of 7th July 1916, withdrawing the Declaration of London, Lord Grey stated that the Government 'in particular will observe the 'terms of all international conventions regarding the laws of 'war.' If by that statement Lord Grey means that the whole of the Hague Conventions are to be observed, the position is very dangerous, and is utterly inconsistent with the declaration made in the same instrument, that H.M. Government intend to keep the law of nations. Such is one aspect of the confusion wrought by the Foreign Office, which none save a skilled jurist can unravel.

But there is much more to follow. For in pursuit of that sinister chimera, an International Prize Court, Lord Grey, in 1908, summoned a Naval Conference of the Powers to

assemble in London, there to frame a code of law upon which the new body should base its decisions. Although the law of nations was universally understood, and although it formed the basis of the prize law of all considerable naval Powers, Lord Grey chose to set it aside as a thing of no significance, and to propound a new law, invented in the Foreign Office. This was eventually embodied in the Declaration of London. By that time there were in existence four codes of law: (1) the traditional code, namely the law of nations as understood down to 1856; (2) the Declaration of Paris of 1856; (3) the Hague Conventions of 1907; (4) the Declaration of London of 1908.

Among the new rules contained in the Declaration of London, the following are important: A vessel carrying half, or less than half, a cargo of contraband is exempt from condemnation, though the contraband cargo is liable to condemnation. This rule is a compromise among various decisions, and in view of the great size of modern merchant ships, confers a most inordinate privilege on the neutral carrier of contraband. It is still in force.

A ship's papers are made conclusive proof both of her destination and of the destination of her cargo. The effect of these articles is to enable a neutral ship carrying false papers to go to any port, with any cargo, and to destroy the doctrine of ultimate destination upon which the power of the belligerent to stop enemy supplies mainly depends. For, if the ship's papers showed that her cargo was destined for a neutral agent in a neutral port, although he might be (and he usually is) an enemy agent, the ship and her cargo would be immune from capture. By the Order in Council of 20th August 1914, these rules were altered, and ultimate destination was made the test of liability to capture. By the same Order the Declaration of London was ordained to constitute the code of sea warfare, and the Judges of His Majesty's Prize Courts were instructed to observe it, a mandate which the Foreign Office had no authority to give. At the same time, one of the most important clauses in the Declaration was altered as above described, and thus the confusion and uncertainty created by the Foreign Office were increased. They were again increased on 29th October 1914, when another Order in Council replaced the Order of 20th August, with some alterations in detail.

Articles 61 and 62 of the Declaration conferred immunity from search or visit upon neutral vessels under their own national convoy. That is to say, a fleet of merchantmen laden with contraband accompanied by a single torpedo-boat might freely pass to its destination. Here was an innovation which might in practice enable the neutral completely to nullify siege by water. It was however abolished by the withdrawal of the Declaration of London on 7th July 1916.

Article 17 restricted the power of the belligerent controlling the seas to enforce a commercial blockade. It created a new (undefined) 'area of operations' outside which no ship attempting to run the blockade might be captured. This rule also was abolished by the withdrawal of the Declaration of London.

Articles 48 and 49 virtually permitted the destruction at sea of neutral and enemy merchant vessels. These very mischievous articles have become of no effect since the withdrawal of the Declaration of London.

Article 46 made enemy correspondence and despatches inviolable if carried by a neutral vessel which is at the same time carrying other matter. This imbecile rule has not been observed, and is now withdrawn.

Article 45 permitted the transport of enemy troops to be conducted by a neutral. This rule was actually enforced by the late Government at the beginning of the war; and they only abandoned it after public indignation had found expression. That orders were issued to H.M. Navy to allow belligerent troops to pass freely on the seas shows the extent to which the Foreign Office was obsessed by the desire to extend the privileges of neutral traders and to limit the power of the British Navy. The withdrawal of the Declaration invalidated the rule.

Articles 55 and 56 made possible the illegal transfer of an enemy vessel to a neutral Power, forbidden by the law of nations. These articles were invalidated by the withdrawal of the Declaration.

Transformation of merchant vessels into men-of-war, or of men-of-war into merchant vessels, on the high seas was discussed at the Naval Conference, but the question was left open. As it was not forbidden, it was allowed.

Article 57 ordained that 'the neutral or enemy character

'of the vessel is determined by the flag which she is entitled 'to fly.' In other words, the nationality of the ship is the determining factor. The nationality, domicile, and business of the *owner* of the ship, which under British Prize Law are the determining factors, are here ignored. Article 58, ordaining that 'the neutral or enemy character of goods found on 'board an enemy vessel is determined by the neutral or enemy 'character of the owner,' fails to state upon what grounds the neutral or enemy character of the owner is to be determined. 'It is not said,' observes M. Renault, the official reporter, 'because it was impossible to arrive at an agreement on this 'point.' But this is the central point of the whole affair. The most potent weapon of the siege by water is the right to capture and to confiscate enemy goods wherever found. In the Declaration of London there is provided no criterion for determining what are and what are not enemy goods. Having by implication jettisoned at the outset the whole of British Prize Law and the law of nations, in which the true criterion is abundantly defined, it is hardly surprising that the delegates to the Conference arrived at so ignominious a conclusion. They even appointed a special sub-committee to deal with the matter. The British delegate on that sub-committee was Mr. Cecil Hurst of the Foreign Office.

'The natural rule as to enemy property,' writes Mr. Bowles, 'is obviously that the character of the property is the character of its owner. And that is the rule of the law of nations, whether for property in ships or in goods, as declared by the British Prize Courts, whose criterion for the character of the owner is his domicile, his habitation, the scene of his activities, the abiding place of his material interests and business—whatever may be the much more indefinite and much less easily established character represented by the word "nationality," which, in these days especially, has almost ceased to have any strict meaning. . . . For property in a ship differs in no essential respect from property in goods; and whatever criterion there is for the one must be equally good for the other.'

Under the terms of the Order in Council of 7th July, withdrawing the Declaration of London, this country returned to the rule of the law of nations, but certain features of that mischievous instrument still remain. The relics are embodied in clauses (*c*) and (*d*) of the Order in Council of 7th July.

Clause (*c*) runs as follows: 'A neutral vessel carrying

'contraband with papers indicating a neutral destination, 'which, notwithstanding the destination shown on the papers, 'proceeds to an enemy port, shall be liable to capture and 'condemnation if she is encountered before the end of her next 'voyage.' In this rule it is attempted to decide what is not proved, and what the Prize Court is alone competent to determine, the lawless intent of the neutral. She might very well change her destination without any such intent. This rule is contrary to the law of nations.

Clause (*d*) runs as follows: 'A vessel carrying contraband 'shall be liable to capture and condemnation if the contraband, 'reckoned either (*sic*) by value, weight, volume, or freight, 'forms more than half the cargo.'

This rule empowers the neutral trader to carry half a cargo of contraband without incurring the penalty of losing his ship. The cargo itself is of course liable to confiscation. The new rule is a monstrous violation of the practice of the British Prize Court, which has observed a wise discretion in condemning a ship carrying only a small parcel of contraband. Strictly speaking, the ship is liable to condemnation should she be carrying an ounce of contraband. The Prize Court is now ordered to release her with half a cargo, which might amount and often does amount to thousands of tons. The Foreign Office has no constitutional right to impose these rules upon the Prize Court.

But though this absurdity remains, most of the Foreign Office-made buckram law has been swept away by the withdrawal of the Declaration of London. The making of a ship's papers conclusive proof of her destination and of the destination of her cargo; the immunity from visit and search by the belligerent of neutral traders under convoy; the restrictions on commercial blockade; the permission to destroy merchantmen at sea; the immunity from capture of enemy correspondence and despatches; the immunity from capture of enemy troops and reservists on neutral ships; the possibility of illegal transfer of enemy ships to a neutral Power; the implied permission to transform merchant vessels into men-of-war, or the other way about, on the high seas; the making the nationality of the ship the criterion of her character, and the leaving undefined the criterion of the character of the owner of her cargo; all these fatuous sur-

renders are now abolished. That is to say, they are abolished *if, and only if,* orders have been issued to the Fleet cancelling the previous orders in which naval officers were instructed to carry into execution the Declaration of London.

The Declaration was in fact from first to last conceived in the interests of a military Power and contrary to the interests of a naval Power, and enured throughout to the advantage of the private neutral trader, and, in a proportion, to the disadvantage of the naval belligerent. The advantage gained by the neutral Power was nevertheless worthless compared with the disadvantage incurred by the same Power should it become a belligerent. Moreover, the advantages theoretically secured to the neutral depended absolutely upon the observation of the new rules by a belligerent. There was no guarantee whatever that the belligerent would adhere to the agreement. No penalty attached to its violation. And, in fact, the instant war was declared, and in the case of Germany before war was declared, every belligerent departed from the agreement. Thus Sir Edward Grey sacrificed the greater part of belligerent rights in order to increase neutral privileges by virtue of a document which had in fact no binding force.

In order to make the Declaration effective so far as this country was concerned, it was necessary to pass a Bill through Parliament to provide for the creation of the proposed Court of Appeal. This Bill was forced through the House of Commons in 1911 by a party vote, but was rejected by the House of Lords—thanks largely to Mr. Gibson Bowles. Yet on the outbreak of war Sir Edward wantonly revived this mischievous code. He subsequently explained his reasons to the United States' Ambassador in a memorandum published in the press on 15th July 1916.

> 'The Allied Governments . . . believed that in the Declaration of London they would find a suitable digest of principles and compendium of working rules.'

With all due respect to the Allied Governments, it must be said that if such was their conviction, their advisers must have been singularly ignorant both of the law of nations and of the history of sea warfare. Indeed, Sir Edward Grey is constrained with a dignified melancholy to confess his complete error. 'As a matter of fact,' he says, 'these rules, while not 'in all respects improving the safeguards afforded to neutrals,

'do not provide belligerents with the most effective means 'of exercising their admitted rights.'

The intervention of the Foreign Office having so far proved disastrously mistaken, Sir Edward Grey proceeds to declare that the Allies have 'come to the conclusion that they must 'confine themselves simply to applying the historic and admitted 'rules of the law of nations.' It might reasonably be supposed that this eminently sensible announcement signified, at least, that the Foreign Office would now be content to leave the Admiralty and the Prize Court to manage their proper business according to the law of nations. Not in the least. For the Foreign Office at once proceeds to enact the four rules already discussed, and to re-enact the Order in Council of 11th March 1915.

That order represents, then, the most recent attempt of the Foreign Office to remake the law of nations. The Hague Conventions may or may not be gone; the Declaration of London, after co-existing for more than a year with the Order in Council of 11th March 1915, with whose provisions it was at variance, has gone. What remains is the Order in Council of 11th March 1915, together with 'the historic and admitted 'rules of the law of nations,' though these are in conflict with the Order in Council.

In what does this remarkable Order consist? Briefly, it may be defined as an attempt to produce the conditions of a blockade without declaring a blockade. That Lord Grey and other members of the Government conceive that it is possible to obtain the results of a blockade without its declaration, is made evident both in their speeches and in the correspondence conducted between Lord Grey and the Ambassador of the United States.

In all probability, the device was intended to obviate the original difficulty of blockading the enemy's ports without at the same time blockading neutral ports, which action is illegal. But the difficulty is solved at the cost of infringing the law of nations in another respect. To avoid one infringement another is committed.

The Order declares that no ship may carry any goods, whether innocent or contraband, to or from any German port; that any ship carrying any goods, whether innocent or contraband, to a neutral port, with an ultimate enemy destination, may be required to discharge her cargo in a

British or an Allied port ; and that any ship carrying enemy property may be required to discharge her cargo in a British or an Allied port.

The rights here claimed by the belligerent are rights which, under the law of nations, can only be exercised after a formal declaration of blockade. They are also a downright violation of the second article of the Declaration of Paris of 1856, which ordains that the ' neutral flag covers enemy's goods, ' with the exception of contraband of war.' As by virtue of its constitution a violation of one article invalidates the whole instrument, the Declaration of Paris is in fact made of no effect. Nevertheless, the Foreign Office continues to refuse openly to repudiate it.

The clauses requiring merchant ships to discharge their cargoes in a British or an Allied port are permissive and not obligatory. Thus the Government left themselves free in any given case, or in all cases, not to enforce the Order in these respects. And, in fact, it was not so enforced. In the course of Lord Grey's correspondence with the Government of the United States, he cites statistics proving that hundreds of thousands of pounds' worth of goods went to Germany from America and from this country after 1st March 1915, when the Order came into force.

By another clause in the Order, the liability of any vessel or goods to capture under the ordinary rules of international law remains unaffected. Therefore two sets of rules are put into operation, with two sets of penalties, and in the Order it is further ordained that ' the practice and procedure of ' the Prize Court shall, so far as applicable, be followed *mutatis* ' *mutandis* in any proceedings consequential on this Order.' It would seem impossible to carry this instruction into effect ; for the procedure laid down in the Order is directly contrary to the procedure laid down in the law of nations, which alone binds the Prize Court.

Under the law of nations, enemy goods captured at sea are liable to confiscation. But under the Order in Council, enemy goods captured at sea may be ' requisitioned,' an innovation of very dubious legality ; or they may be sold, when the proceeds must be paid into the Court ; but they must not be paid out of Court, ' until the conclusion of peace, ' except on the application of the Crown ' ; or they may be restored to the enemy. Everything, in a word, may be done

to enemy goods, except confiscate them as the law of nations prescribes.

Neutrals may complain, and indeed do complain, that their ships are sent into port by the belligerent and made to discharge their cargoes, although they are innocently carrying innocent goods to unblockaded ports. It is a just complaint. Its force, however, is greatly mitigated by the fact that the only injury suffered by the neutral trader is delay. In practice, it is still further mitigated by the fact that the Order in Council of 11th March 1915 has never been fully carried into operation.

In these circumstances, the re-enactment of the Order of 11th March 1915 by the Order of 7th July 1916 is the more inexplicable. In the same order is declared the intention of his Britannic Majesty and of his Allies 'to act in strict accord-'ance with the law of nations.' That intention and that law are inconsistent with the Order in Council of 11th March 1915.

In what the law of nations consists was described in a report made to King George II., in 1753, by Sir George Lee, Judge of the Prerogative Court; Dr. Paul, H.M. Advocate-General; Sir Dudley Rider, H.M. Attorney-General; and Mr. Murray (afterwards Lord Mansfield), H.M. Solicitor-General.*

'When two Powers are at war, they have a right to make prizes of the ships, goods and effects of each other upon the high seas. Whatever is the property of the enemy may be acquired by capture at sea; but the property of a friend cannot be taken, provided he observes his neutrality.

'Hence the Law of Nations has established:

'That the goods of an enemy, on board the ship of a friend, may be taken.

'That the lawful goods of a friend, on board the ship of an enemy, ought to be restored.

'That contraband goods, going to the enemy, though the property of a friend, may be taken as prize; because supplying the enemy with what enables him better to carry on the war is a departure from neutrality.

'By the maritime Law of Nations, universally and immemorially received, there is an established method of determination whether the capture be, or be not, lawful prize.

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* Quoted by Sir W. Scott and Sir J. Nicholl, in a letter in 1794, in answer to an inquiry upon the subject from the American Ambassador, Mr. Jay, as being, in their judgment, the most correct and succinct statement of the general principles of proceeding in Prize Causes in British Courts of Admiralty. See Phillimore's 'International Law,' vol. iii. p. 666.

'Before the ship, or goods, can be disposed of by the captors, there must be a regular judicial proceeding, wherein both parties may be heard; and condemnation thereupon as prize, in a Court of Admiralty, judging by the law of nations and treaties.

'The proper and regular Court, for these condemnations, is the Court of that State to whom the captor belongs.'

These rules are as authoritative in the reign of King George the Fifth as they were when they were written for the information of King George the Second. They contain a plain statement of the principles of the conduct of maritime warfare. Their validity is wholly unaffected by the Declaration of Paris of 1856, the Hague Conventions, the Declaration of London, or the Order in Council of 11th March 1915.

It is here humbly submitted that all that is necessary in order to resolve the existing confusion and uncertainty, to enable the Fleet to fulfil its office, and to put an end to the many illegitimate advantages undoubtedly gained by the enemy in the present state of affairs, is that the British Government should proceed to put into practice the principles as above set forth. That the practice should be made to conform to modern requirements is clear. The difficulty of blockading the ports of the enemy, for instance, without at the same time blockading neutral ports, may be solved by applying the principle that 'supplying the enemy with what enables him 'better to carry on the war is a departure from neutrality.'

For when whole nations are at war with one another, when the whole civilian working population is involved in the war, there are no commodities, except pure luxuries, whose supply does not enable the belligerent 'better to carry on the war.' Therefore all goods whose ultimate destination is the enemy are justly liable to capture; and if they are enemy goods, to confiscation. It is not necessary, were that principle applied, to declare a blockade. Nor is it necessary to retain the Order in Council of 11th March 1915, in which the principle of stopping all enemy supplies whatsoever is indeed embodied, but so embodied that the Government are left free to pass enemy supplies and, if they are captured, to return them to the enemy.

It is not by the employment of such methods that the law of nations is maintained, or that wars are won.

L. Cope Cornford.

TWO FRENCH CRITICS

ÉMILE FAGUET—REMY DE GOURMONT

THE importance of literary criticism in the higher education of a race has been recognised in no country in the world except France. Elsewhere there have arisen critics of less, or more, or even of extreme merit, but nowhere else has there been a systematic training in literature which has embraced a whole generation, and has been intimately combined with ethics. The line of action which Matthew Arnold vainly and pathetically urged on the Anglo-Saxon world has been unobtrusively but most effectively taken by France for now more than half a century. When the acrid and ridiculous controversy between the Classical and the Romantic schools died down, criticism in France became at once more reasonable and more exact. The fatuous formula which has infected all races, and is not yet extirpated in this country—the 'I do 'not like you, Dr. Fell, the reason why I cannot tell'—passed into desuetude. It was implicitly recognised that it is your duty, if you express a view, to be able to 'tell' on what principles it is founded. In fact, if we concentrate our attention on the progress of French professorial criticism, we see it becoming steadily more philosophical and less empirical.

But about 1875, after the period of Taine and Renan, and, in a quite other field, after that of Gautier and Paul de Saint Victor, we find criticism in Paris rapidly tending in two important directions, becoming on the one hand more and more exact, almost scientific, on the other daringly personal and impressionist. Ferdinand Brunetière, who was a man of extraordinary force of character, gave a colour to the whole scheme of literary instruction throughout France. He resisted the idea that literature was merely an entertainment or a pastime. He asserted that it was the crown and apex of a virile education, and he declared its aim to be the maintenance and progress of morality. With Brunetière everything was a question of morals. He was a strong man, and a fighting man; he enjoyed disputation and snuffed the breath of battle.

He advanced the impersonality of literature and stamped on the pride of authors. In the year 1900, an observer glancing round professorial circles had to admit that the influence of Brunetière had become paramount. His arbitrary theory of the *évolution des genres*, founded on Herbert Spencer and Darwin, and applied to the study of literature, pervaded the schools.

But the vehement tradition of Brunetière was undermined from the first by his two greatest rivals, Anatole France and Jules Lemaître, whose character was the exact opposite of his. They were 'impressionist' critics, occupied with their own personal adventures among books, and not actively concerned with ethics. Their influence, especially that of Lemaître, since Anatole France retired from criticism before the close of the century, tempered what was rigid and insensitive in the too-vehement dogmatism of Brunetière, but they did not form a camp distinct from his. The sodality of the French Academy kept them together in a certain happy harmony, in spite of their contrast of character. Brunetière died in 1906, Lemaître in 1914; the effect of the one upon education, of the other upon social culture, had been immense, but it had not advanced since 1900. With the new century, new forces had come into prominence, and of the two most important of these we speak to-day.

It has been the fate of France to lose, within the last few months, the two most prominent critics of the period succeeding that of which we have just spoken. The death of Émile Faguet and of Remy de Gourmont marks another stage in the progress of criticism, and closes another chapter in its history. That their methods and modes of life were excessively different; that their efforts, if not hostile, were persistently opposed; that one was the most professorial of professors, the other the freest of free lances; that each, in a word, desired to be what the other was not; adds a piquancy to the task of considering them side by side. The first thing we perceive, in such a parallel, is the superficial contrast; the second is the innate similitude, so developed that these spirits in opposition are found in reality to represent, in a sort of inimical unison, the whole attitude towards literature of the generation in which they flourished. Their almost simultaneous disappearance leaves the field clear for other procedures under other guidance.

In the extremely copious published writings of these two eminent men the name of each of them will scarcely be found. They worked, in their intense and fervid spheres, out of sight of one another. But, now both are dead, it is interesting to see how close to each other they were in their essential attitude, and how typical their activity is of the period between 1895 and 1915.

If anyone should rashly engage to write the life of Émile Faguet, he would find himself limited to the task of composing what the critic himself, in speaking of Montaigne, calls 'the 'memoirs of a man who never had any occupation but 'thinking.' Through the whole of a life which approached the term of threescore years and ten, Faguet was absorbed, more perhaps than any other man of his time, in the contemplation of the printed page. He said of himself, 'I have never stopped 'reading, except to write, nor writing, except to read.' In any other country but France, this preoccupation would have led to dreariness and pedantry, if not to a permanent and sterile isolation. But in France purely literary criticism, the examination and constant re-examination of the classics of the nation, takes an honoured and a vivid place in the education of the young. The literary teaching of the schools is one of the moral and intellectual forces of the France of to-day, and Faguet, who was the very type, and almost the exaggeration, of that tendency in teaching, was preserved from pedantry by the immense sympathy which surrounded him. His capacity for comprehending books, and for making others comprehend them, found response from a grateful and thirsty multitude of students.

Émile Faguet was born, on the 17th of December 1847, at La Roche-sur-Yon, in Vendée, where his father was professor at the local lycée. M. Victor Faguet, who had received a prize for a translation of Sophocles into verse, nourished high academic ambitions for his son. From the noiseless annals of the future critic's childhood a single anecdote has been preserved, namely that, when he was a schoolboy, he solemnly promised his father that he would become a member of the French Academy. All his energy was centred towards that aim. He passed through the regular course which attends young men who study for the professoriate in France, and at last he became a professor himself at Bordeaux, and then in

Paris. But in that career, as Dr. Johnson sententiously observed, 'Unnumber'd suppliants croud Preferment's 'Gate,' and at thirty-five Émile Faguet was still quite undistinguished. He saw his juniors, and in particular Lemaître and Brunetière, speed far in front of him, but he showed neither impatience nor ill-temper. Gradually he became a writer, but it was not until 1885 that his 'Les Grands Maîtres 'du XVIe. Siècle' attracted the attention of the public. He began to be famous at the age of forty, when his 'Études 'Littéraires sur le XIXe. Siècle,' clear, well arranged, amusing and informing, proved to French readers that here was a provider of substantial literature, always intelligent, never tiresome, who was exactly to their taste. From that time forth the remaining thirty years of Faguet's life extended themselves in a ceaseless cheerful industry of lecturing, writing, and interpreting, which bore fruit in a whole library of published books, no doubt surpassing in bulk what is known as the 'output' of any other mortal man.

Though ever more concerned with ideas than with persons, Faguet did not disdain, in happy, brief, and salient lines, to sketch the authors who had written the books he analysed. Let us attempt a portrait of himself as he appeared in the later years of his life. No one ever less achieved the conventional type of academician. His person was little known in society, for he scarcely ever dined out. He had so long been a provincial professor that he never threw off a country look. In sober fact, Émile Faguet, with his brusque, stiff movements, his rough brush of a black moustache, and his conscientious walk, looked more like a non-commissioned officer in mufti than like an ornament of the Institut. He was active in the streets, stumping along with an umbrella always pressed under his arm; on his round head there posed for ever a kind of ancient billycock hat. He had a supreme disdain for dress, and for the newspapers which made jokes about his clothing. He lived in a little stuffy apartment in the Rue Monge—on the fifth storey, if I remember right. He was an old bachelor, and the visitor, cordially welcomed to his rooms, was struck by the chaos of books—chairs, tables, the floor itself being covered with volumes, drowned in printed matter. Just space enough swept out to hold the author's paper and ink was the only oasis in the desert of books. I

remember that, at the height of his fame and prosperity, there was no artificial light in his rooms. That army of his publications was marshalled by the sole aid of a couple of candles. Everything about him, but especially the frank dark eyes lifted in his ingenuous face, breathed an air of unaffected probity and simplicity, and of a kind of softly hurrying sense that life was so short, and there were so many books to read and to write, that there could be no time left for nonsense.

His image will long recur to the inner vision of his friends, as he went marching to his lecture or to his newspaper-office, nonchalant and easy, with his hands in his pockets, his elbow squeezing that enormous umbrella to his side. In the evening he would go, inelegantly dressed, in the same loosely martial way, to the theatre, for which he had an inordinate affection. He was not a 'first-nighter,' but dropped in to see a new piece whenever he wanted copy for his *feuilleton*. His lectures, it is reported, were familiar and conversational, with frequent repetition and copious quotation, the whole poured out as a man tells a story which he intimately knows, with an inexhaustible flow of thoughts and facts. Sometimes he was so vivacious as to be a little paradoxical, and led a laugh against himself. He stood before his students, formidable only in his erudition, easy of approach, austere and gay. His congested rooms in the Rue Monge were open to any young inquirer, but it was observed that Faguet never asked what the name of his visitor was, but how old he was. The younger the student, the less dogmatic was the professor, but the more familiar, abundant, sympathetic. It was noticeable in all his relations, with young and old alike, that Faguet's one aim invariably seemed to be honestly to make his interlocutor comprehend the matter in hand.

Some recollections of the outer presence of Émile Faguet should not be without value to us in fixing the character of his inner life, the spirit which pervaded his profuse and honest labour. No one in the history of literature has been more distinguished for intellectual probity ; and no one has cared less for appearances, or for the glorification of his own character and cleverness. His value as a critic consists primarily in his capacity for thoroughly understanding what each author under consideration meant by this or that expression of his art. Faguet does not allow himself to be stung into eloquence

by the touch of a master-mind, as Lemaître does, nor does he fly off from his subject on the wings of an imperative suggestion, like Anatole France, but he sticks close to the matter in hand, so close that he reaches comprehension by becoming absorbed in it. There is no writer on literature who has ever crept so completely into the skin of each old author as Faguet has done. He makes the dry bones live; he resuscitates the dead, and revives in them all that was essential in their original life, all that was really vital in them, even if it be ultimately to condemn the taste or the tendency exhibited. The first object with him is to vivify; to analyse and dissect come next.

He was open to all impressions, and he was particularly admirable in his periodical surveys of the four great centuries of French verse and prose, because of his unflagging open-mindedness. He saw the living thread of literary history, running, a pulsating stream, from Rabelais to Flaubert. He had followed it so often, up and down, this way and that, that no curve of it, no backwater was unfamiliar to him. Lassitude is as unknown to Faguet as it was to Shelley's 'Skylark.' His curiosity is always awake; no shadow of satiety ever comes near him. He was a Titan in his way, but never a 'weary Titan'; he never felt 'the orb of his 'fate,' though it embraced so much, to be 'too vast.' The more elaborate or complex an author was, the more actively and ingeniously Faguet penetrated his work, smoothing out the complexities, throwing light into every dark corner. But it is very proper to notice that even where he devotes himself with what seems the most absorbing care to the investigation of a particular mind, he is always essentially detached from it, always ready to quit the tenement of genius and adapt himself with alacrity to another, like a soldier-crab, whose tender extremity will fit itself to any shell-habitation.

In one of his criticisms of Montesquieu—and on no French classic has he been more constantly felicitous—Faguet speaks of the faculty possessed by that prince of intelligence of wandering among souls, and of studying their spiritual experience 'comme un anatomiste étudie le jeu des organes.' The author of the 'Esprit des Lois' took wide views and surveyed a vast expanse of society, but he was equally apt to map out a square inch of mossy rock at his feet. 'Il a du reste beau-

'coup écrit, *comme en marge de ses grands livres.*' These words remind us of a section of Émile Faguet's writings which is peculiarly stimulating and useful. It is illustrated to great perfection in what is perhaps the most fascinating specimen of his vast and various production, the volume called 'En lisant les Beaux Vieux Livres,' which he published so lately as 1911. This was followed by 'En lisant Corneille' in 1913 and 'En lisant Molière' in 1914. If the war had not intervened and if his own health had not failed him, it is probable that Faguet would have extended and developed this section of his work, which exhibited the ripest fruit of his subtle and vigorous criticism.

The method which he adopted in these treatises was to take a portion of a well-known book or a short poem, and read it with his imaginary audience exactly as though they, and he, had never met with it before. In 'En lisant les Beaux 'Vieux Livres' he takes a score of such passages, and analyses them without pedantry, eagerly, curiously, cordially. He explains what the author meant, shows how he has succeeded in expressing his meaning, points out the ingenuities of thought and the felicities of language, and in short exhibits the piece of hackneyed prose or verse as though it had just been discovered. The process may sound perfunctory and pedagogic, but, conducted as Faguet conducts them, these little excursions are not less delightful than original. He takes things that everybody knows—such as Montaigne on Friendship, or Bossuet on the Romans, or a couple of La Bruyère's portraits; he takes a long poem, like Alfred de Vigny's 'La Maison du 'Berger,' or a short lyric, like Victor Hugo's 'Le Semeur'; he takes the character of Sévère in 'Polyeucte' or a landscape out of the memoirs of Chateaubriand, and he illuminates these familiar things until the reader not merely sees in them what he never saw before, but has gained a method of reading by which he will in future extract infinite new pleasures from re-reading old familiar books.

In this system of analysis by conversation consists the chief originality of Faguet's criticism. The idea of it was not entirely new; so long ago as the seventeenth century Descartes said that 'la lecture est une conversation continue avec les 'plus honnêtes gens des siècles passés.' But it had not been planned on a practical basis until Faguet sketched out

these enchanting books of his, in which we seem to see him seated, smiling, at a table, the volume open before him, expounding it to an eager circle of intelligent young people. In these conversations, Faguet had not the weight of Brunetière or the sparkle of Lemaître; he was simpler than the one and soberer than the other. He achieved the dream of the teacher when he discovered how to write books which please and are useful at the same time. He avoided, by a whole continent, the vapid dreariness of the usual English manual, which looks upon the rose of Sharon and the lily of the valley as fit only to be pressed between sheets of blotting-paper in a *hortus siccus*. Faguet is always in earnest, although he sometimes indulges in immense humour and vivacity, not of the Parisian variety, but highly exhilarating. When he suddenly confesses to us that Balzac had 'the temperament of an artist 'and the soul of a commercial traveller,' or when he sums up an entirely grave summary of Pindare-Le Brun by telling us that 'c'était un homme de beaucoup d'esprit, d'un caractère 'très méprisable, et excellent ouvrier de vers,' it is no schoolmaster that speaks to pupils, but a friend who takes his intimates into his confidence.

It has been the habit to depreciate the style of Faguet, which indeed does not set out to be exquisite, and cannot compare with those of several of his great predecessors. He has been charged, in his zeal for the matter of literature, with a neglect of its form. It is true that his phrases are apt to be curt; he gives little attention to the conduct of a sentence, further than to define in it his precise intention. But his criticism has a great purity of design, which is in itself an element of style. It sets forth to accomplish a certain purpose and it carries out this aim with the utmost economy of means. No writer less than Faguet, to use a vulgar expression, 'slops 'about all over the shop.' He has at least this negative beauty of writing, and he adds to it another, the gift of discussing great authors in a tone that is in sympathy with their peculiarities. An instance of this, among a hundred, may be cited from his 'Dix-huitième Siècle'; summing up what he has to impress upon us about Marivaux, he defines that author in these terms: 'c'est un précieux qui est assez rare 'et qu'on s'interdit de condamner au moment même qu'on le

' désapprouve, parce qu'on n'est pas sans en jouir dans le moment ' même qu'on en souffre.' It would hardly be possible to put more of critical value into so few words, but moreover it is said as Marivaux himself might say it.

Faguet had his prejudices, as every honest man may have. He adored the seventeenth and he loved the nineteenth centuries, but he had almost an aversion from the eighteenth. He put Buffon first among the writers of that age, and Montesquieu next ; so loyal a spirit as Faguet's could not but be cordially attracted by Vauvenargues. But the lack of poetry, and, as he asserted, the lack of philosophy of the Encyclopædists annoyed him, and for their greatest name, for Voltaire, he had a positive hatred. Faguet found it difficult to be just to Diderot, and difficult to tolerate Rousseau, but to love Voltaire he made no effort whatever ; he acknowledged that feat to be impossible. He did not fear to contradict himself, and about Rousseau his opinion grew steadily more favourable, until, in 1913, he positively published five independent volumes on this one writer alone. But Faguet could never persuade himself to approach Voltaire with any face but a wry one. Yet, even here, his antipathy is scarcely to be perceived on the surface. Faguet always leaves the judgment of his reader independent. He puts the facts before him ; his own irony marks the line of thought which he suggests ; but he is careful never to attempt to bully the reader into acceptance. Brunetière is apt to be vociferous in persuasion ; Faguet never raises his voice.

In 1899, being called upon to sum up the qualities of the leading French critics from 1850 onwards, Faguet found himself confronted with his own name and work. It was characteristic of his candour and simplicity that he did not shrink from the task of describing himself, and that he undertook it without false modesty or affectation. When he comes to describe Émile Faguet he is as detached, as calmly analytic, as he is when he speaks of Théophile Gautier or M. René Doumic. He defines the qualities, acknowledges the limitations, and hints at the faults of his subject. I do not know a case in all literary history where a writer has spoken of himself in terms more severely judicial. He closes this remarkable little study with words which we may quote here

for their curious personal interest no less than as an example of Faguet's style :

'Laborieux, du reste, assez méthodique, consciencieux, en poussant la conscience jusqu'à être peu bienveillant, ou en ne sachant pas pousser le scrupule consciencieux jusqu'à la bienveillance, il a pu rendre et il a rendu des services appréciables aux étudiants en littérature, qui étaient le public qu'il a toujours visé. Sans abandonner la critique, qu'il est à croire qu'il aimera toujours, il s'est un peu tourné depuis quelques années du côté des études sociologiques, où c'est à d'autres qu'à nous qu'il appartient d'apprécier ses efforts.'

In this connexion a phrase of the great critic may be recalled. When the war broke out in 1914, someone who knew Faguet's absorbing love of books sympathised with him on the blow to literature. He responded, in a tone of reproof, 'L'avenir national est une chose autrement importante que 'l'avenir littéraire.'

Those sociological interests were steadily emphasised. Faguet became, not less in love with great books, but more inclined to turn from their technical to their ethical value. He became himself a moralist, after having in so many eloquent volumes analysed the works and the characters of the politicians and teachers of the nineteenth century. He possessed a finished faculty for amusing and pleasing while he instructed, and it was remarkable that in these treatises of his late middle life he addressed a much wider public than he had ever reached before. His 'Commentaire du Discours sur les Passions' was a link between the earlier purely literary treatises and the later analyses of psychological phenomena, but it was highly successful. Even more universally popular were the little books on 'Friendship' and 'Old Age,' which enjoyed a larger circulation than any other contemporary works of their class. Faguet was pleased at his popularity, and felt that he was recognised as belonging to that 'vieille race de moralistes 'exacts et fins' of whom La Rochefoucauld had been the precursor. Of these moral studies, the most abundantly discussed was that which dealt with 'Le Culte de l'Incompétence' (1910), a book which bears a very remarkable relation to the state of France when war broke out.

Towards the end of his life, Faguet became a great power in France. He exercised, from that book-bewildered room

in the Rue Monge, a patriotic, amiable, fraternal influence which permeated every corner of the French-speaking world. But his health, which had long been failing, gave way under the strain of the war. He had never given himself any rest from perpetual literary labour, and he had always said that he knew that before he was seventy years of age he should be 'buried and forgotten.' A third stroke of paralysis carried away the greatest living friend of literature in France on the 7th of June 1916, in his sixty-ninth year. Buried he is at last, to their sorrow, but his compatriots will not readily forget him.

It is not easy to find common terms in which to describe Faguet and his remarkable contemporary, Remy de Gourmont. Their two circles of influence were far-reaching, but did not touch. In the very extensive literature of each the other is perhaps never mentioned. We may suppose that it would be almost impossible for a French observer to review them together without allowing the scale to descend in favour of this name or of that. But here may come in the use of foreign criticism, which regards the whole field from a great distance, and without passion. The contrast between these two writers, both honest, laborious, and fruitful, both absorbed in and submerged by literature, both eager to discover truth in all directions, was yet greater than their similarity. We have briefly observed in Faguet the university professor, the great public interpreter of masterpieces. In Remy de Gourmont, on the other hand, we meet the man who, scornful of mediocrity and tolerant of nothing but what is exquisite, stands apart from the crowd, and will scarcely share his dream with a disciple. Faguet, like a Lord Chancellor of Letters, is versed in all the legislation of the mind, and lives in a perpetual elucidation of it. Gourmont, standing in the outer court, attracts the young and the audacious around him by protesting that no laws exist save those which are founded on an artist's own eclecticism. Together, or rather side by side, they addressed almost everyone who was intelligent in France between 1895 and 1914.

We have seen in Émile Faguet a typical member of the middle class. Remy de Gourmont was an aristocrat both by descent and by temperament. He was born on the 4th of April, 1858, in the château of La Motte, near Bazoches-

en-Houlme, in the Orne; during his childhood his parents moved to a still more romantic little manor-house at Mesnil-Villement. These Norman landscapes are constantly introduced into Gourmont's stories. His race was of considerable antiquity and distinction; his mother traced her descent from the great poet, Malherbe; a paternal ancestor was that Gilles de Gourmont who printed in France the earliest books in Greek and in Hebrew character. A passion for the Muses, like a fragrant atmosphere, surrounded the boy from his cradle. He arrived in Paris at the age of twenty-five, provincially instructed, but already of a marvellous erudition. He was appointed assistant librarian at the Bibliothèque Nationale, where for eight years he browsed at will on all the secret and forgotten wonders of the past, indulging to the full an insatiable literary curiosity. In 1890 he published a novel, 'Sixtine,' a sort of diary of a very complicated mind which believes itself to be in love, but cannot be quite sure. It was 'cerebral,' without action of any kind, an absurd book, but ingeniously—too ingeniously—written. The historic interest of 'Sixtine' rests in the fact that it led the reaction against the naturalism of Zola and the pyschology of M. Paul Bourget. Gourmont now achieved a single English reader, for 'Sixtine' was read by Henry James, but with more curiosity than approval.

Although hardly a book of permanent value, 'Sixtine' had a lasting effect on the career of its author. It expressed with remarkable exactitude the sentiments of the group of young men who were now coming to the front in France. Gourmont became the champion of the 'vaporeux, nuancé et 'sublimisé' literature which started about 1890. He accepted 'symbolism,' and he became the leader of the symbolist movement, of which his stern mental training and curious erudition permitted him to be the brain. He was the prophet of Mallarmé, of Verlaine, of Maeterlinck, of Huysmans, and at the same time he welcomed each younger revolutionary. All this, of course, was not done in a day, but reconciliation with the intellectual conventions was made impossible by a fact which must not be ignored in any sketch of Remy de Gourmont, and indeed ought to be faced with resolution. In 1891 he was dismissed from the public service and from the Library, for an article which he published entitled 'Le Joujou

'Patriotisme,' in which he poured contempt upon the Army, and openly advocated the abandonment of any idea of the 'Re-'vanche.' The chastisement was a severe one, and had an effect on the whole remainder of Gourmont's life. About the same time his health gave way, and excluded him from all society. His hermitage was high up in an old house in the Rue des Saints Pères, near the quay, and there he sat, day in, day out, surrounded by his books, in solitude, a monk of literature.

For the next eight or nine years, Gourmont, abandoning politics, in which he had made so luckless an adventure, devoted himself exclusively to art and letters. He joined the staff of the 'Mercure de France'; and under its director, and his life-long friend, M. Vallette, he took part in all the symbolist polemics of the hour. He defended each new man of merit with his active partisanship; he wrote ceaselessly; verse, art criticism, humanism, novels, every species of fantastic and esoteric literature flowed from his abundant pen. These books, many of them preposterous in their shape, 'limited editions' produced in conditions of archiepiscopal splendour of binding and type, possess, it must be admitted, little permanent value. They are blossoms in the flower-garden of that heyday of sensuous 'symbolism,' of which we had a pale reflection in our London 'Yellow 'Books' and 'Savoy Reviews.' The most interesting of the publications of Remy de Gourmont during these feverish years is the little volume called 'L'Idéalisme' (1893), in which he sought to restore to the word 'idéal' what he called its 'aristocratic value.' A passage may be quoted from an essay in this elegant and ridiculous treatise, on the beauty of words, irrespective of their meaning:

'Quelles réalités me donneront les saveurs que je rève à ce fruit de l'Inde et des songes, le myrobolan,—ou les couleurs royales dont je pare l'omphax, ou ses lointaines gloires?

'Quelle musique est comparable à la sonorité pure des mots obscurs, ô cyclamor? Et quelle odeur à tes émanations vierges, ô sanguisorbe?'

Stevenson—the R.L.S. of 'Penny plain and Twopence 'coloured'—would have delighted in this.

Gourmont became tired of symbolism rather suddenly, and he buried it in two volumes which were the best he had yet

published : the ' Livres des Masques ' of 1896 and 1898. These have a lasting value as documents, and they mark the beginning of the author's work as a critic of letters. In them he insisted on the warning not to let new genius pass ungreeted because it was eccentrically draped or unfamiliarly featured. These two volumes are a precious indication of what French independent literature was at the very close of the nineteenth century, and it is interesting after twenty years of development and change to note how few mistakes Remy de Gourmont made in his characterisation of types. He took a central place among these symbolists, grouping around him the men of genuine talent, repulsing pretenders who were charlatans and discouraging mere imitators ; marshalling, in short, a ferocious little army of genius in its attack upon the conventions and the traditions of the age. Time rolls its wheel, and it is amusing to notice that several of these fierce young revolutionaries are now members of the French Academy.

At the close of the century Remy de Gourmont abandoned symbolism, and the world of ideas took possession of him. He plunged deeper into the study of philosophy, grammar, and history, and he explored new provinces of knowledge, particularly in the direction of ethnography and biology. In the midst of this acquisitive labour he was stirred to the composition of one remarkable work after another, and to this period belong the four successive publications, which, in the whole of Gourmont's vast production, stand out as the most interesting and important which he has written. His reputation stands four-square on ' L'Esthétique de la Langue ' Française ' (1899), ' La Culture des Idées ' (1900), ' Le Chemin ' de Velours ' (1902), and ' Le Problème du Style ' (1902). During the thirteen years which followed he wrote incessantly, and the widening circle of his admirers always found much to praise in what he produced. But now that we see his life-work as a whole it seems more and more plain that he revealed his genius freshly and fully in these four books of his prime, and in a world so crowded as ours the reader who has much to attract him may be recommended to these as broad and perhaps sufficient exponents of the character of Gourmont's teaching.

It has been said by one of his earliest associates, M. Louis Dumur, that Gourmont was always ' le bon chasseur du

'mensonge humain.' This is a friendly way of describing his intellectual dogmatism and his restless habit of analysis. He took nothing for granted, and, whether he desired to be so or not, he was a destructive force. He describes himself, in one of his rather rare paragraphs of self-portraiture, as 'un esprit 'désintéressé de tout, et intéressé à tout,' and this very accurately defines his attitude. He strikes us as ceaselessly hovering over hitherto uncontested facts in the passionate desire of proving them to be fallacies. The epithet 'para-'doxical,' which is often misapplied, appears to be exactly appropriate to the method of Remy de Gourmont, which starts by denying the truth of something which everybody has taken for granted, and then supporting the reversed position by rapid and ingenious argument. He is unable to accept any convention until he has resolutely turned it inside out, examined it in every hostile light, and so dusted and furbished it that it has ceased to be conventional. He was indefatigable in these researches, and so ingenious as to be often bewildering and occasionally tiresome.

He has left no book more characteristic than 'Le Chemin 'de Velours,' which he called a study in the dissociation of ideas. He chose a very illuminating tag from Pascal as his motto: 'ni la contradiction n'est marque de fausseté, ni 'l'incontradiction n'est marque de vérité.' The whole treatise is a comparison between the Jansenist and the Jesuit system of morals, as revealed in the 'Provincial Letters.' Like many Frenchmen of recent years, Remy de Gourmont liked religion to be championed, but never by a believer. Neither Port Royal nor the Society of Jesus would thank him for his disinterested support, but he defends them, alternately and destructively, with an immense fund of vivacity. No one has defined more luminously the evangelical doctrine of Jansenius, Bishop of Ypres, and for a while the reader thinks that the balance will descend on the Jansenist side. But Gourmont is scandalised to see Calvinism banging the door of salvation in people's faces, while he applauds the humanity of the Jesuits in holding it wide open, and in spreading between birth and death a velvet carpet for delicate souls. He analyses the works of Sarrasa, a Flemish Jesuit, who in 1618 produced an *Ars semper gaudendi* which was, according to Gourmont, neither more nor less than a treatise on the way to make the

best of both worlds. Gourmont was endlessly amused by the indiscreet admissions of Father Sarrasa.

Nevertheless, the Jesuit type shocked him more than the Jansenist. He admired the logical penetration of Pascal, his rigidity of thought, his unalterable ideal of duty, more than the easy-going casuistry of his opponents. He thought that Protestantism, which rests on abstraction, was a purer type of religion than the mitigated and humanised Christianity of Catholicism. But he was irritated by the way in which Port Royal pushed their spiritual logic to extremes, and he dared to suggest that Pascal would have been a better and a more useful man if he had consented to be less holy. Gourmont speculated ingeniously what would have been the future of philosophical literature if Pascal, instead of retiring to Port Royal, had joined Descartes in Holland. On the whole he decides against the Jansenists, because although he sees that they were noble he suspects them of being inhuman, and of laying intolerable and needless burdens upon the spirit of man. Remy de Gourmont considered evangelical Christianity an Oriental religion, not well fitted for Latin Europe. In all the schisms and heresies of the churches he thought he saw the Western mind revolting against a dogmatism which came from Jerusalem. The Jansenist is a pessimist ; the Jesuit, on the other hand, cultivates optimism ; he pretends, at all events, that the soul should be free and joyous, to which end he rolls out his velvet road towards salvation. Remy de Gourmont concludes that the final effect of ' Les Provinciales ' is to make the reader love the Jesuits, and when he comes to sum up the matter he is on the side of the Society, because nothing wounds a civilised man so deeply as the negation of his free will. It will be seen that neither party gains much from his sardonic and fugitive approbation.

After 1902 a further transformation began to be visible in the genius of Remy de Gourmont. An improvement in his health permitted him to mingle a little with other human beings, and to become less exclusively an anchorite of the intellect. Having pushed his individualist theories to their extreme, he withdrew from his violent expression of them, and he took a new and pleasing interest in public life. He continued to seek consolation for the disappointments of art in philosophy and science, and he developed a positive passion

for ideas. He founded the 'Revue des Idées,' which had a considerable vogue in the intellectual world. But his chief activity henceforward was as a publicist. His incessant short essays, mainly published in the 'Mercure de France,' became an element in the life of thousands of cultivated readers. They dealt briefly with questions of the day, concerning all that can arrest the attention of an educated man or woman. The author collected them in volumes which present the quintessence of his later manner, four of 'Épilogues,' three of 'Promenades Littéraires,' three of 'Promenades Philosophiques,' and so forth. These dogmatic expressions of his conception of life were written in a style more fluid, more buoyant, and less obscure than he had previously used, and they achieved a great popularity, especially among women. Meantime, as a critic, he showed less and less interest in the exceptional and the unwholesome, of which he had been the fantastic defender, and more in the great standard authors of France. In 1905 he opened with an anthology from Gérard de Nerval a series of 'Les Plus Belles Pages,' which he continued until the war with admirable judgment.

The war found Remy de Gourmont not totally unprepared. He had always unflinchingly avowed himself an aristocrat and an anarchist; it was his way of expressing his horror at vulgarity and tyranny. He had chosen to be disconcerting in his vindictive pursuit of sentimentality and folly. He had thought it fitting to be a determined enemy to militarism. It was difficult for a critic with so fine an ear as his to tolerate patriotic verses which did not scan. But the ripening years had sobered him, and he made after 1911 a much more careful examination of the destiny of his country. He saw that with all his scepticism he had been the dupe of Teutonic culture, and he repudiated the Nietzsche whom he had done so much to introduce to Parisian readers. From August 1914 Remy de Gourmont put aside all his literary and scientific work, and devoted himself wholly to a patriotic comment on the war. His short articles in 'La France' form an admirable volume, 'Pendant l'Orage,' by which all his petulance in times of peace is more than redeemed. The anguish of the struggle killed him, as it had killed so many others. Remy de Gourmont was seated at his writing-table, with a protest against the outrage upon Reims half-completed before him, when a

stroke of apoplexy put an instant period to his life. This was on the 29th of September, 1915.

In one of his best books, 'Le Problème du Style' (1902), Remy de Gourmont remarks in his aphoristic way, 'Il y a 'une forme générale de la sensibilité qui s'impose à tous les 'hommes d'une même période.' This is excessive in its application, but it is sufficiently true to be a useful guide to the historian. Between 1890 and 1905 there was exhibited, not merely in France and England, but all over Europe, a 'general form 'of sensibility' of which Gourmont was the ablest, the most vociferous, and the most ingenious representative. It is important to try to analyse this condition or fashion of taste, since, although it has already passed into the region of things gone by and of 'les neiges d'antan,' it has not ceased to be memorable. Our comprehension of it is not helped by ticketing it 'decadent' or 'unhealthy,' for those are empty adjectives of prejudice. What was really involved in it was a revolt against sentimentality and against the tendency to repeat with complacency the outworn traditions of art. This was its negative side, worthy of all encouragement. What was not quite so certainly meritorious was its positive action. It was a demand for an exclusively personal æsthetic, for an art severely divorced from all emotions except the purely intellectual ones, the sensuousness of this school of writers being essentially cerebral. It descended in England from Walter Pater, in France from Baudelaire, and it aimed at a supreme delicacy of execution, an exquisite avoidance of everything vulgar and second-hand. The young men who fought for it considered that the only thing essential was to achieve what they called a 'personal vision' of life. In the pursuit of it they were willing to be candid at the risk of perversity, while they obstinately denied that there should be any relation between art and morals. But Remy de Gourmont, who had been their leader in aiming at an impossible perfection, lived long enough to see the whole intellect and conscience of France pressing along a path to greatness which he and his disciples had never perceived in all the excursions of their imagination.

EDMUND GOSSE.

A BELGIAN IDEALIST

1. **Les Flaireurs. Petit drame en trois actes, en prose, pour le théâtre des fantoches.** By CHARLES VAN LERBERGHE. Bruxelles: Lacomblez. 1891.

2. **Entrevisions.** By CHARLES VAN LERBERGHE. Bruxelles: Lacomblez. 1898.

3. **La Chanson d'Ève.** By CHARLES VAN LERBERGHE. Paris: Mercure de France. 1904.

4. **Pan. Comédie Satirique en trois actes, en prose.** By CHARLES VAN LERBERGHE. Paris: Mercure de France. 1906.

5. **Le Parnasse de la Jeune Belgique.** Paris: Vannier. 1887.

6. **Charles van Lerberghe.** By ALBERT MOCKEL. Paris: Mercure de France. 1904.

7. **Le Mouvement Littéraire Belge d'expression française depuis 1880.** By ALBERT HEUMANN. Paris: Mercure de France. 1913.

8. **Contemporary Belgian Literature.** By JETHRO BITHELL. T. Fisher Unwin. 1915.

FOR many years we have accepted M. Maeterlinck, and we have recently come to a slower recognition of M. Verhaeren as among the more prominent figures of modern literature; and yet—'Ask a Belgian writer who is the greatest 'poet of his nation, and the answer is pretty sure to be, 'Charles van Lerberghe.' Mr. Jethro Bithell, whose acquaintance with Belgian literature and men of letters is amply shown in his recent book on the subject, could easily have brought documentary evidence to the support of this statement; for it would be possible to cull a goodly garland of praise of the author of 'La Chanson d'Ève' from the writings of his compatriots and contemporaries, Verhaeren and Maeterlinck themselves, Jean Dominique, Albert Mockel and Fernand Séverin, all of them well-known and admirable poets. The studies by the last two are particularly valuable. That by M. Mockel, which appeared in the 'Mercure de

'France' in April 1904 and was reprinted in book form, contains some interesting details of the poet's life and perhaps the best criticism of his work as a whole which has so far been written. That by M. Séverin, published in the 'Mercure' of 1st August, 1908, after Van Lerberghe's death, is a more intimate character study, and includes several extracts from letters which make one hope that an edition of the poet's correspondence will some day be forthcoming. The present account of one whom M. Mockel has called 'presque un poète 'anglais' owes much, both of fact and of suggestion, to these two papers.*

Van Lerberghe was born at Ghent in 1861. His father was a Fleming—*un Flamand de vieille roche*; his mother came of a Walloon stock; and it may be because of this mixed origin that he does not display very markedly those characteristics of race to which critics of Belgian literature are prone to pay a perhaps exaggerated attention. His method is certainly the very antithesis of the brutal realism which is a characteristic, and sometimes a disfiguring one, of Belgian poetry; nor is his mysticism the Christian mysticism of Ruysbroek. But in one respect, as he himself said, he was a true Fleming. He had that love of visible beauty which belongs to a race of great painters; inheriting it, indeed, directly from his father, who was a well-known connoisseur and collector of prints; and doubtless fortified in it by the surroundings in which he lived during some of the most impressionable years of boyhood in his spacious and quiet home in Ghent, among the apple trees, by the slow waters of the Escaut.

For his education, Van Lerberghe was sent first to a school at Melle and then to the Jesuit College of Sainte Barbe in Ghent, where Verhaeren and Georges Rodenbach had been a little while before him. Maeterlinck (whose uncle was Van Lerberghe's guardian) was his contemporary. In spite, therefore, of the *sévères prudences* which marked the educational methods of the fathers, he found himself in a congenial atmosphere; his natural predilection

* In the 'Nineteenth Century and After' for March 1908 there is an article on Van Lerberghe, entitled 'A Belgian Poet of Yesterday,' by Mr. Edward Sullivan, who confines his attention almost exclusively to 'La Chanson d'Ève'; his verse renderings wherefrom are a praiseworthy attempt to achieve the impossible.

showed itself, and, while still at Sainte Barbe's, he won a prize, in competition with all Belgium, for a poem on the Immaculate Conception. M. Mockel, who insists on the poet's timidity, surmises that without this early success he would never have found the courage to seek a publisher for his maturer writings.

Be that as it may, Van Lerberghe's life was devoted to his art with extraordinary exclusiveness. It is true that he produced little. Two plays, two volumes of poetry, and a few stories and articles and poems as yet uncollected make a short bibliography even for a writer who died at the age of forty-six. But it was his fastidiousness, his unwillingness to publish anything which did not satisfy an all but unattainable ideal, that limited his production, and not any material obstacle. For he had no profession besides literature. The death of his parents during his boyhood had left him with an income which, though small, was sufficient for his simple tastes; and he valued freedom, the freedom to write and to dream, above all things. Once indeed, being in low water, he accepted a berth in a museum in Brussels. But after two months, to the scandal of his friends, he resigned it. He had found that he could not serve two masters and do his duty conscientiously towards both of them; and he had no doubts as to which had the prior claim on him. Because his poetry was so hard to write, it demanded all his attention.

His earliest poems, apart from unpublished school efforts, appeared in 'La Pléïade' in 1886; and in the following year he contributed to 'Le Parnasse de la Jeune Belgique' the anthology in which Belgium proclaimed to the world its national literary existence. Van Lerberghe's are among the most admirable poems in a very interesting volume; and though his own final judgment may be gathered from the fact that only one of them reappears in 'Entrevisions,' and though indeed they are far surpassed in that volume, yet they already display much characteristic beauty.

Between the publication of the 'Parnasse' and that of Van Lerberghe's first book of verse more than ten years passed. In the interval, however, appeared the play which, as M. Mockel complains, gained, largely from accidental circumstances, a celebrity detrimental to its author's far more valuable poetry. 'Les Flaireurs,' a very short three-act play in

prose, was printed in 'La Wallonie,' of which M. Mockel was editor, in January 1889. It deals symbolically with the approach of Death, or rather of his emissaries, the Man with the Water, the Man with the Shroud, and the Man with the Coffin, who come knocking in turn at the door of the room where the old woman for whom they have been sent lies in bed with her grand-daughter. The dialogue goes backward and forward through the closed door, the strangers demanding admittance, the terrified child refusing it, and the dying woman, gradually growing fey, beseeching her to open. The play ends, on the stroke of midnight, with the breaking of the door and the monstrous uproar of the entry of Death's messengers.

'Les Flaireurs' was produced by M. Paul Fort at the Théâtre d'Art in Paris in 1892 and its author was promptly accused of having imitated Maeterlinck, who had lately sprung into fame with his first play, 'La Princesse Maleine,' and whose second play, 'L'Intruse,' was similar in theme to Van Lerberghe's. M. Maeterlinck at once wrote a letter in his friend's defence, and had it inserted in the programme of the performance. He pointed out that 'Les Flaireurs' had actually been published before either of his own plays, and, in his generous enthusiasm, took the charge of plagiarism on to his own shoulders. There were those who were only too pleased to make the most of the confession, and it has even been asserted that but for Van Lerberghe we should have had no Maeterlinck. That, of course, is absurd. No doubt the two friends had often discussed the possibilities of symbolistic drama and such questions as that of the treatment of death on the stage, and we must accept M. Maeterlinck's statement that the idea of 'L'Intruse' was suggested to him by 'Les Flaireurs.' But there is really very little resemblance between the two pieces, and in spite of M. Maeterlinck's eloquent praise of Van Lerberghe's work and depreciation of his own, there can be no question as to which is the finer. 'L'Intruse' is a masterpiece in which an artist found himself. 'Les Flaireurs' was rather a crude experiment in a form of art in no way suited to its author's genius. One has only to compare the mechanical violence of its ending with the pregnant silence of the last moment of 'L'Intruse' to see that this is not a false antithesis. Van Lerberghe's art, indeed, for all its ethereal quality, is not so much

an art of suggestion as of infinitely delicate presentation; or perhaps it were more accurate to say that he suggests by *nuance*, whereas M. Maeterlinck suggests by hiatus. Though he demonstrably did not lack dramatic talent, it was a talent suited to the drama of terror neither in its Maeterlinckian nor its more outspoken form; and when, a good many years later, he wrote again for the theatre, he produced a satirical comedy which is as delightful for its frank humour as for its bright poetic beauty. It is true that 'Pan' has a symbolic significance; but that significance is only the shadow of the play, while with Maeterlinck the play is the flickering shadow of that which it symbolises.

Van Lerberghe, whose taste was faultless, obviously perceived that he had been on the wrong tack in 'Les Flaireurs,' for he published nothing else, whether in dramatic or any other form, of the same temper. At the time of writing the play, however, he had been passing through a phase not uncommon with young poets. He was haunted by the idea of death, by churchyard fancies. He wrote, according to M. Mockel, some *macabre* poems, which have never been printed. Then the mood passed. The thought of death evidently held no horror for him when he could write of it:

> 'Lentement, sans bruit, sans secousse,
> La porte s'ouvre sur la nuit douce.'

Having once defined his ideal, Van Lerberghe followed it with a devotion recalling that of Flaubert or Heredia, or that of Stéphane Mallarmé, who, as Mr. Arthur Symons says, 'was 'always divided between an absolute aim at the absolute—that 'is, the unattainable—and a too logical disdain for the com-'promise by which, after all, literature is literature.' This compromise, however, 'the great compromise,' as the same critic elsewhere calls it, 'the compromise between the mind's 'outline and the outline of visible things,' Van Lerberghe had less need to make than many others have had; for he was so much more susceptible to the beauty which comes through the eye than to that which touches the other senses, that his ideal conformed very nearly to 'the outline of visible things.' 'I see things better,' he said; 'Mockel hears them better,' 'Une âme d'ange ne me ferait pas détourner la tête,' he wrote, 'si elle n'était pas enveloppée de beauté. Un ange, pour moi,

'ce n'est qu'une pure forme, *une jolie fille dont je revêts mes 'pensées.* Je suis très flamand sous ce rapport.' His poetry has always form and colour ; it is never merely music. He has been compared with Botticelli and Rossetti, both of whom he is said to have admired ; and M. Mockel has seen pencil drawings of his which were strikingly reminiscent of the Pre-Raphaelites. But his poems, as they present themselves to the mind's eye, have none of the particular emphasis, the merely personal valuation of form, of those painters, but rather the idealised naturalism of Tintoretto or Mr. Charles Shannon. His dream, indeed, was so like reality that he not infrequently believed himself to have found its embodiment.

A letter which he wrote from Munich to M. Séverin describes one such occasion, and his manner—amusing, touching, very characteristic and significant—of dealing with it :

'Sachez que j'ai découvert ici le plus beau *Backfisch* que j'aie vu en Allemagne ; cela a dix-sept ans et est très mince, très blond et très rose. Gretchen en personne. Elle a des yeux d'un bleu profond, que je ne puis regarder *sans en avoir le vertige.* La bouche, le sourire, la voix, *tout en cet être merveilleux est un enchantement.* Je n'ai jamais vu une plus vivante incarnation de la petite fille demi-ange et demi-femme qui se promène dans les jardins de mon rêve. Je me suis souvenu de tous les vers où *je l'ai chantée sans la connaître.* . . . J'ai eu l'occasion de lui parler, quoiqu'elle ne soit jamais seule. Ce que je lui ai dit en mon étrange langage ne pouvait être que fou, *puisque je croyais vraiment parler à une de mes "entre-"visions."* C'est même la première fois que cela m'arrive. Je lui ai donc dit, en poète : *"Il me semble que je vous ai déjà vue* . . . vous êtes si merveilleusement belle ! *Vous êtes un ange,* le *premier que j'aie rencontré,* etc." Elle a écouté ces beaux propos les yeux baissés mais sans rougir. . . . Une autre fois elle m'a dit une parole terrible qui m'a affolé tout ce jour-là : "Vous allez d'ici en Italie ? Comme je voudrais aussi voir le monde, aller loin d'ici ! Que vous êtes heureux !" Et elle a mis doucement, en disant cela, sa main sur mon épaule, *comme ne le font généralement que mes fées et mes anges.* Je me suis demandé si, à ce signe fatidique, je ne devais pas brusquement l'enlever et m'enfuir avec elle par delà la frontière ! Heureusement que me voilà devenu bien vieux pour de pareilles aventures, et bien sage. Tout cela n'aura été qu'une *"entrevision"* de plus. *Le bonheur, la beauté, l'amour, tout le ciel entrevu un instant, puis à jamais refermé* ; car ne croyez que cette aventure puisse avoir des suites, les rêves ne se réalisent pas, du moins les rêves des poètes. . . .'

One wonders how much of the charm that the poet found in his pretty German was her own, and how much he himself

gave her. It would be quite enough that, like the women of his vision, she was '*rose, bleue et blonde*': his imagination would supply the rest. For if his dream was originally based on the real form of things, he had come by the time of the Munich adventure to see reality only in terms of his dream.

His whole life was the pursuit of his ideal, and, as he saw that more clearly, he grew less and less concerned with externalities, withdrew more and more into himself. He had what he wanted permanently on his retina, as it were, and did not need to look for fresh impressions. He became a recluse, a misanthrope, and before his sudden death in 1907 he seemed to be growing estranged even from his closest friends. His story, 'Les Aventures merveilleuses du Prince de 'Cynthie et de son serviteur Saturne,' in which the prince and his servant, disgusted with the commonness of the world, eat of a certain enchanted mushroom which puts them to sleep until mankind has long become extinct, and the earth is peopled only with ideas and fables and poets' dreams, shows how he had come to despise the world as it is; if indeed, as M. Séverin, who knew him so well, believes, the story is an allegory of the writer's own spiritual life. He always lived alone, in a simplicity which was a matter as much of choice as of necessity. From earliest manhood he had no fixed home, but moved from one place to another—living in turn in Brussels, London and Berlin, Munich, Rome, Florence and Paris. He often returned to the little town of Bouillon in the Ardennes. Much of his chief work, 'La Chanson d'Ève,' was written there, while other parts were composed, in a garden of roses and oleanders which overlooked Florence and the Arno, after mornings spent among the museums and churches of the city. No doubt these beautiful surroundings had an effect on his work, but only because they corresponded in some measure with something already in his mind.

'Paysages et œuvres d'art' (writes M. Séverin) 'l'aidaient à préciser un certain rêve qu'il portait en lui, supérieur à la nature et à l'art, mais peut-être formé d'éléments que la nature et l'art lui fournissaient, rêve merveilleux où d'idéales figures d'enfants, de sirènes ou d'anges, peuplaient un jardin édénique.'

Aspects of art and nature which did not accord with his dream had no appeal for him.

Van Lerberghe was not one of the learned poets, and as he

withdrew from the company of men he also, in a large measure, abandoned books. All his life he was devoted to philosophy, in which he had taken a degree, and latterly he read much science. He loved the great works in which life is treated fantastically or allegorically—Grimm and the 'Arabian 'Nights,' Rabelais and Cervantes. He delighted in the early romances of Mr. H. G. Wells, of whose 'Sea Lady' he wrote, 'J'ai adoré cette sirène-là comme je n'adorerai jamais rien 'd'humain.' But with the realistic novel he would have nothing to do.

His taste in poetry was eclectic. Possibly no poem had so much influence on him as the 'Song of Songs,' suggestions of which (its barbaric beauty tempered to the modern poet's more exquisite uses) are to be found throughout his work as well as in the short cycle directly based on it. M. Séverin finds his truest affinity amongst the English, and M. Mockel insists on his '*charme un peu anglais*.' But whom of our poets he had read one cannot guess from his own poetry. His kinship with Rossetti has been perhaps unduly emphasised: it would be just as easy to establish comparisons between him and the earlier romantics. His affinity to Keats is manifest; and the great poems of Coleridge, if he knew them, he must certainly have loved. Of Shakespeare, in the end at any rate, he cared only for 'The Tempest' and 'A Midsummer Night's Dream.'

Except for the work of some of his contemporaries, he took little pleasure in French poetry. But he cannot have been utterly immune to all those influences which were so pervasive when he began to write. It seems extremely probable that the unpublished *macabre* poems of which M. Mockel speaks owed something to Baudelaire, whose hand was heavy on more than one contributor to the 'Parnasse de la Jeune Belgique'; and there is perhaps a reminiscence of Verlaine in such early lines as

> 'O mon âme, jardin morose
> Où pleurent d'éternels soucis—'

though it is true that the youth of the poet is sufficient to account for their melancholy. From Mallarmé, the most persuasive of all, M. Mockel believes that he got very little, and only what was good—'la pureté musicale d'un vers aux 'transparences de cristal, mystérieux pourtant, et l'ineffable

'légèreté qui fait de la parole une aile, suspendue dans la clarté.' And even this debit account may be unduly heavy; for its radiant impalpability is surely too essential and native a quality of Van Lerberghe's poetry to be the result of an historical accident. Indeed, whatever nourishment he received from the art of others, that which he produced was entirely his own. Take, for instance, the beautiful 'Barque d'Or,' a poem which no writer on Van Lerberghe, nor any anthologist within whose scope it falls, has been able to refrain from quoting:

'Dans une barque d'Orient
S'en revenaient trois jeunes filles;
Trois jeunes filles d'Orient
S'en revenaient en barque d'or.

Une qui était noire,
Et qui tenait le gouvernail,
Sur ses lèvres, aux roses essences,
Nous rapportait d'étranges histoires,
Dans le silence.

Une qui était brune,
Et qui tenait la voile en main,
Et dont les pieds étaient ailés,
Nous rapportait des gestes d'ange,
En son immobilité.

Mais une qui était blonde,
Qui dormait à l'avant,
Dont les cheveux tombaient dans l'onde,
Comme du soleil levant,
Nous rapportait, sous ses paupières,
La lumière.'

It is quite obvious that the writer of those lines knew the delightful anonymous poetry of old France. Yet they are absolutely authentic; the archaic has been perfectly assimilated.

If the authenticity of Van Lerberghe's poetry makes comparison fruitless, its purity and its perfection within its own limits make analytical criticism practically impossible. For such criticism can but remove the wrappings, carefully naming them the while, from the heart of the matter. It may not touch that heart—only indicate it reverently. And round the heart of this poetry there are so few wrappings.

It shines almost naked through the thinnest material covering. 'Ineffable,' M. Mockel has called it. 'Ils sont faits de 'lumière frêle et d'ombre ténue,' writes M. Verhaeren of 'Entrevisions.' 'Ils tremblent devant l'esprit comme un 'printemps qui naît et que les brises accueillent. Tout y semble 'clair et translucide. Des formes passent, ou plutôt s'entre-'voient ; elles flottent aux confins de la vie et du rêve, parmi 'leurs sœurs les fleurs, les feuilles et les sources.' But no descriptions from the outside, not even the phrases of a great poet, give so true a sense of its quality as may be found in the poetry itself ; for it is so homogeneous, so unfailingly true to the temperament from which it springs, so free from alloy or ornament, that it may be judged as well from the tiniest fragment as from the whole. All Van Lerberghe is in such lines as 'fragiles comme des songes' ; 'c'était l'heure ineffable où les 'songes expirent' ; or

'L'adorable et subtile poussière
De ce qui fut jadis des fleurs.'

His are the 'lèvres avides de l'infini' ; he makes true confession when he writes :

'Âmes et flammes, toutes ensemble,
Ailes et fleurs entrelacées,
Je cherche au fond de mes pensées
Des paroles qui vous ressemblent' ;

and, though seeming to acknowledge failure, he at the same time gives us the very essence of his genius when he adds :

'Mais vous êtes ineffables,
Et votre chant mystérieux
Ne s'exprime que par d'impalpables
Effleurements et des silences radieux.'

In a very beautiful mystical love-poem, 'L'Insinuée,' are these lines :

'Et l'air fut plein d'une splendeur profonde
Baignée de rayons,
Et comme un jeu de feu,
Nue en ses longs cheveux,
Rose, bleue et blonde,
Elle fut et disparut
Dans le matin,
Comme un jet d'eau qui retombe soudain
Et devient le silence ;

Évanouie en semblances légères
De poussières de fleurs, de lumières,
D'écumes dans le vent.
Elle était morte sur mes lèvres comme un chant.'

'Elle était morte sur mes lèvres comme un chant.' Is it too fanciful to say that such song dies on the lips like a kiss?

It is at any rate a poetry of extraordinary beauty, of which a principal technical cause is the deliberate and fastidious limitation of the poet's vocabulary. In his story, 'Sélection 'surnaturelle,' a companion to 'Les Aventures merveilleuses,' the soul of the Prince de Cynthie is dying of silence because it cannot find words to express itself. On Saturne's suggestion, they go on a voyage, taking all the words as cargo of their boat, so that the prince may make his choice at leisure. Group by group, for one reason or another, the words are discarded and thrown overboard: first the ugly words; then the words of movement; then those denoting concrete things; then the abstractions; then the words of the senses, and so on. Last of all God goes. It seems that the boat is empty. But there is one word left. They find it hidden at the bottom of the boat: 'J'aspire.' 'Et le prince, s'agenouil-'lant, joignit les mains; et, doucement, il répéta: "Dans la 'lumière: J'aspire."'

By almost as drastic a selection Van Lerberghe created the vocabulary from which his poetry is written. A few words—*rayon, rose, bleu, ombre, or, aile, vague, fleur, ébloui, clarté*—recur again and again in it, and the effect is not monotony but an atmosphere of wonderful delicacy and shimmering brightness.

'N'aime que la beauté, et qu'elle soit pour toi toute la vérité,' Van Lerberghe wrote; and, whether he knew Keats or not, it was at beauty that he aimed exclusively. At one time, indeed, he professed to set a higher value on novelty, but though this caprice affected his aesthetic judgments, it left no trace on his poetry. There is no need to take his critical *dicta* very seriously. In one of his letters to M. Séverin, he defends, or rather asserts the virtue of, obscurity. 'L'obscurité est mon 'élément,' he says. But without going so far as M. Maeterlinck, who maintains that there is nothing in 'La Chanson 'd'Ève' which a child could not understand, one may presume to qualify the poet's assertion. A luminous haze envelops

his work, its outlines are often vague, its precise significance elusive; but it always has sufficient firmness for the mind to rest upon and be satisfied. Van Lerberghe never bewilders one as Mallarmé and his disciples do.

For his sense of form was ineradicable, and his innate taste was classical. At college his orthodoxy had won him favour in the eyes of the authorities, who frowned on the experimental daring of the young Maeterlinck. It was some time before he would abandon traditional measures, and make use of the *vers libre*, the championship of which he never espoused with the ardour of M. Vielé-Griffin and the rest. That one of his generation and temperament should use *vers libre* was almost inevitable; but towards the end of his life he expressed himself dissatisfied with the irregular measure, and with what he had done in it, and showed an inclination to return to the older forms. He was an adept in the one manner as in the other. He was certainly one of the great masters of *vers libre*; but the octosyllabic quatrain was equally characteristic of him, and some of his most beautiful poetry is written in alexandrines: for instance, the lovely lines in which the sirens reveal their nature to the wondering Eve:

'Parfois, les nuits de lune,
Nous glissons sous la vague phosphoreuse, et l'une
Désire l'autre, et cherche, aux profondeurs des flots,
Celle dont le parfum fit plus tièdes les eaux,
Et dont le cri voilé lointainement appelle.
Et, soudain, toutes deux se trouvent et se mêlent,
Comme deux vagues qui se rencontrent et roulent
Ensemble, écument, crient, éclatent et s'écroulent,
Et sans doute est-ce là ce que l'on nomme l'amour.'

Van Lerberghe's poetry, though its pursuit taught him contempt for his fellows, is never angry. In prose he is a satirist: aloof and scornful in the stories, almost Rabelaisian in 'Pan.' In verse he is serenely pagan, ignoring the asceticisms and pruderies which he despises. Occasionally he will show a sort of fairy playfulness, reminding one a little of Herrick but more of Mr. Charles Sims, that Venetian *petit-maître* with Herrick's sense of humour.

'Belle sirène,
Eh quoi! Des anneaux d'eau
À tes doigts de reine?
Qu'as-tu fait de ton anneau d'or?'

'Je l'ai jeté aux profondeurs,
Je l'ai jeté avec mon cœur,
À ma petite sœur la nixe . . .
Car j'habite les hauteurs.

'Elle est belle, je suis bonne,
Et mon cœur est bien heureux.
La pauvre chose que je lui donne,
Sur sa tête aux cheveux bleus,
Lui est toute une couronne !'

Or he will write a humoresque :

'Mets ta main ronde dans ma main,
Dans ma main ta main rose et ronde :
Dansons la ronde.
Ronde est ma bouche et rond mon sein,
Comme la coupe et le raisin.
J'ai couronné des roses rondes
Mes longs cheveux d'or souple et fin.
Mets ta main rose dans ma main.
La lune dans la nuit profonde,
Et le soleil dans le matin,
Mes bras nus et mes boucles blondes,
Mon baiser et mon cœur enfin,
Les plus belles choses du monde
Sont des choses rondes :
Dansons la ronde.'

In the main, however, his preoccupation with beauty is too entire for humour. The completeness of his paganism is best illustrated, perhaps, by one very remarkable poem, 'Métamorphose' :

'L'oraison du soir s'achève,
Tout s'efface comme en un rêve,
Le monde s'endort dans une fluide d'or.

Les yeux baissés sur ses beaux songes,
Dans sa grotte avec ses anges,
La Vierge silencieuse est assise.
L'Enfant divin s'est endormi.
* * * * *
Sa robe blanche se fait diaphane,
Pâle, comme une fleur qui se fane
Sur sa chair, où courent des flammes
Comme des épis ondoyants ;
Ses lourds cheveux dénoués s'écroulent
Fauves avec des roses et roulent
Sur ses épaules et sur ses hanches.
Ses seins se dressent frémissants.
L'Amour s'éveille.

Ses anges, repliant leurs ailes,
Se sont levés. Leurs douces paroles,
Avec le luth et la viole,
Sur leurs lèvres se sont tues.
Ils détachent leurs ceintures
Et délacent leurs robes d'orfrois,
Et tous les trois redeviennent, nues,
Les belles Grâces d'autrefois.
Elles étendent leurs mains stellaires
Dans le jour qui va finir.
Et leurs regards, de leurs prières,
Se détournent vers la mer :
Sur la conque nacrée des airs,
Fleur des flots, en un divin rêve,
Scintillante naît et se lève
Vénus, étoile de la mer.'

In that poem there is no fierce antithesis such as one finds in Swinburne; none of the doubt which one may see in the faces of the women of Botticelli, where the same beauty is now Aphrodite's and now Mary's; but a calm, inevitable transmutation. Van Lerberghe's paganism was broad enough and sure enough of itself to embrace its opposite. It had no need to be militant.

Perhaps as good a test as any of an artist's fundamental honesty in this respect is his treatment of nakedness. Van Lerberghe simply took it for granted. Not in his earliest youth was he guilty of the naughtiness, the protestant immoralism, of the disciples of Verlaine; and he was equally remote from the healthier, but no less protestant, animalism of the earlier Verhaeren. His Eve, his gods and his sirens are naked because it is beautiful and natural for them to be so. In 'Pan,' which was written for the stage and played at the Théâtre de l'Œuvre in 1906, he only under protest makes grudging, and one would imagine from the official point of view inadequate, concessions to the conventions.

Van Lerberghe, student of philosophy as he was, doubtless learned something from Nietzsche. There is no word of the superman or of the will to power in his work, but 'Les Aventures 'merveilleuses du Prince de Cynthie' is full of the aristocratic spirit, and his poetry is Dionysian if ever poetry was. Nietzsche's 'Tout est innocence' is one of the mottoes of 'La 'Chanson d'Ève' and perfectly expresses the spirit of the poem. In the notes to 'Pan' is quoted the philosopher's saying that

he would believe in no god who could not dance, and it is possible that Van Lerberghe had that saying in mind when he made his Eve dance at the culminating moment of her existence.

'Et je danse et je chante, et danse encore.
Je danse nue, éblouie et superbe,
Comme un serpent dans les hautes herbes,
Je danse et rampe dans les airs,
Comme une flamme de l'enfer.

Je danse ailée, frémissante et sonore,
Au fond du tourbillon vivant,
Du tourbillon qui me dévore,
Du tourbillon où je descends.
Je danse jusqu'à ce que j'en sois lasse,
L'âme enivrée et chancelante
Du vin de la danse,
Et du vin de mon sang.'

But, after all, it is not enough to say that Van Lerberghe was a pagan or that he lived for an ideal of beauty. It is possible to be more precise. His governing idea is that which, tentatively adumbrated in one of his early poems published in 'Le Parnasse de la Jeune Belgique'—'L'Ex-voto'—he expressed by means of a symbol of universal appeal in 'Méta-'morphose.' It is the idea of woman awakening to the consciousness of, and joyfully accepting, her womanhood. Its full and final expression is 'La Chanson d'Ève,' a sequence of a hundred beautiful poems forming a whole more beautiful than any of its parts. 'Ce poème est surtout un hymne 'd'innocence, d'émois virginaux, de découvertes aurorales, 'd'allégresses adolescentes,' says M. Maeterlinck, who believes it to be the most perfect poetry written since the Anthology. 'L'Ève de Van Lerberghe est toute l'humanité,' says M. Verhaeren.

There is something of the spirit of 'La Chanson d'Ève' in the writings, the poems and later novels especially, of Mr. Maurice Hewlett, another pagan, whose paganism, though it has not absorbed his Christianity, has been inextricably interwoven with it, and whose mythology, like Van Lerberghe's, is something more than a literary device; and there is a well-known drawing by Aubrey Beardsley, 'The Mysterious Rose Garden,' which might have been made as an illustration to it. It is at any rate the drawing which Beardsley would have made if he

had been asked to illustrate the poem ; and but for the angel's face—which is one of those touches of cynical criticism with which the artist often spoilt his drawings as illustrations and gave them their value as personal documents—it would have succeeded perfectly. The naked girl, who is one of Beardsley's most natural figures, listening, timid, with doubt and wonder and mysterious knowledge nascent in her eyes (the poet's ' yeux ' éblouis ') ; the trellis of roses and the flowered grass ; the winged feet of the angel, and even—though Van Lerberghe loved nakedness better than raiment—the angel's flowered gown—all these are in the poem. Only the angel's sinister, sneering face is not there. Though Eve listens to the voice of the sirens, the voice of Venus, the voice of Love ; though she is tempted and yields to temptation ; though she dances because she has killed God, but comes at last to desire Death—*tout est innocence* in Van Lerberghe's Eden, because, for him, beauty was righteousness.

FRANCIS BICKLEY.

GERMANY'S FOOD LEGISLATION

Germany's Food : Can it Last ? Translation edited by S. Russell Wells. University of London Press. 1915.

GERMANY'S attempt to provide a sufficiency of food for all her people at reasonable cost by fixing maximum wholesale and retail prices and putting the whole population upon rations by means of food tickets has attracted a great deal of attention in this country, and uncritical admirers of German organisation and German efficiency have demanded that the British Government should follow the German plan. It is therefore worth while to see exactly what Germany has done.

The economic position of Germany resembles in many respects that of the United Kingdom. Both are highly developed industrial countries, and the density of the population does not differ greatly. This will be seen from the following figures :

	Area. Square miles.	Population at last Census.	Population per sq. mile.
Germany . .	208,770	64,925,993 (1910)	311·0
United Kingdom .	121,371	45,216,665 (1911)	372·6
France . . .	207,075	39,601,509 (1911)	191·2

Germany is no longer self-supporting. She has become increasingly dependent upon imported foods and raw material, for which she pays with the export of manufactures. The vastness of her foreign trade can most easily be visualised by considering weights, not values. In 1912 Germany imported 79,242,200 tons of goods and exported 73,499,100 tons of goods. It is generally known that she suffers from a shortage of rubber. In 1912 she imported 15,643 tons of rubber, or less than the one-hundredth part of 2 per cent. of the weight of her total imports. The difficulty which Germany experiences in procuring for herself rubber, which is so com-

paratively insignificant an item, gives some measure of the difficulty which she experiences in importing surreptitiously the millions of tons of foodstuffs, &c. which she requires.

For decades the German Government has striven to foster and develop simultaneously and harmoniously all the resources of the nation. It has striven to promote side by side the rural and the urban industries, agriculture, forestry, mining, manufacturing and commerce, and the result has been a remarkable expansion of German agricultural production.

In the opinion of the best experts the expansion of Germany's production of vegetable and animal food has by no means reached its limit. Before the war it was generally believed in Germany that her rural industries were susceptible of almost unlimited expansion, and that she might during a war so very greatly increase her agricultural production as to be much less dependent upon foreign imports for her existence. Many Germans proclaimed at the outbreak of the war that Germany would be able to feed herself during an almost unlimited time; that her enemies could not starve her out, however long the war might last and however stringent the blockade might be.

Accepting, as approximately accurate, German and British agricultural statistics, it may be stated that before the war Germany succeeded in growing on a territory which is 72 per cent. larger than that of the United Kingdom from three to four times as much vegetable and animal food. In other words, her productivity per square mile of territory can be roughly stated as twice and her productivity per square mile of agricultural area as three times that of the United Kingdom. This may be attributed to three factors. She applied to the land an enormous amount of human and animal labour; she applied to it huge and constantly increasing quantities of home-produced and imported manures; and she reared her enormous herds very largely on imported food. Unfortunately for Germany, the war has seriously interfered with these three most important factors. It has very greatly diminished human and animal labour on the land, for it has withdrawn from it millions of men, hundreds of thousands of horses, and millions of cattle. It has greatly reduced the supply of chemical and animal manure. It has vastly diminished the quantity of available food for animals owing to the cessation of imports of feeding stuffs from abroad.

According to the official handbook 'Die Deutsche Land-'wirtschaft,' published by the German Statistical Office in 1913, no less than 42 per cent. of all occupied Germans were engaged in agriculture. According to the industrial census of 1907 the body of the German agricultural workers was composed as follows:

	Male.	Female.
Landowners and farmers . .	2,526,093	403,400
Permanently occupied members of the family	1,218,269	3,462,216
Temporarily occupied members of the family	689,711	2,321,919
Agricultural labourers, &c. . .	2,413,755	2,134,186
	6,847,828	8,321,721

In 1907, at the moment of the census, 15,169,549 people were employed in German agriculture, but the maximum number employed in that year was 19,732,424. It follows that more than 4,500,000 people were temporarily employed in the rural industries of Germany, especially during harvest time. The productivity of Germany's agriculture is largely due to the vast quantity of labour employed. Whereas German agriculture employs about 15,000,000 people, only about 2,000,000 people are engaged in agriculture in the United Kingdom. It will be noticed that while the German output of food per square mile of agricultural area is roughly three times that of the United Kingdom, the output per head of the population employed in agriculture is about half that of the United Kingdom.

The sturdy agriculturists of Germany furnish by far the largest percentage of recruits to the army. Hence agriculture has suffered more severely from lack of workers than any other German industry. The old men, women, and children who have been left on the farms, and unemployed townsmen who are unacquainted with farm work, can supply at best only a small part of the colossal labour deficiency created by the war, and the underfed and unwilling prisoners who have been put on the land will scarcely work with energy and enthusiasm. The more advanced, perfected, and complicated a nation's agriculture has become, the more labour, manure, and machinery are employed, the more dependent will it be on the intensive application of labour and science to the land,

and the greater will be the reduction of output if only an insufficient amount of labour and manure is available. We know that the war, by reducing the available labour, has seriously interfered with agricultural production in Russia, where conditions are rather primitive, and in France, where agriculture is far less intensive than in Germany; that even England cannot find labour enough for the land. If British agriculture, with its 2,000,000 workers, suffers from a great scarcity of labour at a time when compulsory service has just come into action, how much more severely then must German agriculture, with its 15,000,000 workers, suffer after nearly two years of a war in which the whole able-bodied population of her countryside has been engaged?

The bulk of Germany's agricultural land is freehold. It is owned chiefly by small and medium peasants who cultivate it with horses and cattle. Before the war Germany imported, on balance per year, 120,000 working horses, worth about £5,000,000, most of them coming from Russia. That important supply has ceased. At the same time at least 500,000 horses were requisitioned for the army at the outbreak of war, and as the mortality among these has no doubt been very heavy probably only a few good farm horses are left on the land. Furthermore, as the German cattle subsist very largely on imported feeding stuffs, millions of animals had to be slaughtered at the beginning of the war. Fewer cattle are available for pulling the plough, &c. It follows that the German farms are starved not only of human labour but of animal labour as well.

The shortage of animals on the farms is perhaps even more serious than that of men. Old men, women, and children cannot draw the plough and other heavy implements. The numerous animals formerly employed in agriculture cannot suddenly be replaced by machinery driven by steam, petrol, or electricity. Spade cultivation is necessarily insufficiently productive. In the past every great war has led to scarcity because the disappearance of animals and of men made necessary the introduction of spade cultivation by old men, women, and children. The present war is apparently no exception to the rule. All the nations at war suffer from a serious reduction in the productivity of their agriculture, but while Great Britain and her Allies can replace their shortage

by food imported from abroad, Germany and her Allies have to go without.

Although German agriculture is enormously productive, vast quantities of wheat, barley, rice, peas, beans, lentils, fruit, butter, oil, lard, eggs, poultry, and millions of tons of animal food of every kind are imported. Germany's net imports of vegetable and animal food have grown, according to the German official handbook, from £101,195,000 in 1908 to £151,190,000 in 1912.*

From a recent investigation made by a number of German experts, which has been translated into English and which has been published by the University of London Press under the title 'Germany's Food: Can it Last?' we learn that Germany's net imports of some of the more important food items represented the following weights:

Average Net Imports, 1912–1913.

	Tons.
Wheat, barley, rice, oats, potatoes, peas, beans, &c. (of which 2,263,654 tons were for human consumption and 4,006,706 were animal food)	6,270,360
Green vegetables	272,057
Apples, pears, oranges, and other fruit	824,692
Oil seeds and kernels, such as linseed, palm-kernels, colza, cotton-seed, and various oil nuts	1,571,925
Live cattle, pigs, poultry, &c.	108,400
Dead meat, poultry, game, fat and lard	227,262
Herrings and other fish	361,377
Milk, cream, butter and cheese	136,213
Eggs	169,110
Fodder	4,376,712
Cocoa and chocolate	51,574
Total	14,369,682

It will be noticed that Germany imported net before the war nearly 14,500,000 tons of food for man and beast. In addition to the items given she imported vast quantities of articles which are rather stimulants than foods and which are not absolute necessities, such as 170,700 tons of coffee, 78,988 tons of tobacco, 36,510 tons of chicory, 4,127 tons of tea, vast

* The above figures, taken by the author from German official publications, are appreciably different from the figures given in the Statistical Abstract published by the Board of Trade, though both sets of figures lead to the same inference.—*Editor E.R.*

quantities of wine, &c. Adding these, her food imports amount to about 15,000,000 tons per year. The significance of that colossal figure will be clear to us only if we convert it into trainloads or shiploads, or if we compare it with the tonnage of the British mercantile marine—12,400,000 net tons.

Land requires chemical and animal manure. In addition to about 15,000,000 tons of food, of which about 8,000,000 tons were for animals, Germany in 1912 imported net 838,000 tons of nitrates, manure, and guano, and 405,000 tons of phosphates, valued together at £7,900,000. The lack of these imported manures will be a serious matter to her agriculture, but it will not be so serious as the shortage of animal manure which the war has caused, for not only were hundreds of thousands of horses requisitioned by the army, but the number of cattle and pigs kept on the German farms had to be reduced by many millions soon after the outbreak of the war owing to the absence of imported foodstuffs. Thus the fertility of the soil has certainly been very greatly impaired. The German fields have, during the last two years, received probably not one half the usual quantity of manure. They are starved not only of human and animal labour, as has been shown, but of animal and chemical manure as well.

The authors of the book 'Germany's Food: Can it Last?' in taking stock of the position, ingeniously reduce Germany's normal consumption, production, and importation of foods and foodstuffs for man and beast to a common scientific denominator, measured in protein and calories, and come to the conclusion that the German people eat in peace time about 50 per cent. more food than they require, and that Germany cannot be starved into surrender if her agriculturists produce more food than in ordinary times and if the people in general consume only the strictly necessary food. The problem that had to be solved by the Government was to secure this increased production and diminished consumption. Unfortunately for Germany, the Government wished to make the war popular with the well-to-do and to run it as economically as possible.

By the law of August 4, 1914, the minimum State allowance for soldiers' wives was fixed as low as nine marks per month from May to October, and was to be increased to 12 marks per month during the winter months from November to April.

This was done in order to induce soldiers' wives to maintain themselves, at least in part, by their own exertions. Thus they would benefit themselves and aid the State in overcoming the shortage of labour caused by the war. In addition, a minimum State allowance of six marks per month was made for every child. The local authorities were empowered to supplement these very low grants by making additional allowances in money or in kind out of their own resources. By paying low allowances to soldiers' dependants, and by saddling the local authorities with the duty of paying additional grants to them, the national and the local authorities became of course jointly and very strongly interested in economising their expenditure and in keeping the cost of living low.

In order to keep the well-to-do satisfied, no war taxation was at first imposed. The Government proclaimed at an early date that the cost of the war, as of that against France in 1870–71, would be paid for, and more than paid for, by the indemnities which Germany would exact from the defeated nations. As no heavy taxation was imposed upon the well-to-do, they had little inducement to restrict their expenditure. They ate and drank with the same joy and abundance as heretofore, notwithstanding the exhortations of officials and professors to curb their appetites.

The majority of the working men in the German towns are Socialists. Immediately on the outbreak of the war, the Socialists loudly demanded that the 'food usurers' should not be allowed to corner the means of subsistence and to grow wealthy at the cost of the poor. They demanded that, in accordance with the Socialist creed, which does not recognise the law of supply and demand, the Government should regulate prices, keep them low, and provide for the subsistence of the people by taking over and distributing equitably the nation's food. The Government allowed itself to be guided by the views of these Socialist doctrinaires, and it embarked without hesitation upon the most gigantic Socialist experiment which the world has witnessed. On the 17th of December 1914, the Government published a 'Law Relating to Maximum 'Prices' which was dated the 4th of August and was worded as follows:

'1. During the continuance of the present war maximum prices may be fixed for objects of daily requirements, especially for foods

and feeding stuffs of every kind, for raw materials, and for materials used for heating and lighting.

2. If proprietors of the objects enumerated in Paragraph 1 refuse to sell them at the determined maximum price when requested to do so by the competent authorities, the competent authorities may take over these objects and sell them on account of and at the cost of the owners at the maximum price unless they choose to take them over at that price for their own use.

3. The Central Authorities or the authorities appointed by them will make the necessary regulations and arrangements for executing the present law.

4. Those who exceed the determined maximum prices, act in contravention of the regulations made for carrying out this law, conceal stocks of such objects, or fail to act in accordance with Par. 2 when requested to do so by the competent authorities, will be subject to a fine not exceeding 3000 marks, or to imprisonment not exceeding six months if they are unable to pay the fine.

5. The Federal Council is authorised to determine the moment when the validity of this law will come to an end.

6. This law comes into force with its proclamation.'

In a lengthy official explanation of the above law, which was appended to it, the Government stated that the introduction of maximum prices would prevent panic and an undue increase of prices; that, in fixing maximum prices, it would be the object of the administration to safeguard with perfect impartiality the interests of producers, middlemen, and consumers; that thus cheapness and a sufficiency of food would be secured to the people and an adequate profit to the producers and to the middlemen.

After the outbreak of the war the German Government developed a feverish anxiety. It endeavoured to regulate the economic life of the nation in all its branches by numerous war emergency laws, orders, and proclamations. These have been collected and have been published by the publishing house of Carl Heymanns in Berlin in a number of volumes. The laws, orders, and proclamations issued from the 31st of August, 1914, to the 31st of December, 1915—later ones I have not been able to obtain—fill 1330 pages of small print. Yet the collection, which contains 807 laws, orders, and proclamations, is by no means complete. Apart from innumerable Ministerial decrees not contained in it, countless orders and proclamations regulating economic life were issued by Generals in command of German districts, which also were omitted from this collection. If it were not for the great conciseness of language, of

which the law relating to maximum prices, quoted above, is a model, these official pronouncements would fill many thousands of pages. The prolixity of English legal language is fortunately unknown in Germany.

In 1913 Germany had by far the largest harvest on record, and she entered upon the war in July, 1914, with a large stock of food in hand. The 1914 harvest was ripening and seemed very satisfactory. The promising agricultural outlook was no doubt an additional reason for Germany going to war in July, 1914.

The harvest of 1914 was apparently ample, and for many months the necessity of economising food was not very seriously considered. Nevertheless, certain precautions were taken. On the 5th of January, 1915, for instance, the thrifty and thorough milling of grain was prescribed by the authorities. On the 15th of February, 1915, Dr. Delbrück issued an order that from the 1st of April of that year the malt consumption of breweries was to be reduced to 60 per cent. of the average used in 1912–13. On the 31st of March the admixture of potatoes in bread was made compulsory, &c.

In June and July, 1915, the ripening German harvest did not look very promising. The weather was unfavourable, and lack of labour and manure apparently exercised an unfavourable influence upon production. Suddenly edict after edict regulating the supply of food and of feeding stuffs was published. On the 28th of June, 1915, for instance, the confiscation of all grain was ordered, and at the same time the distribution of bread and flour was regulated. The State became the sole dealer in grain and flour, and the local authorities were directed to regulate the supply of bread to individuals on behalf of the State by means of bread tickets.

With the advancing season and the advent of autumn the food-controlling activities of the authorities were redoubled. On the 2nd of September, 1915, for instance, it was prohibited to use milk or cream for industrial purposes and for baking, to sell cream and whipped cream, either pure or mixed, in milk-shops, confectionery shops, and restaurants, Policemen and inspectors appointed for the purpose were empowered to inspect premises, books, and business papers. On the 9th of October, 1915, the management of the potato supply was taken over by a Government authority, the *Reichskartoffel-*

stelle, under the Imperial Chancellor. The authorities were empowered to take over the potatoes of the 1915 harvest from the producers, and the prices were fixed at the following low figures :

Eastern Provinces	55 marks per ton.
Central portions of Germany . .	57 and 59 marks per ton.
Western parts of Germany . . .	61 marks per ton.

The prices determined upon were approximately the normal peace prices. Converted into English weights and coinage, potatoes were to be bought from the producers at the rate of about 3 lb. for one penny. Potatoes and bread are the staple foods of Germany. At the low price determined the potato crop represented a value of about £100,000,000.

On the 14th of October, 1915, private persons were forbidden to make oil from beech nuts, its manufacture being reserved to the Government. On the same day it was prohibited to paint houses, walls, and fences with paint made of white lead and linseed oil.

On the 22nd of October, 1915, it was announced that on the 16th of November a census of the stock of bread corn, oats, and flour in Germany was to be taken. Refusal to give information or the making of false declarations was to be punished with imprisonment not exceeding six months, or a fine not exceeding £500. It is worth noting that in the course of the war the fines imposed for contravening the economic policy of the Government became heavier and heavier. On the same day the Government proclaimed that it would take over all oil kernels and seeds at certain maximum prices. Among the articles enumerated were some of the most trivial, such as sunflower seed, oil radish seed, mowra seed, &c. Two days later, on the 24th of October, the wholesale and retail maximum prices of butter, free Berlin, were fixed as follows :

Wholesale Prices of Butter.

1st quality	240	marks per	50 kilos.
2nd quality	230	,,	,,
3rd quality	215	,,	,,
Poor quality	180	,,	,,

On re-sale 4 marks per 50 kilos. might be added to the wholesale prices, and 11 marks to the retail prices. The maximum wholesale prices were about twice as high as

were the average peace prices. The highest quality would come, wholesale, to 2*s.* 1¾*d.* per English lb., and retail to about 2*s.* 3¼*d.*

Four days later, on the 28th of October, the consumption of meat and fat was limited to some extent by law, the weekly diet of the nation being regulated as follows: On Tuesdays and Fridays it would be unlawful to sell to consumers meat in any form, or any wares containing meat. On Mondays and Thursdays it would be unlawful to sell in clubs, restaurants, &c., meat, game, poultry, and fish, and any other food baked, boiled or fried in fat or lard. On Saturdays it would be unlawful to sell pork. On the day when the foregoing regulation was published, the production of spirits, which in Germany, it is worth noting, are made chiefly from potatoes, was reduced to 60 per cent. of the average production of 1913–14.

In November 1915, as in the preceding month, it rained food-regulating edicts. On the 4th of that month the wholesale price of pigs for slaughter was fixed according to towns and according to the weight of the animals. The prices ranged from 110 marks per 50 kilos. for the largest pigs in the towns of Western Germany to 60 marks per 50 kilos. for the smallest pigs in Eastern Germany. In English weights and coinage the prices were from 1*s.* per lb. to 6½*d.* per lb. for the whole animal. In selling to the consumers, retailers might add to the above prices, up to 40 per cent. for pork and up to 80 per cent. for pork fat.

Four days later, on the 8th of November, it was announced that a national oil and fat census would be taken on the 11th of November. At the same time the production and sale of margarine were severely limited by ordering that margarine works should reduce their consumption of fat and oil to one-third of the average, while other industries were ordered to reduce their consumption of oil and fat to at most one-sixth of the average. This measure accounts for the scarcity of soap in Germany. Simultaneously with this regulation maximum prices were fixed at which the State might take over from the owners fats and oils of every kind. Tallow was fixed at 260 marks per 100 kilos., train oil at 275 marks, coco-nut butter at 330 marks, &c. Owners were ordered to keep their stock in trust for the Government and to treat it with the utmost care until taken over. They were to be responsible for their stock. Contravention was to be punished

with imprisonment not exceeding six months, or a fine up to £750. On the same day the Government fixed the maximum prices for hand-threshed straw at 50 marks per ton, for pressed straw at 47·50 marks per ton, and for machine-threshed straw at 45 marks per ton, at which prices owners would have to hand it over to the authorities on demand. Contravention was punishable with imprisonment up to six months, or a fine up to £750.

Three days later, on the 11th of November, a proclamation was published regulating the sale of buckwheat and millet. On the same day an order was published regarding the regulation of price of 'fruity and other substances to be eaten on 'bread in place of butter.' A third edict of the same day regulated preliminarily the prices of all vegetables and fruit.

On the 15th of November the Government gave notice that an animal census would be taken on the 1st of December. On the 22nd of November maximum trade and retail prices for game were fixed, the former being as follows:—Venison with skin, 7*d*. per lb.; hares with skin, 3*s*. 9*d*.; rabbits with skin, 1*s*.; cock pheasants with their feathers, 2*s*. 6*d*. each, and hen pheasants, 1*s*. 9*d*. each. In the retail trade venison was to be sold at 1*s*. 5*d*. per lb., hares with their skins at 5*s*. each and without them at 4*s*. 6*d*. each, rabbits with skin 1*s*. 7*d*., without skin 1*s*. 4*d*., cock pheasants with their feathers at 3*s*. 6*d*. and hen pheasants at 2*s*. 6*d*. each, &c. On the following day maximum wholesale and retail prices were fixed for buckwheat, millet, and the various articles made from them.

On the 26th of November maximum retail prices were fixed by the Government, in conjunction with the manufacturers, for coffee substitutes, such as barley coffee, malt coffee, &c. The former was to be sold at 5*d*. per lb. and the latter at 6*d*. per lb. if sold loose, and at a halfpenny more per lb. if sold in made-up packets.

On the 27th of November the maximum price of straw, which on the 8th of that month had been fixed, was increased by 15 marks per ton if handed over to the Government in December, by 10 marks per ton if handed over in January 1916, and by 5 marks per ton if delivered in February of that year. The prices had probably been fixed unduly low in the first instance, and the Government tried to rectify them by adding a bonus for early delivery.

On the 29th of November the Government announced that a census of the stock of coffee, tea and cocoa in Germany would be taken on the 3rd of January 1916. Private persons were ordered to notify the authorities of their stock if they had in their possession more than 10 kilos. of coffee or more than $2\frac{1}{2}$ kilos. of tea. Failure in disclosing stocks or incorrect declarations were punishable with imprisonment up to six months or fines up to £750.

On the 1st of December all leather in Germany was seized by the Commanding Generals at various prices for the different qualities. Apparently the owners protested against arbitrary and unjust treatment, for nine days later, on the 10th of December, the Government published a notice that an expert authority had been created before which the former owners of leather, as well as public prosecutors and the law courts, could have the value of leather in dispute adjudicated upon.

On the 4th of December wholesale and retail prices were fixed for the principal vegetables. The wholesale prices were as follows: white cabbage and turnips, 2*s.* 6*d.* per cwt.; green cabbbage and kale, 3*s.* per cwt.; savoy and red cabbage, 4*s.* 6*d.* per cwt.; carrots, 5*s.* per cwt.; onions, 6*s.* per cwt., &c. The retail maximum prices per English lb. were: white cabbage and turnips, $\frac{3}{8}$*d.* per lb.; green cabbage and savoys, $\frac{3}{4}$*d.* per lb.; red cabbage, $\frac{7}{8}$*d.* per lb.; carrots, 1*d.* per lb.; onions, $1\frac{7}{8}$*d.* per lb., &c.

On the following day wholesale and retail prices for fresh-water fish were published. Carp was to be retailed at 1*s.* 3*d.* per lb., tench at 1*s.* 6*d.* per lb., pike at 1*s.* 3*d.* per lb., red eyes and fin scales at 8*d.* per lb., &c.

On the 14th of December maximum wholesale and retail prices were fixed for jams and marmalades of every kind. They were divided into four qualities. The retail prices for these, if sold in quantities of 5 kilos. (11 lb.) or less, were to be as follows: 1st quality, 8*d.* per lb.; 2nd quality, $6\frac{1}{2}$*d.* per lb.; 3rd quality, $5\frac{1}{2}$*d.* per lb.; 4th quality, $4\frac{1}{2}$*d.* per lb.

On the 16th of December the Imperial Vice-Chancellor published a proclamation regulating the making of cake, worded as follows:

'Producers working for gain, especially bakers, confectioners, pastry-cooks, biscuit manufacturers, hotels, restaurants, and refreshment rooms of every kind, must observe the following regulations:

1. In the making of cake no eggs or preserved eggs may be used,

and for every 500 grams of flour or flour-like substance no more than 100 grams of fat and 100 grams of sugar may be employed.

2. In making cakes or pastries from fine paste ("torte") 150 grams of eggs or preserved eggs may be used, as well as 150 grams of fat and 150 grams of sugar to every 500 grams of flour.

3. In making macaroon paste no more than 150 grams of sugar may be used for every 500 grams of almonds.

The use of baking powder is permitted. That of yeast is forbidden. The producers mentioned are forbidden to prepare goods in boiling fat, to use seed, to make "baumkuchen," to use pure cream or cream made with white of egg, fat, milk or cream, to make "fettstreusel" or to bake on their premises goods prepared outside the rooms under their control. . . . The police and experts appointed for the purpose are authorised to enter premises subjected to these regulations at any time, to inspect them as well as all business books and papers, and to take samples. Owners, managers, and foremen must give to the police and their inspectors all desired information as to the composition of the goods and the quantity of ingredients ordered, and must furnish the addresses of their purveyors. . . .'

On the same day regulations as to the making of sweets and chocolate were published, restricting the sugar used to one-half the former quantity, and forbidding altogether the use of milk, cream, and fats of every kind. Likewise on the 16th of December a proclamation was published forbidding the advertising, either for sale or for purchase, of objects of daily use, such as food, fodder, raw material, fuel, lighting materials, manures, war material, &c., in periodicals or dailies, unless accompanied by the full name and address of the advertiser or advertisers. This regulation was obviously made so as to prevent people secretly acquiring and storing goods for sale and to prevent those who had hoarded goods from disposing of them.

The numerous laws, orders, and regulations quoted, which followed one another in rapid succession, and the far more numerous ones which have necessarily to be omitted from these pages, must by their number and intricacy have utterly bewildered and distracted the officials who had to carry them out, and the business men and the people in general.

Everything was done at a breakneck pace. For instance, on the 8th of November 1915 the people were informed that a national oil and fat census would be taken on the 11th of that month, three days later. That short notice was bound to lead to confusion. Sometimes several far-reaching measures affecting the whole official apparatus and the entire body economic of the nation were published on the same day.

The Government's principal idea in regulating the food supply was to ensure cheapness for the consumers. The German food legislation has no doubt kept the cost of living low, but it seems doubtful whether that cheapness has been a blessing to Germany. Comparison of the German maximum retail prices given in these pages with the corresponding British retail prices shows that food has been, and perhaps is still, astonishingly cheap in Germany. Certain items, such as butter, meat, and fat, are dearer, but the most important vegetable foods, the staple foods of the people, are far cheaper in Germany than in the United Kingdom. The Germans are great potato eaters. Potatoes are as much the staple food of the masses in Germany as bread is that of the poor in England. New potatoes cost retail about ½*d.* per lb. in Germany at a time when they cost about three times as much in this country. Bread also, though probably inferior in quality, is cheaper in Germany than over here, and sugar costs half as much. Vegetables also are far cheaper.

The fact that the war had up to the autumn of 1915 produced only a very slight increase in food prices in Germany is convincingly shown by a comparison of the official boarding allowances of the 9th of June 1906 for those who had soldiers billeted upon them with the increased allowances established on the 26th of September 1915. They compare as follows:

Allowances for Boarding Soldiers.

	Of the 9th of June 1906.		Of the 26th Sept. 1915.	
	With bread.	Without bread.	With bread.	Without bread.
	Marks.	Marks.	Marks.	Marks.
For full board per day .	1·20	1·05	1·50	1·35
For mid-day dinner only .	0·60	0·55	0·72	0·67
For evening meal only .	0·50	0·45	0·62	0·57
For breakfast only .	0·25	0·20	0·31	0·28

It will be noticed that if we compare the allowances of June 1906 with those of September 1915 there is an all-round increase of 25 per cent. But as food prices had already increased from 15 to 20 per cent. between June 1906 and

July 1914, the war itself seems up to the autumn of 1915 to have caused a rise of only 5 to 10 per cent. in the cost of food. Germany is anxious to feed her soldiers well and to make the war popular. Had food prices substantially increased, the authorities would undoubtedly have made a corresponding increase in the billeting allowances.

In countries which have a free market, cheapness betokens plenty, and dearness scarcity. The German Government has, by its food policy, abolished the law of supply and demand and has created an artificial cheapness. Instead of allowing the simple mechanism of high prices to stimulate production and to restrict consumption, the German Government has endeavoured to regulate production and consumption by the most complicated system of regulations imaginable. Let us now inquire how Germany's complicated economic legislation and her cheap food policy have affected the consumption and production of food, and let us begin by studying consumption.

It is not easy to regulate the human appetite either by exhortation or by minute Government regulations. As food has been cheap in Germany since the beginning of the war, the people, who habitually ate more than was good for them, probably continued over-eating instead of greatly restricting their consumption, and if some foodstuffs were scarce or dear, or were not easily obtainable, owing to the complicated regulations made, they turned naturally to other foods which were still cheap and plentiful, eating the large quantities to which they were accustomed. Until recently neutral visitors to Germany commented on the fact that the people lived as well as in peace time, that cafés and restaurants were crowded, that food was plentiful. In the beginning of the struggle, when millions of cattle and pigs were slaughtered because of the lack of imported feeding stuffs, the German people gorged on cheap meat and the German housewives pickled and smoked meat in large quantities. At that time advertisements of cheap smoking apparatus for private households could be found in every German newspaper.

The authors of the book, 'Germany's Food: Can it Last?' estimate, as has been shown, that German agriculture produces only two-thirds of the food normally eaten, and that the people should therefore eat only two-thirds of the food

they have been accustomed to. It seems pretty obvious that no such restriction has taken place; and that, on the contrary, the German people have, during the war, eaten far more food than ever before, partly because food has been almost as cheap as usual and war profits and war wages have created an artificial opulence; partly because wars increase the appetite of nations. All the heaviest eaters of Germany were drafted into the army, and the open-air life and exercise naturally increased their normally large appetites. The men in uniform ate more than ever before. Armies are notoriously wasteful with food. In the army kitchens and on the march vast quantities of food are invariably wasted, spoilt, or stolen. The soldiers who were sent to their homes on leave were, of course, feasted by their relations, who participated, and military invalids and convalescents, who have proverbially large appetites, were certainly not stinted either in the hospitals or in their homes. The German newspapers reported victories on land and sea almost every day, and victories must of course be celebrated with feasting. It would not be surprising if Germany, instead of eating two-thirds the quantity of food consumed in peace time, should have eaten about 30 per cent. more than in any previous period.

It is true that at least a million German soldiers have been killed or captured, but as their place as consumers of food has been taken by a large number of prisoners, there are now as many mouths in Germany as there were before the war, especially as the civil population has continued increasing. It is true that Germany has confiscated large quantities of foodstuffs in the conquered territories, but that gain is probably balanced by the loss of the produce of Eastern Prussia, which was invaded by the Russians in the beginning of the war.

The surmise that the German Government has failed in its endeavour to regulate and to restrain human appetite by complicated regulations seems to be borne out by the more recent and more drastic food regulations quoted in the papers, and by the smallness of the allowance per person. Germany and Austria-Hungary produce normally an enormous surplus of potatoes and sugar. In ordinary times Germany consumes only half the sugar she produces, and the Dual Monarchy consumes considerably less than half the yearly sugar production. There ought, therefore, to be a large surplus of sugar.

The fact that the potato allowance is exceedingly small and that saccharine is replacing sugar seems to indicate that even potatoes and sugar are becoming scarce, that the insufficiently restrained appetite of the people has caused terrible ravages not merely in the supply of meat, dairy produce, and bread, but even in that of potatoes and sugar.

In accordance with the demand of the Socialists, the German Government has endeavoured not only to regulate prices, but it has also striven to arrange that all should have an equal share in the food supply by the ticket system. The Government's endeavour at equal distribution has proved a complete failure. The food producers, the peasants, the farmers and their friends, eat, of course, as much as they like. An endeavour to control their appetite would be hopeless. The well-to-do, who cannot obtain as much as they would like to have under the ticket system, can, of course, obtain privately food from the farmers and peasants, who thus are able to sell food in small quantities at far higher prices than the low maximum prices fixed by the Government. Besides, the well-to-do can go to the country and feast there. The result is that the country population and the well-to-do are well fed, while the Socialist masses in the towns, for whose special benefit the ticket system was instituted, are starved. The workers have neither the money nor the opportunities to buy surreptitiously direct from the farmers, and thus they are the principal sufferers by the great Socialist experiment which has been made at the bidding of their leaders. Besides, the attempt to distribute food by ticket has proved a failure because the officials lack commercial experience. Hence in innumerable instances people have to wait many hours, and sometimes all night, before shops with their tickets, and after endless waiting are told that the supply has run out. Commerce is a science and an art, and experienced business men cannot safely be replaced by well-drilled officials directed by unpractical doctrinaires.

Now let us consider how the complicated legislation of Germany has affected individual exertion, and has affected the national food production.

Soon after the outbreak of the war numerous measures were taken to stimulate agriculture. The people in the towns were appealed to for help in harvesting. Schools were closed and the school children were asked to assist in the fields.

Those willing to help with harvesting were given free tickets on the State railways. The rural co-operative societies received liberal State aid. The acquisition of steam ploughs, motor ploughs, etc., was facilitated by grants and by the creation of exchanges for these implements. The Russian labourers who were in Germany when the war broke out, and who numbered perhaps 200,000, were forcibly detained. When the harvest had been brought in, orders were given that every available spot, even parks and drill-grounds, were to be put under cultivation. The German press informed us that a record area would be sown and that it would produce a record harvest in 1915. Nevertheless, the 1915 harvest was poor, owing to bad weather, and especially owing to lack of human and animal labour and of chemical and animal manure.

When, towards the middle of 1915, it became clear that the German harvest would be a poor one, the Government arranged for the distribution of foodstuffs of various kinds and began seizing the existing supply at the low maximum prices which it had proclaimed. On the 28th of June 1915 the standing crops of all bread corn were seized. On the 9th of October all potatoes, and on the 8th of November all straw, were made Government property. The forcible acquisition of vast quantities of agricultural produce at arbitrarily fixed, uncommercial, and artificially low prices has undoubtedly embittered the producers, the peasants, who, at the last moment, saw themselves deprived of the legitimate result of a year's unremitting labour, and who probably considered themselves robbed. A powerful government can do many things, but it can neither control the appetite nor the will of the people. Forcible acquisition at uncommercial prices, confiscation in disguise, may easily lead to a fatal diminution in agricultural effort. Production in a limited number of factories can be supervised and regulated by the State, but rural food production on millions of farms cannot similarly be controlled. According to the newspapers numerous peasants have been prosecuted in the law-courts for the illicit slaughtering of animals, for neglecting cultivation, for allowing their pigs to eat the green bread corn which had expressly been reserved by the Government for human consumption. The tendency of the Government's food policy is to induce the peasants to raise not as much food as they can, but as little

as they dare. Many will produce only enough for their own consumption, and will refuse to produce for sale at official prices, which they think too low.

It is obvious that people can live with little meat and fat, provided they can obtain enough vegetable food. But is there enough vegetable food in Germany to supply the wants of the people? Scraps of information which reach this country by way of the newspapers and through private sources seem to indicate that the general food position in Germany is serious, that there is a shortage not only of meat and fat, eggs and milk, etc., but of food of every kind. Apparently the policy of low prices has had the natural result of greatly stimulating the consumption and severely reducing the production of food, thus producing a general scarcity, and the attempt to distribute the existing food equitably has proved a failure. It is not safe to disregard the elementary law of demand and supply. By over-regulating and over-organising in the economic sphere Germany may regulate herself into starvation and organise herself into defeat.

J. Ellis Barker.

THE LORRAINE FRONTIER

Les frontières lorraines et la force allemande. By FERNAND ENGERAND. Paris: Perrin. 1916.

THAT Prussia is the most dangerous of the enemies of civilisation, and that those who sign treaties of peace with Prussia must impose such terms as will curb Prussian ambitions and curtail the power of Prussia for mischief, is a truth which Talleyrand clearly realised at the time of the Congress of Vienna. This is his memorandum on the subject:

'In Germany, the domination to be resisted is that of Prussia. The physical constitution of the monarchy makes ambition a law of nature to her. Any pretext is good enough for her; no scruple restrains her; she regards her convenience as her right. It is necessary, therefore, to check her ambitions by limiting her German possessions, by preserving the small German States, by enlarging those of moderate territorial extent, and by paralysing her influence by means of the federal system.'

Talleyrand, that is to say, sought to achieve, by the indirect method of tinkering at the German constitution, results which he thought that he could not, in the circumstances, hope to accomplish by the straightforward plan of a redistribution of territory to the advantage of France. He got more or less what he wanted by playing on the jealousies of Prussia's German rivals, and, for a while, all went satisfactorily; but the history of the nineteenth century is nevertheless largely the history of the undoing of his work. The desire to attain greater importance through closer union was genuine and widespread in Germany; and Prussian statesmen exploited it. The expulsion of Austria from the German Confederation, after Sadowa, secured Prussian predominance in the North German Confederation which succeeded it. The imperial crown which Frederick William IV. had refused when the German people offered it to him in 1849, was accepted from the German Princes in 1871, by William I.

Probably William I., who was rather a simple-minded sovereign, did not know exactly what he was accepting, and imagined his promotion to be purely honorific ; but Bismarck, who had intrigued to procure that promotion for him, knew better. It made William I. what Frederick William had told Metternich he would like to be : ' the generalissimo of the ' Empire ' ; and it was for the purpose of manœuvring the King of Prussia into that position that Bismarck had waged three wars. A union of a sort might have been achieved without the wars, but not a union which made Prussia the head of Germany and Germany the sword of Prussia. And that was the only kind of union which Bismarck, or any other ambitious Prussian, thought worth working for. Prussia by herself was a poor country ; Prussia, commanding the resources of Germany, might cherish boundless ambitions. To put it differently : if Prussia conquered Germany, and conciliated the vanquished, then Germany might, under Prussian guidance, conquer Europe.

That was the train of thought ; and there were other Germans besides the Prussians who saw sufficiently far ahead to follow it. Treitschke did so for one, and Treitschke was a Saxon. Most of the Germans, however, sulked for a season ; and did not immediately identify themselves with Prussia, even when they had finished sulking. The spread of Pangermanism was the signal that they were doing so. When Pangermanism became fashionable, the work was as good as done. It only remained to press the button and set the machinery in motion. That is what the Kaiser, who saw clearly the things which his grandfather only perceived dimly, did in the summer of 1914 ; and that is how we come to find ourselves in the presence of a problem almost identical with that which confronted Talleyrand at the Congress of Vienna : the problem of making such terms of peace with Prussia as will prevent Prussian ambition from being a constant menace to other countries. Happily, however, we are better placed than he was for dealing with the problem, not only because we can learn lessons of wisdom from his experience, but also for these two reasons :

1. The problem, which in Talleyrand's time was the problem of France alone, is now equally the concern of the Allies of France, who, at that date, were the Allies of Prussia.

2. The solution of territorial readjustment, which was

inapplicable when Prussia was victorious, can perfectly well be applied when Prussia is defeated.

As a rule, annexation is to be approved when it solves a nationality problem, and to be deprecated when it creates one. The annexations of 1815 were mainly of the latter kind, and were consequently fruitful of trouble. That is a plain historical fact which even the Pangermanists recognise ; and when they pictured themselves as conquerors, they formed their own plan for surmounting the difficulty. They wanted French territory, but they did not want either French fellow citizens or French subjects, who might, in conjunction with disaffected Danes and Poles, cause them more domestic trouble than they could conveniently cope with. Consequently they proposed that the French inhabitants of whatever parts of France they annexed should be expropriated at the cost of the French Government—the necessary payments being a part of the war indemnity. It is a suggestion worth remembering in case it should some day be convenient to quote it against its authors ; but it will suffice, in the meantime, to note two reasons why the principles which normally determine the desirability of annexations may need to be qualified in the present instance.

1. Strategical considerations cannot be altogether ignored. The future peace of the world may depend upon them ; and the future peace of the world is so important that the sentiments of a frontier population cannot be allowed to stand in the way of it. Faced by a choice of evils, we must choose the lesser.

2. The French, unlike the Germans, have shown that they are able, first to conciliate, and then to absorb the people of an annexed territory. They have done so in the case of Roussillon and Savoy ; and there is no reason to doubt their ability to do so in the case of any strip of German soil—provided that it were not too extensive—which might be assigned to them. French rule, indeed, was quite popular, in Napoleonic times, in the Rhine Provinces, and was hardly unpopular even in Berlin. An eyewitness tells us that, when Napoleon made his triumphal entry into the Prussian capital, ' a group of the ' citizens, acting in the best interests of the town, mingled their ' cheers with those of the French soldiers ' ; whereupon the Emperor remarked : ' Really, I do not know whether I ought ' to be pleased with such a success or ashamed of it.' And the

Prussian Streckfuss comments: 'It is impossible to convey 'an adequate idea of the obsequiousness of the population in 'its attitude towards the French.'

It seems to follow that we may safely draw a scientific frontier which will transform a certain number of Germans into Frenchmen, and need have little fear of thereby creating one of those open sores which never fail to break out when Germans are set to rule over men of other races. It might be otherwise if too large a portion of Germany had to change hands; but a fairly moderate transference will suffice. For a considerable distance the scientific frontier is the Rhine frontier. It has been the actual frontier often enough and long enough for French influences to have been felt and appreciated by the inhabitants of what is now German territory to the west of it. It is, for a reason which will presently appear, the barrier behind which it is necessary to confine Germany in order that those Prussian ambitions which justly alarmed Talleyrand may cease to be a public nuisance and a menace to civilisation.

That the natural limits of France are the Alps, the Pyrenees, and the Rhine, is one of the commonplaces of historical geography; and it may be added that the Rhine is the most natural limit of the three because, while there may be many opinions as to the best dividing line in a mountainous frontier, there can be only one opinion as to the course of a straightforward river. Hence the emphasis with which both statesmen and writers have insisted upon the Rhine frontier. 'Without the Rhine,' wrote Bonald, 'France is incomplete 'and lacks stability.' According to Napoleon the Rhine frontier is 'a divine decree.' Barthélemy's instructions for the Bâle negotiations, in 1795, included the statement that 'the Republic regards the Rhine as the natural frontier which 'it is resolved to maintain.' The German Förster, of Mannheim, at about the same date, took the same view. 'The Rhine,' he declared in a manifesto addressed to his compatriots, 'ought, in conformity with justice, to be the frontier of France.' Indeed, the idea became so deeply rooted in the provinces concerned that, in 1815, we find the Prussians combating it in characteristic Prussian style. 'His Excellency, the Governor,' says a report of that date of the French Director of the Geislautern School of Mines, 'has issued an edict to the effect that

'anyone who suggests the Rhine or the Sarre as a suitable 'frontier for France will be punished as a disturber of the 'public peace.'

Some French megalomaniacs in the past may have wanted the Rhine to be the frontier from Bâle as far as the sea, so that they might possess Antwerp and thence point a pistol at the heart of England; but there was no real public sentiment behind that extravagant demand. 'The inhabitants of those 'countries,' said Charles V.—he spoke of the territory which successively constituted the Spanish Netherlands, the Austrian Netherlands, the United Netherlands, and the Kingdoms of Belgium and Holland—' could never endure the domination of 'foreigners.' The Frenchman is just as much a foreigner to them as the German or the Spaniard, albeit a foreigner of more sympathetic character. The French know these feelings, and have long admitted them to be reasonable; and no French Government has entertained designs hostile to Belgian independence since the lapse of negotiations on the subject between Bismarck and Napoleon III. Whatever may have been the grandiose dreams of past chauvinists aspiring after European hegemony the present aspirations are much more moderate.

M. Engerand, in the book placed at the head of this article, urges that the Rhine frontier should extend northwards as far as the confluence of the Rhine and the Moselle. The greater part of the territory here involved consists of the provinces annexed by Germany in 1871, and about that there is no dispute. The rest consists of the triangular block of territory lying north of the French frontier of 1870, and wedged in between the Moselle and the Rhine. This region, according to M. Engerand, derives more of its civilisation from Latin than from Teutonic sources. It has historical links with France, dating back to days before the Revolution. France had, of old, the right of raising troops in the ecclesiastical electorates and duchies; and Louis XV. had in his pay twenty-five German regiments, levied among peoples who were proud to call themselves 'the Germans of France.' Consequently, when the revolutionary wars brought the French up to this part of the Rhine, the Germans were glad to see them. Goethe's testimony on the subject is famous:

'The French arrived. They seemed to come as friends, and, in fact, they did come as friends. Their souls were uplifted, and

they joyously planted the gay trees of liberty. All people, they promised, should have their rights, and should govern themselves. They soon conquered the esteem of the men by their valiant adventurousness and the hearts of the women by their irresistible fascination. The weight of war and its exigencies seemed light to us. Hope for the future floated before our eyes and drew our gaze towards the newly opened paths.'

Communes made haste to pass resolutions proclaiming their union with France. The resolution passed by the Commune of Saint-Jean, near Sarrebruck, which is now in the French Archives, may be cited as an example of them all :

'Let our union, as pure as it is inviolable, be made known to the nation which to-day adopts us and associates us with its great destinies. Making, henceforward, one family with that nation, united in heart and affection to France, our mother country, we shall, for the future, have one mind, one will, one interest with her. Thus shall we live bound together in the principles of liberty and equality.'

A population with such sentiments might, it is clear, have been absorbed into France without difficulty. The French Commissioner, Roberjot, who was sent to study the provinces, reported to that effect :

'The French language is in common use there, and has become better known since the entrance of the armies of the Republic. There is no more difference between these provinces and our nation than there is between our northern and southern departments. Their manners and customs differ from ours, it is true, but they are even better adapted than our own manners and customs to the Republican form of government.'

That things are still quite like that in the Rhine Provinces of Germany even M. Engerand does not venture to affirm. They are so, no doubt, in Lorraine and the greater part of Alsace ; but elsewhere the war of 1870, the consciousness of German unity, and the carefully nurtured faith in German destiny have made a difference which it would be affectation to ignore. Still, even so, the inhabitants of these Rhine Provinces neither hate the French as the Prussians do, nor admire the Prussians quite as much as the Prussians admire themselves. The common saying—common even in Berlin—that every Prussian policeman ought to be sent for a year to the Rhine Provinces to learn politeness is a small indication of a great difference of national character.

But probably few Frenchmen will follow M. Engerand in suggesting that the new French frontier should be advanced so far north as the confluence of the Rhine and Moselle. The district which, on economic grounds, France ought to acquire to the north of her frontier of 1870, namely, the basin of the Sarre, is comparatively small, and the nationality problem will therefore be relatively easy to solve. The French certainly do not want to take a leaf out of the German book, and expel the German population of Lorraine or of the Sarre basin, as we have seen the Germans threatening to expel the population of certain conquered sections of France. At the most they would only desire to get rid of the industrial and commercial magnates, in order that they might suffer no longer from the amiable German methods of peaceful penetration. But they must have not only Lorraine but also the Sarre basin if the world is to be secured against a future incursion of the barbarians. As M. Engerand puts it : 'The (present) Lorraine 'frontier is what has constituted, and still constitutes, the 'strength of Germany.' Germany with that frontier is, and would remain, strong ; pushed back to the Rhine on the east and beyond the Sarre on the north she will be relatively weak, and doomed to continue weak for as long a time as one can foresee.

It is a question of mines : in the first place, of the iron mines of Lorraine, and, in the second place, of the coal mines of the Sarre which serve for the exploitation of those iron mines. The coal mines were acquired in 1815, and the iron mines in 1871. Each acquisition marked a definite stage in the increase of German power. The importance of both acquisitions was clearly realised in Germany at the time ; but its full effect was only revealed, even there, by some of the surprises of the present war.

The war has brought many surprises ; but the chief of them has been the importance of metallurgy to its operations. Munitions are obviously wanted in all wars ; but, in this war, they have been required on a scale which has seriously taxed the industrial, and, above all, the metallurgical resources of all the belligerent countries. Nobody foresaw the extent of the demand—the Germans no more than their rivals. They, on their part, expected a short war, believed themselves to have made ample provision for it, and consequently mobilised many

of their miners, and closed down a considerable proportion of their blast-furnaces. The course of events, however, quickly showed them, as well as us, what were the real sinews of war, and in what quantities they must be provided; and even before we and the French and the Russians had organised our Ministries of Munitions, they had sent their miners back to work, and renewed their metallurgical activities. The fact was established, so clearly that no one could fail to understand it, that metallurgical hegemony spelt victory.

To a certain extent, indeed, the German military authorities had looked ahead. They had foreseen something, though they had not foreseen everything. They knew that iron was important, no less than fats, and nitrates, and copper, and nickel, and that defeat awaited whichever army was caught short of it; but they expected that calamity to overtake the French, long before their own accumulations approached exhaustion. The frontier ran through the middle of the Lorraine iron deposits; and nine-tenths of the metallurgical industries of the whole of France were concentrated in the Briey basin just across the frontier. If, the Germans argued, the Briey basin were seized at the beginning of the war, the French would have lost more than a battle, because they would be deprived of the means of recuperation, and the Germans, on their part, would have gained 'a victory without a morrow.'

What they expected very nearly happened. The Briey basin was duly seized; the victory of the Marne, though a glorious feat of arms, did not recover it, and might, therefore, very easily have turned out to be a victory of the kind called Pyrrhic.

'France, though victorious,' writes M. Engerand, 'found herself nevertheless without munitions and material, and without the means of producing them in the quantities made requisite by the turn which the war was taking—deprived of 90 per cent. of her iron ore, 68 per cent. of her coal, 86 per cent. of her resources for the production of cast iron, and 76 per cent. of her power of turning out steel and iron plates. Of 127 blast furnaces in active operation in 1913, 95 were in the war zone and in the possession of the enemy. She had, besides, been obliged to abandon to Germany enormous stocks of cast iron, steel billets, and iron plate. At Valenciennes the Germans found immense supplies of horseshoes, of which they then stood very much in need.'

So the Germans were able to boast, even after they had run

back to their trenches. 'The economic production of France,' said Herr Schrodter, at the annual general meeting of the Verein Deutscher Eisenhuttenleute, 'is seriously damaged, and, in-'deed, in a large measure annihilated.' It was true; but the boast overlooked one little fact. The British Navy was afloat, and had secured for the French the freedom of the seas. The victory of the Marne had at least gained precious time. Supplies were poured into France from England and the United States; the French talent for improvised organisation came into play; the war became, to an extent not contemplated by any of the combatants, a long drawn struggle of competitive metallurgy. The Germans, no less than ourselves, realised that fact, as appears from a confidential memorandum addressed to Herr von Bethmann-Hollweg, on May 20, 1915, by the representatives of six important industrial associations:

'The manufacture of our shells calls for iron and steel in quantities hitherto unsuspected. Merely for the shells of *fonte grise*, which are inferior substitutes for the shells of *fonte d'acier* and *acier étiré*, we have required, during the last few months, 4000 tons of iron per day. If our production of iron and steel had not been doubled since last August, it would have been impossible to continue the war. As raw material for the manufacture of these immense quantities of iron and steel, the "*minette*" (*i.e.* the ore of the Lorraine mines) takes a place of continually increasing importance; for this is the only ore which we can get out of our mines in continually increasing quantities. From 60 to 80 per cent. of our iron and steel is, at present, being made from the *minette*. If the production of the *minette* were interrupted, the war would be as good as lost.'

There could be no clearer admission that modern war, when waged on a large scale, between antagonists of approximately equal power, is mainly a matter of metallurgy. Hence the importance of determining the difference which the shifting of the present frontier eastwards to the Rhine would make to the metallurgical resources of the countries concerned. In round figures, according to M. Engerand, the amount of iron ore produced in 1913 was:

	Tons.
Germany	29,000,000
France	22,000,000

But, as has been pointed out, nine-tenths of the French iron ore is in the Briey basin; and the Briey basin is now in

German hands. It is the avowed ambition of the Germans to keep it. If they were allowed to keep it, our revised estimates would be, roughly :

	Tons.
Germany	46,000,000
France	4,000,000

On the other hand, according to the Comité des Forges, quoted by M. Engerand, of the 29,000,000 tons of iron ore raised in Germany, 21,000,000 tons come from Lorraine. The restoration of Lorraine to France would transfer that annual production of iron ore from Germany to France ; and we should get this fresh set of figures :

	Tons.
France	43,000,000
Germany	8,000,000

But in order to treat iron ore, coal is required in large quantities. Both Germany and England possess a super-abundance of coal, France has an insufficient supply. That is why it is essential that France, in addition to recovering Lorraine, should also acquire the Sarre basin with its rich deposits of coal. According to M. Engerand the annual output of the Sarre basin is about 16,000,000 tons. Even this would not entirely suffice, but would go a long way towards enabling France to retain her iron ore and develop her own iron industries, instead of feeding those of Germany.

All these facts, of course, are perfectly well known in Germany ; and all these calculations have been made there. That is the explanation of the mysterious talk about ' war ' aims '—which are continually being discussed, though people are supposed to be forbidden to discuss them—and of the bitterly intransigeant attitude of the National Liberals in general and the armour-platers in particular. The commercial and financial people in Germany—the people, for instance, for whom the *Berliner Tageblatt* speaks—are only moderately bellicose in tone. If they are not quite so eager for peace as the social democrats, at least they do not seem to have any insuperable objection to cutting their losses and making the best of a bad job. The iron-masters and armour-platers, however, are even more chauvinistic than the Junkers, though for a different reason. With the Junkers, it is mainly a matter of affronted pride and baffled military ambition ; they have

always regarded themselves as a conquering caste, and will not submit if they can help it. With these others it is really a question, as they are always saying, of ' to be or not to be.' Victory means for them the metallurgical hegemony of Europe, if not of the world ; defeat—above all, if there is something in the way of a boycott to follow—means the practical extinction of the industries which have enriched them. They are like men who have caught a glimpse of the Promised Land, and then been warned off it and told to return to the wilderness. They do not want to return to the wilderness ; they would rather fight with their backs to the wall. So they join the Junkers in the endeavour to stiffen the Chancellor's attitude ; and they do this with the more obstinacy and desperation because they feel themselves at the culminating stage of a struggle which has been proceeding for more than a century.

Issue may be said to have been first joined when the attempt of the Prussians to interfere with the French Revolution brought the French up to the Rhine, and, temporarily, beyond it, as far as Frankfort-on-the-Main. In the sixth year of the Republic, four new departments were constituted : Mont-Tonnerre, containing Mayence and Spiers ; Rhine and Moselle, containing Coblenz and Bonn ; Roer, containing Aix-la-Chapelle, Cologne, Clèves, and Crefeld ; Sarre, containing Trèves and Sarrebruck. Reports concerning the mineral wealth of the country having been received from administrative officials, experts were instructed to procure more detailed information and consider the best means of developing the newly acquired resources. Perhaps the means adopted were not the best which could have been devised ; but the policy of the Directorate was improved under the Consulate and the Empire. A practical School of Mines was established at Geislautern. Prospectors and cartographers were set to work. An elaborate geological atlas of the district, consisting of sixty-six sheets, was prepared. The Emperor found time to inspect it in 1812 while on his way to catastrophe at Moscow, ; and it is interesting to find the Geislautern Director recommending the adoption of the methods of Essen.

That was the state of affairs when the First Empire fell and the diplomatists proceeded to talk about the rectification of the frontiers. The French negotiators lacked the wise prescience with which they have sometimes been credited.

Louis XVIII. seems to have felt that it would be undignified for the Monarchy to retain territory which the Republic had acquired. Talleyrand knew nothing about mines, and was more concerned to paralyse Prussia by sowing discord in Germany than to haggle about coals. Moreover, Napoleon's return from Elba interrupted the negotiations and placed France at a further disadvantage when they were renewed after Waterloo. Consequently, the frontier provisionally drawn in 1814 gave Prussia a considerable portion of the Sarre basin ; while the definite frontier of 1815 ceded a further strip.

Prussia had asked for still more, and no doubt would have got more if it had not been for the opposition of Alexander of Russia and Pozzo Borgo who denounced the Prussian claims as ' a masterpiece of destruction.' But though the Prussians could not get everything that they asked for, they were firm on the matter of the coal fields ; and there is sufficient evidence that they desired them *qua* coal fields and not merely *qua* territory. A certain Von Gruner walked in and seized them before the Treaty of Paris was signed ; and the Geislautern Director's Report of his proceedings, already referred to, shows that his methods were of the high-handed Prussian sort :

' His commission has particular reference to the Geislautern organisation. He is charged to carry off everything which is or might be for sale—in short everything—and to make use immediately of all our raw material—such as coal, pig-iron, and ore. He came here last Saturday, and gave the orders which I have the honour to report to you, adding that he forbade us to communicate with the French authorities on pain of being sent to Coblenz and there punished for disobedience to the allied powers. His Excellency the Governor has further issued a decree to the effect that anyone who suggests the Rhine or the Sarre as a suitable frontier for France will be punished as a disturber of the public peace.'

It was no doubt in the course of this occupation that the Prussians completed their study of the ground, and as the result of the knowledge thus acquired that they defined their claims in the following year. The most that the French Government could do was to cede some of the mines and foundries to private owners, from whom the Prussian State promptly purchased them ; and the next chapter in the history concerns the battle for the Geislautern Atlas.

One of the patriotic Geislautern students had carried it off, and a patriotic porcelain manufacturer, named Villeruy, had hidden it at Sarrelouis. The Prussian authorities searched for it in vain, and then demanded that the French Government should find it for them and hand it over to them, claiming that the terms of the Treaty entitled them to all documents of the kind. As a matter of fact, the Treaty only entitled them to documents of a date anterior to the French occupation of the country ; but they insisted upon their own interpretation of their rights, and the French were not in a position to refuse the demand. The negotiations dragged on for more than a year ; but at last, on July 30, 1817, the atlas was surrendered, and a receipt was given for it. Then the Prussians exploited their coal fields with the help of the French maps, while the French searched for coal on their own side of the frontier, and found some, though not as much, by any means, as they could have wished.

Germany, however, needed not only coal but also iron ; and as she had conquered coal fields at Waterloo, so she was to conquer iron mines at Sedan. It does not appear that she set out to conquer them, or that her soldiers knew exactly what they had conquered. At all events, their topographical knowledge was incomplete ; and while Moltke was more concerned with strategical considerations than with industrial values, even Bismarck does not seem at first to have grasped all the industrial possibilities of the situation. A fuller perception of them, however, came to him in the course of the discussion ; and he left himself a loophole for further acquisitions in the stipulation that 'Belfort shall remain French, together with an 'adjoining strip of territory, to be delimited hereafter.'

Here, obviously, was an opportunity for reopening questions supposed to be closed, and springing fresh demands for advantages which had inadvertently been overlooked ; and that opportunity was duly seized. The preliminary settlement of February 26, 1871, following Moltke's famous 'green line' on the map, had left France the region of Aumetz, and the important mineral beds of Ottange, Villerupt, and Audun-le-Tiche ; and it is believed that Bismarck was warned of his oversight by the indiscreet exultation of the inhabitants. At any rate, the delimitation of the Belfort perimeter gave him his chance of repairing his error ; and he then proposed to

take over the seventeen communes involved, and give in exchange for them the cantons of Belfort, Delle, and Giromagny.

The offer looked plausible. The communes demanded contained only 7000 inhabitants ; in the cantons offered there were 27,000. Moreover, Belfort barred the gap between the Vosges and the Jura. That was how Thiers saw things.

'It is by Belfort,' he told the National Assembly, 'that German armies will pass in order to get at the south of France ; and if Swiss neutrality should ever be violated, it is also by way of Belfort that the enemies' forces would invade us. Belfort, then, is the gate of France. It is even more important than Strassburg used to be. When one has lost Strassburg, one must keep Belfort.'

So he instructed Jules Favre to make all the concessions required in order to retain Belfort ; and the situation was only saved in part by the adroitness of Jules Favre's coadjutor, Pouyer-Quertier—a negotiator in whom Bismarck met his match.

'Prince,' said the ingenious Norman, 'I give you my word of honour that I should never have tried to make you a Frenchman, and here are you trying to make me a German.' 'What do you mean ? I don't understand you. You are a Norman. No one is talking of annexing Normandy.' 'I am one of the principal shareholders in the Villerupt blast furnaces, so, you see, you are making me a German.' 'Very well. You may dry your tears. I will leave you Villerupt. But don't ask me for anything else, or I shall take it back again.'

So five of the seventeen mining communes were saved for France, but there nevertheless were those who understood that France had made a disastrous bargain. General Charreton opposed the agreement in a speech which showed a sound appreciation of its consequences :

'If one reflects,' he said, 'that, by the disastrous treaties of 1815, Prussia not only deprived us of the fortresses of Sarrelouis and Landau, but also of the magnificent coal mines of Sarrebruck, and that, to-day, after having already taken Stiring-Wendel, Ottange, Hayange, and Moyeuvre, she also wishes to lay her hands on the rich mineral area of which Aumetz is the centre, it is not difficult to foresee that, with all these means at her disposal, Germany will immediately be in a position to manufacture prodigious quantities of iron at the cheapest possible rate, to compete even with England in all the European markets, and to ruin,

in spite of any prohibitions and tariffs which the French Government may set up, the entire metallurgical industry of a country which has hitherto been advantageously situated.'

Seldom has an economic prediction been more literally fulfilled. The French, for lack of the coal which they lost in 1815, have had to sell to Germany, instead of exploiting for their own advantage, a great deal even of the iron which was left to them after the territorial cessions of 1871. The Germans have advanced by leaps and bounds until their only formidable competitor is the United States. In order to vie with this last rival, they must augment their mineral resources by stealing more of the French mines; and that is what they have loudly announced their intention of doing. Some proofs of their designs have already been cited in the course of this article; others may now be added. One of the most lucid and candid of the witnesses is Professor Hermann Schumacher of Bonn, who expresses himself as follows:

'Above all, we must assure ourselves the possession of all the raw materials necessary to the industries of war, and must take them away from our enemies. Without the ore raised in Lorraine, we should not be able to produce the iron and steel necessary to the conduct of the war. The Treaty of Frankfort gave us the whole of Lorraine; but a mistake was then committed, owing to the ignorance of the geologists whom Bismarck consulted. Contrary to Bismarck's expectations, it has been known since 1880 that the basin of Briey, which is a continuation of that of Longwy, is one of the richest parts of France. To-day we are able to correct this error, seeing that we seized, at the beginning of the war, and now hold firmly in our hands, the second essential of war industries, which is coal. Just as we should be unable to continue the war without the wealth of the soil of Lorraine, so we should be unable to conduct it to a victorious conclusion if we were not in possession of the rich coal fields of Belgium and the north of France. Now that we know all that munitions mean in war, we may say that it is essential to the life of our people, both for peace and for war, to monopolise these sources of commercial and belligerent strength.'

That is the programme in outline. For the details we have to refer to the manifesto of those six great industrial associations which laid their views before the Chancellor in May 1915. One cannot dismiss the spokesmen of those associations as irresponsible windbags, for the *Berliner Tageblatt* has said, and has been suppressed for saying, that the war is being

protracted for their benefit. They, no less than the Junkers, are the men who have given Pangermanism its driving-power; and no one can complain either that they do not know what they want, or that they are too modest to ask for it. They begin with the charmingly cynical remark that 'protection 'is no longer to be found in treaties which are sure to be 'trampled under foot again at the first opportune moment'; they go on, therefore, to insist upon 'economic and military 'guarantees'; and they conclude with a specification of their requirements. It is as well to have these before us.

1. In the first place they want Belgium.

'Because it is necessary to assure our position on the sea, and our future military and economic situation *vis-à-vis* of England, and because the Belgian territory, which is economically of great importance, is closely linked up with our principal industrial regions, Belgium must, in so far as matters of finance, currency, and postal services are concerned, come under the administration of the German Empire.'

2. In the second place, because their future is on the water, and because they want to be able to point pistols at the heart of England, they require 'the coasts of France from the 'Belgian frontier to the mouth of the Somme—there or there-'abouts.'

3. Coasts obviously suggest hinterlands: 'The hinterland 'must extend far enough back to give the ports in which the 'canals terminate their full strategic and economic impor-'tance.' And this means—the dots are put on the i's—'the 'confiscation of the French coal fields of the Departments of 'the Nord and Pas-de-Calais.'

4. 'The security of the Empire in a future war imperatively 'requires that we should be in possession of all the mines of '*minette*.' It follows that it will be necessary to confiscate 'the mining districts of Meurthe-et-Moselle.'

5. Because the blast furnaces of Esch,* Dudelange, and some others, are commanded by the guns of Longwy, the fortress of Longwy must be ceded.

6. Because the mines of Jarny, Conflans, &c., could be reached by a long-range gun from Verdun, it is further

* Esch is in Luxemburg. There also the Germans evidently contemplate annexations.

necessary to annex Verdun—' without which they could not ' be adequately defended.'

7. For no particular reason except that it is, on general principles, desirable to weaken France, Belfort and the western slopes of the Vosges must be annexed.

That is well thought out and explicit. It is the scheme neither of soldiers, to whom glory is an end in itself, nor of barbarians who lose their heads at the sight of loot, but of men of business, who clearly understand the secret of the rapid growth of German power and the conditions on which the further expansion of Germany depends. They perceive that, by seizing the hegemony of the metal industries, they could acquire the hegemony of the world. And not only acquire it, but retain it, because modern war depends upon metallurgy. The significance of the formidable plan has been grasped even in Italy; for we find Signor Guglielmo Ferrero writing in the ' Secolo ' on March 29, 1915 :—

' If German metallurgy were to absorb Belgian metallurgy and the greater part of French metallurgy, there would remain only three peoples in the world engaged in the iron industry: the Americans on the other side of the Atlantic, the Germans in the heart of continental Europe, and the English in their little island. Who cannot see that German power would then lay its grip on the whole world? All the industries which require iron would then be dependent upon Central Europe. This Empire would be able to equip the most powerful army in the world, with the exception of the Russian. All the other continental nations would disappear from the sea, which the navy and the mercantile marine of Germany would dominate; and then Germany would make her preparations for snatching the trident from England. In these facts probably lies the secret of the fury with which the German people took up arms, and the stoicism with which they have, so far, endured the terrible bloodshed.'

That the German masses ever dreamed a dream involving so much arithmetic and so intimate a knowledge of commercial geography is perhaps improbable; but the National Liberals not only dreamed it in the first hour of exultation, but stubbornly went on dreaming it, long after level-headed people, not directly interested in their projects, had recognised that the dream could not be realised. And that stubbornness also has its explanation. These people knew not only what they stood to gain, but also what they stood to lose. They hoped

to gain—and they consequently feared to lose—not only as Germans, but as individuals. The following item in the programme—referred to earlier in the article—contains the proof :

> ' These proposals for the acquisition of territory are based upon the assumption, necessitated by our experiences in Alsace and Lorraine, that the population of the annexed regions will not be allowed to exercise any political influence over the destinies of the German Empire, and that all the sources of economic power situated therein—including both large properties and the properties of persons of moderate means—will pass into German hands. France will have to indemnify the proprietors and allow them to emigrate to France.'

The men who put forward that proposal naturally fear lest others should do to them what they intended to do to others. Whether it will be necessary for their conquerors to adopt the extreme measure which they contemplated remains to be seen ; but the proposal, at any rate, contains a useful hint as to the means of dealing with them which they themselves feel would be most effective. They must be given a frontier which will deprive them of the iron mines they formerly took from France, and of the adjacent coalfields necessary to work those mines. Further, as a necessary measure of military precaution, the frontier must be so fixed with regard to the configuration of the ground as to constitute a barrier which will prevent the Germans from seizing either the iron mines or the coal mines by a *coup-de-main.*

If that is done, a good many of the problems which are now the subject of keen discussion will be simplified. The military problem will be simplified by the fact that Germany will not have enough iron ever again to make a bid for the hegemony of Europe. The commercial problem will be simplified by the fact that Germany will be dependent upon her neighbours for the raw material of those industries in which her competition has been most formidable and her ' dumping ' most methodical and unscrupulous.

FRANCIS GRIBBLE.

POPULATION AND THE LAND

1. **Decline in the Agricultural Population.** Report by the Board of Agriculture. 1906.
2. **Migration from Rural Districts.** Report by the Board of Agriculture. 1913.
3. **Problems of Village Life.** By E. N. Bennett. 1914.
4. **English Agricultural Wages.** By Reginald Lennard. 1914.
5. **Agriculture after the War.** By A. D. Hall. Murray. 1916.

TWO important demands are arising out of the situation of the war in relation to agriculture: the first that Great Britain shall become more of a self-supporting country in regard to food supplies, the second that a greater proportion of the population shall be employed on the land. Some people are rashly assuming that these demands are one and the same, without any reference to history or to the principles of production in agriculture. But these two demands may be, indeed often are, at variance. The main situation is that Great Britain is now an industrial country. For more than a century her industrial and consuming population has been growing; for more than half a century her agricultural and primary food-producing population has been diminishing. Confining comparison with previous censuses to male and female farmers and graziers and male farm workers, excluding farmers' relatives under fifteen years of age, we have the following figures *:

Food-Producing Population.

	Number.	Inc. or Dec. per Cent.
1851	1,482,007	
1861	1,456,015	− 1·8
1871	1,264,335	−13·2
1881	1,148,814	− 9·1
1891	1,065,494	− 7·3
1901	939,437	−11·8
1911	986,340	+ 5·0

* Census of Occupations, Cd. 7018, 1914, p. xlvi.

It will be seen that from 1861 to 1871 the decline was more rapid and of greater importance in total number affected than in any subsequent decade ; yet this was a period of prosperity in the industry. About 1850 there was undoubtedly a surplus of labour in many agricultural counties ; and as the building of the railways at once familiarised many rural labourers with industrial employment and gave them greater facilities for migrating, some general movement towards the industrial areas and the colonies occurred. After 1850 some improvements in implements and machinery were also made. The reaper was brought from America in 1851, steam was applied to the plough in 1857, and there was a general increase in the application of steam to barn-machinery, although much threshing was still done with the flail. Perhaps the most important development was that many common implements became lighter in draft, more efficient and adaptable. But on the whole it is wise not to overrate the actual saving of labour by machinery up to 1870.

From 1871 the rate of decline in the number of people engaged on the land was slower, although the influence of bad seasons and influx of foreign produce was felt towards the end of the decade. At the beginning of the ' seventies ' the wire binder for corn harvesting, and at the end the string binder, were brought to England. During this decade implements became still more adaptable and efficient, the use of machinery for hay and corn harvesting became more common, and a large amount of ploughing was done by steam-power. Up to the beginning of the ' seventies ' agriculture had been a prosperous and expanding occupation, but from the middle of the ' seventies ' agriculture began to decline in prosperity, a diminution of the arable area set in and has continued to the present day.

In 1906 the Board of Agriculture sent to its numerous correspondents a schedule of inquiry on the reasons for the decline in agricultural population. Important amongst the reasons given in the replies was the decline in arable area and cereal production ; or, as it was sometimes expressed, ' owing to ' the low price of corn, tillage has been laid to grass and less ' labour is required.' Subsequent experience has proved that the diminution of arable area alone is not sufficient to account for the decline in agricultural population. Since 1871 the most rapid decline occurred between 1891 and 1901, when the

area of arable land, and number of cattle and sheep, were all falling ; while from 1901 to 1911, when arable land was still disappearing and cattle and sheep were increasing, agricultural population increased by some 5 per cent. The population was not so much affected by the area of the arable land as by the total production of all cultivated land, including both crops and grass. Nevertheless it is certain that future increase in employment on farms largely depends upon the area under the plough. During the last census period ' there were altogether ' twenty-five counties in which the recorded rate of increase ' for male farm workers was above the average for England ' and Wales, and in nearly every case the increase of workers ' is associated with an increase either in tillage or dairying.' * This had been noticed in several districts before the census returns were collected, and it is well known that the increase in farm workers was more notable in areas in which vegetable-growing, fruit-growing, and intensive dairying were practised.

Sir R. H. Rew, the compiler of the Report on Decline in the Agricultural Population, states emphatically that ' while ' manual labour has no doubt been economised to some extent ' by curtailing some of the operations which require it, the ' main cause of the reduction is undoubtedly the extended ' use of labour-saving machinery.' Up to the time this report was issued the great development in labour-saving machinery had been in the adoption of machinery for harvesting hay, corn, and potatoes ; and in the extended use of power for barn-machinery, including besides threshing machines, trussing machines, with others for preparing foods. Drills, horse-hoes, and other implements had undergone still further improvement. For the sheep-farmer had come the shearing machine, and for the dairy farmer the centrifugal separator and the milking machine. Dairy machinery is not important in the matter of saving labour on the farm. In some cases the instalment of the separator meant more labour for male workers, while the number of milking machines was unimportant. The chief labour-savers were the various harvesting machines. These had reduced the number of extra men required at certain seasons by 50 to 75 per cent. or even more. Since 1906 further developments and the wider adoption of

* Census of Occupations, Cd. 7018, 1914, p. 1.

these machines have again reduced the number of men required; or, to be more accurate in regard to some counties, the absence of extra labour has forced farmers to adopt these machines. On the other hand it is probable that much less steam-power was used in cultivation than was the case in the 'seventies' and 'eighties' of the last century.

During the last census period migration and emigration continued while population generally was increasing. In the report prepared by the Board of Agriculture on Migration from Rural Districts it is stated that 'agriculture in this 'country is not an expanding industry capable of absorbing 'the natural increase of population.' And again:

'The concurrence of the natural increase of population with a reduced demand (except in a few limited districts) for labour on the land obviously implies chronic migration from rural districts. It is difficult, under existing conditions, to regard as probable the employment in agriculture of a normal increase of, say, 10 per cent. each decennium, and the question is rather whether sufficient employment can be found to prevent in all districts an actual reduction in the agricultural population.'

The question here posed has to some extent been answered by the publication of the Census of Occupations. In every English county except Lancashire the returns showed an increase in farm labourers, varying from 1 to 10 per cent.; although in nine counties there were small decreases in the number of farmers and graziers. But the essential question remains, how can the land provide sufficient employment, yielding an adequate reward, for the normal increase of rural population, to say nothing of an organised increase?

Before an attempt to discuss this question is made some other stated causes for the decline in rural population must be considered. The causes affecting the demand for labour, namely, a decline in agricultural production and the increasing use of labour-saving machinery, have been mentioned. The causes affecting the supply as given in the two reports quoted are as follows:

(*a*) Higher wages and superior social advantages afforded by other industries, and superior attraction of town life.

(*b*) Absence of reasonable prospect of advancement in life. This may be taken to include the subject of small holdings and allotments.

(*c*) Deficiency of cottages, often of mere number, but generally deficiency in quality.

(*d*) Increasing desire of labourers to leave the land, sometimes due to 'simple restlessness and mere rebellion.'

(*e*) All these causes are more or less aggravated by the prevailing type of rural education.

In the last report it was stated that

'the special peculiarity of the present "rural exodus" is that the normal movement to the towns and to industrial life—which has perhaps rather diminished than increased—is supplemented to so large an extent by a movement to the overseas Dominions. This accelerated emigration is attributed to several causes, the most generally mentioned being the activity of emigration agents in advertising the allurements of colonial life. These agents appeal to a generation which has become accustomed to the modern disregard of distance. Canada to-day seems as near to the young countryman as London did to his father. The freer life, the easy facilities for becoming a landowner, the wider scope for energy and enterprise, and the higher wages for manual labour are the prospects which appear to be the chief inducements to our rural population to emigrate.'

But while it is true that the ground has been prepared for the emigration agent by the combined causes affecting the demand for and supply of labour, it is important to remember that—with the possible exception of slightly increasing production—all those conditions remain; and that the land of England must still compete with the land of the Dominions for the available supply of labour. Further, the land of the Dominions can accommodate an increase of population without the risk of such disorganisation as would occur in England if we were to attempt to establish small holdings on a vast scale.

As regards migration from country to town it is notorious that our industrial centres are able to offer agricultural labourers higher wages, together with freer and more varied conditions of life than they could enjoy on the land. The freer and more varied life of the towns is, it must be added, to a large extent the result of the higher wages. These higher wages can be paid because the production per man is increased by the use of machinery and mechanical power, and by the direction of efficient managers. In town industries total output per head and average earnings are both higher than in agriculture. Again, in the colonies higher output per man is

made possible not by intensive but by ' extensive ' cultivation, combined with a fuller use of machinery and mechanical power than in our own farming operations. Similar causes have produced similar results in England also. From 1871 to 1901 the number of labourers fell approximately 30 per cent., while total production probably fell only about 10 per cent.* In other words, the decline in the numbers of persons employed on the land, combined with the extended use of machinery, produced a higher output per man. In the long run it is not possible to increase remuneration without first improving production, unless extraneous forces raise the value of produce. Where the latter event occurs the whole body of consumers has to suffer for the benefit of a particular group of producers. In 1907 it was estimated that the total output per person engaged in agriculture in England only amounted to £90 per annum. On this basis the industry cannot pay wages, salaries, and interest on capital invested so as to be able to compete with other industries or with the colonies for these factors of production. Not only have labourers both migrated to the towns and emigrated to the colonies but there has been considerable migration and emigration of young farmers from some districts, and it is well known that many, perhaps most, students of English agricultural colleges emigrate to the colonies and possessions.

It was a good sign that in the years 1913 and 1914 the labourers partly relinquished their traditional method of meeting the difficulty of low wages by migration, and adopted organised efforts to raise rates of pay. There were organised disputes during those years in several counties, including Norfolk, Essex, Somerset, Northampton, Cheshire, and Lancashire. Disputes may not be welcomed by some people, but from the point of view of maintaining rural population a conflict is better than the constant driving of men from the farms. If the economic advantages of agricultural employment are not sufficient to hold the workers on the land, country life does not offer the labourers any social advantage to counterbalance the initial economic drawback.

Next to the low economic return the most important cause of the labourers' migration is the absence of reasonable prospect

* Cf. A. D. Hall, ' Agriculture after the War,' p. 23.

of advancement in life. The boy who begins work on a farm at the age of twelve or thirteen years generally reaches the maximum of his advancement at twenty-five, and often before. He may begin with odd work in the stable or yard, sometimes as a boy with a team. As he gets older he is trusted to work horses himself. Perhaps later he may change his employment and become an attendant on cattle, or he may in many counties become an ordinary day-man or 'dataller.' After the age of twenty-five a few men who have gained experience obtain positions as shepherds, head-stockmen, or head-carters. But on farms up to 200 acres in size these positions do not carry much responsibility, and consequently little advance in social position. A few other labourers may advance to the position of farm foreman or bailiff. The number of these positions open to men was increasing from 1851 to 1901, but has since slightly declined. In 1851 the number was 10,561 ; in 1901, 22,623 ; and in 1911, 22,141. The increase in the number of these positions has been primarily due to the process of 'laying farm to farm,' by which separate farms, often lying at a distance apart, are occupied by one farmer, who needs a foreman on the farm distant from his residence ; and to the increase in smaller residential estates, the owners of which employ a bailiff to manage the land connected with the residence. The decline since 1901 may be due to the return of some farms to separate occupation. This development has undoubtedly created openings for some intelligent labourers, but the proportion of foremen and bailiffs to total employees is very small, and some of the positions are held by men who have been farmers, or their sons.

There is no other industry approaching agriculture in importance which opens for its employees so few positions of responsibility and trust. Apart from the possibility of rising from the position of mere labourer to that of one of control, or delegated control, there has been very little attempt consciously to evoke or foster the application of skill or intelligence to the work in hand. In almost every district there has been a tendency to pay standard rates to men of a given class, without reference to their particular value. On other grounds there is much to be said for the standard rate, but it certainly does not give the keen and enthusiastic worker encouragement to develop his knowledge and skill, and in an industry which holds

out few possibilities of movement from one class to another this is a great defect. In some respects the possibilities of obtaining special rates for special work have been reduced since 1880. In particular the demand for highly skilled hedgers, drainers, and thatchers who were once recruited from the class of daymen has largely disappeared, and as the old men retired few young men learned the work. This movement has more than counterbalanced the increase in the number of positions as bailiff or foreman open to labourers.

The proportion of labourers who can, apart from the Small Holdings Act, become small holders or farmers varies in different counties. In some parts of Devon and Cornwall where farms are small as many as 40 per cent. of the farmers have been labourers or are the sons of labourers. But taking England as a whole at least 70 per cent. of the farmers are of farming stock—i.e. descendants of men who have been employers in agriculture—and it would be rash to assume that the other 30 per cent. had been labourers or were sons of labourers. Many, perhaps most of them, are sons of other inhabitants of the countryside, particularly of tradesmen whose business is connected with agriculture. As distinct from farms, small holdings that have come into existence independently of the Small Holdings Act vary in number and proportion in different counties, the proportion being high in such counties as Cornwall, Cheshire, Lancashire, Holland Division of Lincolnshire, Staffordshire, Cambridgeshire, and Bedfordshire, where either dairying or market-gardening fostered these holdings.

Since 1908 the number of small holdings established by County Councils has also varied. In some counties the number of holdings would provide opportunities for advancement for as many as 6 or 7 per cent. of the labourers, in others less than 1 per cent. These holdings, too, tend to be more numerous in the market-gardening and dairying districts. But not nearly all the old small holdings or those recently established are sufficient to support a family, and many of the old-established small units are connected with other units to make a fairly large farm. Taking the country as a whole the Small Holdings Act has not provided opportunity to become controllers of land for more than 3 per cent. of the farm labourers, even if all holdings were occupied by erstwhile labourers, which is not the case. Perhaps some 4 per

cent. of the labourers can actually become small holders, and a few become larger farmers. Also about 2 per cent. can become bailiffs or foremen. But in any case not more than 7 or 8 per cent. can rise to positions of control of land, labour, and capital, while they remain in the industry; and for the majority of the remainder their positions and earnings are fixed by the standard of the class which they attain by the age of twenty-five or thirty years.

The shortage of cottages or the deficiency in quality of existing cottages cannot be separated from the question of economic return from the industry. Cottages are not built or improved because owners of land who provide cottage equipment cannot build so as to secure the current rate of return on the capital invested. Farm rents again are too low to cover the cost of new or better cottage equipment. In some cases, however, cottages have been improved as a matter of social duty. Investors in small property do not build or improve cottages for the occupation of farm labourers because the rate of wages for farm labourers does not provide a sufficient margin for payment for better houses. Where the difficulty is one of absolute shortage of cottages many complaints have been made against the restrictions of the local building bye-laws. But in the main the local rules are based on fair demands for a standard of housing under modern conditions; and in view of the general complaints as to the deficiency in quality it is useless to build cottages which will not meet the fair demands of the labourer and his wife.

The demands of the wife or prospective wife are of great importance in regard to cottages. It is not generally recognised by those in control of our agricultural industry that the migration of the brightest women from the countryside has been, if possible, more disastrous than the migration of men. Testimony to this migration is borne by many people. Mr. A. W. Pickard-Cambridge said in 1903: 'The men, and still 'more the women, refuse to live in such cottages as are avail-'able, or to marry if they are expected to live in them.' 'A 'much larger percentage of the men remain bachelors, and '"bachelors can put all their goods on their back and be off 'in an hour."'* Mr. E. N. Bennett says: 'The migration 'of village girls is still more marked; for economic or other

* Economic Review, October 1903.

'reasons they flock to "service" in the towns, and the young 'men follow these playmates of their boyhood.'* While Mr. Lennard states that 'the rural exodus has not reduced 'the male population so much as it has reduced the female 'population of the countryside,' and statistics support this view.† Unless the general conditions of country life are good enough to attract the brightest girls of the villages, the farmers will not be able to retain their brightest men as they reach marriageable age; nor can a decent standard of civilisation in rural areas be secured without the co-operation of intelligent and energetic women. And from the point of view of national health and vigour no advance will be made by inducing men to return to the land unless women of equal physical and mental stamina can also be induced to return to village homes. Superficially this is a problem of cottages and wages, but at bottom it is a question of the output of wealth per man in the industry and a reasonable division of the profits. State aid for housing and Wages Boards might effect much temporary reform, but unless the organisation of the agricultural industry provides for a rising standard of life approximately equal to that provided by progressive urban and semi-urban industries the problem of migration will recur again within a very short period.

Various causes produce what may be called 'general rest-'lessness' leading to migration from rural districts and the abandonment of farm work. Amongst these the 'seven-day 'week' is specially important. The demand for the Saturday half-holiday has become vocal during recent years. In the labour disputes which occurred in 1913 and 1914 it was one of the most prominent demands. Indeed in several districts where farming is carried on by modern methods and intelligent, trustworthy labour is essential to success, some farmers have made concessions to this demand without waiting for a dispute. On many estates there have been concessions to 'estate labour' because of the demand of artizans for the half-holiday. When artizans obtain the concession it must also be made to the labourers who attend them, and soon extends to wood-men, timber-yard men, and gardeners. In some cases the minimum

* Problems of Village Life, p. 63.
† English Agricultural Wages, pp. 34–36.

concession is made by providing for all 'estate labour' to leave at 4 P.M. instead of 5 or 5.30. On farms it is not impossible to organise work to provide something approaching a 'six-day 'week,' or even the shorter day on Saturday. On one large farm which is 'farmed to the hilt,' and carries a large herd of dairy cattle, it is the rule that every employee shall be able to milk and to attend horses. An arrangement is made that every man shall undertake these duties one Sunday in every month. The head and under carter, the head and under cowman, the head and under shepherd attend alternate Sundays to superintend the work in their separate departments, and this duty is covered by extra pay. No other man attends more than one Sunday in four and every man has so to attend. As foods are mostly prepared by machinery they are usually prepared on Saturday, and Sunday work is reduced to a minimum. This is not a 'fancy farm' but a commercial business; and when agricultural employers cease to regard labourers as existing solely for their benefit such organisation of work will be extended. Indeed it would be a necessary corollary of any movement of labour from urban to agricultural employment.

Another cause of restlessness is the feeling that the position of farm labourer does not leave the employee with the same amount of personal independence as other occupations. In the whole realm of rural economics and sociology there is no question which rouses such violent antagonisms as that of the political and religious independence of rural dwellers and workers. The antagonisms aroused by discussions of wages or tariffs are negligible compared with those roused by this subject. Up to 1890 there were estates on which it was a proud boast that no Nonconformist could rent a farm. But the years of the middle 'nineties,' when farming families of long standing were meeting financial failure and men of other origin were offering themselves as tenants, saw the almost entire abolition of such restrictions. It is now becoming generally recognised that the bond between lessor and occupier of land should be one of a purely business character. Similarly, the labourers have been able to exercise their right to personal independence most fully where and when labour is scarce and wages comparatively high. The bond between employer and employed has been developing into one of mutual financial

interests without reference to any side-issues. There are, however, districts in which the labourer has still something to gain in this direction, both in connection with the tenure of his cottage and his employment. Generally speaking, these are the districts in which the new influences in agriculture have been least felt. But personal independence in thought and the use of capacities and leisure from economic obligations are at once the foundation of citizenship and of nearly all developments in social life. This must be completely secured if the rural population is to take equal standing with the urban population in the creation of the national spirit and power. The development of industrial production and urban civilisation in all Western nations has set the accepted standard of all conditions of life, and agriculture can only attract population by advancing to equal standards of production and life. The aspirations of the whole of the younger classes of agriculturists, both farmers' and labourers' sons and daughters, may become a source of positive good if fostered, but if baulked can lead only to negative or destructive action, as in the recent migration from rural districts.

It is here that the consideration of the superior attraction of town life and the social advantages offered by other industries becomes important. There is no doubt whatever that villagers now have a clearer idea of the real value of urban wages compared with their own incomes, and the higher wage rates are not in themselves such a great attraction as they were; but the attraction of town life remains. It is true that some of the attraction of town life is its liberty —that kind of liberty which implies absence of moral control by parents or neighbours. Some village youths undoubtedly do 'desire to escape observation, and want to get away from 'the parson and public opinion. They don't want everybody 'to know what they are doing; and in the great cities they 'can do this.' Not a few youths from our public schools and universities desire and obtain the same kind of liberty; and some objections to identification marks on automobiles arise from a similar desire for moral irresponsibility. It is probably true also that the cinema, the cheap music hall, and similar attractions lure some village youths; but on the other hand there is scarcely a more industrious and sober (in the widest sense) class of men than urban railway workers, many of whom

are recruited from outlying rural districts. Nor can it be said that the hosts of village girls who go into domestic service in urban and suburban areas are altogether attracted by the lighter lures of the city. They might be excused if they were, for people of better education and training are caught by the superficial and widely advertised things of life. It must also be remembered that the range of thought and action which meets with social approval is much more rigidly determined by tradition in villages than in cities. When a farmer's daughter leaves home to take up some employment it is usually wise to be very circumspect in enquiries as to what she is doing, for if the new position is one which would be held to reflect on the position of the family in the village you will not be told, even though the position in itself is quite an honourable one.

In the villages the possibilities of association are meagre. They are limited in the first place by mere numbers. In a town of only 10,000 inhabitants there may be a hundred social groupings existing for all sorts of purposes ; but in the village there is the church, the chapel, and the public-house, and often little or nothing else. Even the churches and chapels often cannot provide the modern groupings of their members, especially the young, into Guilds, Young People's Societies, etc., which have done so much in recent years to keep urban churches together. But association is not limited by mere numbers alone, it is limited as much by rigid class restrictions. Many influences tend to break down these barriers, but country school-masters and mistresses can tell moving stories of their social ostracism because their society is not good enough for one class and too good for another. In Oxfordshire villages it is not at all an unknown thing for the leading ladies of the village to meet and decide whether they shall call on the wife of a newly resident farmer, invite the family to the half-crown seats for the Hospital Concert, or merely send them a handbill advertising the shilling and sixpenny seats ; and woe will follow any lady who dares to contravene the decision of the meeting. The labourer's daughter who begins to speak and dress nicely on her visits to home gets much less familiarity with farmers' wives she has previously known than the girl who returns somewhat coarse and tawdry. There is about one something of the attitude of challenge to the existing social distinctions (which is often quite unconscious), the other

'knows her station' and keeps it. The intelligent labourer who goes on the Choir Excursion is carefully shepherded into another railway compartment than that occupied by the parson and churchwardens.* Persons interested in village society who came in at the top pooh-pooh discussions of these things; the smart labourer who wishes to rise in the social scale laughs at them as he takes his seat in the train leading to the great city or the far Dominions, but till then they put gall into his spirit. The old village communism with the rights and duties attached to its social distinctions has gone, and while insistence on rights is still keen in some districts memory of duties is very faint. No organisation along the traditional lines of religion, politics, or social life will again rear the corporate spirit of the village. The solution of the difficulty of providing for all classes means for self-realisation in association, and for social life, will be found—is indeed already being found—in organisations covering more than one village. The danger is that all the life of the rural areas will become centralised in the country towns. The organisation and administration of everything in the villages, including the one non-partizan organisation—the village friendly society—tends to become centralised in towns.

Many people reside or work in the country, but the threads of life are woven in the towns. For the middle and higher class residents the automobile and the train have provided quick and comfortable transport, and many do little more than sleep and play in the country: in no sense do they live there. For other classes the market train and the bicycle have centralised shopping, and both provide village youth with the means of getting to the local town cinemas and the football match. More recently another development of transport is increasing traffic to the towns. The carrier's motor van may

* The old attitude towards these distinctions is well expressed by a resolution of the Central Chamber of Agriculture demanding special 'middle-class' schools for farmers' sons. 'It is no answer to this to urge that the national elementary schools are open to all classes, and that farmers' children may avail themselves of their advantages at will. It is impossible in this country to ignore the existence of social distinctions, and the reluctance with which many parents look on any system proposing to associate their children with those beneath them in position.' (May 1873.)

be seen in many market thoroughfares. No less than five run into Newbury and Reading almost daily from villages within a short radius of a little market town like Newbury. Similarly many country-town cinemas which do not open in the afternoon for their town patrons, except on Saturday for children, open on market day for their country patrons. Very little can be done to revivify social life in the villages until some existing obstacles are destroyed. Meanwhile the towns increase their grip, for while there is an increasing tendency to work in the village there is an increasing tendency to spend leisure away from it. Nearly every Saturday afternoon in the season youths from Warwickshire villages cycle as much as forty or fifty miles to Birmingham to watch football matches. There is no customary half-holiday ; they simply lose their pay and take their leisure, and as labour is scarce they are able to do so with impunity. Such a movement may be deprecated, but it is better than stagnation or final and complete migration.

With this attraction of the towns and this feeling of restlessness amongst rural labourers many people have connected the idea that it is our rural education that is at fault, and the existing type of rural education has been denounced as a cause of migration by a host of people. ' The system of education ' attempts too much and arouses ambitions which only town-' ward migration seems to satisfy ' : ' Education is making the ' rising generation feel that they are too good for farm work,' are typical statements from the first official Report. In the later Report similar complaints were made. ' Our educational ' system positively discourages any capacity for farm work ; ' for the boys are now kept at school till an age when, by ' the unanimous agreement of farmers, landlords, and other ' observers, it is too late for them to really take to the work,' is a fairly typical statement from the general literature on the subject. No more foolish statements have been made in the whole realm of rural sociology than on the supposed connection between elementary education and migration. If the amount and type of the so-called ' literary ' education provided in rural elementary schools were such an important cause of migration, it is strange that the rate of migration was most rapid between 1861 and 1871, before education was compulsory and general, while agricultural population increased when the

amount of education given was increased by the Education Act of 1902! In reality the idea is born of mere prejudice. The traditional view of the farming class has always been that labourers' sons should begin to work on the farm at about ten years of age. 'They will never do men's work at twenty 'unless they begin to do boys' work at ten. They will never 'really manage animals, unless they begin when they have 'to climb into the manger to put the horse's collar on,' is a statement still frequently made. It is difficult to dissociate the ideas of the controllers of the agricultural industry on education from some ideas of the fixed status of individuals in village life.

Since the age of compulsory attendance at school has been rising, in spite of the protests of agriculturists, a demand has developed for more 'manual instruction' in schools. There are, no doubt, good psychological grounds for the demand from an educational point of view. Some children in particular profit by manual training and have not been fitted by heredity or environment for much training of any other type; but the general grounds and special cases are not confined to any one class in the community. And too much manual training, with too little attention paid to the development of imagination, interest, and personality, is more likely to drive the young labourer to the town than to retain him in the country. The demand for stimulation of curiosity and interest is already strong in the villages, and unless a type of education is provided which will guide such a demand it will be satisfied by the cheap and widely advertised amusements of the towns. In reality the curriculum of the rural school has never been in any sense 'literary' or 'bookish.' Its chief elements consist of the 'three R's,' without knowledge of which nothing can be taught. Indeed some parents are complaining that the addition of such subjects as hygiene, nature study, and gardening to the curriculum of a school which the children leave at twelve or thirteen years of age does not leave sufficient time for the teaching of the elementary subjects.

For good or ill we have embarked on a policy of increasing and improving general education, and if the country child is not given the same chance as his urban cousin he will ensure that his children are not penalised in the same way by himself migrating to the towns or emigrating to the Dominions. In

future the poverty of rural elementary education is more to be feared in regard to migration than its excessive amount or its too 'literary' character. Nor is farming under modern conditions a business which can be carried on profitably by 'rule of thumb' methods. The farm employee, the small holder, and the farmer of the future, who are to control physical, chemical, mechanical, and physiological forces, will need all the mental as well as manual training they can possibly obtain. Talking about rural education without talking about social and economic reconstruction is merely beating the air; arranging for social and economic reconstruction in rural areas without also arranging for more technical and humane education is merely ploughing the sands without providing the fertiliser or sowing the seed.

But the fundamental problem in the maintenance of population on the land, either the natural increase, or an organised addition to rural population, is one of the proper organisation of the production of wealth. It is here that the demands for increased population and increased production of food are likely to come into conflict. Any increase in population employed on the land which carries with it only a proportionate increase in gross production of food-stuffs leaves the urban population as much dependent on imports as before. An increase in rural population which is not accompanied by such proportionate increase in production leaves the urban population more dependent on foreign producers. It would be possible to increase production with the present amount * of labour on the land, provided it were equipped with more capital, used more power, and could command better directors. This would both provide a greater net amount of food for the sustenance of the industrial population, and a greater amount of wealth for distribution amongst those finding the capital and trained labour for agricultural production. It would also be possible to increase population as well as production, but this process could not go far without also increasing the unit cost of goods produced, and thus providing a smaller net amount of food for urban consumption and a smaller amount of wealth for distribution per head of those employed in agriculture. Production cannot be considered apart from

* i.e. the amount employed in 1914 before the war.

cost; and population cannot be considered apart from the standard of life. Some increase in production would be possible without reaching the point of increasing unit cost, but this would be by introducing more capital and better organisation rather than by increasing the amount of manual labour.

The primary necessity is perhaps an improvement of quality, especially mental quality, rather than an increase in quantity of rural population. The increase of manual labour without greater proportionate increase in capital and improvement of direction would almost certainly increase unit cost. And while urban industries and agriculture compete for labour the most important factor in maintaining population on the land is to ensure that the output per man in agriculture shall be approximately equal to the output in urban industry. The establishment of a system calculated to provide the greatest gross product per acre in an industrial country is not likely to maintain the greatest permanency of residence on the land. Such a system will be wasteful of labour and capital, and will lead to a low standard of living. On the other hand the organisation of production to secure the greatest output per man ensures the most economic use of available labour, increases the margin for possible saving, and at once provides for an increase in the productive power of the future.

This consideration has excluded the question of the restricted area of the land within these islands, and the possible necessity of more intensive cultivation at greater unit cost in order to obtain a larger gross product so as to diminish our dependence upon imported produce. If it were decided on grounds of national policy to encourage such intensive cultivation, it would be necessary to provide some form of financial subsidy to compensate the agricultural population for the low returns of a system which necessitates high unit cost for home produce in competition with produce from countries working on a system of low unit cost. But even from the military point of view such a system would be of doubtful advantage; for in time of war it would curtail the supply of men for military service. While the seas are open we have the military advantage of the productive labour of agriculturists in many countries; but directly we increase our supply of home-grown food on the basis of

increasing the gross product per acre, regardless of unit cost, we immediately increase the number of men necessary for the cultivation of land, leaving fewer men available for military purposes. In particular a system of small holdings worked by a comparatively high ratio of manual power and a low ratio of machinery and mechanical power is the one from which least labour can be withdrawn if production is to be maintained. When we organise for peace the only economic organisation of production is that which provides for the greatest net output per man employed. This is the primary necessity for the maintenance of the present population on the land, and the only principle of organisation which can produce conditions which will make possible a permanent increase in our rural population. Maximum production per man is the *sine qua non* of a rural civilisation which is to be in any sense worthy to stand side by side with a civilisation largely arising out of, and still more largely dependent upon, the modern organisation of industrial production. On the other hand, the principle of maximum production per acre leads to a type of civilisation which is best described as Chinese, for it is the principle on which agriculture is organised in that populous and poverty-stricken land.

ARTHUR W. ASHBY.

THE CROSS CURRENTS IN ENGLISH EDUCATION

I

A GERMAN writer has been describing for neutral eyes the discipline of his fellow-countrymen after two years of war.

'More than ever before,' he writes, 'is each man a wheel in the huge machine which is called the German Empire, but more rightly the German System. The wheel does not know, and does not need to know, anything but that it must turn with all its might according to the order of the higher wheels. Neither do the higher wheels themselves know anything. They too turn as the mechanism orders them to turn. In each subordinate member of the system, intelligence must limit itself to the work assigned to it to do. The electric current which drives the whole machine comes from above. One might almost say that it comes from an unknown source. For the electric current is impersonal.'

These words were written, it seems, not in irony but in praise. Their author regards 'the German System,' with its precision of passive obedience, not as a rapture of heroic self-abnegation in the hour of the nation's need, but as a habit of mind, practised already in the days of peace and now perfected by the discipline of war. He is hypnotised by an idea which has fascinated him. He thinks that it will impress neutrals as it has impressed himself. He imagines that they also will admire what he has been persuaded to think good. He does not realise that the pattern of life which he holds up as excellent is the very thing to which free nations, and most of all the English, are determined never to submit. What he means as a panegyric they listen to as a warning. They would rather lose everything, not wealth only, or power, but life itself, than surrender the citadel of their souls and become, like the movements of a time-piece, the will-less wheels of an impersonal machine. But they know also that the German guide has mistaken the way to what is best in the future, and that the road which he would have them follow leads, after momentary success, first to paralysis of the power of adjustment to new conditions, then to failure, and finally to fury of despair. They are aware that blind obedience

to an impersonal force is not the warrant of success in warfare, and still less in the tasks of peace. Human nature, including the German nature, must in the end rebel against an attempt to reduce the minds of men and women to clockwork, and to replace the moral freedom of citizenship by the instinctive discipline of the hive.

The now hidden Germany, the soul of it, which is held fast by the hypnotic rigour of the nation's present thoughts, is not so tractable as this imaginative writer, in his zeal for unity at any price, has persuaded himself that it has become and as he wishes a wondering world of neutrals to believe. We know too much of German history, we are too well acquainted with the intimate accounts which Germans have given of themselves, to be deceived. We have but to wait and to beat down the prestige of the system which has gripped their will, and we shall see that the German mind is impatient of restraint, and unwilling (save for a time and for some gain which it sees within its grasp) to give up its freedom of thought. It is because the thoughtful German knows that he is by temperament overcritical, and therefore liable to dissension or self-distrust, that, in certain moods and at certain stages in human experience, he rushes to a remedy which, he hopes, will protect him against his weakness by putting the responsibility for certain moral decisions beyond the pale of his own judgment. It is because he is by nature prone to jealousy and therefore to internal divisions that, under the stimulus of some glittering ambition, he has thrown himself into the hands of a supreme power which can override jealousies smaller than its own and can give the nation the strength otherwise dissipated by civil discord. It is because the German mind knows itself too prone to those vague dreams which leave men dissatisfied and poor that, under the temptation of opportunities for quickly becoming rich, it has flung itself (as it always flings itself from one extreme to another) into ambition for material success, and has gilded the half-sordid aims of its new empire and the not wholly self-regarding purpose of its commercial policy with a philosophical theory only true in part to its real belief. As the German painter, Max Liebermann, confessed before the war, 'To-day we idealise materialism.'

But the German System is only half wrong. If it were in truth what the writer whom I have quoted alleges it to be,

neutral opinion would find nothing in Germany but what is detestable, we nothing in the organisation of our enemy to admire, and the Germans themselves no future worthy of being worked for. It is because there is something in the German System which commands our respect, in spite of the cruel outrages which have stained its name; something in it which checks waste and binds together a people with the cement of a common purpose; something in it which has therefore promise of permanence and may serve as an incentive, though not as a model, to other lands, that we are interested in it and impressed by it, and, amid all our loathing for some of its consequences, wish to get at the good which is the secret of its strength. And when we examine the structure of the System we find that a method of education is one of its vital parts. That method aims at doing something which is characteristic of modern industry. It tries to make profitable use of what would otherwise be wasted. It works up to a serviceable point of usefulness the intelligence of minds of ordinary calibre. It fixes the attention of the schoolmaster on the average boy—much more on the boy, hitherto, than on the girl. It requires every teacher to bring the average pupil up to the highest point of industry, of competence, and of cultivation to which the wide and carefully recorded experience of other teachers and inspectors shows that such pupils can attain. Its schools are so organised, its standards are so fixed, its lessons and discipline are so planned as to make the most of the average pupil and to force him to make the most of himself. There are no scholarships to stimulate and reward the brilliant boy, or to encourage the schoolmaster to concentrate special attention upon the most receptive minds. There are no competitive examinations which give a chance of distinction to candidates of exceptional promise. In each class of the school the boys learn together all the subjects which the official syllabus requires that class to learn. There is no re-classification of the pupils for mathematics or for natural science or for modern languages. The class is the unit, and, moving up the school year by year, is kept together for all subjects. In each group of studies it receives instruction from specialists.

Thus a high average of general attainment is the aim of the German higher secondary education. No specialisation is

allowed in schools, even when a boy develops a gift for some one branch of learning. The Germans aim at making the most of average material. They think that in this way they put to good use that grade of ability which is the most common, but, under some other systems of education, is neglected or allowed to run to waste. And, because this working up of average minds to a passable standard of competence is believed by the Germans to be important, they insist upon every boy in their higher schools doing creditably in all the subjects of what they call a liberal education, although for some of them he may have little aptitude or may even have distaste. This levelling-up of the different sides of a boy's knowledge, this insistence that those who have a special gift for a particular subject shall, instead of receiving exceptional facilities for its exercise, keep their minds in common stock with those of all their comrades in their class, are central principles of the German System. They are designed to raise the average level of attainment and of intellectual interest throughout the nation, and especially in that part of the nation which can send its boys for a long and exacting course of study in higher secondary schools. Nor are efforts wanting on the part of the German Imperial Government to impel parents to make the pecuniary sacrifice entailed by keeping a boy long at school. The weight of the military system is so used as to induce parents to send their boys to schools where they can qualify for service as 'one-year volunteers,' and to keep their sons at school long enough to secure this much desired privilege, which confers some social consideration.

Germany is proud of its policy in regard to the higher secondary schools. Except the army, none of its institutions is so characteristic of German life. The higher secondary school is the nursery of the Civil Service. To have passed through its course gives a man standing in the hierarchy of classes. In its modern form it sprang originally from a great intellectual movement, and its history recalls to every German the recovery of Prussia from humiliating defeat. It would never have gained its hold upon the middle class but for two things—the privilege its alumni enjoy in regard to military service, and the qualification which it imparts for admission to Universities and to courses of training for posts under government and for the professions. But, having once gained a firm hold upon the

middle and professional classes, it produced two results, one calculated upon by statesmen beforehand, the other largely unforeseen, but both of high importance. The first is that the higher secondary school, because of its privileged position, has supplied the governments of the German States with competent officials and has given the middle classes a strong interest in the maintenance of those governments, because the latter, through their public services, provide a variety of careers to which the pupils at the higher secondary school may look forward. The second result is that business firms have found the certificate of having attended for at least six years at a higher secondary school a convenient qualification to exact from the applicants for their more responsible posts. The consequence of this is that the higher levels of German industry and commerce are full of well-instructed men who have received a good general education. Of the intellectual fabric of the modern German State, the higher secondary school is the keystone.

Three things, in each of which England is backward, are noticeable in Germany and may be traced directly to an unconfused and carefully articulated system of higher secondary schools.

In the first place, German fathers of the middle and upper middle classes are very much more interested than are their English counterparts in what their sons are learning at school and in their sticking closely to their work. They know, and they make their boys understand, that in Germany a man's chances in life, his access to a profession or to the higher grades of the Government service, his prospects of being taken on by a good firm for responsible work, and even to some extent his standing in society, are conditioned by his doing creditably in his class at school. There is no time of life at which it is so important that a boy of brains and strong physique should be spurred to put his whole will into his school-work as between fourteen and seventeen. Of delicate boys (and many are delicate at that age) I am not speaking here. For them such pressure is mischievous. It is generally bad also for boys who have really creative insight in letters, or in science, or in art, to be forced during these years to fix their whole attention upon uncongenial tasks. If they have genius, they will be working hard on their own account, though not in the

schoolmaster's way, for they may seem to be idle or brooding. But for boys whose gifts point towards organisation and administration, for boys who have it in them to become the active-minded heads of great businesses, or to rise to eminence in the law, or to hold responsible posts in civil administration, those years from fourteen to seventeen are, as a rule though not always, of crucial importance. *Labor improbus* during those years fixes the habit of purposeful industry and lays the foundations of success. And it is just at this time in his life that a boy in the middle classes in Germany is under persistent pressure both in his home and at school. He is expected to work hard and is made to work hard. The father does not leave this duty to the schoolmaster alone, and the schoolmaster on his part takes a serious view of it. Middle-class Scotland is rather more like middle-class Germany than is middle-class England. The Scottish secondary schools are not organised upon the same pattern as the German. But in Scotland, as in Germany, the day school predominates. In Scotland, as in Germany, the middle classes inherit a feeling of respect for erudition. And in both countries the middle-class homes are usually competent to take an interest in what a boy is learning at school.

Secondly, everyone holding a responsible position in German industry and commerce is, in the scholastic sense of the word, a well-educated man. This is not yet the case in England. On the contrary, some of our successful business men seem proud of having had so little education. A rapidly increasing number of men in English business have had a good school training, and many have been at the University as well. Their influence is already noticeable in many directions. But too large a proportion of English business men are ill-educated, and very limited indeed in their range of interests. That, in spite of this, they have achieved so much, proves that in most cases they are men of probity and of strong will, industrious in their habits, punctual to engagements, gifted with a sense of the market and with an instinct for finance. But it remains to be seen whether they have served the national interest as effectively as they have served what they believed to be their own. Such failure in adaptiveness, in scientific foresight and enterprise, and in power of intellectual combination, as British commerce and industry are now prepared to admit,

may be traced in great measure to the stubbornness, the obstinacy, and the want of trained imagination which are due to defective education in individuals, and also to the temper, habit of mind, and mental outlook common to an inadequately educated class. Some, though not all, of the labour troubles which have embarrassed English industry might have been averted if English employers had been better educated to understand the changing conditions of the age. The remedy lies in better secondary education, mostly given in day schools and accessible to the whole middle class. Germany, in spite of the very serious defects in her schools, has had this advantage for more than fifty years. If it was the German elementary-school master who, fifty years ago, won for Bismarck decisive victories on the field of battle, it is the German higher-school master who, during the last three decades, won for the new German Empire her brilliant successes in the domains of industry and trade.

The third advantage which Germany has gained from her system of higher secondary schools is that the schoolmasters who teach her middle-class boys are experts in the science and art of giving instruction and in making their pupils put their minds to their work. A German boy at a secondary school is forced to listen with concentrated attention to what he is told. He is made to express himself accurately, in complete sentences, unshamefacedly before a class, grammatically, and with an intelligent interest in the subject he is talking about. He is compelled to work, even when he does not want to work. In the schoolroom he is under sharp discipline. He knows that if he does not keep up with his class he will pay the penalty of a thwarted career. The road is clear before him. He can see it on the map, and he understands how many milestones he has to pass before he reaches his journey's end. What the school has to teach (though not how the school is to teach it) is plainly set forth in official instructions. These are very far from being the result of merely bureaucratic cogitations. They represent the outcome of the mature experience of schoolmasters and the judgment of the educated public. There has been as much intelligent discussion in German newspapers and magazines about changes in secondary-school curricula as there was in England about changes in the training of naval officers. In each country, that part of the public which is interested in the matter knows that the question is vital to the nation.

But, as the problem of secondary school studies affects nearly every middle-class family in Germany, a greater number of people are qualified to make sensible contributions to the discussion of it. The 'Lehrpläne' of the German higher schools are models of precision; they are skilfully condensed from professional experience; and they give plain guidance to parents and to teachers. They do not neglect science or mathematics. They insist on mastery, though it may be but a conventional mastery, of the mother-tongue. They require a boy to be taught, and to learn, the outlines of the history of his own country and of the modern world. And they are drawn up by men who are experts in the teaching of languages, whether living or dead, and who know exactly from laborious and lengthy experiments how a fresh language may be learnt with least expenditure of time and with least loss of what has been learnt before. The skill of the teachers in the art of instruction (which includes the art of making boys use their minds for themselves) is worthy of the fine technique of the official curricula. The higher secondary-school teachers in Germany know that they are dealing with a scientific problem, a problem of applied psychology as well as of scholarship and of practical organisation. They discuss their problems as scientific engineers discuss theirs. Amateurishness is out of the game. These men are members of a scientific profession, with its literature, its body of recorded practice, and its exacting and rather conservative professional opinion. If you grant that in their higher secondary schools the Germans are aiming at the right target, there is no question of their marksmanship.

II

But are they aiming at the right thing? That is the question which has to be considered. They are certainly not aiming at wholly the wrong thing. The difficulty lies in deciding how far they are wrong, and how far right, in order that we may judge whether our own secondary schools, which are excellent in many points upon which the Germans are weak, could, if they were given the chance, combine what is strong in the German system with what is strong in our own.

Bismarck, in a conversation with Mr. Beatty Kingston in 1872, said 'You English should not be so hot to imitate

'Germany. Nations that imitate do not do much good. 'Nations should keep their individualities. The system that 'suits us does not suit you, your habits, or your character. . . 'You have your England ready to hand. . . . Take care that 'you do not spoil your people.' We need not suspect him of having said this in order to keep England from adapting the good things which Germany had got hold of. Great institutions, especially those which are deep-rooted and of ancient growth, can rarely be transplanted to foreign soil. But one country can catch from another something of the spirit and purpose which animate every great institution. Such spirit and purpose, however, will express themselves in very different forms of organisation in different countries. This was Bismarck's point. One who knew him well records that 'nothing 'angered him more than to meet people who wished to 'transplant English institutions promiscuously into Germany.' But it would have been good for Germany if Bismarck had encouraged her to get more of the English spirit.

It has been suggested in the course of this article that there are three things which it would be to the advantage of England to catch from the spirit of German higher secondary education. These are (1) a much stronger interest on the part of the parents in the intellectual work which the schools aim at doing for their boys ; (2) a clearer perception of the value of a liberal education for those destined to a career in modern industry and commerce ; and (3) a greater keenness on the part of schoolmasters in the study of the professional technique and of the psychological conditions of their calling. To counterbalance these, there are three other things which, in the light of German experience, English higher secondary education would do well to refrain from copying from Central European example. But I admit that all three points are disputable. They are of central importance. The real question is whether, in view of the advantages which might follow from an adoption of the German practice in the three matters about to be mentioned, we can afford to disregard it, and to take our own line through country still unexplored. On this difficult subject the reader will not wish me at this stage to obtrude my own judgment, but to state, as fairly as I can, the grounds upon which he can form his own.

(1) The spine of German higher secondary education is not the will of the Government (important as that is) but a

theory of culture. The theory is that, before a boy can be deemed ripe for the University (to which it is assumed that most pupils from higher secondary schools will wish to proceed, and where more specialised studies and investigations await his attention), he must be initiated into each of the chief methods by which the mind arrives at truth. In each of these he must serve an apprenticeship before he can become a master in the use of any one of them. He must study the abstract relations of forms and of numbers, and become proficient in deductive reasoning. He must study nature, and realise by observation and instruction what amount and quality of evidence a valid inductive generalisation requires. He must study language (his mother-tongue and at least one other) in order that he may learn by analysis and comparison the logic of human speech. He must study the record of the past through history and literature, in order that he may know what the human race (and particularly his own countrymen) have achieved ; how the great seers and poets have interpreted the experience of life ; how, by the collection and testing of evidence, the mind may determine the truth of past events ; and by what canons of critical judgment it may distinguish fair from foul. In other words (the theory runs), there are four ingredients which are indispensable to the liberal education which must be given to boys in a higher secondary school, and which (in so far as their minds are sufficiently mature) must be actively assimilated by them. These four ingredients are Mathematics, Natural Science, Languages, and Literature. Every class in the school, and every boy in every class, must be given something of each of these four groups. And no one should be allowed to pass with a satisfactory record out of the higher secondary school unless he has done adequately throughout the course his appointed stint of work in all the four.

Before Prussia or any German State set its hand in modern times to a serious reform of the higher secondary schools, this doctrine of ' Allgemeine Bildung ' had come into vogue. It was deemed to be a re-statement and revival of the Greek ideal of education. Its votaries upheld it with fervour as if it were a new creed. By means of a liberal education, they held, a man gets liberality of mind. And they assumed that only an all-round education deserves the name of liberal. This formula (they thought) if applied to the higher schools

of the nation, would rout out pedantry from its corners, and would open windows to light from every quarter. This, and this alone, was worthy to be spoken of as Gymnastic, and therefore, when their chance came to translate theory into practice, they called the higher schools, remodelled on their plan, by the Greek name Gymnasia. The great force which reformed higher secondary education in Prussia and in other German States was thus in its origin an intellectual movement, sweeping through many minds with the enthusiasm of a new religion. The founders of the modern system of higher secondary education in Germany were intellectually white-hot. Their creed was General Culture. They had embraced their faith because they believed it to be a revelation of truth, not because they wanted to aggrandise their State or to extend German trade. As it happened, national disaster did befall their country years after they had been converted to their new intellectual religion. As patriots, they came to her aid, and it fell to them to reform the higher schools of Prussia. They applied their doctrine, using for that purpose the administrative power of the Government, because it was the most powerful instrument within their reach. Their leader, Wilhelm von Humboldt, hated State action in things of the mind. But he succumbed to the temptation of making drastic use of it in the national emergency. The work was done, and no other reform did more towards rebuilding the fortunes of Prussia; no reform did so much to give intellectual union to Germany; none so much, when the time came, to put brains and science at the service of German trade.

But was the theory true? Was this doctrine of 'Allgemeine 'Bildung' a sound formula for the liberal education which is to be given to every boy in every higher secondary school? If the theory is unassailable, it must hold good in the case of every normal human mind; it is not exclusively German in its application; and it should be adopted by England and by every other country which wants to have good secondary schools and to secure for its people a liberal education. If, on the other hand, the doctrine, though plausible, was merely the product of a passing phase of thought, and if it is too rigid to be applied without caution to so undulating and diverse a thing as the movement of a boy's mind, it behoves us to be on our guard against it, and against all systems of education and requirements in school examinations which have been built upon it,

because evidently, wherever it is accepted, its influence is profound.

It should be borne in mind that, whatever the truth of the original theory of 'Allgemeine Bildung,' its practical application has had to be modified many times in the land of its birth. Even in its palmy days, critics observed that this new Greek education had forgotten the body, and that the schools in which it was enshrined must have been called in irony Gymnasia. It was true that the intellectual people who had embraced this new educational doctrine had left wholly out of account any need for the scientific training of the body, or for exercises in grace of movement, or for athletic games. They may be forgiven, perhaps, because these things were not in their line. But the omission makes one suspect that they fell into the mistake of thinking of education solely as a training of the mind, and that, in the belief that everything else would follow if such training were done well, they made the further blunder of assigning to intellectual discipline much too large a part of a boy's time and energies, especially during the years of puberty. Later, another difficulty arose when natural science demanded more room in the classical-school time-table, on the ground that its study had become too important and too many-sided to be satisfied with the very limited notice given to it in the original plan. And, just as natural science grew in range of interest and in its specialisation, so also did history, geography, and the study of literature, until the cup was overfull. Finally, after a thirty years' war, the classical monopoly was broken down. Not one 'general 'culture' only but two 'general cultures' were now recognised. In many schools the link with Greek was broken. And at last a third 'general culture' without Greek or Latin won its way, if not to favour, at least to recognition. In all three of the official alternatives the four ingredients were retained. But in two of them there was lacking the intellectual ferment (Greek) to which the originators of the doctrine of 'Allgemeine Bildung' had attached supreme importance. A still more serious criticism of the universal applicability of the doctrine then made its appearance, partly under English and American influence, but has up to the present made no deep impression upon German opinion, and none at all upon the educational practice of the higher secondary schools. It was asked whether it is indeed necessary that every boy

should be initiated into, and required to attain a passable standard in, every one of the four groups—Mathematics, Natural Science, Languages, and Literature. How about a boy with a remarkable gift for science and mathematics, but none for literature? Will you, throughout his long course at a higher school, forbid him to give his energies to those studies for which he shows exceptional aptitude and promise, in order that he may be forced, *invita Minerva*, to reach a conventional standard in studies for which he has distaste? Again, how about a boy with a genius for language or literature, or for both? Will you, in order to compel him to conform with your doctrine of all-round culture, harass him by administering unwelcome doses of (to him indigestible) instruction, and by thus curtailing the time he wishes to give to the studies he loves?

These questions cut at the root of the educational theory which dominates the higher secondary schools of Germany. If, as I myself believe, the right answer to them is No, the central doctrine of German school-culture is condemned. It is significant that, since the doctrine of 'Allgemeine Bildung' has held sway, there has been no striking increase in the number of exceptionally original minds which the German higher schools have produced. And as the weight of knowledge involved in the application of the theory has grown heavier (as it has grown during the last thirty years) the number of such men seems to have declined. If you allow at school varieties in the natural growth of individual aptitudes for this or that branch of knowledge, you enrich the nation by a number of men and women whose range of attainment may be narrower, but whose point of view is less standardised and whose special abilities are fresher for later growth. By making the intellectual pressure at school limited and light; by allowing, so far as may be, the spontaneous growth of natural tastes, you get among the educated people of the country a larger proportion of independent judgments and a less general respect for established expert authority. On the other hand, you have a less organisable people, and a greater indisposition to intellectual co-operation under skilled direction. Germany has secured the last, but at a heavy cost. We on our part have failed to get a sufficiently high standard of general attainment. But Germany has pressed the doctrine of General Culture too hard and with a clumsy

hand. The men who were originally responsible for the present system of higher secondary education in Germany would have deplored the results of the too painstaking and humourless administration of it. The scholars who invented the theory of 'Allgemeine Bildung' a hundred and thirty years ago simply wanted future generations of German boys to have, as they themselves had had, intellectual adventures in many fields of knowledge, instead of being tied by a cord to the narrow pasture of school-Latin. Moving lightly as they did under the slender armour of the science of their time, they simply meant by their theory what we should mean if we said that, as his mind comes into flower, a child should be encouraged to see the connexion between many of the different things he learns; should be helped to understand how one part of his knowledge bears on other parts; and, as his experience deepens, should be set in the way of learning that in all its aspects life is one.

(2) The second principle which governs the practice of teaching in the German higher secondary schools is even more disputable than the first. And yet it has done more for German commerce than have the efforts (excellent and necessary in their way) to provide specialised instruction in commercial subjects. The principle is that the teacher has to make the *average* boys in the class understand what he teaches them, and do to his satisfaction the work which he sets them to do. It is difficult for a clever man to realise how slowly some minds work. If he is peppery or irascible by nature, the slow reactions of unresponsive minds make it hard for him to avoid, as the years steal on him, outbursts of temper which alarm a nervous boy and amuse a thick-skinned one. A man who himself learns slowly and who sympathises with slow-learners is generally the best teacher for average boys, provided that he has sympathy and also perseverance in his own studies. But a quick-witted, brilliant, impatient man may go above the heads of three-quarters of his class and miss the mark with all but a few clever boys at the top of it. It is a point of principle with the directors of German higher secondary education to prevent this slurring-over of the needs of the average boys. The headmaster stops it: the inspectors (who are all experienced schoolmasters) detect and reprove it. The result is that in a German higher school the average boy learns what he is supposed to learn and has

a very bad time until he comes up to the standard. Consequently the schools make what, according to the German view, is good use of average material. It will not be disrespectful to the devotion of the German schoolmasters if one says that there is little waste in their manufacture of 'educated men.' This is one service which the higher schools have rendered to German commerce and industry. They have furnished them with multitudes of well-educated men who have not 'slacked' at school, but have learnt how to learn, to appreciate the value of scientific method and to enjoy applying it to problems of business, whether in their own firms or in combination with other firms engaged in the same trade. But an even greater boon has come to German industry and commerce through this methodical intellectual work in the higher schools. It has come indirectly and unobserved. It is one effect of the very carefully considered methods of teaching employed in the German schools. Those methods are designed to make difficult things clear to slowly-working minds, and to ensure not only comprehension of what is taught, but (so far as this is humanly possible) retention of it in the memory. Now the boys who are taught by these methods gain insensibly an idea how to teach other people. They carry that idea with them into practical life. And those who know both English and German houses of business will agree that in his relations to his subordinates and in showing them exactly what he wants them to do and how to do it, the average German is a much better teacher than the average Englishman.

There is no reason why this superiority should continue. By no law of their being are Englishmen less adroit than Germans in learning how to teach. An Englishman can become as good a teacher as anyone in the world if he is properly trained, and if he puts himself to the trouble of learning and practising the art. English women make first-rate teachers. The English trained elementary schoolmaster has few rivals in his skill in doing what the conditions of work of our elementary schools allow. But, up to the present, professional training is not obligatory on masters in English secondary schools, though an increasing number of them see its value and obtain it.

It must be added, however, that if the most characteristic difference between the English and German higher schools is to be preserved, professional training for the English master

will be a more complicated thing than it is for the German. To begin with, while the German higher schools are standardised, the English are various. Their great variety is not due wholly to accident or wholly to mere survival from an earlier state of things, but to a response on their part, in some measure deliberate, in some degree unconscious, to shades of preference felt by the parents, and by no means centred in a choice of intellectual advantage. This variety, which has both merits and drawbacks, rests upon the autonomy of each of the great English Public Schools. And autonomy involves freedom in the choice of masters, and that not necessarily on grounds of purely professional skill. But a much more serious difficulty remains. The English higher secondary school system has special regard to the interests of the clever boys; the German, to the interests of the average boys. It is clear that the English Public Schools ought to do more intellectually for the boys of average ability. But should this be at the price of doing less for the exceptionally gifted? If not, can the teaching be so managed as to meet the needs of both types? How to combine the advantages of two opposite qualities and principles, each of value to the country, is the recurring problem in every department of English life, including its education. Canning said in 1823 of the position of Great Britain in the contest then going on in the world between unlimited monarchy and unlimited democracy, 'Our station is essentially neutral 'between two conflicting principles.' What we need, however, is not the inaction of neutrality, but a patient effort at uniting in one whole what is good in both of many pairs of opposite tendencies. Can such an attempt be successful in a system of education closely controlled by State officials? The German higher school, in proportion to its success in giving an effective education to the average boy, has failed in continuing to meet not only the needs of the boys of exceptional ability but also those of boys whose mental development is abnormal. The German system leaves little room for minor originalities, and it prefers to make as much as possible of the ninety-nine rather than risk sacrificing them to the brilliant hundredth. But when this practice is enforced throughout a country for a long period of years it may cost a nation dear. Certain products of the English educational system seem to mature into something of finer intellectual quality than what is produced by the German. A former correspondent of 'The Times' in Berlin, Mr. George

Saunders, a good judge of men and exceptionally qualified to compare the best German type with the best English, said some years ago :

> ' I find that the intellectual apprehension of the average educated German is at least, on a rough computation, ten times quicker than that of the average educated Englishman. On the other hand, in nine cases out of ten, I find the German's intellectual judgment most uncertain and weak, and often most conventional. In ordinary matters of judgment, it usually turns out that the Englishman has, perhaps unconsciously, been taking a much wider basis for his induction than the German has. . . The German is taught at school to form judgments on the strength of the facts submitted to him and not to distrust their adequacy.'

Highly efficient teaching of the German type raises the level of the intellectual interest of men of average ability, and makes them more appreciative of the value of expert knowledge and of science. It does not necessarily do as good service to brains of an unusual quality of excellence and may even retard or thwart their development by imposing upon them a discipline injurious to their natural growth.

(3) The third point is one upon which English opinion is divided ; but German opinion apparently unanimous. Every schoolmaster in a German higher school is a Civil Servant. This means that, though he has sometimes to wait many years before he gets a permanent and pensionable position, he is paid according to a definite scale of salary and has pension rights on retirement. He is paid less well than a man in a corresponding position in the legal branch of the public administration, and he does not enjoy the same social consequence. But his remuneration is adequate, though not generous ; his professional prospects are encouraging ; his status is satisfactory. He receives less than a master who occupies one of the more favoured positions in our English Public Schools, but he is in a wholly better position than that which (to the shame of England) is the lot of the vast majority of our secondary schoolmasters. Each German State, as in the case of all members of its public service, prescribes what is required of the secondary schoolmaster in the way of professional training. It holds him responsible for loyalty to the Government, gets rid of him if he holds ' dangerous ' views on politics or economics, and evidently in recent times has found it at

the very least not convenient to discourage him in taking an anti-British view in questions of foreign affairs and of naval developments. The surest way of standardising secondary education is to make all the teachers in secondary schools civil servants. Some think that only in this way will the English secondary schoolmaster attain to the salary he merits and to the consideration he deserves. Some believe that only in this way will professional training be made obligatory on all secondary schoolmasters. But the supporters of such a fundamental change in the English secondary schools have to meet special difficulties. In England no Government could make the men teachers civil servants without having to face the question of doing the same for the women. Nor could secondary education be governmentalised without similar treatment being given to elementary. To what extent the political bias (if one may so call it) in the teaching of history in the German secondary schools is due to the inspiration, or merely to the connivance, of the Governments is a matter upon which the reader will form his own opinion. How far it is likely that any similar result would follow upon the introduction of the German system of civil service for teachers into England is a disputable question. To make English secondary school teachers civil servants would, however, certainly undermine in due time both what is good and what is bad in the autonomy and variety of our schools. Yet the nation cannot afford to allow the profession of secondary school teaching, both for men and women, to remain so ill-requited and unattractive as it is to-day. English secondary education cannot accomplish its full work for the nation until the emoluments and prospects of the profession are effectively improved. To bring about such general improvement without large assistance from the Government would be impracticable. But it does not follow that the Government need decide to give such assistance only on condition that all secondary school teachers become civil servants. Nor, on the other hand, even if those teachers were added to the civil establishment, would their salaries and pensions necessarily be raised to the level which is desirable for true efficiency.

III

At the present moment there are many discordant plans for the reform of English education. Rightly put together, they will form a coherent policy which, without abandonment of what is vital in our national tradition, will lift our education as a whole to a higher level of intellectual activity, fill it with a more united purpose, and give it clear aims. Taken separately and overpressed in any one direction without regard to the balancing opposite, these competing plans will checkmate each other, and have already produced a feeling of bewilderment and of distaste. Some urge that the experimental study of natural science should be the chief and central part of everyone's education. Others, resisting this claim, are tenacious of the present position of the classics. What is needed is a balance between the Humanities and Natural Science, with freedom for individual aptitude to develop itself in either study. Some speak of education as if its sole purpose was to produce more tractable and profitable wage-earners. Others, resisting this narrow view, resent anything which might seem to interfere with a rather vague and general preparation for life. What is needed is an education which encourages alertness of mind, but also purposeful self-control ; imagination and originality, but also respect for knowledge and the habit of discipline ; diligence and concentration, but also vigour of initiative. Such an education fits men and women for life and for livelihood. Some would get rid of all but the rudiments from our elementary education : others insist on putting into it all the separate elements of a liberal training. The true characteristics of the education of young children are simplicity, but also many-sidedness of sympathy, and initiation into the beginnings of many kinds of knowledge and power.

English thought about education is thus full of cross currents. So, before the war, was the German. But in Germany the minds of men, accustomed to the vast and carefully-jointed system of State education, are less distracted by conflicting criticisms than are the minds of English people, who have no settled standard of educational excellence and no authoritative tradition of educational method, but are moved by a just desire to unite in their institutions different forms of excellence

not easily combined. This is the central difficulty of our task. No educational model in the world will serve our purpose. We shall have to remedy our defects in our own way. George Meredith said in 1909 ' We are not yet a people.' But the war has shown us that we are. We have not yet a system of education which fully expresses our national purpose or fully meets our national needs. But we are passing out of the stage in which English education was organised in social layers, now obsolete, into a new phase in which we may hope to gain unity of spirit without having to pay the price in uniformity of State administration. Education is a semi-public, semi-private thing. It is too vital a public interest to be divorced from public supervision; too intimately private to be the concern of the State alone. The German system of making all education subject to Government control is one-sided, and has the effective simplicity of one-sidedness. But the real needs of the case are many-sided, and therefore the German model of school-administration will not give us what we are looking for. We can learn from it, we can take many hints and many warnings from it, but we should be more than unwise incontinently to imitate it. Better far would it be to turn for suggestions to the Scandinavian model, which consists in financial partnership between independent educational effort and the State, a model which Mr. J. S. Thornton has patiently studied and has pertinaciously pressed upon the reluctant attention of our administrators.

But the true way to get improvements in education is to resolve on getting them for ourselves. Great changes in the outlook of schools and colleges, changes in what is taught and in what is required to be learned (such changes, for example, as the more general study of natural science and the more effective teaching of living languages), come most surely, though perhaps more slowly, when a large number of intelligent fathers and mothers are determined, in the interests of their sons and daughters, that what they want shall be supplied. Hitherto English parents in all classes have as a rule been far too careless about the intellectual side of their children's education. They have thrown upon the boarding schools, and are disposed to throw upon the day schools also, responsibilities which ought to be discharged by themselves at home. But the effects of the war may make a great difference

in public opinion in these matters. They will enforce an economy, and a degree of forethought for the future, which will compel parents to consider carefully what kind of education they should get for their children, and what part of that education should be given by teachers at school; what, by themselves, at home. Happily no country is more fertile of sound educational ideas, more promising in its educational experiments, than England is to-day. Instead of allowing those ideas to run largely to waste, we should insist upon their being put to adequate tests, and, if proved valuable, adopted more widely in the schools. There can be no great reform of the schools, secondary or elementary, unless there springs up a new spirit and purpose in English life, a stronger desire to learn, a keener interest in things of the mind, a more generous social ideal. If the deep experiences and tragedies of the war bring that new spirit and purpose into our national life, education will quickly respond. We shall be wise if we do not put our chief reliance on the initiative of the State. Entrusting the control of education to the absolute power of the Government has been one of Germany's great mistakes. But national education cannot dispense at any point with some contact with the State. It is possible, but only by showing moral courage in criticism and in personal resistance to unwise interference on the part of officials, to make use of the machinery of Government aid and supervision without allowing that machinery to dominate individual judgment and to supersede individual responsibility. Such a combination, however, such a union of individual freedom and of State action, is the most difficult and exacting of all political tasks. To discover, through discussion and experiment, how we may secure that contact without on the one hand leaving educational scandals uncorrected and educational destitution unrelieved, and without on the other hand making bureaucracy sovereign in the future development of our schools, is one of the tasks which this country seems now bidden to undertake, both for its own well-being and for the guidance of many other nations. Education is the highest service which the present can give to the future. But it is a service in which the fundamental need is moral freedom. And 'he only wins freedom who has 'daily to conquer it for himself.'

M. E. Sadler.

THE WELFARE OF FACTORY WORKERS

1. **Welfare Work.** By E. Dorothea Proud, B.A. G. Bell and Sons. 1916.
2. **Labour, Finance, and the War.** Edited by Professor Adam W. Kirkaldy and published by authority of the British Association. Sir Isaac Pitman and Sons. 1916.
3. **Experiments in Industrial Organisation.** By Edward Cadbury. Longmans, Green. 1912.
4. **Scientific Management and Labor.** By Robert Franklin Hoxie. New York: D. Appleton and Co. 1915.
5. **Reports of the Health of Munition Workers Committee.** Ministry of Munitions. 1915 and 1916.

ONE of the most remarkable things about this war is its reaction on civil life. Its direct effects on the lives of the people are not here considered, though they are unprecedented in character and magnitude. By reaction on civil life is here meant the impetus given to movements for social amelioration which existed before the war and will continue after it—movements which are essentially domestic and concerned with normal conditions. Such are education, temperance, sexual morality, the suppression of contagious disease, the preservation of infant life, the improvement of industrial conditions, the redistribution of wealth, the reorganisation of society. So far from having interrupted efforts for the promotion of these and similar objects, as might have been expected, the war has stimulated them in an extraordinary degree. Social reformers of every sort and kind have seized upon the war as an opportunity for pushing their several causes and achieving a success denied them in peace. And in some cases the result has justified their instinct. Proposals long advocated in vain and deemed incapable of realisation in peace have been realised in war with dramatic suddenness and almost by a stroke of the pen. A striking instance is the transformation of the liquor traffic by a drastic curtailment of the hours of sale, the prohibition of treating and

other popular practices, and the inauguration of a great scheme of public control with the establishment of model public-houses. How far these measures have succeeded in their object is another question irrelevant to the present point, which is that changes have been introduced and put into operation that no Government dared attempt in peace. The apparently insuperable difficulties have melted away and a great interference with general habits has been accepted by the public so calmly that many persons are emboldened to demand a much greater interference.

The obvious reason why the war has stimulated social reforms in the manner indicated is that the searching test which it imposes on the nation lays bare weak points and brings them out into such strong relief as to compel general recognition. And the lesson will leave a permanent impression though the intense strain will relax with the cessation of warfare. Many questions have been lifted on to a new plane and can never fall back to the old one, though the changes effected in connexion with them are nominally 'for the 'duration of the war' only. Ideas and standards have changed as well as conditions, and they will never again be as they were. Steps have been taken which cannot be wholly retraced.

This applies to nothing more surely than to the conditions of industrial life. The calls made on the workshops are one of the great surprises, and the response one of the wonders, of the war. They have become a popular commonplace, but their bearings are not fully understood. The intense effort demanded and enforced by imperative needs has thrown a flood of light over the whole field and illumined its dark corners. It has disclosed deficiencies, waste, and weakness, as well as unsuspected sources of strength. It has caused the whole apparatus to be overhauled, forced the investigation of standing but neglected problems, stimulated reform in many directions, and opened the way to a new order. All this cannot be treated as though it had not happened and was only a dream. If it were it would still leave an ineffaceable impression which must influence the future. There is no going back to the pre-existing state of mind. The conditions to be dealt with hereafter will, it is true, differ from those obtaining now. Activities wholly associated with a state of

warfare will cease automatically with the end of war, and the particular changes which they called forth will cease with them. Others will be modified. But the general lessons that have been learnt will remain in force and will be applied to the conduct of industry in peace. Nobody really expects or wishes for a return to the old order. One section may desire to go back on this point and another on that, but they all expect changes in other directions. And changes there will be, though some of them may give great trouble before they are adjusted.

Improvement in the conditions of factory life is one of the most certain changes. The war has given it a great impetus. Much closer attention has been paid to the care of the workers than ever before ; matters formerly left to chance or individual opinion and often neglected altogether have been methodically investigated ; experiments have been made, conclusions formulated, and new standards set. Some points, prominent now, will decline in importance when the existing conditions pass away, but others have a standing interest, and the light that has been thrown on them cannot be extinguished. There is more likely to be a competition in progress on this side of industrial life than a falling back to the old order.

The subject is not new, though the name of ' Welfare Work,' now given to it, is new in this country. Miss Proud, in her valuable study, has traced it back to the eighteenth century, but it no doubt goes back very much farther, like the ' factory ' system ' itself. In fact, the principle of welfare work in the sense of voluntary arrangements by employers for the benefit of the employed is as old as employment for hire, which is at least as old as the Christian era. We know from the New Testament that industry in the old world by no means rested entirely on slavery, as innumerable writers constantly assert. Labourers standing idle in the market-place because no man had hired them were engaged for the day, or part of the day, just like dock labourers now. And there were all sorts of employers—humane ones who cared for the welfare of their workers and hard ones who did not. Nor was it otherwise with slave-owners ; some were kind and some were cruel. And they all used the same arguments as to-day. Some were humane from conscience and a sense of duty, some because it paid ; others said that business was business, and insisted on

their right to do as they pleased with their own. Men act according to their disposition and can always find reasons for their conduct.

But the environment changes and presents new material, which so far constitutes a new problem, though the essential forces involved are the same. The change of environment in the industrial world by the development of machinery and the application of mechanical power produced a new problem for the employer of labour in regard to the care of the workers. It threw a great deal more responsibility upon him by aggregating large numbers of people to work together under conditions determined by him and beyond their control save for the bare choice of refusing his employment. Some recognised the responsibility and endeavoured to discharge it by making the well-being of the workers a distinct object and a part of the system of management. They led the way in a gradual process of improvement. The classical example is the cotton-spinning mill, in which the new environment produced by machinery was most complete and most rapidly developed. And the classical examples of welfare work by employers in the cotton mill are those of Dale and Owen, who were pioneers.

A false picture of that period has been put forward and repeated so often as to have become stereotyped. Employers are represented as monsters of greed and cruelty, who, with two or three eccentric exceptions, did nothing for the welfare of the factory workers and never would have done anything if they had not been compelled by law. The truth is, that while some had to be compelled by law, others set the standard in advance of the law and prepared the way for it. Miss Proud does a great service in bringing this out, because the inference drawn from the other and erroneous reading is that it is useless to try and promote voluntary care for the workers among employers, and that improvement can only be effected by the law or by State control. If that were so improvement would either cease or be infinitely slower than it is, because the initiative is always individual. The State follows private experiment whether by administration or legislation, and must do so because it cannot, and ought not to, undertake the risks which private enterprise does. The function of the law in this field is to make general and compulsory what has

been proved to be feasible and desirable, and to bring backward and resistant employers into line with the more enlightened. Miss Proud puts the part of employers very well :

' The discovery and development of methods of improving working conditions have, at least since the time of the Industrial Revolution, been the peculiar function of employers as such. This function has been largely forgotten or disregarded, both by employers and by the public. Busied with the obvious economic functions of the employer in the capitalistic state, theorists long ignored every other function and, as a class, employers themselves, absorbed in the search for wealth, thought nothing of their social duties to the State. Yet, to a certain extent, those duties have been performed, and, necessarily, by employers, for no one else can perform them. . . .

' In theory and in practice it appears that the best employers have played a fundamental part in the gradual raising of the worker's standard of life. Indeed, step by step, the path of progress has been marked out by employers, through their individual efforts made from time to time throughout the nineteenth century. . . .

' Welfare Work has in fact dragged the law after it and the law still lumbers in its wake.'

This acknowledgment is not merely just ; it is essential to a right understanding of the problem. It indicates the real path of social evolution, which proceeds by way of individual initiative leading to a common rule. Both are needed, but without the first there is no movement at all. Employers have, indeed, often been in advance of their age.

' The most extravagant projects of the most progressive employers of to-day have their prototypes in some of the earliest mills. Doctors and schoolmasters have from the time of the Industrial Revolution been associated with factories ; works' dining-rooms, doubtless primitive and unlovely, were in existence in the middle of the eighteenth century ; baths in mills were deemed expedient a century ago or more ; recreation clubs antedate all factory legislation ; and old age pensions and sick insurance have superseded the charitable doles of employers prompted, by kindness of heart or pressure of public opinion, to provide, more or less adequately, for those whose lives or strength had been spent in their service. Even the special Welfare Secretary in a modern factory is foreshadowed as early as 1851 by the appointment of a factory chaplain, " one who could give up his whole time and care " to the " originating and superintending of the educational arrangements," so that the others in their " several positions in the factory should only have to back him up and assist him." Indeed it might almost be said that there is nothing new in Welfare Work except the name.

Edward Baines, writing of the cotton industry in 1835, observes :

'There are not a few mills in Lancashire, Yorkshire, Cheshire, Derbyshire, and Scotland, where ventilation, cleanliness, and even neatness are enforced, greatly to the advantage both of the master and of the workmen ; where strict regulations exist against immorality of conduct or language ; where schools are taught, in which every child employed in the manufactory receives instruction, and where the girls learn sewing and knitting ; where there are libraries for the use of the workpeople and rewards for the children who attend Sunday-schools ; where there are benefit societies, which afford relief to the subscribers in sickness or in misfortune ; and where medical men are employed to inspect the workpeople weekly.'

The question at once presents itself, why so little advance has been made in this direction. If so much welfare work was carried on so far back, why is there not more now ? Why did not it spread and develop ? Edward Baines expected it to do so and looked forward to as much improvement in care for the workers as in machinery. That expectation has certainly not been fulfilled. Some people will be inclined to say that there has been a positive retrogression, and that there is less welfare work now than there was a century ago in Owen's mills. That is not true. There is a great deal more welfare work than is generally known, and a model factory of to-day is as far in advance of New Lanark as modern machinery is superior to its predecessor of the same date. But it must be admitted that the example of pioneers has not been so generally followed as was expected, and that improvement has been slow, partial, and spasmodic. For this there are many reasons. In the first place the ground has been progressively covered by other agencies which have superseded the employer's voluntary efforts. The law lays down regulations for health, safety, cleanliness, convenience, and comfort ; it has shortened hours and protected women and children in various ways ; it has raised wages and imposed insurance against sickness ; it has provided schools and made attendance compulsory ; it has even, as Miss Proud points out, recognised the value of ' welfare work.' The Home Office has recently made it compulsory in the Potteries for employers to maintain an official who is in effect a ' Welfare Secretary,' though he is called a ' Works Inspector.' Now the advent of compulsion

always checks voluntary action and not merely by rendering it superfluous. It is true, of course, that factory laws were demanded because the bulk of the employers did not follow the example of the pioneers in improving factory conditions. They were demanded by the best employers themselves, who have repeatedly urged and eventually secured compulsion to bring the rest up to their own standard. Nevertheless compulsion has for a time a deterrent influence on further voluntary efforts. It is followed by a period of quiescence. Some men lose interest; they see what has been their own work taken out of their hands, and though they may welcome its general application the previous stimulus is gone. After movement comes rest; there is a general feeling that enough has been done for the present. This passes in turn with the lapse of time and a fresh initiative supervenes. This explains the 'spasmodic' activity both of voluntary and of legislative advance; they occur in waves.

Another agency by which the action of employers has been superseded is civic enterprise. Municipal libraries, institutes, technical schools, parks and playgrounds, houses, gardens, baths, hospitals, and so on provide for a whole community what individual employers provided for their own staff. A good instance is Saltaire. Sir Titus Salt, who created it, was a great pioneer, and his model settlement marked a wave of welfare work and set a new standard in the middle of the last century; but most of the institutions he founded have passed into the hands of the local authorities.

Supersession of employers' efforts by the State and the civic authorities is not retrogression. It may check voluntary action for a time, but by consolidating and extending the ground gained by individual pioneers it forms a platform from which a fresh advance can be made. There are, however, influences which are positively hostile and deterrent. Employers who have taken great interest in welfare work, and built up with much thought and trouble various institutions for the benefit of the people they employ, have often been driven to abandon their efforts by the lack of appreciation or the determined hostility shown by those very people or a section of them. The failure is sometimes the employer's fault. He may have adopted a too paternal or feudal attitude, or he may have made his voluntary benefits the ground for

refusing some other condition more valued by the workers, such as higher wages. But there is always another element in these cases and often it is the sole cause of failure.

The greatest obstacle to the improvement of working conditions in modern times, and the bitterest enemy of welfare work, is the theory that the whole existing order is fundamentally wrong, and that there can be no real improvement until it has been swept away and replaced by a totally new one. This theory takes several forms with as many names all ending in 'ism.' They differ about the new and ideal order which is to take the place of the existing one; but they all agree that the latter must go, and they make common cause against anything which tends to prolong its existence. Good relations with employers and conditions making for contentment tend more than anything to do so and are fatal to the object in view. So every effort is made to upset them. It cannot be done by directly objecting to obviously beneficial measures, such as the provision of good meals, rest pauses and rest rooms, factory surgeries, recreation rooms and playgrounds. Nobody can denounce these things as bad in themselves.

The attack is made on their provision by employers. According to the theory it is impossible for private employers, as such, to be actuated by any but bad motives towards the employed. Welfare work is a mere blind intended to lull the workers into a false contentment and acquiescence in a state of slavery and robbery by the employers. It is argued that money spent in beneficial measures is really stolen from the workers, and that employers have no right to possess it at all. Suspicion is thus engendered and gratitude turned to gall. The benevolent employer becomes a by-word and the object of more distrust and abuse than one who treats the wage-earners on the most rigid business lines. Sometimes his patience is eventually exhausted and he gives it up; in all cases he is discouraged, though he may continue from a sense of duty, and the example inevitably deters others and sets the movement back. The hard-headed business view of industrial relations is justified and the welfare appointments of the model factory are discredited as sentimental nonsense. The fact that they have in some cases been carried to a fanciful extreme lends colour to this judgment and confirms the condemnation.

So we get a see-saw. The hard business principle, carried

too far, calls for the social reform theory, which, carried in turn to an extravagant length, reinstates the business principle. Nevertheless the welfare principle, between the two, still lives and blooms afresh from time to time. It partakes of the nature of both and tries to reconcile them, which draws upon it the hostility of each in turn as the other appears to gain the upper hand in its operations. It has a humane element and a business element. That is to say, it seeks to realise the promptings of sympathy, from which idealist social theory springs and at the same time it acknowledges the claims of business in this work-a-day world and maintains that humane treatment *is* good business. Social theorists attack it because they hold that business is incompatible with human sympathy; business people deride it because they hold that sentiment is incompatible with business.

Welfare work, as it stands before the world to-day, may be classified under two well-defined types, though there are many indeterminate variations which do not fall clearly under either. The distinguishing feature of the two types is the point of view from which they approach the problem of the treatment of factory workers. One approaches it from the humanitarian point of view, that is from a sense of duty towards the workers; the other approaches it from the business point of view, that is for the promotion of efficiency. Their methods are different, but each claims that in the end it secures both objects; they meet in the middle, so to speak. The first maintains that the well-being of the workers involves efficiency, which cannot be secured without it; the second that efficient management ensures the highest degree of welfare. There is obviously no inconsistency here, only a different way of looking at the same question, due to temperament, or partly, perhaps, to the character of the industry to be dealt with.

The famous establishment at Bournville perfectly illustrates the first type. Mr. Edward Cadbury's account of the numerous welfare institutions there, which he calls 'experiments in 'industrial organisation,' leaves no doubt that the prime motive was a sense of duty towards the workers and a genuine desire for their welfare. Professor Ashley, of Birmingham University, affirms this with emphasis in a preface to the book.

'Everyone,' he says, 'who is acquainted at all intimately with the Bournville Works and with those who direct them knows full

well that the mainspring of their policy has been a sense of social duty.'

But it has paid as a business proposition.

'Though,' he continues, 'the ultimate motive has not been business expediency, and much of the action here narrated has evidently been the direct outcome of considerations of a quite different nature, it is the belief of the firm that, taken as a whole, their policy has distinctly paid.'

He gives the reasons for the belief which he evidently shares, and one of them is—'the better the work and the mental and 'physical powers of the operatives are adjusted to one another, 'the less there is of lost time and of a score of those other 'occasions of expense which do so much to swell general 'charges.'

The passage just quoted is very pertinent to the present argument, because the adjustment of work to powers is precisely the technical basis of the other type of welfare work, which is exemplified by the American system of 'scientific manage-'ment,' commonly known as the Taylor system. Professor Hoxie's book is a critical examination of the system undertaken for the United States Commission on Industrial Relations. The prime object of scientific management, as laid down by Mr. Frederick W. Taylor, its chief exponent, is the highest attainable efficiency in production, securing the largest possible output from the means available, and the greatest prosperity for both employers and employed who have a common interest in the product. But, it is claimed, the methods employed for attaining this object incidentally benefit the workmen by so adjusting the work to their capacity as to reduce to the lowest point the effort required for producing a given result. The methods are in the main an exact analysis of the processes involved and of the physical efforts required, and a determination therefrom of the most economical use of both in place of the old haphazard rule of thumb procedure. The result is a largely increased output and higher earnings for the same effort, or a corresponding reduction of effort for the same output. It is further claimed that the system eliminates overspeeding and exhaustion, secures rest pauses and recreation, treats the workman as a personality, trains him to make the most of his ability, adapts the work to it and rewards him fairly in proportion to its use.

The two types here indicated not only start from a different

point of view, but are obviously suited to different conditions. The Bournville institutions are best adapted to an establishment in which girls are chiefly employed. The most suitable field for scientific management is an engineering industry, in which many varied and intricate processes are carried out by skilled men, and in which there is great scope for variations of method and machinery. But the two touch at various points, theoretically at least. One is the selection and training of workers, which is carried out with great thoroughness at Bournville and is supposed to be an integral part of scientific management. Another is the respect paid to physical fitness and the avoidance of fatigue. This is the chief welfare element—in the technical sense of the word—in scientific management, and is the point in which welfare and efficiency most obviously meet.

Now it is evident that the welfare work associated with war industries partakes of both types. It was originally stimulated by the motive of efficiency under the intense pressure of war demands and the need for the utmost possible output. This has been at the back of the scientific investigations which turn on the question of efficiency ; and the Ministry of Munitions, whose business is to get the output, had the same object primarily in view in appointing the Welfare Department attached to that office. But in the actual provision of welfare appliances humanitarian motives have played a large part both among employers and the outside public, who have given voluntary help. The great outstanding fact which has called most loudly for welfare work on both grounds is the large influx of women and girls into the war workshops. Their willingness, docility, and industry have won the hearts of managers ; and their picturesque appearance in a quasi-Amazonian rôle has made them the pets of the newspapers and the public. The emotional part of all this will pass with the occasion, but it will leave some solid matter behind.

The first element in welfare is health. It is all-important and almost synonymous with welfare, though that properly includes moral and intellectual elements too. It was the first object of factory legislation, and the great bulk of the factory laws in every country aim at it. Health depends on a great number of factors, which may be classified for present purposes under the heads of (1) standing workshop conditions, (2) nature and conditions of work, (3) outside conditions. Under

the first heading come the state of the air (ventilation, dust, temperature, humidity), light, sanitation, state of the ground (damp or dusty), facilities for meals, dry clothing, and general conditions of comfort. Under the second come hours of work, the physical effort and closeness of attention required, the risk of injury, the form and amount of remuneration. Under the third come housing, travel to and from work, recreation.

Of the several factors enumerated, most of those under the first head have long been objects of factory legislation and administration in this country. A certain standard is required, and more or less enforced in regard to nearly all the conditions named except meals. It is on this point that there is most scope for voluntary improvement by employers ; and canteens are, in fact, one of the most prominent features of welfare work in war factories. This does not mean that there is no scope in the others. On the contrary it is open to employers to improve upon the compulsory standard indefinitely in regard to most or all of the standing workshop conditions. There is a growing tendency to do so, as the importance of light, ventilation, and other conditions conducive to efficiency have been more fully appreciated, and improved means of securing them have been devised by architects or engineers. In modern workshops much attention is paid to all these matters, and employers generally pride themselves on the appointments. Some of the new factories specially built for war work embody the most recent arrangements and will influence future construction. There is, however, endless scope for improvement. In regard to cleanliness, for instance, and the removal of dust, we have nothing in this country approaching the elaborate arrangements adopted in the best cutlery workshops at Solingen.

Beyond the conditions directly affecting health but belonging to the same category lies another stage which falls wholly within the field of voluntary effort by the employer, and that is the stage of decoration or beautification. There is sound sense in making the factory pleasant to the eye both within and without, as well as physiologically wholesome, provided that it is not done at the expense of more material conditions. It promotes cheerfulness, particularly in girls, who are far more susceptible to such influences than men or older women. It is a recent development and has not got very far, though more is done in this way by employers who take a pride in the appear-

ance of their premises than is generally known. But they are exceptions. It never enters the heads of most manufacturers to embellish their works either within or without. Their taste is shown in the hideous lithographs prepared as advertisements and therefore intended to appeal to the eye. The sole object of the artist seems to be to present the idea of great business activity. He makes the buildings look as large, bare, and staring as he can (and much larger than they really are), depicts trains, drays, and steamboats surrounding them in profusion, with dense clouds of smoke pouring from the chimneys and floating over the whole field. Smoke may be a sign of activity but it is not one of economy or efficiency, and it is nearly as great an enemy to health and welfare as to attractiveness of appearance. Many works, it must be admitted, are not open to embellishment ; but they might be more dignified than they generally are. Unfortunately there is a tendency towards increasing ugliness. The substitution of American smoke stacks for tall chimneys is a change for the worse. A fine chimney has character and dignity ; it is the achievement of a genuine craft working in solid and durable materials. Such is the chimney at Manningham, in which Lord Masham took a justifiable pride. When it was finished he had a dinner party on the top to celebrate its completion. The great chimney at Croix between Lille and Roubaix impressively dominates the whole of that busy district, now under the iron heel of Germany. There used to be a noble rivalry in craftsmanship between Lancashire and Yorkshire chimney builders. The American smoke stacks are uniformly as mean as they are ugly.

There are therefore tendencies in both directions. Neither has been much affected by the war industries, which have not taken this element into account. The great requirements in construction were speed and good working conditions. There was no time to think of anything else. Nevertheless some of the new workshops are distinctly attractive and embellishment has not been wholly lacking. The *coup d'œil* of several thousand girls at as many machines in a single shop, and every machine decorated with the red, white, and blue, is curiously exhilarating. The touch of colour is a recognition of the value of embellishment.

The effect of the war on the question of meals has been very different. Of all the standing factory conditions this is the

one that offered most scope for welfare work, as we have already seen, and the immense stimulus given to it by the war cannot but have lasting results. The provision of meals and facilities for meals was an extending practice among employers before the war. Of course sufficient and suitable food is an absolutely necessary condition of health, but it was once left entirely to the workers, who managed it in three ways. Either they went home, or had food brought them from home, or they brought their own with them. They still practise all three. But distance between the works and home has become an increasing difficulty for the first two methods, and food brought from home is necessarily cold when consumed. Various efforts have been made to meet the problem, as the Advisory Health Committee to the Ministry of Munitions observe in a memorandum on Industrial Canteens. Coffee-houses and refreshment-rooms have been established near works by commercial enterprise and philanthropic efforts. But the provision of facilities inside works by employers is a more important and more promising development. The Committee classify the facilities provided under a number of heads. The simplest and earliest was a room in which the workers could eat their own food. The next step was the supply of hot water and means of heating food. This has always been greatly appreciated, and is still preferred by the majority of workers who do not go home. Then came the full dining-room with food they could buy. A refreshment-bar and portable canteens in the workshops are more recent innovations. The regular dining-room with a tariff is always an important feature in establishments where welfare work is systematically carried on. It has been adopted by the Ministry of Munitions as an essential part of the special factories they have had erected for war purposes, and the great majority of employers engaged on war work have taken the same course, in respect of new workshops at least. Canteens of one sort or another are now provided in most munition works where girls are employed, and in many where there are only men. The Health Committee speak highly of the results :

'The Committee have been impressed with the consensus of opinion which they have received as to the substantial advantages both to employers and workers following the establishment of an effective and well-managed canteen. These benefits have been direct and indirect. Among the former has been a marked im-

provement in the health and physical condition of the workers, a reduction in sickness, less absence and broken time, less tendency to alcoholism, and an increased efficiency and output ; among the latter has been a saving of the time of the workman, a salutary though brief change from the workshop, greater contentment, and a better mid-day ventilation of the workshop. The Committee are satisfied that the evidence of these results is substantial, indisputable and widespread. In the isolated cases where the canteen has failed it has been evident that its failure has been due to exceptional circumstances, misuse by the workers, or mismanagement.'

They further find that in almost all large works there is a body of men or women, averaging at least 25 per cent. of the whole, who in the interest of physical health and vigour need canteen provision. It is not too much to say that the canteen has done more than any other single welfare institution to improve the war output ; and though the conditions hereafter and the lessened strain of normal industry will render the need for it less imperative they will not make it superfluous. One may confidently predict that canteens will become a standing item of equipment in all considerable factories where workers are employed at any distance from their homes.

Passing on to the second group of conditions affecting health —namely, those pertaining to the work itself—we have to do with a series of associated questions which constitute the crux of the technical problem of production, and must do so under any system—capitalist, collectivist, or syndicalist. That problem is the most economic use of the energy available by the right adjustment between the worker and the machine and the adaptation of both to the work. It is a problem of extreme complexity and infinite variability, mainly because the human factor is infinitely complex and variable. The capacity of the machine can be measured with accuracy, and the best disposition of mechanical processes between the material and the product can be determined by the methodical application of adequate technical knowledge. That is to say, a series of operations with a given equipment can be planned so as to give the best results. This is rarely done in a systematic way by British manufacturers. The number of works in which it is even attempted can probably be counted on one hand. Very often there is no planning at all ; it is left to the operatives and rule of thumb. Generally there is some planning of a rough and ready kind, but some of the most famous works in this country are in such a state of chaos and

disorder that the stuff seems to be turned out by accident. There has been enormous loss of energy in the war through this cause. But the experience has greatly stimulated improvement. Manufacturers who have undertaken work new to them and installed new machinery for the purpose have had to think out the processes and have brought fresh intelligence to bear. It has been a valuable school for them.

The mechanical part of the problem is comparatively simple, as has already been said, and in itself has nothing to do with welfare, which pertains only to the human factor. But the latter depends upon it, and a proper adjustment of mechanical appliances to the work is a necessary preliminary to the right adjustment of the worker to the machine, because it ensures the attainment of a given result with the least human effort, or conversely the attainment of the greatest result with a given effort. And economy of human energy is the great problem. All the detailed questions that arise—hours of work, physical and mental strain, risk of injury, methods of remuneration—are directed to its solution. Health is the measure of success on the human side. To put it in another way, the problem is to combine the health of the workers with production.

It is here that 'scientific management' comes in as an instrument of welfare. It is an attempt to provide a true adjustment between the worker, the machine, and the work on a general principle which shall be to workshop organisation what Whitworth's true plane surface was to the construction of machines. That general principle is exact measurement. The idea is to measure the energy, both human and mechanical, required for a given task, and apply both elements accordingly. This does not mean that human energy is measured as mechanical or placed on the same footing. Quite the contrary. The essential point is that it is measured as human energy, which requires entirely different treatment from the machine. The main thing is that the human organism is susceptible of fatigue and requires both rest and recreation at proper times and in proper quantities. Scientific management means, in this connexion, the measurement of fatigue and the determination of the amount of rest required to avoid it.

The abnormal pressure on production caused by the urgent demand for war material, and the deficiency of male labour due to enlistment, have forced the question of fatigue into extreme

prominence. The necessity of dealing with it caused the appointment of the Health Committee a year ago, as the terms of reference plainly indicated. The Committee was instructed 'to consider and advise on questions of industrial fatigue, 'hours of labour, and other matters affecting the physical 'health and physical efficiency of workers in munition factories 'and workshops'; and it has issued several memoranda on the subject. The first dealt with Sunday labour, and urged 'the principle that Sunday labour is a serious evil which should 'be steadily and systematically discouraged and restricted.' Work had then been for a long time carried on at the rate of twelve hours a day or more, and seven days a week; and the bad results were apparent. From this the Committee went on to consider hours of work and industrial fatigue in general, and endeavoured to lay down some principles on physiological grounds, or in other words to put the subject on a scientific basis. This in itself is a marked advance. The question of hours is not new; it was the earliest subject of legislation, and it had engaged the attention of employers before the law interfered. It was seen that children suffered from unlimited hours in the textile mills, where they were first introduced, and their hours were compulsorily fixed. Later women and young persons were similarly protected. But the question was never scientifically considered and it was clearly not understood. Long hours were defended on the ground that the work was 'light' and that the hard work was done by the machine. The nature of fatigue was not understood; it was associated with muscular effort only, and the work seemed lighter than that done at home not only to employers but also to parents who took the children with them to help in the mill. Now every physiologist knows that fatigue is not really muscular but nervous, as the Committee point out, and that though one sort is induced by muscular strain, there are others affecting other parts of the nervous system and induced by other sorts of strain. While machinery might lighten muscular strain it increased that of the senses and of the mechanism in the brain —whatever it is—which controls attention. These nervous elements require rest as well as the muscular apparatus; and with machinery they do not get it, because they are continuously at work, whereas no muscular actions are continuous. Hence the 'fatigue of monotony' and the need of rest pauses.

It is something to have got the nature of fatigue put on a physiological basis, but the Committee has gone further and endeavoured to measure it by output. This is the basis of the Taylor system. A recently issued interim report contains the results of observations collected by Dr. H. M. Vernon on the output of particular groups of workers working a varying number of hours a week. The object seems to have been to ascertain the hours of maximum efficiency or those conducive to the largest output for the particular work investigated. The results show generally that shorter hours may yield a larger output than longer ones. In some cases the difference was very striking. A reduction of hours from seventy to fifty-seven a week by some lads engaged in sizing steel base plugs was followed by an increase of output which reached 38 per cent. for a period of weeks and 55 per cent. per hour. But there was probably some other factor in this case, such as increased expertness. In other cases Dr. Vernon claims to have eliminated every factor except that of fatigue due to prolongation of work.

Simultaneously with the enquiry conducted by the Health Committee acting under the authority of the Munitions Department, an enquiry on very similar lines has been in progress under the authority of the Home Office. In this case the investigation has been conducted by Dr. Stanley Kent, who is emphatic that overtime and, to a less extent, early morning hours tend to diminish total output. He concludes that overtime is both physiologically and economically extravagant, and he condemns overtime as involving ' a progressive diminu- ' tion of the power of the worker to resist fatigue.'

The principle of the adjustment of work and rest by the measurement of fatigue is obviously capable of yielding great benefit to the workers by safeguarding their health. But there is much more in it than that. It would at the same time increase output and so benefit both employers and employed, provided that the product were fairly shared. This must in any case be an essential condition of increased production, and scientific management seems to offer better facilities for realising it than any formula. The planning out of the operations, their distribution among the workers, the fixing of hours, pauses, etc., and rates of remuneration could only be carried out by consultation and co-operation. And

herein lies a possible solution of the most dangerous problem confronting industry in the immediate future. The joint arrangement of the details involved would give labour that share in the management of which Mr. Gosling spoke at the Trades Union Congress and a voice both in production and in division of the product.

The foregoing considerations are confirmed from a different point of view by a recent report to the British Association from a committee on ' Industrial Unrest ' which included some well-known employers and trade unionists. The following passages are particularly pertinent :

' It is essential from the point of view of the welfare of industry that workpeople shall not be over-fatigued by their work, and that they shall have sufficient leisure to recuperate fully. This work-limit needs to be determined by observation and experiment ; at present it is far too little known and considered.

. . . . . .

' The co-operation between workpeople and managers should go further than the mere distribution of the products of industry. The carrying out of the processes of production involves a series of co-operative actions which can be accomplished best if the parties concerned work together with full confidence. This spirit can be attained only if all those engaged in industry feel that they have some share in determining the conditions under which the work is carried on. . . . With such things as the marketing of products labour is only indirectly concerned, but with others (e.g. workshop arrangements and speed of machinery) it is directly concerned. . . . There are branches of organisation concerned with the detailed working of factories which might be carried out by co-operation between the workers and the management. They are functions which, in a large factory, are sometimes delegated to works managers and foremen, and concern the precise arrangements as to hours of work, rest periods, working shifts, speed of machinery, the sub-division and grading of labour, discipline, etc. These matters might be determined with the assistance of a committee of workers who know the conditions existing in the factory.'

It is on these lines and these only that increased production can be reconciled with the aspirations of the workers. Development along them is, therefore, true welfare work, though it may not be included in that term as usually understood.

We have dwelt on this point because of its great importance at the present juncture of affairs, and must pass over many of the ordinary details of welfare work. But mention must

be made of one institution, on which the rest depend for their working; and that is the Welfare Secretary. This is an American term for a special officer appointed to look after the welfare of factory workers and superintend the various arrangements made to promote it. The size of modern works and the number of persons employed make it impossible for the management to have personal relations with all of them. If those relations are to be retained or revived the duty must be delegated to some one, representing the management, whose function it is to go into matters affecting the interests of the workers apart from the technical conduct of the works. The growing practice of appointing such officers even before the war indicated a tendency towards general recognition of the duty and the value of welfare supervision, though that rather fanciful term was not applied to it then. One of the largest concerns in Sheffield has on its staff a gentleman who began by taking an interest in the personal welfare of the men, and went on from one thing to another until that came to occupy his whole time. His sole duties have now for many years been to look after their personal interests, and his influence has gradually permeated the town. He has become a consultant whose advice is sought by other employers. This is one of the reasons for Sheffield's remarkable freedom from industrial troubles.

The war has greatly stimulated the pre-existing movement and welfare supervision has developed into a profession, for which professional training is already being provided. Birmingham University, which has for some years offered a diploma in Social Study and held a regular course for it under the direction of Professor Ashley, has this month started a short special course of training, both theoretical and practical, in welfare supervision. This is apparently for women only, and is an emergency measure on account of the present urgent demand. In the future it may be confidently expected that such provision will be developed. Proper training is necessary, for the supervisor's duties are very varied and the position demands an unusual degree of tact and judgment. The Health Committee of the Ministry of Munitions has drawn up a list of the principal duties from the Ministry's point of view. They include the following: the engagement of labour; information and advice about housing accommodation

and means of transit; feeding arrangements; sickness; slow and inefficient work or incapacity arising from conditions of health, fatigue, or physical strain; sanitation and hygiene, night work, Sunday work, long hours and overtime; recreation and educational work; complaints, maintenance of discipline and order; co-operation with other welfare organisations.

Some of these items obviously cover in themselves a whole host of subsidiary details. The conditions vary indefinitely, and no arrangements can properly be described as typical. In some establishments the welfare provision is limited to a dining-room; in others it extends to rest rooms, surgeries, operating theatres, infirmaries, hostels, cinemas, concert halls, playgrounds, with a staff which includes not only cooks and attendants but nurses, doctors, and chaplains. The field is infinite, and if the survey includes foreign countries it will be found always to offer something new. We have nothing in this country like the remarkable school system maintained by MM. Schneider at Le Creusot, or their magnificent hospital, or the coal-miners' gardens about Lens, or the institutions of D. Peters & Co. at Neviges, to mention a few.

But whatever form welfare work may take, the heart of the thing, the idea inspiring and vivifying the whole, is regard for the personality of the workers. The keynote is struck by the first item on the Health Committee's list of duties—the engagement of applicants. This is a more important matter than it appears to be at first sight. It should be the first step from which the rest proceed in due sequence. There is a factory in Glasgow which may serve as an example. When a workman applies at the door he is shown into a waiting-room furnished like the waiting-room of an ordinary office, and there the foreman comes to see him. He is interviewed alone, addressed as Mr., and treated as a self-respecting member of society. The way to encourage self-respect in a man is to show him respect.

In conclusion, if all the changes and signs here briefly outlined are put together they furnish grounds for hope that a new day is dawning within the factory, with a promise of more light in spite of the dark clouds that obscure the future in other directions.

A. Shadwell.

ITALIAN ACHIEVEMENTS AND ASPIRATIONS

1. **Trieste e la sua fisiologia economica.** By MARIO ALBERTI. Rome: Bolognesi. 1915.
2. **Dal Brennero alle Alpi Dinariche.** Compiled by FRANCESCO BIANCO. Rome: Quattrini.
3. **Italiani e Slavi nell' Adriatico.** By ATTILIO TAMARO. Rome: Athenaeum. 1915.
4. **La Dalmazia: sua Italianità.** By various writers. Genoa: Formíggini. 1915.
5. **La Question de l'Adriatique.** By ITALICUS SENATOR. Rome: G. Bertero. 1916.
6. **Il problema idraulico e la legislazione sulle acque.** Issued by the Gruppo nazionale di Azione economica. Rome: G. Bertero. 1916.

WHETHER by accident or by arrangement, it so happened that the Italian declaration of war upon Germany was followed within twenty-four hours by the declaration of war by Rumania on Austria. The latter event was from the military point of view obviously by far the more important, for it brought a new force into the field. Public attention was immediately concentrated upon the action of Rumania, and upon the consideration of the results that might follow from that action. As a necessary consequence the action of Italy did not attract as much attention as it would have done had it occurred at a less crowded moment in the drama of the war. Yet from the diplomatic point of view Italy's formal breach with Germany was as important as from the military point of view was the Rumanian entry into the war. There can be no harm in stating that Italy's long hesitation to declare war upon the partner of her enemy and the enemy of her Allies was a cause of both bewilderment and anxiety to her friends. Few could understand the reasons for this hesitation, and some were anxious as to what it might portend. By declaring war on Germany, Italy not only removed all suspicions as to her future action, but by creating an atmosphere of absolute

confidence she enabled her friends to appreciate her previous position.

That position was not of her own seeking. When Italy declared war on Austria in May 1915 she clearly challenged Germany also, and probably most Italians assumed that Germany would reply with an instant declaration of war. The gravity of the risks involved can never have been absent from Italian minds. Germany had already proved her power. She had overrun Belgium; she had conquered a great slice of France; she was more than holding Russia; it was only on the sea that she had been defeated. Looking back at the position as it was in May 1915, it is impossible to ignore the courage that Italy displayed in challenging Germany by declaring war on Austria. That Germany did not formally take up the challenge was—the Italians fairly argued—her affair; but doubtless they were frankly relieved when the challenge was not taken up, for they were able to concentrate their strength upon fighting Austria without fear of direct attack from Germany. Nor can we blame them for wishing to prolong this relatively comfortable situation. It is an open secret that until far on in the present year one of the anxieties of the Italian military staff was the fear that Germany might violate Swiss neutrality and pour down a powerful force through the St. Gothard tunnel, and perhaps also through the Simplon. Had the Germans diverted to this purpose the troops they employed in the futile attack upon Verdun it is at least possible that the whole of Piedmont and Lombardy might have been overrun, and Italy would then have been compelled to sue for peace.

That many Italians should have been nervously anxious to avoid this risk is more than intelligible. We in England, living in an island that is protected from attack by a supremely powerful navy, are a little apt to forget that war is a much more serious matter for Continental countries. We have never seen our country invaded, our houses occupied by enemy soldiers smashing and defiling what they cannot steal, our prominent citizens seized as hostages or shot out of hand to 'encourage the others.' Had we ever seen these things we could better understand why the Italians, having made in May 1915 the great decision to challenge both Austria and Germany, were relieved when they found that they had Austria alone to deal

with and were not in a hurry to invite Germany to pay more attention to them. Happily, however, the movement of events enabled the Italian Government and the Italian people to realise that it was worth while to run some additional military risk to win the great moral gain that would accrue from a formal breach with Germany. Appearances have their importance as well as realities. It is necessary not only to do right but also to seem to be doing right. As long as Italy refrained from a formal declaration of war upon Germany her critics had an excuse for suggesting suspicion of her conduct. They can suggest such suspicions no longer.

This is not the place, nor this the pen, for attempting any appreciation of the military task that Italy has accomplished. The main features of her accomplishment are fairly familiar to English readers. She started her campaign in 1915 at an immense strategical disadvantage. Along the greater part of her frontier the Austrians were on the crest of the hills, occupying positions of great natural strength, made stronger by careful preparation. The Italians were on the lower slopes or in the plains. Week by week and month by month they have fought their way steadily upwards. The present writer has had the pleasure of seeing some of the ground they have won up mountain slopes so steep that to climb them even under peace conditions looks impossible. The Italian soldiers have climbed these slopes in defiance of Austrian gun-fire and rifle-fire, in defiance of bombs dropped almost vertically from Austrian trenches higher up the slope. The mere physical labour of what has been accomplished must have been appalling. Great guns have been dragged by ropes up mountain gullies ; tunnels have been driven through the rock to make emplacements for the guns or to blow up Austrian trenches. A constant supply of ammunition and of all the necessaries of a soldier's life has to be conveyed to these high emplacements ; hospital provision has to be made within as easy a distance as possible. Doubtless our own troops and the troops of France and Russia have had in many of the theatres of war, notably in Mesopotamia, East Africa, the Cameroons and the Caucasus, natural difficulties as great as those which the Italians have faced and surmounted. But without continually keeping before one's mind the mountainous character of the Italian campaign it is impossible to get a

real measure of the magnitude of the advance achieved. Just as cartographers, when preparing raised maps, have to take a vertical scale several times as large as the horizontal scale, so an advance of 100 yards up a steep mountain slope may well be the equivalent of many miles upon the plain.

The military successes already recorded by the Italians would have been impossible without contemporaneous industrial progress. Indeed the equipment of modern armies is perhaps even more important than their fighting quality. Without ample supplies of ammunition the best of soldiers are impotent; without good food and good clothing armies waste away with disease. Before the war Italy was only beginning to become an industrial country; since the war her progress towards industrialisation has been rapid. Thrown back upon her own resources, she has discovered her latent powers. Industrial concerns which used to look to Germany for directorship and skilled management are now being controlled and managed entirely by Italian brains and by Italian technical skill. Equally striking is the substitution of Italian-made machinery for machinery imported from Germany. Without the war the Italians would perhaps have failed for many years to discover that they were capable of reproducing in their own workshops the best German machines. Necessity has compelled them to learn this useful lesson. Unable any longer to buy from Germany the machines needed for making munitions of war, they have been driven either to copy the German machines previously acquired or to produce something of their own design to effect the same purpose. Thus the industries directly engaged in the manufacture of munitions of war have given a new stimulus to the engineering industries. Both are as busy as they can be.

The results are highly satisfactory, not only from the point of view of the future industrial capacity of Italy, but also from the point of view of the immediate necessities of the Italian Army. The Italian soldier is well fed and well found; and those who are competent to form an opinion of the technical problem of a commissariat service say that the organisation of the supplies to the Italian armies, scattered over more than four hundred miles of a mountainous front, works with admirable precision and smoothness. At the back of this great supply service are tens of thousands of Italian men and women who,

like many of our own munition workers, have for the first time in their lives undertaken industrial work. In the case of the Italians many of these new industrial workers are drawn from the peasant class, for Italy is still mainly an agricultural country. These peasants converted into machine operatives have acquired a new prosperity from their new work. The women especially have gained in physique and personal appearance from the higher standard of comfort which their new profession enables them to command. It is one of the ironies of war that while it brings mutilation or death to many, it brings to others improved health, increased strength, and a greater enjoyment of life. Italy is not unique in this experience.

But manufacturing industries, whether their product be food, or clothing, or cartridges, require materials and motive power as well as brains and manual labour. Italy is altogether deficient in many of the most important industrial materials, and she is still largely dependent for motive power on imported coal. Therefore all the skill of her manufacturers and the courage of her soldiers would have been useless if she had not been able to obtain from abroad adequate supplies of many essential materials. Happily her Allies were able in these respects to help her. The key of the situation lay in the command of the sea by the fleets of the Entente Powers. Failing that primary condition, Italy would have been powerless to procure the materials for the equipment of her armies ; it is even doubtful whether she would have been able to feed her civil population.

Some Italians have not made sufficient allowance for this consideration in what they have said and written about the question of freights. They have been irritated, naturally enough, at the enormous increase in the freights upon the commodities they have been compelled to import. They have failed to realise that the rise in freights is a necessary consequence of the struggle for sea supremacy, and of the measures taken by Great Britain to secure that supremacy for the benefit of all the Allies. On the one hand we have the actual losses of merchant ships at sea, sunk by German cruisers in the early days of the war, and by German submarines in the later days ; on the other hand we have the temporary absorption into the Royal Navy of a large portion of the

British mercantile marine, partly to serve as transports for troops, partly to act as auxiliaries for one or other of the many duties the Navy has to discharge. Finally, in order to keep the Navy at its full strength it has been necessary to divert the activities of many of our shipbuilding yards from the building of merchant vessels to the building of fighting ships. This wholesale diversion of shipping and of shipbuilding from the purposes of commerce to the purposes of war is part of the price we have had to pay for the maintenance of the sea supremacy of the Entente Powers. Italy has enjoyed to the full the advantages of that sea supremacy; without it she would have been powerless, and would have become a mere appendage to the Central Empires, subordinate to their will, unable to take a single step towards independent action. Having gained so much from the command of the sea which the British Navy secures, Italy suffers no wrong in having to pay a small part of the price of that supremacy.

Nor have the Italians any ground of complaint against Great Britain because the higher freights have in some instances gone to enrich British shipowners. It could not be otherwise, for the greater part of the mercantile marine of the world is, and for several years has been, in British hands. British shipowners have not charged higher freights than other shipowners, nor have they charged higher freights to their Italian customers than they have charged to their other customers abroad or to their own fellow subjects at home. On the contrary, through the good offices of the British Government the Italians have had the use of a great deal of British tonnage at less than the market rates. Meanwhile all the Italian ships which had not been requisitioned were free to take more profitable business. Italian shipping companies have certainly obtained their part of the advantages accruing to shipowners from the high scale of freights. The shares of the Navigazione Generale Rubattino, which stood at 358 lire in December 1914, rose to 516 lire in June 1916. Such a rise, in face of the general demand for capital for war loans, points to a very great increase in the profits earned by the company.

Just as the freight question was exploited by pro-Germans to create an anti-British feeling in Italy, so the coal question was utilised for the same purpose. Italy is dependent for the maintenance of many of her industries and of most of her

railway service upon imported coal. In the years before the war her importations of coal represented from 8 to 10 per cent. of her total imports. Most of the coal she buys comes from Great Britain, and the war has led to an enormous increase in the price. This is partly due to the increased price that British coal commands at the pit mouth, partly to high shipping freights, and partly to increased cost of handling at Italian ports and to increased cost of distribution in Italy. Doubtless also, in the various stages of ownership through which the coal passes from the pit mouth in South Wales to the furnace door in an Italian factory, the successive holders have exacted a higher rate of profit in view of the urgency of the demand and the difficulty of obtaining supplies. The Italians are not the only people who have suffered from this normal, and ultimately necessary, incident in the operations of commerce. But here again provision has recently been made by the British Government to enable Italy to obtain a supply of coal on specially favourable terms. The charge so industriously circulated by German agents that Great Britain is commercially exploiting her Allies is not only baseless but is the reverse of the truth.

The inconvenience which Italy has experienced through the rise in the freights and the rise in the price of coal has been further aggravated by the fall in the exchange value of the lira. Most of the causes which have produced the fall in Italian exchange have operated with greater or less intensity in all the belligerent countries. Every belligerent is consuming more and producing less exchangeable wealth than before the war; the most vigorous producers have become soldiers, while some of the best equipped factories have ceased to produce goods for exchange and are producing instead military supplies. To maintain these supplies it has been necessary for belligerents to import many commodities from the outer world to a greater extent than in time of peace. This is true not merely of special military requirements such as steel for making shells, nickel for covering rifle bullets, copper for telephone wires, india-rubber for motor tyres, leather for belts, and so on; it is also true of the materials required for the food and clothing of the soldiers. In all the armies now fighting—at any rate in all the armies of the Entente Powers—the average soldier obtains better clothing and better food than

he could command when he was a civilian. Before the war Italy was a large importer of wheat and wool. She has had to increase her purchases of these commodities and in addition to buy large quantities of frozen meat. But while thus compelled to increase her cash outgoings she has had to witness the reduction of her cash receipts. Two very important sources of income for the Italian nation have been cut off by the war, namely the payments made by foreign tourists visiting Italy, and the remittances sent home by Italian workmen temporarily employed in foreign countries—Germany, Switzerland, France, the United States and South America.

The result of all these commercial changes is that the number of people who want to convert lire into pounds sterling or into American dollars in order to effect purchases abroad has increased, while the number who wish to make the conversion the other way in order to settle payments in Italy has decreased. Consequently the relative value of the lira has declined. In other words, more lire are required than before the war to buy a gold sovereign or an American dollar, so that in addition to having to meet the rise in international prices Italy has had to face a heavy further financial burden owing to the fall in exchange. Here again, however, the Italian position is not essentially different from that of her Allies. The Italian lira has, it is true, fallen more than the French franc, and much more than the English sovereign, but it has fallen a good deal less than the Russian rouble.

In our own case it was possible for the Government, with the aid of the bankers of the City of London, to check the fall in exchange by mobilising the foreign securities held in the United Kingdom. For several generations Great Britain has been investing part of her spare capital in the development of enterprises of all kinds in the newer countries of the world. She has thus accumulated an immense reserve of capital, which she is now able to draw upon to meet the cost of all the materials she has to buy abroad for the needs of the war. The Treasury, by obtaining control of the paper representing this great investment—or, as the phrase goes, by mobilising our foreign securities—is able to manage the problem of payment abroad with greater advantage to this country than could be obtained if each individual holder were left to wait till he happened to be tempted to sell his foreign securities.

The Italian Government has no similar resource for regulating exchange, for Italy is a young country, still borrowing capital for her own development and with none or little invested abroad. Her only way of dealing with the situation was therefore to borrow abroad, and happily the British Government has been able to make the necessary arrangements on terms satisfactory to both governments. But while Italy is borrowing she is also preparing to pay. In this respect she occupies a stronger position than any other of the belligerents except Great Britain. It is true that Germany has imposed a certain amount of new taxation, but it is quite insufficient to meet the liabilities she is piling up, and probably does not even cover the loss of pre-war revenue. The other belligerents seem to be trusting entirely to loans. Italy, on the other hand, following confessedly the example of Great Britain, has imposed additional taxation *pari passu* with her borrowings. The anticipated new revenue will be sufficient to cover the interest upon considerably more money than has yet been borrowed and to provide an adequate sinking fund.

This very satisfactory condition of Italy's finance is reflected in the price of her government securities. At the end of July 1914 Italian 3½ per cent. Consolidated Stock stood at 93.20. The price fell more or less steadily to 82 in May 1915 on the eve of the Italian entry into the war. With slight fluctuations it rose to 83.95 on the 1st of June 1916. That is an excellent price for a 3½ per cent. stock at a time when all the world is borrowing money at high rates of interest. The Italian Government has already raised three internal war loans, and has in addition, like Great Britain, obtained a good deal of money by the issue of Treasury Bonds of various types, and by the issue of notes for currency. It is satisfactory to learn on the authority of the annual report of the Banca d'Italia that Italy has put less paper money into circulation than several of the other belligerents, in particular Germany and Austria.

Looked at as a whole, the industrial and financial position of Italy is extraordinarily favourable. The war, with all its cost and all the personal suffering involved, has brought prosperity to the country generally by stimulating new activities and perhaps also by freeing the nation from old commercial fetters. Before the war many Italians were growing conscious that their industrial development was too largely controlled by

German financiers. In no country had Germany's methods of peaceful penetration won such complete success. In all directions Germany, by helping to finance Italian undertakings, had obtained a control over their operations and was using that control very largely for the benefit of German interests. The process was progressive, for each extension of the operations of any of these German-controlled undertakings brought fresh firms within the range of German influence. There are Italians who assert that if the war had not come Italy in another ten years would have been tied hand and foot to German bankers, and her whole commercial and industrial policy would have been directed to advance German objects. This Germanisation of Italy was greatly aided by one of the most enterprising of German-controlled institutions—the Banca Commerciale. The power of this bank was said to extend in every direction, and not least in political directions. It still remains a very important institution, but all visible German control has been removed from it. That Italians should have been able to shake off, so completely as they appear to have done, the widely ramifying influences of German finance is one of the best proofs that could be desired of the healthiness of their patriotic spirit and the strength of their national will.

There are, however, many Italians who fear that after the war German influence may again creep back. The danger is not imaginary. Italy, it cannot be too often repeated, is still, from the point of view of industrial development, a new country. Germany is many years ahead, but yet not so far ahead as to have lost the pushing spirit that youth gives. If Germany ends this war with even half the resources still at her command with which she began it, she will certainly attempt to resume the industrial control which she had established over Italy. By themselves the Italians will find it difficult to resist. Already in the past they have sufficiently tested the pretended armour-plate of protectionist tariffs, and found it useless. The reason is very simple. Unless a country contains within her own borders all the elements essential to her own economic life she must import from outside. The protectionist ideal of complete self-dependence is only approachable in a great continent like the United States, with an enormous range of natural products, or in a little country whose inhabitants are content to preserve the simple life of our prehistoric parents.

The normal nation must import, and all that can be done by means of tariffs is to determine what things shall be imported and what made at home.

The policy of the Italian Government before the war, as of most protectionist governments, was to encourage the importation of primary materials and the home production of completed products. With this object in view a higher tariff was imposed on the finished article than on the materials that went to its construction. Leaving aside difficulties of detail which must arise in deciding where to draw the line, this tariff discrimination undoubtedly tended to encourage the establishment in Italy of what may be called the more advanced industries, but it did nothing to prevent German penetration. The German manufacturer adapted himself to the tariff, and with the aid of German banks procured the control of Italian factories engaged in assembling partly finished products imported from Germany.

That there was some gain to the Italians is indisputable, for probably these new developments would not have come into existence without the aid of German money and German technical skill. What the Italians objected to was the German control which accompanied the German enterprise. It may be argued that the two factors are inseparable, that the men who provide a large part of the brains and the money required for establishing a new industry must of necessity exercise some control over it. That is perfectly true. The real crux of the matter is that the Italians suspected, and with good reason, that German control was exercised, partly at any rate, for German political ends, to the political detriment of Italy. It is this characteristic of German operations which has made Italians dread German penetration. Behind the commercial traveller they see the political spy; behind the harmless dynamo they see the Krupp gun.

The question, then, which arises is whether the Italians can find elsewhere under safer conditions the financial and technical assistance which they used to obtain from Germany for the development of their industries, together with a sufficient supply of the materials which they wish to import. Naturally enough Italy looks to England, not merely because of our advanced industrial development, but also, we may fairly assume, because our motives are not suspect. There may be a few pro-

German Italians who go about whispering 'Take care that you 'do not merely substitute British for German domination'; but the average Italian is sufficiently well informed to know that England has her hands so full elsewhere that there is not the remotest chance of her wishing to acquire any kind of political control over Italy. Indeed it may happen that the magnitude of our commitments in other parts of the world will prove an obstacle even to that purely commercial co-operation with Italy which on general grounds all Englishmen would like to see established.

It is this consideration which justifies the special steps recently taken in both countries to promote Anglo-Italian trade. Largely on the initiative of an important Italian bank —the Credito Italiano—there was created a few months ago a British-Italian Corporation for the express purpose of encouraging trade between the British Empire and Italy and for facilitating the development of Italian industries with the aid of British capital. This corporation, with its headquarters in London, will have a counterpart in Italy, and the two concerns will pool their profits and losses. In order to induce English banks to interest themselves in this project at a time when the world is clamouring for capital for war purposes, the British Government has agreed to guarantee to the shareholders in the British half of the concern 5 per cent. on their paid-up capital for the first ten years, and this arrangement was publicly announced by the Chancellor of the Exchequer in August last.

It is well at once to say that the wisdom of this State subsidy to a new financial enterprise is doubtful. From the point of view of the British taxpayer it means the compulsory risking of his money in a scheme in which business men will, *ex hypothesi*, not risk their own money; from the point of view of the Italian people it implies that their country is in need of quasi-charitable assistance. The former consideration ought not to be ignored at a time when the British Government is borrowing at 6 per cent.; the latter is even more important from the effect it may have on Italian sentiment. Needless to say, no reflection upon Italy was intended by the British ministers responsible for this novel step. Their whole purpose was to secure the end in view—Anglo-Italian commercial co-operation—by what appeared to be the speediest method.

But it often happens that supposed short-cuts lead a long way round, and there is considerable danger that those Italian interests which are jealous of the new institution may be inclined to discredit it by proclaiming its financial dependence upon the British Government. We may at any rate be certain that the pro-Germans in Italy will say that unless the British Government were aiming at some political advantage it would not pay such a price as a possible £50,000 a year for ten years.

To such a charge there is, of course, a fully adequate answer. If it were true that Great Britain aspired to establish for her own benefit political control over Italy, it would certainly be worth her while to risk considerably more than half a million pounds in ten years upon such an important enterprise. The best proof that she has no such design is her realisation of the results of the policy of domination in the case of Germany. The bitterness which the Italians feel towards Germany is no doubt partly due to their moral indignation at such outrages upon civilisation as the destruction of Louvain and the sinking of the ' Lusitania ' ; but in addition they realise how narrowly they have escaped from the complete financial, industrial, and political domination which Germany designed to impose upon them. They now look upon German enterprise as synonymous with German domination, and to the vast majority of Italians everything German has become suspect and odious.

We do not wish to build up a similar edifice of Italian distrust, to be ultimately converted into Italian hatred. Our only political purpose in the matter is purely negative ; we wish to prevent our friend being brought under the control of our enemy. What we are seeking is the destruction of Germany's position of power ; we have not the slightest desire to establish a corresponding position for ourselves. That being the case it would probably have been better if the British Government had stood aloof, preferring to wait, even at some risk, for the commercial men to move, rather than incur the greater risks of creating a false impression, and thus giving excuse for the display of hostility where we are only seeking friendship.

In any case it is certain that no government subsidy will effect the purpose in view unless the mental atmosphere as

well as the material conditions are favourable. In the main both are favourable. British industries have proved during the war their adaptability and power of expansion. After the war it will be the primary business of our manufacturers to seek new markets in order to provide employment for our returning soldiers and our discharged munition workers. Italian industries will be in much the same condition, and though to a certain extent our industries compete with theirs, in other respects they supplement one another. It is indeed a mistake to imagine that under modern conditions any country can confine itself to a particular group of industries, or that it can establish a monopoly even in the industries in which it is most successful. In practice, despite both tariffs and freights, different countries interchange with one another articles of almost identical type. Thus Italy is both a buyer and a seller of motor-cars, and so is Great Britain. Again, Italy buys certain classes of machinery from us and sells other classes of machinery to us. The question of sale or purchase depends either on special fitness for a particular purpose or on price quotations at a particular moment. Anyone who has visited, as the present writer has had the pleasure of doing, some of the admirably designed and splendidly equipped manufacturing establishments of Northern Italy, will realise that while the Italians may need to buy much from us they are able to produce in exchange many things that we shall gladly buy from them. Provided the business men on both sides are sufficiently alert, they ought to be able to establish business relations between Great Britain and Italy so close and so active as to leave little room for German penetration.

This consideration fairly well covers the industrial districts of Northern Italy. The problem of the agricultural south is more difficult. Before the war there was a considerable trade between Southern Italy and Northern Germany in early fruit and vegetables. The trade was facilitated by through railway rates, and what is even more important, by through railway wagons, so that the goods could be loaded up at a roadside station in the south of Italy and unloaded in Berlin. The same wagons brought a return load of German manufactures. Measured in money, this vegetable trade was not very important in comparison to Italy's total trade. But it had a very great political importance, because the Southern Italian has a special

flair for politics, and is in consequence able to exercise a disproportionate influence over the Chamber of Deputies and the Italian Cabinet. During the war the South Italian farmer has been kept busy and happy by supplying fruit and vegetables to the Italian soldier on the Isonzo or in the Alps. But the question of what may happen to the Southern Italian farmer after the war causes considerable anxiety in political circles. The excellent market which he previously enjoyed in the industrial centres of Germany may be closed to him through either of two causes. If Germany is very badly beaten her industrial population will probably not be in a position for many years to come to indulge in the luxury of early Italian cabbages. On the other hand, if she ends the war in a position still to assert herself, she may refuse to admit Italian farm produce except in return for concessions in the Italian tariff on German-manufactured goods. This, indeed, did happen before the war. Germany used the known desire of Italian politicians to help the south as a means to extort a favourable tariff on goods which she wished to force into Italy. Thus in either event there is trouble ahead.

To meet the difficulty a strong effort is being made to encourage a direct trade between Southern Italy and London. With the assistance of the French Government a through railway service and through railway rates have been provisionally arranged, and during the present month some experimental consignments have been made. The scheme is deserving of all sympathy, but perhaps it would be wise not to expect too much from it. London has many sources of supply from which to draw agricultural produce of all kinds, and most of these are a good deal nearer than Southern Italy.

Looking ahead a little farther, it seems more than probable that in a few years' time the Italian agriculturist will find the best market for most of his produce in his own country. Hitherto, as stated above, Italy has been predominantly an agricultural country, but her industrialisation is proceeding rapidly, and the pace will probably be even increased after the war. Till recent years the main obstacle to Italy's industrial expansion was the lack of coal, but that obstacle is on the way to be completely overcome by the use of hydro-electric power—*la houille blanche, il carbone bianco,* as the French and Italians expressively describe it. The utilisation of Italy's immense

resources in water-power for the generation of electricity began between twenty and thirty years ago. One of the earliest installations was for the transmission of part of the power of the falls of Tivoli to Rome, a distance of some twenty-seven kilometres. This was completed about the year 1890. Approximately at the same period an important installation was completed for carrying electric energy a slightly longer distance, from the falls of Paderno to Milan. The present writer recollects visiting in the year 1893 a number of small workshops in Milan which had recently been supplied with electric energy conveyed from Paderno.

Since those days progress throughout Italy has been continuous, both on the material and on the technical side. Great lakes have been formed in hilly regions to provide a constant head of water; level channels have been cut along the mountain-side, or tunnels driven through the rock, to convey the water to the point where the turbines can be most conveniently placed so as to get the maximum yield of the water power. Inconspicuous wires transmit the energy either to a distant city on the plains, or perhaps to a factory established in a neighbouring valley, and drawing for its labour supply upon the families of the peasant farmers. It is pleasant to note that the artificial lakes, which are rapidly becoming numerous, so far from disfiguring the country, add not a little to the natural beauties. An Englishman cannot help looking with somewhat envious eyes on such a beautiful source of power, contrasting the blue water and the wooded mountain slopes with the ugly winding gear and the uglier dumps of refuse that are the distinguishing marks of an English colliery district.

Equally does he find himself envying the Italians the clear atmosphere their towns are able to enjoy through the use of 'white coal' in place of black. Almost everywhere hydro-electric energy is now taking the place of steam as the source of motive power in Italian factories and workshops; but there are still immense possibilities of further development. In particular, electricity does not appear to have been yet employed to any great extent for foundry or forging work. Electric furnaces are employed by a large steel foundry in Milan, but in some of the most modern Italian engineering works the forges are still fed with coal or coke, or in some cases oil, while the machinery is driven entirely by hydro-electric power. Again,

the Italian railways have up to the present only been electrified to a very small extent, doubtless through lack of available capital. From the passenger's point of view the case for the electrification of Italian railways is peculiarly strong, for the coal burnt on the Italian lines is of a very unpleasant quality, and the frequency of tunnels on many of the main routes of traffic aggravates the discomfort caused to the traveller. Half a century ago English capital was largely employed in building and equipping Italian railways; there is certainly an opening for the employment of a good many more millions of pounds sterling for the electrification of the existing lines, apart altogether from the construction of new ones. In many other directions there are immense possibilities for the further employment of hydro-electric energy, and a great deal of attention is being directed in Italy to the problems that have to be solved. These problems are not only technical and financial; they are also legislative. On the technical side developments are being discussed which to the non-technical student are almost bewildering in their audacity. For example, in the excellent selection of pamphlets on 'Il problema idraulico' published by the Gruppo nazionale di azione economica, one writer sketches out a scheme for the creation of a single trunk line or network of lines for the conveyance of electric power to all parts of the country:

'The moment is not distant when a great part of Italy will be covered with a single network receiving its hydraulic power from various points. When that moment arrives we shall no longer know whence the energy comes which we draw from any particular point on the line; we shall not know whether the force which is moving a tramcar in Milan or lighting a street in Rome comes from a torrent pouring down some gorge, perhaps in the Apennines, perhaps in the Alps, or comes from the rainfall over a wide basin collected into an artificial lake. . . . When a great part of Italy is covered by one single network, even the power generated by intermittent hydraulic forces will be able to be fully utilised. For the minimum power available at any moment will be the minimum of the aggregate power of all the various streams at that moment; and this is obviously greater than the sum of the separate minima of each. On that day Italy will be seen to be much richer in hydraulic power than she has yet appeared to be.'

As regards the legislative problems involved, it is sufficient to point out that the development of large areas of water-power

necessarily creates occasions for conflict with existing private and public interests. The conversion of a mountain valley into an artificial lake submerges farms and houses and roads, and may sweep out of existence a number of little mills that for centuries have used the direct power of a mountain stream. In addition there is a possible conflict of interest in some places between agriculturists, who want water for irrigation, and the industrials, who want it for motive power. At the same time as hydro-electric concerns are consolidated for the sake of securing a fuller utilisation of the available powers there is created the danger of an irresponsible trust. These are some of the problems which Italians are now considering, and they are discussed with admirable lucidity from various points of view in the collected volume of pamphlets above referred to.

As Italy develops her water-power so may she hope to become less dependent upon imported coal. It is true that hitherto this has not happened; for the imports of coal and coke have increased rapidly during the present century. They rose from 4,839,000 tons in 1901 to 10,057,000 in 1912. The explanation is that the industrial development of the country has been even more rapid than the development of hydro-electric power, and it may be that for some years to come a similar relative progress will continue. But Italy's utilisation of her water-power is still only in its infancy, and it is not unreasonable to anticipate that the time will soon arrive when the growth in the supply of hydro-electric energy will overtake the growth in the demand for motive power. Specially can Italy count on this satisfactory development of her economic position if, as the result of the present war, she acquires large new areas of Alpine country capable of yielding an enormous new supply of hydro-electric energy. The importance of the issues involved can hardly be exaggerated. Just as coal is the principal key of England's industrial strength, so Italy may find in her mountain streams a sufficient source of power to sustain a great manufacturing industry, which in turn will make a home market for the produce of her fields.

The question of what territory Italy may acquire as a result of the war is one which naturally occupies the minds of many Italians at the present time. Already Italy has won by the sword an appreciable fraction of the territory which her

'Irredentists' have so long desired. She has won the pleasant valley of Cortina d'Ampezzo, and though the valley is still dominated from one or two points by Austrian guns the Italian troops are steadily clearing the surrounding summits and consolidating their conquest. Those who have known Cortina in days of peace will warmly congratulate Italy on the acquisition of this delightful holiday resort. In the southern Trentino the Italians have made a more extensive advance geographically, and have won their way far towards the summits of the hills from which the Austrians used to look down upon the plain of Lombardy.

Even more important is the conquest achieved along the banks of the Isonzo. Gorizia is an ancient city that has lived to enjoy modern prosperity. It possesses a castle that was in existence in the year 1001; its streets contain modern, well-built houses, reminiscent of Vienna; it had in 1910 a population of 31,000 inhabitants. The surrounding administrative division, part of which is still in Austrian hands, has a further population of 74,000; the neighbouring divisions of Gradisca and Monfalcone have respectively populations of 34,000 and 53,000.* Monfalcone has in recent years been developed by the Austrians as a port and has considerable local industries. Even if the Italians advanced no further they would have secured in territory and in the improvement of their defensive position an appreciable compensation for the cost of the war.

But no friend of Italy would be content if her gains were to be limited to what she has already conquered. Two issues are involved—the question of including within the Italian kingdom all those who regard Italy as their motherland, and the question of obtaining a better strategic frontier. It will be convenient to deal with the latter point first.

The northern boundary of Italy before the war seems to have been expressly designed by the Austrians for the purpose of keeping the Italians in military subjection. The great wedge of Austrian territory that ran southwards to the Lake of Garda was in effect an Austrian stronghold, threatening what may almost be described as the heart of Italy. By far

* These figures are taken from Dal Brennero alle Alpi Dinariche, pp. 101, 102.

the most important part of the agricultural and industrial wealth of Italy is to be found in the great plain that stretches from Turin to Venice, and this plain from a strategical point of view was dominated in the centre by the Austrian wedge of the Trentino and on the north-east by the Austrian possession of the commanding positions along the Isonzo. From the southern slopes of these mountainous outposts the Austrians could pour down into Italy within easy striking distance of such precious Italian possessions as Vicenza, Padua, Verona, Venice, Brescia, Mantua, Cremona, Milan. It is essential for the future security of Italy that she should obtain as a result of the present war a northern and north-eastern frontier that will relieve her from the strategic disadvantages she has so long endured, and create an effective physical barrier against Teutonic aggression.

The natural division between north and south is the line of summits that runs roughly east and west through the middle of the Austrian Tyrol and along the northern boundary of the Austrian province of Carinthia. Starting from the eastern frontier of Switzerland, this natural boundary includes the Weisskugel, the Brenner, the Tre Signori, and the Gross Glockner, and thence runs due east as far as the Katschberg pass. In maps published by the Irredentists and sold at popular prices in Italy the western portion of this line up to the Tre Signori is indicated as the future frontier of Italy. At that point the proposed frontier abandons the main line of summits and drops south to Toblach, a place familiar to many tourists as the station for Cortina d'Ampezzo. Thence onwards the Irredentists propose to follow the existing Italian frontier along the tops of the Carnic Alps till they reach the neighbourhood of Pontebba, and then to extend boldly eastwards so as to bring within the Italian kingdom the whole of the Isonzo region and the whole of Istria, together with the district of Fiume.

So far as this proposed frontier affects the Trentino and the Austrian province of the Tyrol, the Irredentist claim is likely to receive hearty support from all the Allies of Italy. It is imperative that Italy should recover the Trentino, and it is difficult to see where her northern boundary could be drawn better than at the Brenner pass.

A similar consideration applies to the western half of the

Austrian province of Carinthia that lies just north of the present Italian frontier. The Irredentists do not include this territory in their programme, but it is open to question whether, for the sake of her future security, Italy ought not to advance her frontier from the Carnic Alps up to the higher range that forms the northern boundary of western Carinthia. She would thus obtain a great wall of defence against any risk of invasion from the north.

That this line will bring many Austrians within the Italian kingdom is admitted, but the Italians claim with justice that they are able by their policy of tolerance to reconcile foreigners to their rule. There are already in other parts of Italy certain small districts inhabited by peoples of foreign origin who retain their language and their customs, but are quite content with their Italian citizenship because no attempt is made to force them into an Italian mould. In this respect Italians claim that their national policy differs fundamentally from that of the German Empire. Therefore it is legitimate to hope that Italy would be able to reconcile to her rule any German-speaking Austrians brought within the Italian kingdom for the sake of securing a better strategical frontier. In any case the constitution and character of the Austrian Empire will be completely changed after the war. The most probable development is the separation of the non-German portions of the Empire from the control of Vienna, and the subjection of Vienna and of all the German portions of the Austrian Empire to the control of Berlin. In that event the only alternative before the Tyrolese would be between government by Prussia and government by Italy, and it is by no means certain that they would not, in spite of their German speech, prefer the latter. It may be assumed that the Italians would be willing and even anxious to concede the widest possible measure of local self-government, so that these German-speaking mountaineers, in their domestic concerns, would be entirely free from Italian interference. In effect there would be created an administratively independent mountain State, placed for strategical reasons under the suzerainty of Italy.

Unfortunately, Italy has no equally well-marked natural frontier on the east, and infinite argument is possible as to what should be the eastern boundary between Italy and the

Austro-Hungarian Empire or any new States that may be carved out of it. In examining the proposals put forward by the Irredentist party one has to remember that the strength of that party lies, not in the German-speaking region to the north of the present frontiers of Italy, but in the partly Slavonic regions to the east, namely Istria, Fiume, and Dalmazia. It is primarily from Italians having family or business connexions with these regions that the Irredentist movement springs. They call insistently, passionately, to the Italian motherland to win these countries back to Italy. To understand the strength of this appeal it is necessary for Englishmen to try to place themselves mentally in the position of Italians who have lived, or whose fathers have lived, in the coast towns of the northern and eastern Adriatic from Trieste to Cattaro. Most of these towns were for a long time under the rule of the Venetian Republic ; their commercial life was in the hands of Italians ; they were the outposts of Italian civilisation in regions where other civilisation was almost unknown. When the Venetian power came to an end these Italian settlements still retained their predominantly Italian characteristics, still preserved their Italian speech, still looked to Italy as their motherland.

These facts alone would suffice to create among the Italians of the eastern Adriatic a passionate desire for reunion with Italy. But a further fact has of late years enormously intensified that passion. When the Austrians were driven out of Lombardy and Venice half a century ago, they realised that in order to combat the growth of Italianism they must call into being a rival force. With this object in view the Austrian Government deliberately encouraged hostility between the Italians and the Slavs. In countless little ways the Italian subjects of the Dual Empire were oppressed while favours were accorded to the Croats and the Dalmatian Slavs. For example, if a man of Italian descent wished to obtain service under the Austrian Government he probably would find it convenient to deny his Italian origin and to pretend to be a Slav. It was an ingeniously worked-out policy of *Divide et impera*, and up to a point it has certainly succeeded. By the evidence both of the Italian Irredentists and of their rivals the Yugo-Slavs the bitterness between the two races is intense.

It is therefore entirely natural that the Italians of the eastern Adriatic should desire before all other things the annexation of this debatable region to Italy, so that their long oppression may come to an end and they may be able once more to enjoy the privileges—or at least the liberties—that belong to a ruling race.

How far Italy will be justified in committing herself to the full Irredentist programme is a very delicate question. The most definite Irredentist proposal is that Italy should take the whole of Istria, including of course Trieste and Pola, and that she should also take the important harbour of Fiume, and all the islands that occupy the patch of sea known as the Quarnero at the north-east corner of the Adriatic. East of Fiume it is proposed to concede a strip of coast to Croatia, running down as far south as the beginning of Dalmazia in the neighbourhood of Obrovazzo. This strip of coast has at present no harbours worth speaking of, but the Irredentists say that there are several places which could be developed into good harbours. The whole coast would be commanded in a military sense by the Italian possession of all or nearly all the islands. Further south the Irredentist proposal is that the Italians should take the whole province of Dalmazia, down to the river Narenta, and should also take the islands opposite to the Dalmazian coast. South of Narenta most of the Irredentists recognise that Herzegovina and Montenegro must have an adequate outlet to the sea, and propose, with intelligible regret, to abandon to their Slavonic rivals places with such long Italian memories as Ragusa and Cattaro, while Italy would acquire Zara, Sebenico, and Spalato.

The Irredentist claim to Dalmazia and the islands of the eastern Adriatic is supported by an important strategic argument. It is pointed out that Italy has very few harbours on the western coast of the Adriatic, while on the eastern coast of that sea there are many. Consequently a naval Power in possession of the eastern coast and the adjacent islands would be able to dominate the whole sea. This argument would have overwhelming force if anything like the existing conditions were to continue. If after the war a powerful Austria backed by Germany still remained in possession of such places of natural strength as Pola and Cattaro, together with the islands

that give such excellent shelter to submarines and furnish a starting-point for drifting mines, the Italians might well say that the war had been fought almost in vain. But Italy may feel confident that her Allies will not end the war until the power of Austria is broken, until Pola as well as Trieste is in Italian hands, and until Italy has such further material guarantees as may be necessary to assure her supremacy in the Adriatic.

So far as it is possible to forecast future conditions in this region of Europe, the war will end with the establishment of a new Serbo-Croatian State, or group of States, comprising within its limits the whole of the southern Slavonic territory which is now governed from Vienna or from Budapest. The population of this Yugo-Slav State, even assuming it to include, for the sake of argument, Serbia and Montenegro, Bosnia and Herzegovina, and the whole of Dalmazia and Croatia, would only be, according to the estimates of the Yugo-Slavs, about 12,000,000. The present population of Italy is very little under 36,000,000; her future population will certainly be well over that figure. It is inconceivable that such an Italy, with well-established industries and a highly efficient army and navy, would have any reason to dread the naval power of a newly-created Yugo-Slavia.

On the other hand, if Italy advances her frontier too far to the east she runs the risk of creating on her eastern flank a relentless enemy. The danger is a very serious one. The ultimate purpose of the present war is to relieve Europe from the threat of German domination. Italy suffered from that domination more than almost any other country. Owing to the weakness of her northern frontier, she was compelled to accept the alliance of Austria and Germany as an alternative to disastrous war. But her two partners barely disguised their contempt for her, and did their best to thwart any effort she made for independent expansion. The Tripoli War was forced upon her because Germany was secretly planning to forestall Italian ambitions in Africa. If the present war had not broken out Italy would have become more and more the dependent, politically as well as commercially, of the Central Powers.

It needed much courage on her part to defy this over-

shadowing power ; it will need wisdom in at least equal measure to avoid the dangers that lie ahead. However badly Germany may be beaten, she will not be wiped out of existence by the war, nor will her racial ambitions be destroyed. She will seek for opportunities of dividing her previous foes ; she will look round for new friends. Already Vienna has proved that it is possible to set Slavs and Italians against one another ; Italy can hardly wish to see that operation repeated on a larger scale under the direction of Berlin. Yet it is as certain as anything can be in the grouping of national forces that if the Yugo-Slavs are denied reasonable outlets to the Adriatic, and if territory which they regard as essentially Slav is annexed by Italy, they will turn their eyes northwards and look to Vienna and Berlin for help. On the other hand, if a fair compromise is reached between Italian and Serbo-Croatian claims, which must at certain points conflict, there will be hope of permanent friendship between the newer and the older State.

Wherever Italy's new eastern frontier be drawn, it is certain that some racial heartburnings must be created. Gorizia, which the Italians have already conquered, and rightly intend to keep, has a considerable Croat population. All the other towns in this region contain many Croats, and in the country districts the Croatian element is stronger still. The same is true of the town of Trieste and of the Istrian peninsula. The actual figures are much disputed. The Irredentists assert that the Austrian Government has deliberately falsified census figures in order to diminish the apparent importance of the Italian element in the population ; they do not, however, deny the existence of a very considerable Croatian element. The Yugo-Slavs, on the other hand, claim that they are in the majority not only on the eastern bank but also on the western bank of the Isonzo, and they would like to annex to the new Yugo-Slavia an appreciable strip of what has been Italian territory for half a century. This is an impossible demand, and it is equally impossible for Italy to be content with her present eastern frontier. In order to secure her north-eastern frontier and her position in the Adriatic she is entitled to claim Tolmino, Gorizia, Monfalcone, Trieste and Pola, and the hills that command these cities. This implies the annexation

of practically the whole of the long narrow Austrian province which stretches from the neighbourhood of Villach to the extremity of the Istrian peninsula. It is to be hoped, however, that no large body of Italian opinion will endorse the Irredentist claim to Fiume. The fact that part of the population of Fiume is Italian is not a sufficient justification for depriving the Croatians of the only existing harbour that gives access to their territory. The Italians can have no possible commercial use for Fiume, for it lies beyond all the territory they hope to acquire. Both sides should be satisfied if Italy takes Trieste and Croatia takes Fiume.

As regards the coast line furthur south the present writer does not feel competent to express any definite opinion, but it is worth while to point out that there are certain general considerations which the Irredentists seem to have overlooked in their natural eagerness to unite all Italianised territory with the Italian motherland. The main consideration is this, that it is worth while for Italy to sacrifice some territorial ambitions for the sake of winning Serbo-Croatian friendship. That friendship is important to her not merely on political but on commercial grounds. One of the hopes of Italian business men is to develop a large Italian commerce in the Balkan States. There is no physical or industrial obstacle to the realisation of that hope, but the paths of commerce will certainly be blocked unless Italy can remove the marked political hostility that now exists between Italians and Serbo-Croats.

Italy's position in relation to the Yugo-Slavs is in fact the very reverse of her position in relation to Germany. From the Germans she has nothing to hope. Whatever concessions she might make to Teutonic sentiment would only be used as a starting-point for fresh Teutonic aggression. Her clear interest therefore lies in drawing between herself and Germany —or German-controlled Austria—the best attainable strategic frontier, even if she has to annex a considerable German-speaking population. Provided this population is not so large as to be a political danger to Italy, its absorption within the Italian kingdom will be a gain to Italy by depriving Germany of potential soldiers. Incidentally, the annexation of the southern Tyrol and western Carinthia will give Italy, as

indicated earlier in this article, the command of a region rich in water-power, and will thus greatly enlarge her possibilities of industrial expansion. On the other hand, Italy has nothing to fear in a military or naval sense from the new Serbo-Croatian State ; she has everything to hope for in a commercial sense. The new State is almost as young industrially as it will be politically. It will have nearly everything to learn, and Italy will have the most favourable chance of acting as industrial tutor. Provided that a real bond of political sympathy can be created between Italy and the new State, the Italians may confidently count on extending their commercial, linguistic, and literary influence throughout the Balkans from Cattaro to Bukarest.

EDITOR.

Erratum

Through a proof-reader's error it was made to appear in the last issue of the EDINBURGH REVIEW that Mr. Basil Worsfold in his book, ' The Empire on the Anvil,' had rejected the idea of an Empire tariff. This is inaccurate, as Mr. Worsfold's proposals provide the Central Government with the fiscal and other powers necessary to direct the organisation and development of the *common* resources of the Empire.

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